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The United Nations record of imposing sanctions in response to nuclear 
proliferators, (civil) wars, terrorist organizations, and coups d’état reflects a 
regime of selective security. Some offences have been met with sanctions 
under Article 41 of the UN Charter, while many similar cases were left off the 
hook or blocked. What is the logic behind this selectivity? Is it power politics? 
Humanitarianism? Democracy? Or something else? 
 
This dissertation is a scientific attempt to answer this question. It considers a 
total of 191 ‘sanctionable offences’ in five categories (nuclear proliferation, 
interstate war, civil war, terrorism, and coup d’état), sixty of which (31%) 
received UN sanctions. Subsequently, each offence is tested on a wide range 
of variables, which serve as proxies for seven hypotheses.  
 
The conclusion is that different types of offences can be explained through 
different hypotheses. While nuclear proliferation and interstate wars follow a 
straightforward logic of neorealist power politics, the UN’s sanctioning record 
in response to civil war reveals a logic that is much more informed by 
humanitarian concerns and concerns about state failure and its consequences. 
This is not to say that the geopolitical weight of those involved is irrelevant (it 
isn’t), but rather that it is an exception. Public pressure through media attention 
in the West can magnify these concerns in civil wars.  
 
The sanctions records in response to terrorism and coups d’état follow yet 
other patterns of selectivity. Sanctions on terrorist groups exclusively focus on 
Islamic extremism, disregarding many non-Islamic groups responsible for 
thousands of innocent deaths. Finally, UN sanctions after coups d’état are 
used as a sort of ‘democracy wild-card’ for the West, which they can play 
whenever convenient, but which lacks any form of coherency. This is a shame, 
because it is difficult to convince members to follow you if you don’t always 












El historial de las Naciones Unidas de imponer sanciones en respuesta a 
proliferadores nucleares, guerras (civiles), organizaciones terroristas y golpes 
de Estado refleja un régimen de seguridad selectiva. Algunos delitos se han 
visto sancionados con arreglo al artículo 41 de la Carta de las Naciones 
Unidas, mientras que muchos casos similares quedaron no sancionados 
¿Cuál es la lógica detrás de esta selectividad? ¿Es política de poder? 
¿Humanitarismo? ¿Democracia? ¿O algo más? 
 
Esta tesis es un intento científico de responder a esta pregunta. Considera un 
total de 191 "delitos sancionables" en cinco categorías (proliferación nuclear, 
guerra interestatal, guerra civil, terrorismo y golpe de Estado), sesenta (31%) 
recibió sanciones de la ONU. Posteriormente, cada infracción se prueba en 
una amplia gama de variables, que sirven como proxies para siete hipótesis. 
 
La conclusión es que diferentes tipos de delitos pueden explicarse a través de 
diferentes hipótesis. Si bien la proliferación nuclear y las guerras interestatales 
siguen una lógica directa de la política de poder neorrealista, el historial 
sancionador de las Naciones Unidas en respuesta a la guerra civil revela una 
lógica que está mucho más informada por las preocupaciones y 
preocupaciones humanitarias sobre el fracaso del Estado y sus 
consecuencias. Esto no quiere decir que el peso geopolítico de los 
involucrados sea irrelevante (no lo es), sino que es una excepción. La presión 
pública a través de la atención de los medios de comunicación en Occidente 
puede magnificar estas preocupaciones en las guerras civiles. 
 
Los registros de sanciones en respuesta al terrorismo y los golpes de Estado 
siguen otros patrones de selectividad. Las sanciones a los grupos terroristas 
se centran exclusivamente en el extremismo islámico, sin tener en cuenta a 
muchos grupos no islámicos responsables de miles de muertes inocentes. Por 
último, las sanciones de la ONU después de los golpes de Estado se utilizan 
como una especie de "comodín democrático" para Occidente, que pueden 
jugar cuando sea conveniente, pero que carece de cualquier forma de 
coherencia. Esto es una pena, porque es difícil convencer a los miembros de 
que te sigan si no siempre practicas lo que predicas.


























Introduction: UN Sanctions and Selective Security 
 
When the League of Nations was established it was thought that sanctions would 
be the best new tool to deal with aggressors in International Relations. However, 
the League’s track record between 1919 and 1939 showed that, at the end of the 
day, sanctions episodes were a simple reflection of geopolitical interests. They 
could be imposed when none of the major powers had any clear objections, but 
they were useless when important states violated international norms. As Benito 
Mussolini famously put it: ‘The League is very well when sparrows shout, but no 
good at all when eagles fall out’.1 
In the aftermath of 1945 a more realistic institutional setup was created with the 
United Nations. The design of the UN Security Council (UNSC) made sure that the 
rules-based system would work better, while at the same time protecting the vital 
interests of the five permanent members, China, France, the Soviet Union (USSR), 
the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US), by giving them the right to 
veto Resolutions. During four and a half decades, however, sanctions never came 
off the ground because they were almost constantly blocked by either the US or 
the USSR. The only two cases in which they did actually occur had nothing to do 
with wars of aggression, but rather with Apartheid regimes in Southern Rhodesia 
and South Africa. Again, the track-record of UN sanctions pointed towards 
(neo)realism, not idealism or liberal institutionalism. Whatever the words in the UN 
Charter said about human rights and the obligations arising from treaties and other 
sources of international law, and no matter how many breaches of the peace and 
acts of aggression occurred during the Cold War, sanctions were scarce.  
The 1990s marked two important shifts. Firstly the end of the Cold War and the 
west’s hegemony allowed for many more resolutions to pass through the Security 
Council. Secondly, and simultaneously, there was also a pronounced regime shift 
with respect to the norms and ideas that dominated the thinking about the role of 
the UN generally, and UN Sanctions specifically. The procedures stayed the same, 
but the idea about ‘what sanctions are for’ changed. Ideas about the threats posed 
by ‘new wars’, humanitarian crises, and ‘failed states’ changed the normative 
thinking about when the UN should use sanctions. Suddenly, not only aggressor 
states in international conflicts could be sanctioned, but also state- and non-state 
actors in civil wars, terrorist groups and governments who harbor them, and 
stagers or coups d’état. The era of absolute and unconditional sovereignty had 
come to an end. Between 1990 and 2018, the UNSC imposed sanctions under 
                                            
1 While this is one of the most frequently used quotes about Mussolini and the failure of the League 
of Nations, none of the many texts I consulted refer to an original source about when and where he 






Chapter VII in response to two nuclear proliferators, two interstate wars, twenty 
civil wars, twenty six terrorist organizations, three governments that harbor 
terrorists, and three coups d’état. It was a big win for those in favor of global 
governance and liberal institutionalism.  
But how impressive is this track record really? Are we looking at a win for 
institutionalism and a rules-based system? Or are we rather looking at a system in 
which some cases are ‘securitized’ through a logic of cherry-picking, while others 
are not? And if so, who gets to pick the cherries? The answer is that while the 
changing norms surrounding UN sanctions find their basis in liberal institutionalism 
and ideational liberalism, the rules that surround voting in the UNSC have not 
changed since 1945, resulting in a track-record that remains selective.  
The evolution of norms and rules regarding UN sanctions might have brought 
sanctions regimes closer to an ideal of liberal peace, but there are too many 
exceptions of bloody conflicts left unsanctioned, coup-stagers unpunished, and 
terrorist organizations reigning free to fully fulfill this promise. Simultaneously, 
some of the groups and individuals that have been sanctioned can in reality hardly 
be considered a ‘threat to the peace’.  
The selective nature of UN sanctions has two main explanations. Firstly, some 
sanctionable offences are blocked by power-politics. These failures to impose 
sanctions can be explained through geo-political, realist interests rather than 
through idealist ones. One must accept the reality that nuclear powers such as 
Israel, regional hegemons like India, and close allies of the five permanent 
members of the UNSC can get away with certain things. The second type of 
selectivity concerns the cases that remain after power-politics is filtered out, and 
in which liberal ideas about human security and democratic governance can be 
applied freely. This is where the West has the chance to demonstrate their 
commitment to the norms they claim to uphold universally, and that they have tried 
to institutionalize at the United Nations. This is where the credibility of the United 
States and the European Union is at stake. A consistent sanctioning-record 
enhances their credibility. An incoherent one means they risk being labelled as 
negligent, hypocritical, or neo-imperialist.  
This dissertation will show that both explanations exist. It will explain why strong 
states are hardly ever targeted by sanctions, why states that suffer from civil 
conflict don’t receive sanctions until the state truly falls apart, why sanctions are 
almost always aimed at non-state armed groups, but almost never against 
governments, why sanctions on terrorism focus exclusively on Islamic groups, and 
why coups d’état are only sanctioned when Western interests are at stake. The 
results show that there is not one single answer to what the selectivity of UN 
sanctions is based on; the UN’s sanctions record in response to nuclear 
proliferation and interstate war is clearly realist; the in response to civil war is more 






liberal and humanitarian, while the ones on terrorism and coups d’état are rather 
neo-colonial, or outright racist. While in some cases policy makers should focus on 
diplomacy to overcome geopolitical obstacles, in other cases Western 
governments should rather look in the mirror. That is the only way to create a truly 
credible and coherent sanctions regime.  
 
Why read this thesis? 
 
This dissertation touches upon a question that many academics, students, and 
other commentators have debated explicitly or indirectly, but that has not been 
answered comprehensively: What are UN sanctions for?  
The research presented in this thesis adds to the literature about international 
sanctions, as well as to the literature about the role of international institutions, 
most notably the United Nations. In the academic realm of international sanctions, 
this thesis goes beyond the question of sanctions’ effectiveness, and looks into the 
question of what sanctions are for in the first place; a question that many have 
‘skipped’ and that few have bothered to ask. In the academic realm of the United 
Nations there is a sizeable amount of research that considers the role of the UN 
Security Council, the evolution of the UN as a peace keeper, the importance of the 
Veto of the P-5 members, and the successes and failures of UN sanctions regimes. 
However, when it comes to sanctions regimes, research again focuses on 
questions of effectiveness. Research that does ask deeper questions about the 
reasons behind UN action tend to focus on the Security Council’s role in 
peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions, not as a sanctioning 
party. By studying the track record of UN sanctions since 1990 we learn about the 
true motivations behind UN sanctions regimes, as well as the nature of the UN as 
an institution in general.  
 
Research on sanctions does not provide a satisfactory answer 
 
Academic research on sanctions tends to deal with questions of effectiveness, 
impact, and efficiency. Already at the establishment of the League of Nations in 
1920 Woodrow Wilson was convinced that: 
 
“A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, 






remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted but it brings a pressure 
upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist”2 
 
Wilson was quickly proven wrong when the League began to fall apart in the years 
leading up to World War II, but the search for effective sanctions continued. In 
1967, when Johann Galtung studied the impact of the United Nations first 
sanctions regime on the white-minority regime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia, 
he listed the ideal theoretical conditions for an economic boycott.3 The boycotted 
country was most likely to concede to the senders’ demands if they suffered 
disproportionally from the discontinuation of trade,4 and if the sanctions were easy 
to supervise and control.5 One commentator noted that with regard to the Rhodesia 
sanctions, the British predicted that the Rhodesian regime would fall ’in a matter of 
weeks’.6 It took fourteen years for Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front party to be replaced 
by Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party, and not because of the sanctions. Indeed, 
Galtung labelled the research on sanctions as tools of coercion as the ‘naïve theory 
of sanctions’.7 
In the 1970s and 1980s Margaret Doxey and David Baldwin further developed 
explanatory frameworks for the success and failure of international sanctions as 
policy instruments. Both made an important distinction between sanctions as 
moral/legal tools on the one hand, and sanctions as tools of economic statecraft 
on the other.8 For example, Doxey recognized that the founders of international 
(and regional) organizations borrowed the idea of imposing penalties in response 
to non-conformity with law from the domestic sphere.9 Indeed, many scholars of 
international relations and international law did not recognize unilateral economic 
measures (or trade wars) as sanctions at all.  
Despite ‘warnings’ by academics about the limited impact of sanctions and their 
unintended consequences, the 1980s mostly saw optimism about the utility and 
effectiveness of UN sanctions. Sanctions were considered as a harmless and cost-
                                            
2 Padover. “Wilson´s Ideals”. (1942). 
3 Galtung. “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions”. (1967) page 384. 
4 I.e. if the receiver depended heavily on imports from the sender, while the sender did not depend 
heavily on exporting to the receiver.  
5 Galtung. “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions”. (1967) page 384. 
6 Makonese. “The Significance of the Sanctions Campaign for the Liberation Movement”. (1974) 
page 5. 
7 Galtung. “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions”. (1967) page 380. 
8 Baldwin. “Economic Statecraft”. (1985); Doxey. “International Sanctions in Contemporary 
Perspective”. (1987) pp 4-6. 
9 Doxey. “International Sanctions”. (1972). 






effective alternative to military intervention. The idea was proposed that ‘economic 
statecraft’ should be used more frequently by policy makers. After all “it would be 
a pity – perhaps a global disaster – if a contemporary American president were to 
resort to war solely because the nature, implications, and consequences of 
economic statecraft had been misinterpreted by his advisors”.10  
Adding to this wave of optimism was the project ‘Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered’ by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, perhaps the most comprehensive 
study on sanctions as foreign policy tools of the era.11 First established in 1982 
and still active, it boasts a database of 174 sanctions episodes between 1914 and 
2000 to try to answer what the record of economic sanctions has been in achieving 
foreign policy goals. The 35% success-rate that the authors claimed was widely 
copied by academics and policymakers.  
The 1990s also saw a sharp increase in the use of sanctions within the United 
Nations. Whereas the UN had imposed sanctions only twice during the Cold War, 
the 1990s came to be dubbed ‘the Sanctions Decade.’12 The UN Security Council 
imposed sanctions regimes in a total of twelve cases in response to traditional wars 
of aggression, but also civil wars, coups d’état, and state-sponsors of terrorism. 
International sanctions became a policy tool between words and wars.13 
As sanctions became a more popular tool of foreign policy, so did the criticism on 
sanctions grow. Researchers showed that sanctions are not always as successful 
as claimed, sometimes have grave unintended consequences, and are oftentimes 
blatantly violated and evaded.  
In response to the work by Hufbauer et. al., Robert Pape asked: Why do economic 
sanctions not work?14 He found that claim of a 35% success-rate of sanctions was 
overrated, because in reality the successes were determined through force or 
because only minor objectives were achieved. Another critique involved the 
argument that sanctions were not as harmless as presented. After the strict 
economic sanctions imposed on Iraq,15 it became clear that the economic isolation 
had indirectly killed hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, who starved to 
death while the regime of Saddam Hussein stayed in power. When US 
Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright defended on national television that the 
estimated half a million deaths among children in Iraq was ‘worth the price’16, the 
                                            
10 Baldwin. “Economic Statecraft”. (1985) page 373.  
11 Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot. “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered”. (2009). 
12 Cortright & Lopez: ¨The Sanctions Decade. (2000). 
13 Walleensteen & Staibano: “International Sanctions”. (2005).  
14 Pape: “Why Economic Sanctions do not Work”. (1997). 
15 UNSC Resolution 661 (1990). 






image of sanctions as harmless was shattered17. Sanctions regimes on Haiti and 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia further consolidated the argument that 
sanctions can have grave unintended consequences18. Subsequent research on 
sanctions has dealt with the question of how to make sanctions more effective. 
Smart sanctions on individuals and groups make it harder for targets to use their 
bank accounts, travel abroad, or acquire money or arms.19 Researchers have also 
learned more about the design of UN targeted sanctions, their relation to other 
policy tools, and their implementation.20  
All research on sanctions thus seems to simply take for granted the list of existing 
cases and asks (1) who is the target? (2) What did they do to deserve sanctions 
(3) which sanctions were imposed? (4) Did the sanctions achieve their objectives? 
(5) Why did they succeed or fail? (6) Were there any unintended consequences? 
None of the research on United Nations sanctions regimes, or other unilateral and 
multilateral sanctions regimes for that matter, looks into the question of why UN 
sanctions are imposed in the first place.  
This is not to say that scholarly research on sanctions says nothing whatsoever 
about the question of what sanctions are for. The authors of ‘Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered’ are not much concerned with international norms and fully accept 
that international economic sanctions, both unilateral and multilateral, are (legally 
supported) acts of foreign policy. Governments can use them to demonstrate 
resolve and US leadership, to demonstrate moral outrage over an international 
event, or to reassure allies that the US will stand by its international 
commitments.21 Similarly, Drezner describes economic sanctions as a ‘purposeful 
tool of foreign policy’, to be employed in situations where the sender has a 
significant political outcome.22 One of his conclusions is that other factors being 
equal, senders of sanctions will be eager to coerce adversaries and reluctant to 
coerce allies, but that sanctions on allies are actually more likely to be successful. 
Again, the focus remains on effectiveness.  
Some scholars have recognized that the senders’ objectives of sanctions are not 
always, to paraphrase Robert Dahl, ‘getting targets to do things they would 
otherwise not do’.23 For example, governments that impose sanctions sometimes 
                                            
17 Andreas. “Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions”. (2005). 
18 Gibbens and Garfield. “The Impact of Economic Sanctions in Haiti”. (1999); Weiss and others, 
eds., “Political Gain and Civilian Pain.” (1997). 
19 Cortright & Lopez. “Smart Sanctions”. (2002).  
20 Bierstecker, Eckert, and Tourinho. “Targeted Sanctions”. (2016). 
21 Hufbauer and others. “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered”. (2009): pp. 5-6.  
22 Drezner: “The Sanctions Paradox”. (1999): Page 4. 
23 Dahl: “The Concept of Power”. (1957): Page 203.  






merely want to ‘demonstrate resolve’ or to ‘express outrage’, without actually 
resolving anything or fully acting upon their outrage in terms of forceful policy.24 
Indeed, sanctions are unlikely to affect the behavior of their targets if the objective 
of the senders is merely symbolical.25  
Giumelli makes an important distinction between the different ‘purposes’ of 
sanctions, recognizing three categories: Coercion, Restraint, and 
Signalling/Stigmatization.26 Coercion is the attempt by sanctions to change the 
behaviour of targets. It builds upon the classical notion that sanctions are tools of 
power. Already in 1967 Johan Galtung’s criticized this perspective by calling it the 
‘naïve theory’ of sanctions;27 time after time it has been shown that economic pain 
or political pressure rarely lead targets to change their behavior and cede to the 
demands of the senders.28 To the contrary, sanctions can even embolden targets 
(rally-around-the-flag), or pass-on the burden of sanctions on innocent civilians.29  
Restraint is defined as the effort to reduce the capacity of targets to achieve their 
objectives. Targeted sanctions with the purpose to restrain rather than to coerce 
are more likely to actually fulfil that purpose. While targeted sanctions on their own 
are seldom sufficient to end the war-making efforts of armed groups, they can 
certainly help in weakening targets’ abilities to travel, conduct financial 
transactions, and to sell conflict-related commodities. Together with coercion 
(56%), restraint (41%) is an important primary purpose of UN targeted sanctions.30 
The third purpose (signaling / stigmatizing) occurs when sanctions signal targets 
and the broader international community about international norms. This purpose 
is present in 100% of UN targeted sanctions episodes analyzed, although almost 
never as the sole or primary purpose. It is also a purpose that is always and 
instantly effective. As the author puts it: ‘… signaling is often accomplished by the 
very act of the Security Council in moving to address international crises’.31 Since 
UN sanctions are essential in shaping international norms regarding peace and 
security, those who are targeted by them are undoubtedly stigmatized, whether 
they admit it or not.  
                                            
24 Chesterman and Pouligny. “Are Sanctions Meant to Work? (2003). 
25 Fearon. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests (1997). 
26 Giumelli. “The Purposes of Targeted Sanctions”. (2016). 
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The symbolical value of sanctions is thus far from useless,32 especially for an 
institution such as the United Nations. UN Sanctions signal to the target as well as 
the international community that the offence at hand deserves a serious reaction. 
If done coherently, this has a double advantage. On the receiving end, it 
stigmatizes or ‘shames’ targets, even when they don’t actually bite; one the 
sending side, they enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the sender.  
Failing to impose sanctions also sends a signal. Targets can interpret the UN’s 
failure to impose sanctions as a green light to continue what they were doing. For 
example, the UN’s failure to react forcefully to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, by 
means of sanctions or otherwise, sends a signal to Myanmar’s regime that either 
they are right in ethnically cleansing Rohingya ‘foreigners’ from the region of 
Rakhine, or that the UNSC doesn’t find the issue important enough.33 On the 
sending side, the failure to impose sanctions sends a signal that apparently 
geostrategic and political interests of some (permanent) members of the UNSC 
outweigh humanitarian suffering on the ground. For example, failure to impose 
sanctions on Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria (blocked by Russia) has made 
policy makers predict that inaction could become the ‘grave of the United 
Nations’.34 
Many authors have recognized the diverse range of offences that UN sanctions 
have addressed, including the reversal of aggression, the restoration of 
democratically elected leaders, the promotion of human rights, the deterrence of 
terrorism, and the promotion of (nuclear) disarmament.35 One author has even 
recognized that serious humanitarian crises have been a reason for the UNSC to 
impose sanctions under Chapter VII, related to the civil conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire, 
Sudan, and Rwanda, as well as in the aftermath of the 1991 coup in Haiti.36 Others 
have rather focused on the motives of the senders, including the compliance with 
international law, containing conflicts or other threats to the peace, or simply 
expressing outrage.37 However, almost nobody goes deeper than simply listing the 
purposes of sanctions and the motives that exist for imposing them. Nobody asks 
why some cases are sanctioned and others not.  
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The book that comes closest to answering what UN sanctions are for is arguably 
that by Andrea Charron.38 Dividing the list of UN sanctions episodes between 1990 
and 2010 into four categories (Interstate Conflicts (4), Intrastate Conflicts (14), 
International Norm-Breaking States (5), and International Terrorism (4)), she 
comes to the conclusion that the Security Council sanctions policies have more 
substance and direction than what is oftentimes suggested, even if in reality only 
22% of the international conflicts identified between 1990 and 2010 was actually 
sanctioned. The ‘conflicts’ identified by Charron are as follows: 
 
Table 1. Charron on sanctionable offences 1990 - 2010 
Conflict Type UN Sanctions Regimes Cases 1990 - 2010 
Interstate Conflicts 4 8 
Intrastate Conflicts 14 31 
Norm-Breaking States39 5 3 
International Terrorism40 4 83 
Total 27 125 
 
Charron’s work teaches us that there is more logic to UN sanctions regimes than 
critics oftentimes portray. For example, her detailed analysis of the objectives, 
targets, and measures of UN sanctions regimes shows that the objectives of 
sanctions regimes that respond to interstate conflicts and intrastate conflicts are 
primarily to call for adherence to a ceasefire and secondarily to encourage 
negotiations. Sanctions tend to be imposed after violations of peace agreements, 
and almost all sanctions regimes include arms embargoes. Also, sanctions 
regimes are typically combined with UN peace operations, with the majority of the 
conflicts being home to peacekeepers before the imposition of sanctions, not 
afterwards.  
In the case of intrastate conflicts, the Council has been greatly innovative since the 
1990s, sanctioning not only states as a whole, but also sub-state and non-state 
groups and individuals. There is a clear logic to the evolution from comprehensive 
economic sanctions to smart sanctions in response to the unintended 
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consequences of the sanctions on Iraq (1990), the FRY (1991), and Haiti (1993). 
There is also a certain logic to the evolution of the purposes of sanctions from mere 
security issues to the promotion of democracy and governance and the protection 
of natural resources and human rights violations.  
In the category of terrorism, the Council has shifted from simply expressing outrage 
previous to the 1990s to an increasingly ambitious and proactive stance against 
state sponsors of international terrorism (1990s) and directly against terrorist 
groups and individuals (since 2001). Indeed, terrorism has become one of the chief 
issues on the agenda of the Council, as well as UN sanctions regimes, 
representing a ‘generic, norm-setting, and institution-building approach.’ 
Finally, in the category of international norm-breakers, the sanctions against 
human rights violators (Southern Rhodesia and South Africa) as well as those 
against nuclear proliferators (Iraq, North Korea, Iran) might have followed some 
sort of logic, but were not successful. Additionally, international norm-breakers 
elsewhere in the world are not mentioned. Human rights are gravely and 
systematically violated in dozens of countries around the world, and it is not clear 
where the threshold lies that included some regimes and excludes others.41 For 
the sake of this thesis, Charron’s research answers a lot of questions about the 
logic behind UN sanctions regimes, but it still departs from a confirmation bias; it 
looks only at the cases that were sanctioned, not at those that weren’t. 
 
Research on the UNSC doesn’t provide a satisfactory answer either 
 
Academic research on the United Nations Security Council itself helps us in 
understanding the institutional design of the Council, the evolution of the Council 
in responding to international threats, as well as the politics that determine when 
the UN interferes in humanitarian crises. However, there is no comprehensive and 
unbiased study that investigates what UN sanctions are for and how the answer to 
that question differs depending on the type of offense.  
The United Nations as an institution has been recognized as “potentially the most 
powerful supranational organ in the world”.42 Indeed, no other international security 
institution has as many member states as the United Nations, and no other security 
institution has intervened as much in international security affairs. It is the only truly 
global security organization, and despite the many criticisms on its workings it is 
widely perceived as a legitimate institution. Since the 1990s the UN has practically 
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eliminated unilateral military interventions.43 Although the number of sanctions 
imposed by regional organizations such as the European Union, African Union, 
ECOWAS, or the League of Arab States has grown significantly since 1980,44 they 
also widely seek to associate themselves with the UN to legitimize their actions,45 
and to communicate important information about their policy intentions.46  
Whereas the scholarly debate on (UN) sanctions hardly looks into the question of 
what UN sanctions are for, the academic literature on UN peacekeeping does so 
much more comprehensively. To be sure, most academic research on UN 
peacekeeping (as well as that on preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, and 
peacebuilding) is also concerned with its value as a policy tool. After all, 
determining the ingredients for success and failure is ‘essential for building 
knowledge about peacekeeping and making good policy choices.’47 Case studies 
and comparative analysis of peace operations help policy makers in determining 
the evolution of UN peacekeeping,48 as well as their weaknesses, lessons 
learned,49 and (unintended) consequences of half-hearted action or peace 
enforcement.50 
Many others have however theorized about the track-record of UN peace 
operations from a more critical point of view. For example, Barnett and Finnemore 
argued that to assess the decision-making behind UN peacekeeping, it is crucial 
to understand the norms and rules that dominate the institution.51 Their perspective 
goes further than the neo-liberal institutionalist premise that powerful sovereign 
states can use institutions to promote or solidify their interests and foster 
collaboration.52 In a Weberian fashion, the United Nations’ bureaucracy extends 
actual power to experts within the system, regardless of their nationality.  
At a macro-level, the purposes of military intervention and the norms surrounding 
them have indeed changed, also within the UN.53 The dominant theory about UN 
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peacekeeping since the 1990s is best described as the ‘liberal peace thesis’, which 
is based on the premises that (1) liberal democratic states are inherently less likely 
to experience civil war, and (2) liberal democratic states do not fight each other.54 
Others go as far as recognizing a growing ‘global culture’ surrounding 
peacekeeping and the norms that steer UN agency after civil conflict.55  
Norms about peacekeeping can also find their origins in cosmopolitanism.56 In 
other words, some scholars consider norms such as the responsibility to protect 
civilians, human rights, and principles of conflict resolution as philosophical truths, 
rather than expressions of culture. While cosmopolitan norms about global 
governance are difficult to square with the political reality of the UNSC, they do 
provide perspective on where the UN stands.  
The reality of institutional rules and procedures surrounding UN intervention 
however tend to emerge in a post-hoc manner, creating a historical mismatch 
between cosmopolitan, cultural, or legal theories, on the one hand, and 
international politics on the other.57 At best, this leads to a policy of incoherence. 
At worst, it leads critics to claim a policy of neo-colonialism58, old-fashioned 
realism, or other critical argument that start from the premise that ‘theory is always 
for someone and for some purpose’.59 As Damrosch puts it: “A system can hardly 
qualify as law when its rules are enforced selectively and only in accordance with 
the preferences of great powers.”60  
Some scholars that study the role of UN interventions describe the selectivity of 
the Security Council to act arbitrarily with regard to the interpretation of the UN 
Charter’s Article 39 as inevitable, or even purposeful. As a matter of fact, the term 
‘selective security’ that I use throughout this thesis to describe the regime of UN 
sanctions since 1990 is not mine; it comes from a 2014 book that carries the title 
‘selective security’ to explain the issue of war and the UN Security Council since 
1945.61  
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Roberts and Zaum defend that the UN Security Council is inherently selective, and 
that this is purposefully so. Indeed, the very institutional design of the Council and 
the role of the P5 and their right to veto allows for selectivity, as well as many 
articles of the UN Charter, most notably Article 39. The advantage of such 
selectivity is that the Council has been able to react to a wide variety of changing 
threats since 1945. The downside is that the design of the Council in combination 
with international politics can help maintain international peace and security in the 
broadest sense of the term, but that it cannot maintain a ‘rule of law’. The Security 
Council was not designed on the view of justice as the treating of like cases alike, 
or as the impartial administration of justice. It was designed to allow for politics and 
selectivity, and the maintenance of the status quo.  
Even if the Council had wanted to play a more pro-active and consistent role in 
implementing the rule of law, it simply doesn’t have the capacity and the finances.62 
The UN does not have an intelligence agency or its own army. Rather, it depends 
on member states willing to provide resources and troops to UN missions. 
Peacekeeping missions are structurally short on soldiers, leading to inadequate 
peace operations. Out of the 34.000 UNPROFOR troops deemed necessary in 
Bosnian safe areas such as Srebrenica and Sarajevo, only 7.000 arrived.63 In the 
months preceding the Rwandan genocide, none of the nineteen member states 
that had promised to provide troops to the UNAMIR mission did so.64 In some of 
the cases in which sufficient amounts of blue helmets do materialize, they have 
produced more harm than good, as witnessed in accounts of UN soldiers 
participating in rapes, smuggling, and arms trafficking, among others.65  
Despite the shortcomings of UN peace operations in terms of capacity and finance, 
one might still expect the UNSC to carefully select those cases to which it responds 
in accordance with some sort of logic. This logic might be moral, legal, institutional, 
or selfish; and its theoretical origins might lie with humanitarianism, liberalism, 
cosmopolitanism, or realism, among others. The trick is finding out which logic fits 
the UN’s track-record best.  
One attempt to analyze the logic behind UN involvement in international crises was 
by Beardsley and Schmidt,66 in which they analysed 270 international crises based 
on two competing models, the first of which tested proxies related to the UN’s 
mission and the second of which tried to explain ‘parochial interests’. They found 
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that the gravity and potential for escalation of a crisis was a much better predictor 
for UN involvement than selfish interests of the P-5.  
The book that methodologically comes closest to explaining why and how UN 
humanitarian interventions are selective is by Martin Binder.67 He explains that 
depending on the humanitarian, material, and institutional considerations that play 
a role in humanitarian crises, the UNSC can decide to take either (1) strong action, 
or (2) limited or no action. The most important reason for taking limited or no action 
regards political prudence towards targets that possess a strong countervailing 
power. Other reasons for failing to act include situations in which the humanitarian 
suffering is relatively low with little risk of international spillover, or cases in which 
the UN has previously been relatively uninvolved, meaning they have less sunk 
costs.  
The strength of Binder’s method is that, contrary to most research in the field, the 
cases he considers include both humanitarian crises in which the UN did intervene 
and crisis in which it didn’t. By doing so he avoids a confirmation bias. As he puts 
it: “An unbiased analysis of the drivers of Security Council intervention cannot 
focus only on cases where the Security Council has taken action; it must also 
include those situations in which the Security Council could have intervened, but 
chose not to.”68 The list of 31 humanitarian crises since 1991 that Binder uses as 
a starting point of his analysis is based on the numbers of casualties, displaced 
people,69 hunger, and disease. Although Binder’s research is methodically similar 
to this thesis, and although some of his conclusions are in line with those found in 
this thesis, it only focuses on humanitarian crises, not on threats posed by nuclear 
proliferation, (civil) war, terrorism, and coups d’état. Additionally, it focuses on 
selectivity of UN intervention in general, not on UN sanctions regimes. 
There has also been research on the selectiveness of sanctions, but this only 
focuses on the United States, European Union, and other regional organizations. 
For example, a 2005 book on US economic sanctions and presidential decisions 
found that American presidents consider both trade relations, domestic political 
conditions, and political relations with a target country before imposing sanctions.70 
Research on when and where the European Union imposes sanctions shows that 
the EU focuses on security issues close to home, while engaging more with 
democracy and human rights outside of its neighbourhood.71 The EU has also 
                                            
67 Binder. “The United Nations and the Politics of Selective Humanitarian Intervention”. (2016). 
68 Ibid. Page 13. 
69 The decision to include the variable of displacement in the Sanctionable Offences Database was 
inspired by Binder’s research, for which I would like to extend my gratitude.   
70 Drury. “Economic Sanctions and Presidential Conditions”. (2005). Pages 90-132 
71 Portela. “Where and Why does the EU Impose Sanctions?” (2005) 






been increasingly active in acting upon its mission as a crisis manager in its own 
Eastern and Southern neighborhood, sanctioning almost half of the 16 countries 
under its European Neighborhood Policy.72 While this research is instructive in 
explaining why other actors impose sanctions, it doesn’t say anything about the 
United Nations.  
 
Like Binder’s method, this thesis also takes as a starting point a list of events that 
‘could’ have been sanctioned. While such a method avoids the trap of confirmation 
bias, it also has two important downsides that need to be addressed. Firstly, the 
Sanctionable Offences Dataset (SOD), just like Binder’s list of 31 humanitarian 
crises, is not a source of legal or political authority. It doesn’t exist outside of the 
realm of this thesis. It is not part of the UN Charter or any other international treaty. 
It is also not in line with the official policy of any government, regional organization, 
or non-governmental organization. The SOD does also not claim any moral 
authority. That is to say, I don’t think that each case in the dataset ‘should’ have 
necessarily received UN sanctions under Chapter VII of its Charter. It is also not 
in line with any specific religious or philosophical teachings such as the Catholic 
Church or Kantianism.  
If the SOD were to aspire to any sort of authority, it would be academic authority. 
That is to say, I hope that the reasoning behind the list of 192 sanctionable offences 
between 1990 and 2016 is widely considered to be rational, logical, and 
convincing. My argument is that, for each of the five offences (nuclear proliferation, 
interstate war, civil war, terrorism, and coup d’état), if some cases were sanctioned 
by the UNSC, then a number of other ‘similar’ cases might have also been 
considered for sanctions. It is my job in Chapter 4 of this thesis (methodology) to 
defend the choices I have made.  
The second downside of the dataset approach is that non-sanctioned cases might 
have been left off the hook for perfectly sensible reasons. What would be good 
reasons to not impose sanctions? It has been argued that non-credible sanctions 
can be counter-productive. The weak sanctions regimes (due to disagreements in 
the UNSC) in the early 1990s in response to the coup Haiti and the wars in Angola 
and Serbia arguably emboldened the targets because they felt ‘untouchable’.73 
While it is true that stronger sanctions or more credible (military) threats could have 
deterred these targets more effectively, failing to impose any sanctions whatsoever 
arguably would have emboldened them even more. 
A better excuse for not imposing sanctions exists when a stronger UN response is 
already in place. UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions have been 
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recognized as more forceful actions than sanctions.74 Such missions don’t 
necessarily make sanctions redundant, but they do provide a credible alternative 
response. Indeed, many UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations go 
hand in hand with arms embargoes or targeted sanctions.  
The advantage of sanctions is that they are relatively a cheap tool both practically 
and politically. UN peacekeeping missions require personnel, equipment, and 
millions of dollars, all of which have to be voluntarily supplied by willing member 
states, not to mention the consent of the parties involved.75 They are not required 
to be impartial either, and they are strictly speaking not a violation of the (territorial) 
sovereignty of member states. This makes it much easier to identify and sanction 
those who form a ‘threat to the peace’. Additionally, like other tools of foreign policy, 
sanctions should be understood as two-level games in which the domestic 
audience can be as important as the actual target.76 Indeed democratic 
governments are sometimes pressured by their own domestic audiences to be 
responsive to humanitarian crises.77 Sanctions are then an easy tool to convince 
both domestic and international audiences. They are a tool worth using more often, 
even if only for the sake of the Council’s credibility and coherency.  
 
What can this thesis be used for? 
 
Throughout this thesis the reader should sense a constant tension between utopia 
and reality, between principle and practice, between ought and is. The reason for 
this tension is that the method used to analyze the track-record of UN sanctions 
since 1990 forces the reader to navigate between the roles of theorist and lawyer. 
Finding a balance between naïve idealism and strict legalism is a difficult but 
crucial exercise, and anyone who tilts too much towards one of the extremes ends 
up lost in irrelevance. Moral theorists that start their exercise in utopia will end up 
frustrated when faced with reality, or their very premises of justice will be put up 
for debate. Plain lawyers of international law the opposite problem as they can’t 
allow to indulge themselves with moral principles or theory. As Marti Koskenniemi 
puts it:  
‘Engaging in “theory”, the lawyer seems to engage himself, on his own 
assumptions, with something other than law.’78 
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Applied to the topic of UN sanctions regimes, those who have drifted too far 
towards utopia would theorize on a set of absolute and universal values that 
require punishment whenever breached, compare their theory to the track record 
of UN sanctions, and drown in their own misery or call for a revolution. Those who 
have veered off into the other direction and became cold-blooded lawyers would 
simply look at the rules and procedures surrounding UN sanctions in the Security 
Council and come to the conclusion that all UN sanctions regimes since 1945 were 
neatly and correctly imposed under chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Of 
course neither of these positions adds any value to the literature on sanctions or 
international relations in general, hence the inevitable tension.  
The insight that this thesis provides as to what UN sanctions are for is that the 
tension between principles and politics is present throughout history. The 
institutional design of the United Nations has allowed for both ideas and interests 
to influence sanctions regimes. Progressive ideas surrounding R2P, conditional 
sovereignty, democratic peace, and the war on terror have allowed states to 
change the agenda in accordance with contemporary threats and ideals. The 
institutional rules of the game serve as safety valves, allowing for some offences 
to slip through the cracks whenever political interests trump humanitarian or 
democratic concerns.  
The conclusions of this thesis are therefore relevant to those who ‘support’ the 
growing importance of the Security Council as an institution that provides 
international peace and security, as well as to those who are more critical towards 
it. Additionally, and related to the above, it also adds to the literature on the role of 
international institutions and international law in general, as it shows how the 
theories of neo-realism, liberal institutionalism, and ideational liberalism play out 
differently depending on the type of offence that the institution has to deal with.  
To the liberal supporters of UN sanctions this thesis shows that indeed there has 
been an evolution of UN sanctions regimes and that sanctions are increasingly 
used to achieve humanitarian objectives and to uphold international norms, 
especially when it comes to interstate and intrastate wars.  
To the more critical and realist readers the research shows that despite the 
progress made, UN sanctions regimes remain a tool of politics. Although deadly 
conflicts are indeed more likely to receive UN sanctions, deeper analysis shows 
that in reality the track record of UN sanctions since 1990 in response to war 
reflects neo-realist and geo-strategical interests of states. It’s not about deaths; it’s 
about state stability. On top of that, sanctions have been and remain a tool of the 
west, especially with regard to coups d’état, terrorism, and nuclear proliferators. 
As a result, some targets have not been sanctioned despite gross violations, while 






To the scholars that focus on selectivity in the Security Council this thesis shows 
that selectivity works very differently in different types of offences. Sanctions as a 
response to coups d’état are highly selective, with only 3 out of 36 coups receiving 
UN sanctions since 1990. Sanctions in response to interstate conflicts and civil 
wars are much less selective and are closer in line with international laws and 
norms of humanitarian intervention. Interstate wars tend to be sanctioned, and if 
they fail to receive sanctions there are relatively obvious reasons for it. Similarly, 
civil wars that represent larger humanitarian threats are more likely to receive 
sanctions than relatively minor conflicts.  
Selectivity also works different for different P-5 members. Whereas China and 
Russia have only used their power in the UNSC for ‘defensive’, neo-realist 
purposes such as to protect their allies from being subjected to sanctions in 
response to civil wars, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have 
also used sanctions as an ‘offensive’ tool. This phenomenon is clearly visible in 
the chapter on coups d’état, but also in the chapters on civil war and terrorism. 
Organizations that have been listed to the Al-Qaida and Islamic State in Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL) designated lists of terrorist organizations were oftentimes listed 
after ‘Western’ interests had been targeted. The same goes for states that were 
sanctioned for sponsoring terrorism or harboring terrorists.  
What does this mean for theorists of international relations? Firstly, to ideational 
liberalists this thesis shows that ideas matter. When the United Nations were 
established in 1945, the idea that civil wars or coup d’état’s would one day be 
sanctionable offences was utterly unthinkable. Interference in domestic matters 
would be a breach of state sovereignty, and as such an act of imprudence. Today 
the ideational link between internal stability and regional security is reversed; 
interference in civil wars and coup d’état’s in fragile places in the global south is 
perhaps the best thing the UN can do, not only from a humanitarian standpoint, 
but also from a geo-strategic perspective. UN sanctions on civil wars in far-flung 
places like Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire, on coups d’état in Haiti and Guinea Bissau, 
and on militant groups like Al Shabaab in Somalia or the Abu Sayyaf Group in the 
Philippines attest to the power of ideas in steering institutional change.  
Secondly, to liberal institutionalist readers this thesis confirms Keohane’s promise 
that institutional cooperation is sometimes possible after hegemony, but only when 
it comes to conflicts of secondary geo-strategical importance. The importance of 
the United Nations as an international institution has grown substantially since 
1990. Whereas during the Cold War situations of discord in the international arena 
typically led to political deadlock, UN sanctions since 1990 show that the institution 
of the UNSC can successfully create an environment of cooperation, even in 
situations in which harmony is absent. The fact that this trend has continued into 
the 2000s and 2010s, eras in which the world has been described as multi-polar 






rather than unipolar, demonstrates that institutions indeed have the stickiness 
Keohane attributed to them.  
Thirdly, despite the various victories of ideational liberalism and liberal 
institutionalism, the track-record of UN sanctions since 1990 shows that neo-
realism has not lost much appeal or explanatory power. Surely the UN as an 
institution has modernized the norms and principles around UN sanctions, and 
surely the UN has at times served as a platform enabling cooperation, but the 
classic claim of Benito Mussolini that the League of Nations is “very well when 
sparrows should, but no good at all when eagles fall out” is still painfully relevant 
in today’s Security Council. When the stakes are relatively low, cosmopolitan and 
humanitarian calls to impose sanctions in response to (some) domestic conflicts 
may give us the illusion of justice. Similarly, when the UNSC adds another jihadist 
group to the list of designated terrorist organizations under the 1267 or 2253 
regime, we might feel that UN sanctions are precisely where the heat is. The 
analysis of this thesis however shows that UN sanctions in response to such 
offences are rather a reflection of Western “cherry picking” with permission of the 
non-western P-5 members. Optimists might recognize this as a form of institutional 
cooperation, as sanctions materialize without a harmony of interests. Neo-realists 
might rather see it as a result of the distribution of power within the P-5, which is 
still tilted toward the west. China and Russia have to save their ammunition for the 
real issues. The analysis of high-stakes issues, including nuclear proliferation, 
interstate wars, and civil wars in strong states, paint a picture that is much more in 
line with traditional power politics. Most importantly, strong states or states allied 
to P-5 members get away with murder, whereas actors in the geopolitical periphery 
are typically subjected to sanctions.  
Finally, this thesis is relevant to those who have proposed that the permanent 
members of the Security Council should give up their veto-right and that P-5 should 
be expanded to a P-7 or larger, including states such as India, Brazil, South Africa, 
or Japan, or replacing the votes of France and the UK with one single vote for the 
European Union. It must be noted that while this thesis points out several 
inconsistencies in UN sanctions regimes since 1990, it does not necessarily an 
overhaul of the UN Charter or radical changes to the design of the Security Council. 
Trying to impose sanctions in response to grave sanctionable offences without the 
approval of (or despite disapproval of) regional hegemons, regardless of whether 
they have a vote on the Council, can make the world a more peaceful place, but it 
can also trigger an escalation of conflict, hence the lack of sanctions on Pakistan 
and India. In states that carry less geo-political weight a more ambitious push 
towards human security, democracy, and nuclear disarmament is less risky and 
more feasible. Such progress can however only evolve gradually and through soft, 
ideational power. As long as this doesn’t exist, a situation of discord will remain, 






when members of the Council, regardless of who or how many they are, develop 
a more similar answer to the question: What are UN sanctions for?  
 
Overview of the Chapters 
 
Chapters one, two and three of this thesis provide a theoretical framework, 
showing that throughout history the League of Nations as well as the United 
Nations have struggled with the mismatch between utopia and reality. Chapter 1 
explains how the ideas of visionary philosophers and politicians from Immanuel 
Kant to Woodrow Wilson laid the foundations for our thinking about international 
peace and the League of Nations, but in reality classical realist balance-of-power 
politics was much more determinant in explaining war and peace and sanctions 
regimes before the establishment of the United Nations. Chapter 2 describes how 
both the institutional design of the Security Council and its actual activity (or lack 
thereof) to deal with threats to the peace during the Cold War was much more 
inspired by pragmatism and realism. As a result, sanctions were only imposed 
twice, on Southern Rhodesia (1964) and South Africa (1986), both in response to 
white minority racist regimes.79 During the same period however, other 
international institutions such as the World Bank (WB), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and European Union were thriving, leading liberal institutionalist 
scholars such as Keohane and Nye to study the power of institutions and the rules, 
ideas, and players within them. Chapter 3 then explains that since the 1990s the 
permanent players within the UNSC have not changed, but that the rules, norms, 
and ideas surrounding UN sanctions most definitely have. The doctrines that have 
come to dominate UN sanctions regimes (as well as humanitarian intervention in 
general) are those of ‘Liberal Peace’ or ‘Democratic Peace’ and the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P). The language of these doctrines can be found both within and 
outside of the United Nations, and has helped the Security Council to impose 
sanctions not only in response to classical interstate conflicts, but also to deal with 
civil wars, coups d’état, terrorism, and nuclear proliferators. UN sanctions have 
even been imposed to ensure good governance in post-conflict situations.  
Studying the evolution of UN sanctions regimes since 1990 through the lens of 
only the cases that did receive sanctions is misleading. Practically all research on 
sanctions regimes suffers from selection bias. Chapter 4 therefore presents a 
methodology in which all cases that could have been sanctioned by the Council 
since 1990 are taken into consideration. Dividing up the cases into five types of 
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offenses that have been sanctioned by the Council, we end up with the following 
track-record.  
 
Table 2. Offences Since 1990 and UN Sanctions 
Offence Type Offences 
since 1990 
UN Sanctions Percentage 
Nuclear Proliferation 5 3 60% 
Interstate War 4 2 50% 
Civil War 58 26 45% 
Terrorism 88 26 30% 
Coup d’état 36 3 8% 
    
Total 191 60 31% 
 
The subsequent five chapters provide an analysis of each offense type, every time 
using a number of proxies that help answer the question: why were some cases 
sanctioned and others not? Some proxies test to what extent the cases follow a 
logic of humanitarian intervention. Other proxies give us more insight into a 
doctrine of state sovereignty considerations and geo-political interests of states. 
Yet other proxies test to what extent sanctions serve neo-colonial interests of the 
states who propose to impose UN sanctions. Finally, by looking at unilateral 
sanctions imposed by the EU and US, we get a better idea about to what extent 
UN sanctions since 1990 reflect Western ideas and interests.  
Chapter 5 regards UN sanctions in response to nuclear proliferation. This chapter 
will show that when it comes to imposing UN sanctions, the offence of nuclear 
proliferation is the embodiment of structural realism. Decisions about who gets 
sanctioned and who doesn’t can be almost fully explained through geopolitical 
calculations of the P-5. During the Cold war, this led to the successful proliferation 
of nuclear weapons by Israel and India, but not South Africa, which received UN 
sanctions in response to its nuclear ambitions combined with its internal Apartheid 
policies and acts of aggression against its neighbors. After the Cold War, Iraq’s 
nuclear ambitions were successfully contained, even though it was not clear 
whether such ambitions truly existed. The proliferation of nuclear weapons by 
Pakistan in 1998 was perhaps the UNSC’s biggest miscalculation. Not only did it 
bring Pakistan on the brink of a nuclear war with India, it also indirectly benefited 






technology through Pakistan, bringing them closer to reaching their nuclear 
ambitions. The UN sanctions regimes against North Korea and Iran show that the 
P-5 are currently on the same geopolitical line when it comes to nuclear 
proliferation: keep the status-quo. 
Chapter 6 is concerned with UN sanctions in response to interstate conflicts, the 
offence for which UN sanctions were originally designed. However, due to 
geopolitical constraints of the Cold War the P-5 not able (or willing) to impose 
sanctions in response to any of the many interstates wars that broke out between 
1945 and 1990. After the Cold War, only four interstate wars occurred; Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait (1990), the Kargil War between India and Pakistan (1998), the 
border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia (1998-2000), and the US-led invasion 
of Iraq (2003). Iraq, Ethiopia, and Eritrea received sanctions under Chapter VII of 
the UN charter, India, Pakistan, and the US-led coalition of the willing did not. Just 
as in the chapter on nuclear proliferation, chapter 4 shows then us that UN 
sanctions in response to interstate wars are a tool that can only be applied when 
geopolitical constraints are absent.  
Chapter 7 analyzes the issue of UN sanctions regimes in response to civil wars, 
starting from the observation that 20 out of 58 civil wars since 1990 were met with 
some form of UN sanctions. This chapter shows that while this is by all means 
progress for the proponents of human security and a more ambitious sanctions 
policy, UN sanctions have been, and will remain, tools of politics. The seriousness 
of the offence matters, but the fact that several serious civil wars have remained 
unsanctioned shows that it also matters who you are. Quantitative analyses of 
conflict deaths, state strength, and state failure, show that UN sanctions have more 
to do with maintaining intact the international sovereign state system than reacting 
to or minimizing human suffering.  
Chapter 8 regards UN sanctions and terrorism, a threat that the UN has recognized 
and sanctioned since the 1989 Lockerbie Bombing, after which it sanctioned Libya 
for so-called state-sponsored terrorism, but that came to be at the center of UN 
sanctions policy with the UNSCR 1267 regime. The 1267 sanctions committee 
started out as a tool to deal with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and their 
extradition of Osama Bin Laden in response to the 1998 bombings of the American 
embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and then grew into the most 
comprehensive sanctions regime after the attacks of 11 September 2001. Besides 
imposing sanctions on an extensive range of individuals and entities related to the 
Al-Qaida network, the ensuing 2253 regime split the Al-Qaida list to create a 
separate regime related to ISIL in 2015. While Al-Qaida and ISIL and their 
associates are indeed among the organizations that have killed most people in 
terrorist attacks, analysis of the 84 terrorist organizations that have killed at least 
100 people since 2001 shows that UN sanctions are only imposed on organizations 






that pose a threat to Western interests, not on terrorist organizations that stay 
outside of the scope of Western interests.  
Chapter 9 shows that UN sanctions have also been used in a highly selective 
manner by the West in order to correct adverse regime changes after coups d’état. 
Although coups d’état can certainly represent a threat to the internal stability of 
states and even to regional stability, the track record of UN sanctions in response 
to coups certainly doesn’t reflect a concern with human security, or even with 
democracy. Since 1990 a total of 36 successful coups d’état have taken place, 
some of which were undoubtedly bloodier and more harmful to democracy than 
the coups in Haiti (1991), Sierra Leone (1997), and Guinea Bissau (2012), which 
are the cases that were sanctioned under Chapter VII of the United Nations.  
Finally, chapter 10 sums up the findings of chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, and relates 
them back to the theoretical discussions and literature on sanctions and the role of 












































































































The Leagues of Nations and Selective Security 
 
 
The Utopia of Perpetual Peace – Perpetual Politics 
 
The origins of United Nations sanctions regimes lie with its predecessor, the 
League of Nations. In the aftermath of World War I, the League of Nations was the 
first global attempt to legalize international relations through an organization that 
aimed at institutionalizing a set of norms and rules regarding warfare. Studying the 
League of Nations and its failure to change the behavior of the great powers 
teaches us many things about the current regime of UN sanctions. Firstly, it 
teaches us that the ideological origins of both organizations can be found in the 
teachings of Immanuel Kant. Secondly, it teaches us that sanctions regimes are 
oftentimes a reflection of the interests of those who impose them, even if they 
sometimes seem to reflect a more transcendent ideal.  
 
1.1. The Utopia of Perpetual Peace 
 
The origins of liberal thinking about a perpetual peace or a liberal peace go far 
back. Utopian philosophers, from Plato to Abbé de Saint Pierre, and from Thomas 
Aquinas to Woodrow Wilson, all started their exercises with political structures and 
ideas about justice that have no basis in the empirical world. They were utopian 
visions that imagine a perfect world in which justice, virtue, and harmony trump 
crime and vice, and in which all players, be they individuals or states, act in 
accordance with the rules envisioned by the creator. Similarly, Augustine´s City of 
God and Kant´s Essay on Perpetual Peace both found their roots in the mind and 
the heart, not in the earth. The liberal school thus starts with imagination, not with 
reality. Its practitioners are dreamers, not doers. They wrote about what ought to 
be, not about what is.  
The search for a perfect and just society already existed with the Greeks. Plato´s 
Republic and his concept of the philosopher King was an exercise in search of 
justice and human virtue; not a description of a real political system.80 Plato taught 
                                            






his audience about how politics ought to be, not what it was actually like. He 
described a utopia that would never be materialized.  
Before the creation of the international state system, the rules and ethics 
surrounding war and peace were dictated by the Catholic Church. Augustine of 
Hippo, in accordance with his divine master, laid the groundwork for a set of rules 
that still guide western thinking on issues of personal morality as well as justice 
and truth in matters of war and peace.81 Dividing his doctrine of Just War into the 
right to initiate a war (Jus ad Bellum) and rules that guide soldiers and generals 
during warfare (Jus in Bello), Augustine established an order that spread through 
medieval Europe and far beyond that. This is of course not to say that wars in the 
Middle Ages were always fought justly; history books are full of tales of deceit, 
betrayal, torture, and other atrocities of war, especially against non-believers.  
The Church´s most famous student and preacher of the doctrine of Just War was 
perhaps Thomas Aquinas, a 12th century Italian priest, philosopher, and jurist, who 
worked on his (unfinished) Summa Theologica between 1265 and 1274. In many 
ways, Aquinas´ work forms a synthesis between the divine authority of Augustine´s 
City of God and Aristotelian Natural Law, which is inherent in human nature, and 
can be universally recognized. God still enjoyed supreme authority in matters of 
justice, but his representatives did have to back up their arguments in order to 
claim legitimacy in the 13th century.82 The most important of these arguments are 
still used to legitimize contemporary wars. For example, the doctrines of Just 
Authority (the idea that the decision to go to war has to be based on a legitimate 
political and legal process) and Just Cause (the idea warfare is only morally 
justifiable when it is a response to a sufficiently weighty offence) are the 
cornerstones of institutions like the UN and NATO. Similarly, the Jus in Bello 
principles of proportionality, discrimination, and responsibility directly underlie 
conventions of international law such as the 1907 the Hague Convention and the 
1945 Geneva convention. The principles of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello are also 
still taught at universities and military academies around the Western world, and 
form the basis of international outcries, from military invasions in Vietnam to 
massacres in Bosnia, and from suspected terrorists in Guantanamo Bay to Syrian 
refugees in the EU. 83  
The philosophical origin of the League of Nations however lies in 17th century 
Western Europe. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the idea of a perpetual 
peace is not based on a divine authority, but rather on reason. Secondly, a 
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perpetual peace regards a peace between sovereign states, not a “Pax Romana” 
or “Pax Cristiana.”  
Although the concept of universal peace between sovereign states is normally 
associated with Immanuel Kant, he was by no means the first to propose ideas 
that would foster peace and eliminate war.84 Already before the Peace of 
Westphalia was signed, a Parisian monk by the name of Eméric Crucé published 
a book in 1623 subtitled “Discourse on Opportunities and Means for Establishing 
a General Peace and Freedom of Trade throughout the World”, in which he 
proposed the expansion of physical infrastructure (roads, canals) to enhance 
international interdependency, a common currency, and a permanent congress 
with representatives from each country in the world.85 With the Protestant 
Reformation, the beginning of the end of the Holy Roman Empire, and with a new 
order of sovereign states taking shape after the Treaties signed in Münster and 
Osnabruck in 1648, it was only logical that philosophers and statesmen started 
thinking about how to achieve a lasting peace between sovereign states. But in 
international affairs, is it true that, as Locke promised: “Everyone knows the rules 
and canons natural reason has laid down for the guidance of our lives on the basis 
of this relation of equality between ourselves and those who are like us”?86 And if 
not everybody knows the rules and canons, can they at least be acquired through 
philosophy?  
Thomas Hobbes certainly didn´t think so. Just as it was no surprise that Locke’s 
Treatises on Government were published shortly after the Glorious Revolution, it 
was also no surprise that Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan was published not only after 
the English civil war of 1642-1651 and the execution of King Charles I, but also 
shortly after the first consolidation of an order of sovereign states in Europe with 
the Peace of Westphalia. Hobbes warned his contemporaries that peace can only 
be secured under a Leviathan.87 The natural passions of humans are only 
restrained when “some power frightens us in observing them”. In the international 
arena however, according to Hobbes, there was unfortunately no possibility for a 
social contract or philosophical justice. Such a contract could never be enforced, 
because there is no international equivalent of a Leviathan; no world police; no 
monopoly on legitimate violence. As a result, the international order of States is 
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doomed to be an order of anarchy. In order to enjoy peace in Europe, the most 
one could wish for was balance.  
Many enlightened intellectuals tried to design blueprints for perpetual peace 
anyway. And at least in Europe, they succeeded. Inspired by international jurists 
such as Hugo Grotius, who laid the foundation for international law, as well as 
earlier doctrines on just war by Aquino and Cicero, the search for international 
justice began.  
One of these intellectuals was Charles-Irénée Castel, better known as Abbé de 
Saint-Pierre, an 18th century French Jesuit, author, and politician. His Projet pour 
rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe, (project for settling an everlasting peace in 
Europe) was published in 1713, after working as a negotiator of the Treaty of 
Utrecht, a treaty that ended the war of Spanish succession and that had affected 
all of Europe.88 Saint-Pierre proposed to unite Europe in a federation that is in 
some ways reminiscent of the European Union. Each state would minimize their 
military capacity, and voting power in the federation’s political commissions would 
be based on population size.89  
But Saint-Pierre was far too utopian, at least for his own time. When Louis XIV died 
in 1715 he had to arrange for his nephew to serve as regent because his only direct 
heir was his 5 year old great-grandson. The rest of Europe’s royalty was equally 
concerned with marrying off sons and daughters so as to seize power in Spain, the 
Austrian Netherlands, and Prussia. Voltaire was a young man, Rousseau was only 
a child all of the Founding Fathers of the United States still had to be born in 1713. 
The Treaty of Utrecht at most represented a temporary stop to French hegemony 
in Europe under Louis XIV and a momentary restoration of a balance of power. 
Perpetual peace and respect for sovereignty was not to be on the agenda of 
Europe´s political leaders until the early 20th century. However, de Saint-Pierre did 
plant a seed; an idea that would grow bigger after WWI, and that forms the basis 
of institutions such as the European Union and the United Nations.  
Building upon the rise of democracy in the United States, Britain and France, as 
well as upon the ongoing scientific revolution that fundamentally changed man´s 
understanding of how the scientific world works, Immanuel Kant was perhaps one 
of the most ambitious liberal philosophers of the 18th century. Besides his more 
abstract philosophic works on rationalism and empiricism, Kant´s essay on 
Perpetual Peace90 built upon Abbé de Saint Pierre´s work to prescribe a set of 
heavily influential prescriptions for republican states in order to establish universal 
peace. As a matter of fact, Kant´s work is directly presented as a framework of law, 
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divided into six preliminary articles and three definitive articles. The preliminary 
articles describe the steps that States should take immediately. These articles 
include the prohibition of secret treaties, the respect for State sovereignty, and the 
abolishment of standing armies, among others. The definitive articles rather 
constitute a political foundation upon which peace can be built. These articles 
prescribe that the civil constitution of every state should be republican, that free 
states should build a federation, and that free states should recognizes 
cosmopolitan law with regard to world citizens.   
Kant’s political timing was better than that of Saint-Simon, but prescriptions were 
still as grandiose as they were utopian. Kant himself was a contemporary of 
George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, and he wrote his work after the French 
Revolution. However, he also lived to see the rise of Napoleon and the fall of the 
Holy Roman Empire.91 After a relatively stable balance of power between the great 
powers during the 'Concert of Europe' (1815-1914), the likes of Kaiser Wilhelm in 
the German Empire, Nicholas II in Russia, and Napoleon III in France in the early 
20th century did not seem to have brought Europe any closer to perpetual peace.  
Nevertheless, Kant´s philosophy did plant a major seed for subsequent liberal 
thinkers with an interest in prescribing peace or other ideas of the mind. Whereas 
previous empirical philosophers such as David Hume and John Locke found justice 
through the passive analysis of the physical world and human nature, Kant put the 
human mind at the start of the equation, considering the creations of the brain as 
independent variables. According to Kant,  
 
"Reason must approach nature not in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his 
master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witness to reply to 
those questions which he himself things fit to propose."92 
 
With Kant, liberal philosophy permanently climbed out of the swamps of Utopia. 
Ideas were not dependent on the empirical world anymore; empirical concepts 
became dependent on ideas. Ideas became independent variables that could steer 
the world towards any place imaginable. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, a 
compatriot and contemporary of Kant as well as one of his most influential readers, 
also put ideas at the beginning of the equation of social science. According to his 
Idealist Dialectic, progress in ethics and society is the result of a continuous 
process of synthesis between emerging ideas (theses) and their counterparts (anti-
                                            
91 Although the Holy Roman Empire had already been in decline for many decades when 
Napoleon came to power, 1806 marked its official dissolution.  






theses).93 This struggle between competing ideas creates a gradual evolution, 
closer and closer towards a form of eternal truth each time a new synthesis is 
reached. For example, the competing ideas of 19th century capitalism in 
industrializing Britain on the one hand, and the idea of communism proposed by 
Marx and Engels on the other, lead to a synthesis of social democracy. Similarly, 
the stand-off between the ideas of absolute monarchy and democratic 
republicanism has led to the synthesis of a constitutional Monarchy. Keep on 
walking up the Hegelian staircase, and one will come across universal voting 
rights, the welfare state, the League of Nations, decolonization etc., all the way up 
to the Schengen Agreement and gay marriage. Not all countries are on the same 
step, and occasionally one fall down a few steps, but the general direction is up.  
One might suspect that Hegel´s evolutionary selection through idealist dialectic 
was inspired by Charles Darwin, but this is not the case. Darwin was just 22 years 
old when Hegel died. Darwin´s logic of the survival of the fittest did have an 
enormous impact on sociology, and they helped many 19th century sociologists 
and political scientists in defending that the dominance of western civilization was 
the result of an evolutionary process in which white Christian societies represented 
a highly advanced stage of political evolution, followed by Asian and Central 
American hierarchical societies, and finally by barbarian tribal societies in the 
African continent as well as in far-flung places in the Amazon, Australia, and the 
Pacific Islands, among others. 94  
Although many 19th century sociologists used the idea of natural selection to 
defend issues such as racism and colonialism, Hegel was in many ways right that 
ideas, just like institutions and technological innovations, can spread like wildfire. 
Whereas the geographical spread of animal species or plants in nature can take 
tens of thousands of years of natural selection, human inventions, both political 
and technological, can jump from brain to brain in an instant.95 Thanks to cultural 
interaction between groups, humans can quickly and easily adopt new ideas and 
institutions that serve their interests, while adapting the parts that don´t fit their 
cultural preferences with great flexibility. It took many thousands of years for the 
bell pepper to migrate from the Fertile Crescent to the Mediterranean coasts of 
Italy and Spain. The ideas of Rousseau, on the other hand, made a return trip to 
the United States and back to France in just a few decades. Since then, the 
invisible hand of democracy has touched every state in the world in one way or 
another.  
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The final reason for optimism about perpetual peace in the 19th century was the 
rise of utilitarianism, and the idea that public opinion would not only equate justice, 
but that public opinion would also restrain imperialism and interstate aggression 
for once and for all. Rather than the high-minded rhetoric of their French and 
German contemporaries, who looked for recipes of philosophical justice, the British 
utilitarian philosophers looked for a more practical formula, based on common 
sense and compatibility with the realities of the industrial revolution. Utilitarianism 
has been so successful in guiding our contemporary thinking on good and evil that 
we would almost forget that its origins are just as utopian as those of Rousseau 
and Kant.  
Jeremy Bentham, the philosophical father of utilitarianism, had argued in the early 
19th century that nature had ‘placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.’96 The tasks of the individual and the 
community were simply to pursue those things in life that promoted benefit, 
advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, while preventing the happening of 
mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered. 
Utility, in other words, could be determined by pursuing those things that produce 
the greatest good for the greatest number. No need for Hegelian dialectic and 
syntheses between competing ideologies; rational and informed citizens will take 
care of moral evolution. Utilitarianism is thus a form of democratization of 
philosophy. 
James Mill, Bentham´s pupil, took the democratization of utilitarianism one step 
further. Elaborating on the infallibility of public opinion, he argued that:  
 
“Every man possessed of reason is accustomed to weigh evidence and to be guided and 
determined by its preponderance. When various conclusions are, with their evidence, 
presented with equal care and with equal skill, there is a moral certainty, through some 
few may be misguided, that the greatest number will judge right…”97 
 
So no more need for God to guide as our moral compass, and no more need for 
philosophers to translate the laws of nature for the common man. As John Locke 
had explained in the 17th century, anyone who takes the trouble to consult the laws 
of nature will get an answer.98 Bentham and Mill just added up the opinions. But 
although they were the first to turn public opinion into a doctrine for morality, they 
were certainly not the only ones, or the first ones, to assume that the matter of 
moral progress was dependent on intellectual development of citizens. For 
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example, Kant argued that self-interested citizens in democratic republics would 
never vote to wage war, as it was against their public interest. Wars of conquest 
only benefited self-interested Princes and Monarchs in pursuit of wealth and honor, 
not the people. Until today there have indeed been no wars between two 
democratic states, just as there has never been a war between two states that are 
both home to McDonald´s franchises. As we will see towards the end of this 
chapter, Woodrow Wilson and the architects of the League of Nations were also 
highly influenced by the doctrines of utilitarianism. If they had studied more closely 
the balance of power since the peace of Westphalia, they might have reached the 
conclusion that the doctrine of utilitarianism, much like those of jus ad Bello or 
perpetual peace, is not a guarantee for success.  
 
1.2. Perpetual Politics 
 
Daydreaming aside, Kant’s idea of perpetual peace had not come to a synthesis 
at all yet. If anything has perpetuated itself in the sovereign state order of Europe 
it is war. Each time a new peace in Europe was signed, 1648, 1815, 1919, 1945, 
it was a pragmatic peace, not a perpetual peace.  
 
Attempt one: Münster and Osnabruck (1648) 
 
Ever since the Peace of Westphalia, the balance of power between modern 
sovereign States in Europe has been offset several times, but is has always been 
restored. The doctrine of State sovereignty has been so successful that it has 
spread all over the globe, and serves as the basis for International Relations. In 
the meantime, however, sovereignty within the State has changed hands several 
times. Whereas the 1648 order of States in Europe was based on the traditional 
authority of Kings and Clerics, the 18th, 19th, and 20th century saw power within the 
state shift, first towards charismatic authority, and eventually to bureaucratic 
authority.99 Although the units of analysis in the international state system, 
sovereign states, have stayed the same, they are in no way made up of the same 
internal structures.  
The Peace of Westphalia did not only create the basis for an order of sovereign 
States in Europe, it was also born out of self-interested States attempting to 
preserve their sovereignty. The 30 years’ war, although initiated as a religious war 
between the Holy Roman Empire on one side, and an alliance of Protestant States 
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on the other, shattered illusions of religious loyalty when France, a Catholic power, 
switched sides.  
France’s First Minister under Louis XIII between 1624 and 1642, Cardinal 
Richelieu, had no doubts about his professional priorities: Centralize the power of 
the State in France itself, and check the power of the Holy Roman Empire in 
Europe. As a young man, Richelieu was said to have personally lied to the Pope 
in Rome about his age in order to get his clerical appointment. Both a Catholic 
Cardinal and a Statesman, his loyalty lay with only one institution: l´état.100 Under 
the reign of Louis XIII, Richelieu centralized the national taxation system, stripping 
feudal lords of their titles and their powers to raise taxes locally. This infuriated the 
nobles, but strengthened the power of the Monarchy. The revenues allowed 
France to slowly disentangle itself from the Catholic Church in Rome. When Louis 
XIV, many years later, claimed that l´état, c´est moi (I am the State), he had 
Richelieu to thank for it. Richelieu’s foreign policy objectives were equally 
unambiguous. In the 1620s, the French had started financing the Dutch Republic 
in their struggle for independence from Spain. Similarly, Richelieu incited the 
Protestant Swedish Kingdom to invade Northern Germany in order to balance the 
growing power of Ferdinand II, the official Holy Roman Emperor.  
The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 ended both the Thirty Years’ War and the Eighty 
Years’ War. However, it was not a Peace Conference akin to the Paris Conference 
of 1919, but rather the sum of a number of separate treaties negotiated between 
1646 and 1648 a region of Western Germany that would later become mainland 
Europe’s industrial center.101 Delegations of the Kingdom of Spain and the Dutch 
Republic convened in the city of Münster, while the Holy Roman Empire signed 
two separate treaties with the Kingdom of Sweden and its allies in Osnabruck, and 
another treaty with France and its allies in Münster. Although the delegations all 
spoke words of universality and God’s glory in their various meetings, their true 
interests were crystal-clear: to defend the sovereignty of the state.  
The Treaties proposed a system of state sovereignty and national self-
determination. It created a system of political order between Europe’s major 
Princes; a balance of power that gave political leaders protection from their 
competitors, and that constituted a promise of Westphalian sovereignty within the 
national borders of each state.  
The likes of Immanuel Kant and Abbé de Saint Pierre, to be sure, had nothing to 
do with Westphalia; both of them were born after the fact. The Peace of Westphalia 
was by all means a product of practical statesmanship and national self-interest, 
not one of high-minded philosophy about perpetual peace. The rules that the 
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delegates agreed on in Münster and Osnabruck, and that constituted the basis of 
international law, were a balancing act, not a philosophical revelation. They found 
their origins in Aristotle and Machiavelli, not in Plato and Augustine. Indeed, 
balance in continental Europe would be the keyword to the strategic interests of 
Britain and the other major powers for the centuries to come. In the early 19th 
century, when Napoleon took the French revolution in his own hands and 
conquered more than two thirds of continental Europe, Russia and Britain felt 
obliged to end French hegemony.  
 
Attempt two: Vienna (1815) 
 
The 1815 Vienna Congress that ended the Napoleonic wars and restored national 
boundaries to their defaults explicitly aimed at building a healthy balance of power 
between the Great Powers in order to prevent one power from attempting to 
dominate the whole of Europe, especially France. Since Austria, France, Russia, 
Britain, and Prussia had the common interest in being protected from each other’s 
imperial ambitions, the ‘Concert of Europe’ was successful in preventing any of the 
powers from dominating the continent for a century.102 For a while it almost seemed 
as if Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace had truly enlightened the minds of Europe’s 
Princes. It wouldn´t be the last time; the end of WWI and the end of the Cold War 
inspired similar hopes.  
For a while the balance indeed held strong. Many historians even recognize the 
Concert of Europe and the Belle Époque as one of the most peaceful episodes of 
European history. The early 19th century was full of technological and societal 
changes, putting nations on a track of industrialization and democratization. In 
1848 the whole of Europe experienced a wave of democratization, with popular 
uprisings and demands for universal suffrage and democratic freedoms from 
Sweden to Italy, and from Ireland to Hungary. Not only Kant’s liberal prophecy, but 
also those of John Locke and de Montesquieu were being fulfilled. Popular 
demonstrations in Pest and Buda forced the imperial governor Hungary to allow 
for freedom of the press, equality before the law, and the establishment of a 
national assembly, among others. In Denmark, King Fredrick VII ceded to popular 
demands for a transition towards a constitutional Monarchy. On the other side of 
the Atlantic, the British provinces of Nova Scotia and Canada established 
parliamentary democracies.  
But the 19th century was also a century of other –isms, most notably socialism and 
nationalism, both of which contributed to distorting Europe’s newfound balance. 
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1848, the year of ‘Spring of Nations’, was also the year in which Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels published the Communist Manifesto.103 Inspired by the second 
industrial revolution and the harsh conditions of the working class, Marx and 
Engels presented the struggle of their age not as one between Monarchs and their 
peoples for political liberties, but rather as an economic struggle between an 
international bourgeois class of capitalists on one side, and an ever impoverishing 
working class on the other. Their ideas were picked up in the 19th and 20th century 
by Marxists, Communists, and Socialists, and have made an enormous impact on 
the world, whether in terms of the welfare state, international movements against 
slavery and child labor, or the communist revolutions that changed the history of 
states from the Soviet Union to China, and from Cuba to Ethiopia.  
Marx’s material dialectic did however never threaten the doctrine of the state 
sovereignty. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels had argued that “The 
Modern Bourgeois is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers 
of the nether world that he has called up by his spells,” and that as a result of this 
ever-suffocating grip of capitalism, the international proletariat had nothing to lose 
but their chains.104 The manifesto ended with the words: “Working men of all 
countries, unite!” The working men of all countries did unite; but each group united 
behind their own nation. During the Concert of Europe between 1815 and 1914, 
Liberalism and Socialism were merely the support acts. Without a doubt, the main 
act was Nationalism. If Liberalism and Socialism shifted more power to the people, 
Nationalism pumped this newfound energy into separate combustion chambers, 
ensuring that each people would power their own nation.  
Already before the Concert of Europe, and even before the French Revolution, in 
Germany a movement developed that railed against the abstract enlightenment 
ideas of pure rationalism and universalism, trying to synthesize them with the 
forces of emotion and language. For example, Johann Gottfried Herder, in his 1772 
Treatise on the Origin of Language, argued that although human beings are free 
and progressive agents, they are also a ‘creature of the herd’, an a creature of 
language and culture.105 Echoing Aristotle, Herder warned his enlightened 
contemporaries that humans, as political animals, would not magically be freed of 
their thumos106, of their love for their heritage and ethnicity, through philosophical 
treatises that did not resonate with these innately human feelings. Not surprisingly, 
Herder’s writings, but also those of Goethe and later Hegel, were music to the ears 
of statesmen in the German Confederation and Kings of Prussia. The 1848 popular 
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revolutions in the German states demanded democratic reforms, but were also 
inspired by Pan-Germanism, a desire to unify all German speaking nations of 
Europe into a single nation state.  
Again, the international order did not hold. First it was France that felt threatened 
by its neighbor to the East. But the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, initiated by 
Napoleon III but won by Prussia, only strengthened the Germans. In 1871 Wilhelm 
I was proclaimed Kaiser of the unified German Empire, with Otto von Bismarck as 
its first Chancellor. Further to the South-East, the trust between Austria-Hungary 
and Russia slowly crumbled as the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire occupied 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had until then been under Ottoman influence.  
It was the Russians who felt most threatened by the new power balance though. 
Whereas Russia was initially allied with Germany through the (secret) Reinsurance 
Treaty of 1887, this understanding came to an end when von Bismarck signed 
another alliance with Austria-Hungary, promising to support each other in case of 
an attack by Russia. Suddenly, Russia found itself in a vulnerable position. If the 
Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary would also include to Ottomans 
in their alliance, which they later would, the Russians might lose their access to 
the Dardanelles, its only waterway to the Mediterranean. With the power balance 
on the continent out of equilibrium, a minor incident could be enough to spark a 
major conflict between the Great Powers. By 1914, the collapse of order was 
imminent. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo urges 
Austria towards a war with Serbia. Germany promises to back Austria. Russia 
starts mobilizing its troops at signs a pact with France. Germany, feeling that war 
is imminent, declares war on France, and invades Belgium. Britain sees the 
invasion of (neutral) Belgium as a breach of international law and joins the Allied 
powers. 5 years later, more than 38 million people are dead, and the Allied Powers 
convene in Paris to establish the foundations for the League of Nations.  
 
Attempt three: Paris (1919) 
 
Just as the conferences in Westphalia two and a half centuries earlier and in 
Vienna a hundred years earlier, the Paris Conference of 1919 did two things: One, 
re-establish the boundaries of national sovereignty, and two, prescribe a set of 
rules to prevent future conflicts. Imperial ambitions were to be constrained. If the 
conferences of Westphalia had constrained the power of the Holy Roman Empire, 
and the conference of Vienna was designed to prevent the rise of another 
Napoleon, the 1919 Paris Conference was a response to contain the imperial 
ambitions of Germany.  






But not only the alliances and imperial tides in Europe had changed. The timing 
and political climate also seemed perfect to finally put into practice Kant’s 
prophecy. Firstly, in most of Western Europe the forces of liberal democracy and 
the industrial revolution had created societies that had only existed on paper during 
the Vienna conference of 1815. Secondly, for the first time the United States had 
entered the arena as a Great Power, full of optimism about the spread of its values. 
Thirdly, states in Europe and outside it had grown much stronger and more 
nationalist, with a bigger yearning for national sovereignty and a desire to finally 
abolish imperialism. Finally, and as a result of the other three, the British school of 
Utilitarianism and the belief in the power of public opinion flourished. As a matter 
of fact, it was so successful, that it clouded the minds of the project’s architects so 
much that they built a Utopia that was not in line with political reality.  
The first reason for the negotiators of the Paris conference of 1919 to be more 
optimistic about was that Europe was in the process to become more liberal and 
Republican than in 1648 and 1815. The liberal idea that true legitimacy of a ruler 
can only be achieved through Republicanism, that is, the interest of the people, 
had for a long time only existed in salons in Paris and ivory towers in Königsberg. 
In reality, however, enlightenment Europe was ruled by Kings and Kaisers, not by 
the people or their representatives in parliament. The Great Powers of the Vienna 
Conference of 1815 had no need to negotiate their treatises in coordination with 
parliament, or to consult public opinion before acting in name of their country. The 
diplomats that travelled to Vienna to represent the Empires of Russia, Austria, 
Great Britain, Prussia, and France only had to coordinate with their respective 
Monarchs, Emperors, and Tsars.  
The Allied victors that led the negotiations of the 1919 Paris Conference, The 
United States, the British Empire, and the French Republic (and to a less extent 
Italy) were by all means more Republican. Woodrow Wilson, the 28th president of 
the United States and a Democrat, had to pass legislation through a Republican-
majority Senate. Lord Cecil, the British representative, worked at the Red Cross 
before being elected as an MP in a coalition government between liberals and 
conservatives. Georges Clemenceau, the French prime minister, had started his 
political career as a political activist and a critic of imperial France. It was thus no 
surprise that the chief negotiators of the League of Nations were optimistic about 
the force of public opinion and liberal peace. Even Germany had become a 
Republic by 1919, and other Western European nations were also democratizing. 
Surely the rest of the world would follow soon enough.  
The second reason for optimism laid with the role of the US as an emerging 
superpower. While the previous conferences of 1648 and 1815 had been 
negotiated by the Great Powers of Europe, the 1919 Paris Conference was led by 
a new trans-Atlantic power, the United States. A shining city upon a hill, all the 






Locke’s Treatises on Government had become the cornerstone of American 
politics. The texts of the Founding Fathers, from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 
had become a political reality. One of the biggest literary odes to Democracy in 
America was written by a Frenchman. De Tocqueville, in search of the greatness 
and genius of America, came to the conclusion that: “America is great because 
she is good, and if America ever ceases to be good, she will cease to be great.”  
No wonder the American optimism about the League of Nations was so great. Less 
than a year before Wilson’s speech, the world had witnessed the downfall of the 
last Tsar in Russia, an event arguably more groundbreaking than Gorbachev´s 
policies of Glasnost and Perestroika in the late 1980s that marked the end of the 
Cold War. A few years earlier, China had witnessed the end of more than 2000 
years of dynastic rule. If even China, without a doubt the greatest empire in the 
history of mankind, had become a Republic, then the age of empires was surely 
over. 
The third reason for optimism, ironically, lay with the power of Nationalism. “The 
day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by”, Wilson told his colleagues in 
Paris. In his Fourteen Point speech in 1918, the arrows were pointed towards 
military dictatorship and imperialism, not nationalism. If the Peace of Westphalia 
dealt with the Holy Roman Empire, and the Vienna Treaty with Napoleon’s empire, 
the League of Nations aimed at eliminating the very legitimacy of empire for once 
and for all.  
Nationalism was not seen as a force of evil, or even danger, in the aftermath of 
World War I. As a matter of fact, the League of Nations was based on the premise 
that nationalism could perfectly well be a source of peace and progress, as long 
as legitimized through republicanism. As Giuseppe Mazzini, a 19th century Italian 
Nationalist explained: “For us, the end is humanity; the pivot, or point of support, 
is the country.” Building on this logic, Wilson argued that the danger of war did not 
come from the German or Italian people themselves, who had no interest in 
empire, but rather from the military elites that claimed to represent them. As long 
as power laid with the German Reichstag, or with the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 
nationalism would be a force of progress, and international peace would be 
safeguarded. As a matter of fact, Nationalism was also the basic building block of 
many independence movements in the colonies in Africa and Asia, many of which 
had send soldiers to the front in WWI. Although most colonies would have to 
endure another World War in order to achieve the independence of their nations, 
Wilson was among the first Western statesmen to touch upon the colonial question. 
By the late 19th century all intellectuals in Europe agreed: Whether through Kant’s 
philosophy, Grotius’ international law, or Mill’s public opinion: War was immoral, 
illegal, and irrational. And then World War 1, the Great War, broke out. Von 
Bismarck in Prussia, Tsar Nicholas II in the Russian Empire, and Emperor Franz 






Joseph of the Habsburg Empire had clearly not understood the message yet. 
Surely they soon would. Despite the horrors of WWI, or perhaps as a result of 
them, the architects of the post-WWI era were hugely optimistic about the prospect 
of peace. The ideological forces of Morality, Law, and Logic had withstood the evil 
of Empire, and had nested themselves firmly in the minds of the founders of the 
League of Nations. Clearly now was the right timing to put Kant’s vision of a 
universal and perpetual peace into practice, and into law.  
The initial idea of a League of Nations had already been born at the start of WWI 
with the Bryce Group, a group of international pacifists created by Lord Bryce, a 
British academic and Liberal politician, and Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, a 
political scientist, among others. The ideas of the Bryce Group were found an 
audience in Britain, but also in political circles in the United States. In 1915, William 
Howard Taft, a former US President, was influential in setting up the League to 
Enforce Peace, an organization to promote the formation of an international 
institution for world peace. Although the Bryce group was not successful in 
institutionalizing its ideas before the outbreak of WWII, the United States did 
already sign pacifist treaties with other Powers before the war, and even during 
the initial days of WWI. The Bryan Treaties, named after Woodrow Wilson’s first 
secretary of state William Jennings Bryan, aimed at preventing international 
conflicts through third-party conciliation. The treaties’ power, Wilson said in 1914, 
was “that whenever any trouble arises the light shall shine on it for a year before 
anything is done; and my prediction is that after the light has shone on it for a year, 
it will not be necessary to do anything; that after we know what happened, then we 
will know who was right and who was wrong.107  
The end of WWI proved to be a great window of opportunity for pacifist idealists. 
The post-war Paris Conference of 1919-1920 produced not only the Versailles 
Treaty that dealt with Germany and similar treaties to reign in the imperial 
ambitions of Austria, Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire, but it also laid the 
foundations for an institutional framework for peace. Led by the four big allied 
powers, France, Britain, Italy, and the United States, the League of Nations 
became the first international institution of collective security.  
The League´s biggest proponent was US president Woodrow Wilson, who laid out 
his vision of the institution in his fourteen-point speech in 1918. Much in line with 
the ideas proposed by Immanuel Kant more than a century earlier, as well as those 
by the Bryce group and American pacifists, Wilson announced that ‘the day of 
conquest and aggrandizement’ was gone by, and that the representatives of 
modern sovereign states ought to represent the interests of their citizens, not the 
political elites or the military.108 With regard to international security Wilson´s 
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demand was that the world be made ‘fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it 
be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its 
own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by 
the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression.’  
The initial belief in the power of the League of Nations was tremendous, especially 
among the allied powers, and even more so in Britain and the United States. The 
League had 42 founding members in 1920, growing to a total of 58 members in 
1934. Lord Cecil, speaking in front of the Assembly of the League of Nations in 
1931, said that there had scarcely ever been a period in the world’s history when 
war seemed less likely than then. The idea of international sanctions on member 
states, let alone military intervention, was not even a serious matter of concern to 
the League. Rather than using tools of material force, conflicts were much more 
likely to be solved through diplomacy and arbitration. This optimism was based on 
the liberal assumption that the international public opinion would be able to 
distinguish Good from Evil, and that as a result member states would establish and 
implement the rule of law. After all, Good and Evil were universal values that could 
be derived from nature and that could rationally be explained by anyone who 
bothered to consult them.  
 The main article in the Covenant of the League regarding the use of sanctions 
cited that: 
 
¨Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under 
Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against 
all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the 
severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their 
nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all 
financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-
breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or 
not.¨ 
 
Sanctions, then, served two purposes. Firstly, they served the goal of deterrence 
through the rule of law. Ronald F. Roxburgh argued that, although it is true that the 
law-abiding spirit is the basis of legal orders, this spirit arises only when physical 
sanctions are institutionalized: 
 
¨It is true that for every man who keeps the law through conscious fear of punishment, 
there may be hundreds who do so as it were instinctively, and without a thought on the 
subject. But while this law-abiding spirit, which is characteristic of large sections of a 






modern community, owes its origin to a number of causes, perhaps the most potent of all 
has been the enforcement of law through long ages in the past.¨109 
 
The second objective of sanctions was more practical. Rather than a tool of law, 
sanctions were also believed to be a highly effective tool of punishment. Woodrow 
Wilson envisioned international sanctions as a tool that would perhaps not even 
be necessary, because: 
 
“A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, 
peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. 
It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted but it brings a pressure upon the nation 
which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist”110 
 
The optimism of the interbellum didn´t last long. It turned out that the political timing 
was not right at all. Politics actually stood in the way. Woodrow Wilson, the 
League´s spiritual father, was not able to get the Covenant ratified by his own 
country. The US Congress, much rather maintaining a position of isolationism, was 
not willing to agree on article X of the Covenant, calling for international assistance 
in the case of international aggression. It was a bad sign for events to come.  
Initially, the League of Nations was successful in mediating in a number of small-
scale conflicts in the 1920s, including disputes between Sweden and Finland, 
Germany and Poland, Colombia and Peru, and Greece and Bulgaria, among 
others. The League of Nations also laid the foundations for the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), the International Court of Justice, and the World Health 
Organization, among others. However, as the stakes got higher in the 1930s, the 
members of the League were not able or willing to deal effectively with real threats 
to international peace.   
But the first signs of danger presented themselves relatively quickly. When the 
League of Nations was founded, on the 10th of January of 1920, Italy was already 
home to social unrest. With high inflation rates and increasing unemployment 
rates, Italian factory workers, farmers, and disarmed soldiers had plenty of time 
and motive to join strikes, soviet-style factory occupations, or right-wing militias 
such as the Fascist Blackshirts. In October 1922, less than two years after the 
Paris Conference, Benito Mussolini marched on Rome and was proclaimed Prime 
Minister of Italy. Three years later he changed Italy into a legal dictatorship, setting 
an example for other European fascists, most notably Franco in Spain and Hitler 
in Germany, to follow.  
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The imperial ambitions of Japan, although far away from the direct geopolitical 
concerns of the Great Powers, presented another warning sign. In the run-up to 
WWI, the Japanese empire had already acquired Formosa (1895), half the 
Russian Island of Sakhalin (1905), Korea (1910), and a whole range of islands in 
the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. It was only the 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and the establishment of a puppet government of 
a newly independent state called Manchukuo, however, that made the bells ring at 
the League of Nations. As designed at the Paris Conference of 1919, a League of 
Nations Committee was sent to the region to determine the causes of the incident. 
In October 1932 the Lytton report established that the incident constituted an act 
of aggression of Japan. The report, approved unanimously, insisted on the 
withdrawal of Japanese troops, and stipulated that both partied had three months 
to accept or reject the report’s recommendations. In March 1933 Japan left the 
League. The puppet government of Manchukuo stayed in power. It was the first 
sign of the weakness of the League in enforcing its decisions.  
Two years later in October 1935 the Kingdom of Italy initiated a colonial war in 
Ethiopia, then known as Abyssinia. Although both Abyssinia and Italy were 
members of the League, and although the occupation was a clear violation of the 
Covenant as well as the Geneva Convention, the sanctions on Italy were only half-
hearted. Italy successfully occupied Ethiopia, and the efforts of Emperor Haile 
Selassie in the League’s General Assembly were in vain. In 1936, when Hitler 
invaded the Rhineland and France needed the support of Mussolini in Europe, 
France and Britain even allowed for the sanctions to be lifted. As Mussolini had 
observed: "the League is very well when sparrows shout, but no good at all when 
eagles fall out.” By the end of 1936 Italy regarded it safe to exile Haile Selassie 
and to fully incorporate Ethiopia without fearing severe punishment from the 
League. It was the beginning of the end.  
Germany, in the meantime, had not been sitting still either. Clearly the geopolitical 
loser of the Versailles Treaty, Germany was economically indebted and politically 
humiliated. When Hitler rose to power, promising to put the German Nation back 
on the map while wiping Jews and other minorities off it, he proved that nationalism 
could easily trump cosmopolitanism. After a failed coup d’état in 1923 and eight 
months of imprisonment, Hitler’s NSDAP party quickly gained popular support. 
Especially after the 1929 stock market crash, Nazi anti-Semitism and promises of 
Pan-Germanism resonated well with millions of Germans who had lost their jobs 
and sense of national pride since the end of WWI. It did not help that Germany had 
been left isolated and humiliated by the other Great Powers. According to the War 
Guilt Clause of the Versailles Treaty, Germany was to pay 132 billion Marks in war 
damages, out of which 20 billion were actually paid until 1931. Germany also had 
to disarm, and had to make substantial territorial concessions, a cause of deep 
humiliation. It is no wonder that Germany withdrew from the League of Nations in 






1933, only seven years after its accession. In 1935 Hitler re-introduced army-
subscription, and in 1936 Germany had expanded its first bit of lebensraum, when 
it invaded the Rhineland. Before the end of the year the Axis alliances with Japan 
and Italy were completed, and by the late 1930’s Germany had expanded into 
Austria, and parts of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Lithuania. Just like in 1914, 
another World War was already becoming inevitable.  
By the summer of 1939 Wilson’s utopia was definitely shattered. In the years that 
followed, all major powers in Eurasia and America were drawn into a world war 
that was took an even higher toll than the previous one. The battles, bombings, 
killings and other atrocities throughout the Eurasian heartland and the Atlantic the 
Pacific rims produced an estimated 50 to 85 million casualties, most of which were 
counted in the Soviet Union, Germany, China, and Japan. During the Holocaust, 
Nazi Germany and its collaborators exterminated an estimated 6 million Jews, and 
another 5 million non-Jewish individuals, including Poles, Romanians, 
Homosexuals, and other minorities. The US nuclear bombings of the Japanese 
cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima in August 1945 that marked the end of the war, 
left the world in awe. How could this have happened?  
From the Liberalist’s perspective, Wilson, just like de Saint Pierre and Kant before 
him, were right. If the League of Nations failed had to hold up, it was without a 
doubt because of the illiberal and fascist regimes of Germany, Italy, and Japan, 
who overstepped their boundaries in the 1930s. The theory had not failed the 
nations. The nations had failed the theory. In theory, the Nation was supposed to 
be a building block towards humanity; in reality, Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito used 
the force of Nationalism as a tool of imperial expansion, and the League of Nations 
proved to be but a peace of paper.  
De Saint Pierre, Kant, Hegel, and Wilson moved to the back of the library. Liberal 
daydreaming about natural law and perpetual peace had only distracted the world 
from the harsh reality of international politics. What had these utopian intellectuals 
really brought us but a naïve narrative of ought and should? What was the value 
of liberal peace if it was but a peace of paper? Would it perhaps be safer to analyse 








"No matter how many people passionately desire a 'world-state' or 'collective security', 
the point is soon reached where the initial stage of wishing must be succeeded by a 
stage of hard and ruthless analysis"111 
 
In Chapter one we have seen how various utopias, from Plato to Wilson, have 
guided our thinking about Justice through history. We have also seen that the 
visionary projects of Rousseau, Locke, Kant, and Wilson could only be realized 
when political circumstances allowed for it. During the Cold War this logic was no 
different. The dominant Utopia was still that of perpetual peace between sovereign 
states, in line with those of Kant and Wilson. The vision of finally bringing an end 
to inter-state aggression was inspired by the horrors of two devastating World 
Wars, and it was institutionalized through the League of Nations’ successor, the 
United Nations in 1945.  
Chapter two will consider the role of the UN during the Cold War in two ways. First 
the chapter will explain why during the Cold War the United Nations was appointed 
a secondary role. Having learned from Wilson’s naiveté in designing the League 
of Nations, the statesmen that laid built the institutional foundations of the United 
Nations on a mix of ideological principles and norms on one hand, and pragmatic 
realist rules and procedures on the other. As a reluctant superpower, the US had 
neither the capacity nor the ambition to impose its idea of world order on the rest 
of the world, but they also knew that justice and peace would not magically 
materialize through sheer brainpower. The geo-political deadlock of the Cold War 
and the geo-strategical interests of the United States and the Soviet Union did not 
allow for Justice to prevail….yet. The UN Peacekeeping missions and sanctions 
regimes of the period 1945-1990 are a reflection of this ultimately realist stand-off.  
Secondly this chapter will explain why ideology also played an important role in 
explaining the UN’s institutional failure during the Cold War. We will do so by 
looking at the role of international institutionalism. Whereas before the states of 
the world had lived in a system of anarchy and realist power balancing, post-war 
                                            






institutions regulating international trade, finance, and security made a definite 
mark on global politics. Not only did institutions make cooperation between states 
more transparent and easier under US hegemony, they continued to flourish as 
the world became more multi-polar in the new century, making the world more 
interdependent, wealthier, and safer. All the major international institutions that 
were established after WWII, ranging from the UN and NATO to the WTO and the 
IMF are based on the premise that although states are self-interested actors, they 
are still willing to restrict their behavior if they can be assured that other players 
will do the same. Study after study has shown that institutions can foster 
cooperation and absolute gains for all players involved. However, realists have 
countered institutionalism by observing that when the stakes become too high, 
institutions are not always as effective as their designers might hope for.  
During the Cold War the realist critique on the UN as an institution was by all means 
true. The UN only played a role in marginal conflicts. However, as ideational 
liberals as Moravcsik and Nye have shown, the preferences of states and societal 
actors that represent them can shift over time.112 Soft power has become 
increasingly important in affecting state behavior, and issues of discord that during 
the Cold War seemed unbridgeable even to institutionalists become potential 
issues of cooperation in the 1990s.  
 
2.1. The Establishment of the United Nations 
 
The design of the United Nations Security Council makes the institution inherently 
selective. Rather than providing a framework for ‘collective security’, in which each 
state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, the Council 
is better described as one of ‘selective security’; a doctrine that allows the UN to 
deal with some international events while leaving others aside.  
Clearly the post-WWII years had to be years of sober Realism. If only the 
Statesmen of the League of Nations had read Clausewitz rather than Kant, 
analyzed Hitler’s thumos rather than Hegel’s truth, they might have avoided this 
unnecessary war. As Karl von Clausewitz, a 19th century Prussian General and 
military theorist instructed in his 1823 work Vom Kriege, war must always be 
considered as an act of policy.113 It is a political instrument that political actors 
employ to achieve political objectives. It is “merely the continuation of policy by 
other means.” Hans Morgenthau, an influential political Realist and consultant to 
the US State department after WWII, suggested that, to improve an imperfect 
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world, one must work with the forces that are inherent to human nature, not against 
them. The best way to identify these forces is by assuming that “statesmen think 
and act in terms of interest defined as power.”114  
Already in 1943 at the Moscow Declaration China, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States agreed on the need for a successor to the League 
of Nations. The Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security 
Organization, better known as the Dumbarton Oaks conference of 1944, brought 
together representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet 
Union to formulate the institutional basis of the United Nations.115 Subsequent talks 
at the Yalta conference of February 1945 between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin 
were not easy as WWII was still in its final stages and because Stalin tried to secure 
the Soviet Union’s geopolitical future, pushing for the independence of Mongolia 
from China and influence in its satellite states in Eastern Europe, among others.116 
Later that year, the San Francisco Conference brought together representatives of 
forty-six nations that had declared war on Germany and Japan. By the end of June 
the Charter was signed.117 President Truman, addressing the final session, said: 
 
“The Charter of the United Nations which you have just signed is a solid structure upon 
which we can build a better world. History will honor you for it. Between the victory in 
Europe and the final victory, in this most destructive of all wars, you have won a victory 
against war itself…. With this Charter the world can begin to look forward to the time when 
all worthy human beings may be permitted to live decently as free people." 
 
Various articles of the UN Charter allow for selectivity in the Security Council. First 
of all it is the Council (not the General Assembly) that has the power to determine 
on behalf of all UN members whether a certain event constitutes a ‘breach of the 
peace’ or ‘threat to the peace’. Indeed, Article 24(1) of the Charter states that: 
 
Its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.118  
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Article 27 of the Charter (about the veto right) makes the power of the permanent 
five members of the Security Council, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, even more selective. Although the Council as a whole 
counts fifteen members, decisions on non-procedural matters need to be made by 
an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the 
permanent members. The veto right has indeed been used frequently by all 
permanent members, most notably the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. Since 2000 the Veto has been used 
less, and France has even pledged to stop using its veto right, urging the other 
members to follow suit.  
One way to get around the deadlock created by the P5 vetoes was through the 
‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution passed by the General Assembly in 1950, which 
made provision for the General Assembly to act in certain crises or wars when a 
veto prevented Council action.119 This resolution allows the UN General Assembly 
to call for an Emergency Special Sessions (ESS) and to override a veto in cases 
in which “the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent 
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.” It was used on many occasions during the Cold 
War, but has since gone out of fashion.  
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter also allow for the Council to be selective in its 
dealings with peaceful settling of disputes (Ch.VI) and threats to international 
peace and security (Ch.VII). Article 39 of the Charter is simultaneously clear-cut 
and ambiguous. It is clear-cut in the sense that, contrary to the League of Nations, 
it points to the Council as an arbiter when it comes to identifying threats to the 
peace and taking action in accordance with articles 41 and 42. Article 39 states 
that:  
 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
 
As straightforward Article 39 is with regard to who calls the shots, as ambiguous it 
is with regard to which types of events qualify as threats to the peace, breaches of 
the peace, or acts of aggression. There are no mentions of specific laws; no rules 
or guidelines; no card index. An event is a threat to the peace when a sufficient 
amount of Security Council members regards it as such. White-minority racist 
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regimes in Africa; wars of aggression, civil wars, coups d’état, international 
terrorism, and nuclear proliferation have all qualified.  
The measures that the Security Council can take in response to violations under 
Article 39 are also subject to selectivity. The Charter distinguishes between actions 
taken under Article 41 (measures not involving the use of armed force) and Article 
42 (military intervention), but it does not specify which Article should be used under 
which circumstances. Sanctions do not necessarily precede military action, and 
they can be imposed in countries in which a UN peacekeeping mission is already 
present. In the case of Liberia the sanctions on timber exports were imposed when 
the conflict had officially ended in 2003120, thirteen years after the first UN approved 
ECOWAS observer mission, and ten years after the establishment of the UN 
Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).  
Initially there was a call from less powerful member states in the UN to establish 
detailed definitions of threats, so as to prevent countries from being subject to 
arbitrary decision making in the Council.121 Initially there was a call from less 
powerful member states in the UN to establish detailed definitions of threats to the 
peace, specifically with regard to acts of aggression, so as to prevent countries 
from being subject to arbitrary decision making in the Council. The fear of small 
countries was however not that the Security Council would intervene too easily, 
but rather that they wouldn’t interfere at all. They were looking for assurances from 
the P5; seeking protection by the Council, not from it.122 Even China and the Soviet 
Union shortly considered the option, but eventually the P5 proved reluctant to 
agree to such commitments because they would never be able to back up the 
words with troops. As a French Memorandum on the Dumbarton Oaks proposal 
read, “Nothing would be more dangerous than a system that would have more or 
less the appearance of guaranteeing the peace and security of everyone without 
having the capacity to do so”.123 
 
2.2. The realism of the Cold War 
 
The United Nations, although more successful than the League of Nations, was 
condemned to play a marginal role on the world stage during the Cold War. Its 
institutional design, combined with the geo-political realities of the 1945-1990 era, 
allowed for a number of peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, the Indian 
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Subcontinent, and Africa, as well as for the imposition of comprehensive sanctions 
on the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. Large scale conflicts 
between superpowers were avoided, but the respect for territorial sovereignty was 
by no means assured. 
In order to better understand the role of the UN and sanctions during the Cold War, 
we will consider three issues. Firstly we will consider the geo-political stage in 
which the United Nations were established. Secondly we will look at the UN Peace 
Operations that did take place during the Cold War, as well as the role of Peace 
Keepers during these episodes. In this section we will also consider the conflicts 
that were not addressed through the UN framework and the reasons for their 
absence. Thirdly, we will consider the two cases in which the UN imposed 
sanctions during the Cold War. 
1945 marked the establishment of the United Nations, but also that of a geo-
political balancing act, with continental Europe as the most complicated part of the 
puzzle. A mere three weeks after the conclusion of the San Francisco Conference, 
the July 1945 Potsdam Conference split Germany into four parts. France, Britain, 
and the United States would occupy the provinces that would later become West 
Germany, and the Soviet Union would control the East. Even the cherry on top of 
the cake, Berlin, was split, ironically creating a geographical monstrosity 
reminiscent of the 1885 Berlin conference that divided up colonial Africa.  
The rest of Europe was also up for grabs. With Germany and Eastern Europe 
decimated, and with France and Britain still heavily injured, Russia had no need to 
fear the former Great Powers of Europe as it had for centuries. By 1949 the Soviet 
Union had expanded, without officially annexing, to Albania, Poland, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany. The United States, a 
natural and historical ally of Western Europe, had by that time already committed 
the Marshall plan. Between 1948 and 1951, Britain and France, but also West 
Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries received massive amounts of financial 
aid, as well benefiting from free trade agreements with the United States. During 
the same years, these countries also laid the foundation of the European Union by 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and had become 
members of NATO, a collective defense system that also included the United 
States, Canada, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. In 1952, as part of the 
Truman doctrine, Greece and Turkey also joined. When the Eastern Bloc 
answered with the establishment of the Warsaw pact in 1955, the bi-polar world 
order was a definite fact.124  
The typical description of the role of the UN during the Cold War, or even in 
general, is a story about geo-political selfishness, vetoes in the UNSC, and proxy 
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wars in the third world. Despite the newly welcomed utopianism after WWII and 
the promising establishment of the UN Charter, the geopolitical and ideological 
divisions between the United States and the Soviet Union indeed paralyzed the 
UN Security Council on many occasions, leading to over a hundred Soviet vetoes 
and more than forty US vetoes until 1989. The liberal framework that laid down the 
rules for the respect for territorial integrity and the use of articles 41 and 42 of the 
Charter regarding sanctions and interventions existed on paper, but it wasn´t 
always used. The institutional power of sanctions was thus very weak, allowing 
those who created the norms to use the system according to their state-interests. 
However, in some cases the permanent members of the Security Council agreed 
on the need for intervention. Despite the relative side-lining of the UN, thirteen UN 
peace operations were carried out throughout the Cold War, six of which were 
typical interstate conflicts, two of which concerned decolonization, and five of 
which concerned civil conflicts.125  
The first intervention in a major territorial war of the Cold War, the Korean War, 
was approved by the United Nations due to a Russian failure to use its veto. Similar 
to the territorial division of Germany in the aftermath of WWII, the Korean 
peninsula, a former subject of the Japanese Empire, was occupied during the post-
war years by Russian and American forces, with the Russians managing affairs in 
the North until 1948 and the Americans controlling the South until 1949. When in 
June 1950, the North, under the leadership of Kim Il-Sung, attacked the South, 
America gained UN approval to dispatch UN forces in defense of South Korea and 
to “defeat the Northern aggression”. The Russian ambassador to the UN had 
abstained himself from the vote, not with the objective of allowing the UN mission, 
but as part of a boycott of the UN because the exclusion of communist China from 
the United Nations. Mao Zedong’s China, who had just won the Chinese civil war 
in 1949 and supported the North Koreans, were not allowed to vote in the UNSC 
because the seat was occupied by the KMT nationalist government in Taiwan until 
1971. After the Korean mistake, the Soviets used the veto rather than the 
abstention.  
Another typical assumption about the Cold War is that many potential UN 
interventions were blocked through vetoes. Although it is true that the veto was 
used on many occasions by all the permanent members, the stalemate between 
permanent members of the UNSC and the use of the Veto, in contrast to popular 
belief, was never impenetrable. 
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Many UN missions during the Cold War were actually established through the use 
of UNGA Resolution 377(A), also called the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution. As a 
matter of fact, between 1950 and 1997 the UN General Assembly has successfully 
pushed through ten “Uniting for Peace” Resolutions, essentially overriding vetoes 
or abstentions of permanent members of the Security Council. For example, 
Emergency Special Sessions have helped establish UN missions with regard to 
the Suez Crisis (1956), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980), and the South 
African occupation of Namibia (1981), overriding vetoes or abstentions of the UK 
and France, the Soviet Union, and the US and UK, respectively. The last “Uniting 
for Peace” Resolution however dates back to 1997. 
The thirteen peacekeeping missions that did take place during the Cold War were 
each unique, but all adhered to a certain standard. Scholars have conceptualized 
the role of the UN during the Cold War as that of a traditional or Westphalian 
peacekeeper.126 Traditional peacekeeping respects the premises of the so-called 
´holy trinity´ of consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force. The agents in 
the international system, i.e. belligerent states, are assumed to be Clauzewitzian 
actors with the objective of ending conflicts and that are open to conflict resolution 
with help from outside. The traditional role of the UN is that of a value-free 
peacekeeper, not intervening in internal affairs. Internal integrity political 
independence were expected to be maintained at all times. As Jeremy Farrall 
explains on the role of traditional UN peacekeeping: 
 
“The idea [...] that the Council might initiate action to promote democracy or build the rule 
of law would have seemed not only fanciful, but highly dangerous. For what happened 
within the boundaries of a state was considered to be the business of that state and that 
state alone.”127 
 
Just as the Cold War protagonists were not neutral outside of the scope of the UN 
framework, obviously they also pulled strings within the UNSC. This led to an 
interesting mix between power-politics on the one hand, and impartial 
Peacekeeping missions on the other.  
One good example of the interplay between the UN´s envisioned role as an 
impartial peacekeeper and stabilizing force for international security on the one 
hand, and the interests at stake for the permanent members of the UNSC, is that 
of the Suez Crisis in 1956 when Egypt´s president Nasser nationalized the Suez 
Canal. While the Arab world rejoiced over Nasser’s precipitous action, the British 
did not, recognizing that they stood to lose out economically as a result. 
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Negotiations between Britain and Egypt failed, leading Britain to look for political 
allies to remove Nasser from power and to regain control of the Canal. France and 
Israel were eager to join the alliance, seeing that France saw Egypt as a threat to 
its colonial interests in North Africa, and Israel was threatened by Egypt´s military 
presence in the Sinai desert and the Gaza strip.  
Officially, the act of aggression was carried out by Israel, when it invaded the Sinai 
desert on the 29th of October 1956. A day later France and Britain intervened to 
pacify the zone, and regain control over the canal. Votes in the Security Council 
did nothing to stop Britain and France; both used their veto. The US, despite being 
allied with all three aggressors, was not amused by this reckless action that could 
destabilize the region. With Russia being an ally of Egypt, they might have forced 
the US to take the side of Israel. Canada, under the presidency of Lester B. 
Pearson, recognized this risk, and pushed through the first “Uniting for Peace” 
resolution in the General Assembly, invalidating British and French vetoes and 
allowing for the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) to take over without 
the use of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNEF forces were deployed on the 
demarcation line and the international frontier south of the Gaza Strip in what can 
be recognized as a typical traditional peacekeeping operation, upon which many 
would later be based: “The peacekeepers were lightly armed, and only permitted 
to fire in self-defence. The nations who supplied the peacekeepers were intended 
to be impartial; the peacekeepers were not in the business of determining an 
aggressor. They were not there to solve the conflict, but merely to supervise the 
withdrawal of troops and give the hostile parties breathing space to find a solution 
on their own.”128 Pearson would later be rewarded with a Nobel Peace Prize, and 
the UNEF mission would lay a basis for traditional peacekeeping.129 Later, other 
UN peace operations, such as those in Cyprus (1964-present), India-Pakistan 
(1965-1966), or the Golan Hights (1974-present), would represent a recognizable 
trend of traditional Westphalian peacekeeping.  
Despite the UN Peace operations, and despite the use of the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution, the Cold War also knew a number failures to uphold international law 
and to respond to acts of territorial aggression. Taking into consideration those 
conflicts in which the UN did not interfere because of the Cold War divide we can 
hardly speak of neutrality. International relations during the Cold War in were far 
from neutral and the respect for national sovereignty only existed on paper. The 
ideological East-West divide turned foreign intervention and military support 
against the socialist/communist threat into a vital issue for the survival of western 
capitalism and vice versa. The proxy wars fought and regimes supported in 
Vietnam, Cuba, Cambodia, Angola, Indonesia, Libya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, 
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among others, support this argument. The role of UN peacekeeping should be 
viewed in perspective. The big and important battles were fought out between the 
US and USSR and their proxies; second-rank conflicts would be dealt with by the 
UN. The East-West divide in the UNSC thus both complicated and defined the use 
of the UN framework as an institution. As one author notes: 
 
Peacekeeping was "not designed to be used at all in uncompromising conflicts between 
the rival power blocs, but instead for conflicts amongst smaller powers, in non-bloc areas, 
and in situations where the great powers might find their hard-core interests so little 
threatened that international intervention might be preferable to unilateral interventions 
which could lead to unwanted superpower confrontations."130 
 
In the Vietnam War for example, also officially an interstate war of aggression 
between two neighboring sovereign states (North and South Vietnam), UN 
approval was not an option. Having been split in the aftermath of WWII, the 1945 
Potsdam conference decided that North Vietnam would be controlled by China, 
and South Vietnam by the British. However, as a former French colony, the French 
were quick to restore its authority. By 1949, when Mao had successfully 
consolidated communist control in China, a conventional war with the French in 
Northern Vietnam broke out, which eventually led to the control of North Vietnam 
by Ho Chi Min in 1954, and a continued conflict with the South until 1972. In 1966, 
UN Secretary General U Thant publicly spoke out against the war, denouncing it 
as “one of the most barbaric in history”, and calling for a three-step plan to reach 
a peaceful settlement.131 However, the Vietnam issue never made it to a vote in 
the UN Security Council or even the General Assembly. The ideological and 
strategical interests of the US and the Soviet Union, but also of France and China, 
were too opposed and too important to allow the UN to play a role. The first 
Resolution on Vietnam regarded its admission as a member of the UN, in 1977.  
Still, many of the traditional interstate conflicts of the Cold War were somehow 
dealt with in the UN. Besides the Vietnam War, the only other acts of international 
aggression that were left outside of the UN framework are the Ogden War of 1977 
between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88.132 The weakness 
of the UN during the Cold War thus had not so much to do with its inability to 
respond to classical border-wars, but rather with its inability to deal with the many 
proxy wars, which were officially recognized as domestic affairs or civil wars that 
lay outside of the jurisdiction of the UN and its role as a ‘Westphalian 
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Peacekeeper’. The promotion of political systems or the condemnation of 
autocracies was something completely outside of the scope and ambitions of the 
UN. The only exception to this rule absolute respect for territorial integrity by the 
UN concerned the issue of Apartheid, which was sanctioned on two occasions.  
 
2.3. The Cold War and Sanctions 
 
Although envisioned as a non-violent but highly effective tool by Woodrow Wilson, 
UN sanctions were not a tool of choice during the Cold War, even though the UN 
Charter explicitly mentions sanctions as a primary means of responding to 
breaches of the peace, threats to the peace, and acts of aggression. Article 41 of 
the Charter stipulates that: “The Security Council may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, 
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and 
the severance of diplomatic relations.” Subsequently, article 42 explains that the 
use of military intervention by the UN should only become an option when article 
41 has been exhausted: “Should the Security Council consider that measures 
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it 
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of 
Members of the United Nations.” However, none of the interstate conflicts that 
broke out between 1945 and 1990 were met with Sanctions. As a matter of fact, 
even in the General Assembly only two votes on sanctions were called with regard 
to acts of aggression. In 1951 the UNGA voted for an economic blockade of China 
and North Korea in response to the North Korean aggression towards South Korea, 
and in 1962 it voted against sanctioning Portugal for its colonial war in Angola. 
Neither made it in the UNSC.  
The only two cases in which the UNSC did successfully impose sanctions under 
Chapter VII of the Charter were the cases of Southern Rhodesia (1966-1979) and 
South Africa (1977-94). Both cases regarded internal issues in which white 
minority racist governments were in power, not acts of international aggression, 
meaning that both cases essentially fell outside the UNs own legal framework.  
In Southern Rhodesia a white elite minority claimed independence from the United 
Kingdom in 1965. The UK, which had been stalling the road towards 
independence, considered this declaration of independence illegal and marked the 
new white government ruled by Ian Smith as a racist rebellion. UNSC Resolution 






independence by these illegal authorities constituted a threat to international peace 
and security. Subsequently, Resolution 232 in 1966 called upon all UN member 
states to prevent ´(a) the import of asbestos, iron-ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, 
tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating 
in Southern Rhodesia´.133 The Resolution also included an export-ban, prohibiting 
member states from selling a long list of items to Southern Rhodesia. The 
sanctions, although comprehensive and mandatory on paper, had more impact in 
terms of diplomacy than in terms of economic isolation. In 1966 the UN counted 
only 120 member states, meaning that a large number of countries, including 
Switzerland and West Germany, could trade with Rhodesia legally. Other 
countries, most importantly Japan, Portugal, South Africa and the United States, 
also continued various types of trade despite the embargo. In the end, the 
government of Ian Smith remained in power until 1979, until internal military 
pressure in the Bush War and international political negotiations led to a political 
settlement and elections.  
In South Africa the UNSC imposed sanctions in response to the Apartheid regime 
that had been in power since 1948, and that structurally segregated black South 
Africans and racially discriminated in favour of whites economically, socially, and 
politically. During the 1960s and 1970s, the South African government under Prime 
Minister Verwoerd resorted to massive violence against black citizens opposing 
the regime and supporting the African National Congress (ANC). Simultaneously, 
the international community was concerned about South African acts of aggression 
against neighbouring states, most importantly the occupation of Namibia, as well 
as suspicions that South Africa might be producing nuclear weapons. The UN was 
involved with the situation in South Africa from the start, organizing a task team to 
monitor the Apartheid regime in 1952, officially condemning Apartheid policies in 
1962 in the General Assembly (UNGAR 1761), and imposing a voluntary arms 
embargo in 1963 (UNSCR 181). In 1974 the General Assembly even passed a 
motion to expel South Africa from the United Nations, but this motion was vetoed 
by the US, the UK, and France. A mandatory UN arms embargo under Chapter VII 
of the Charter was imposed in 1977 (UNSCR 418), prohibiting ´the sale of arms 
and related materiel of all types, including the sale or transfer of weapons and 
ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, and spare parts […..]´. Economic 
sanctions were only imposed outside of the UN framework in the late 1980s. 
The UN sanctions episodes of the Cold War teach us two things. Firstly, despite 
the many acts of international aggression and despite the explicit mention of 
sanctions as a primary tool to deal with threats to the peace and breaches of the 
peace, sanctions were not used. Secondly, the only two occasions in which the UN 
did impose mandatory sanctions, they dealt with ‘internal affairs’ of sovereign 
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states. This is of course not to say that the governments of Rhodesia and South 
Africa did not deserve punishment (from a moral standpoint they obviously did), 
but rather that UN policies concerning sanctions were repeatedly inconsistent with 
its own legal guidelines. Had these guidelines been followed more accurately and 
more in line with the respect for territorial sovereignty, sanctions could have been 
imposed in response to the Arab-Israeli War (1948), the India-Pakistan War in 
Kashmir (1948-Currently) the Korean War (1950-53), the Vietnam War (1950-75) 
the Six-Day War (1967), the Yom Kippur War (1973), the Ethiopia-Somalia War 
(1977-1980), and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). The cases of Rhodesia and South 
Africa, to the contrary, could have been left to other UN organs or multilateral 
sanctions outside of the UN.  
 
2.4. The promise of institutions? 
 
In chapter one we discussed different Utopias that have dominated historical 
thought about political power and legitimacy. Whether through philosophy, god, or 
reason, the legitimacy of these ideas, time and time again, was only achieved when 
they were combined with real power. Whenever and wherever real power was not 
aligned with the Utopian ideas of Rousseau, Kant, Wilson, and others, these ideas 
stayed in the clouds. The Cold War illustrates this too: Realism trumps Liberalism.  
However, the post WWII era of embedded liberalism had also added an extra 
dimension to International Relations and IR theory: namely that of international 
institutions. For the first time in history, international politics were to be coordinated 
and regulated by institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UN, and regional organizations 
such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the EU, and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Liberal Institutionalist scholars 
such as Krasner, Ruggie, and Keohane argued that as a result of these forums, 
the areas of trade and finance, but also those of governance and security, could 
not be described as ‘anarchic’ in nature anymore. 
The following paragraphs will first show that international institutions have become 
an important variable in International Relations as well as IR theory since the Cold 
War. Organizations such as the WTO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the UN, and other forums for cooperation in the areas of trade, finance, 
security and governance have fundamentally changed the way the world works.134 
Even structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer recognize 
that institutions have to be part of a comprehensive realist analysis of international 
                                            






relations.135 On the other, more liberal side, ideational liberalists such as Moravcsik 
and Fukuyama also recognize the power of institutions, but rather than focusing 
on the realist power struggles within institutions, they focus on the ideational forces 
that precede institutions. 136   
In an attempt to synthesize the debate on the power of institutions in international 
relations, specifically with regard to the UN and the issues of sanctions, we will 
consider the work of Joseph Nye Jr., who distinguishes between three faces of 
power: Realist Power, Institutional Power, and Ideational Power.137 The shifts in 
power between 1945 and 2015, both in international politics in general and among 
states and non-state actors in specific, help us explain that institutional power and 
ideational power have become more and more important, but also that realist 
power is still an important determinant in deciding (1) which ideas become 
institutionalized, and (2) how well institutions work. Chapter 3 will then apply this 
theoretical framework on the ideational regime that has dominated international 
relations and UN sanctions since the 1990s: liberal peace. Together, chapters 2 
and 3 help us in explaining (1) why sanctions were almost never imposed during 
the Cold War, (2) why UN sanctions were imposed much more often during the 
1990s and 2000s and (3) why the record of UN sanctions and unimposed sanctions 
in the epoch of liberal peace is still determined by realist power.  
At its core, institutional liberalism finds its origins in the shift to a rules-based 
system in general. Rather than legitimizing authority through mere power or 
charisma, liberal institutionalism is based on the premise that the authority lies with 
the law itself. This idea, better recognized as bureaucratic authority, was first 
identified by Max Weber, who applied it to the historical shift of legitimate authority 
within the state. According to Weber, authority within the European State had 
shifted from ‘traditional’ sources of authority such as Monarchs, to ‘charismatic’ 
sources of authority such as Napoleon, and eventually to ‘legalistic’ or 
‘bureaucratic’ sources of authority, embodied not by a single person, but rather by 
a large body of bureaucrats in control of implementing the law, and adapting slowly 
it through bureaucratic expertise.138 Weber’s description of the modern State was 
thus a state in which no single person, not even Ministers and Presidents, had the 
power to make any drastic changes to the regime. It is the State in which the 
citizens of the democratic West have lived since the early 1900s, and the State in 
which the law protects people from arbitrary politicians. Contemporary discussions 
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on the strength of the rule of law and the issue of ‘weak states’ and ‘failed states’ 
all essentially refer to this Weberian conception of power. 
Although it is not often explicitly mentioned, attempts to institutionalize the realm 
of International Relations are essentially attempts to create ‘legalistic’ or 
‘bureaucratic’ forms of authority in the international arena. They are attempts to 
make the areas of international trade and international politics less arbitrary, less 
based on ‘traditional’ and ‘charismatic’ forms of authority, and more based on 
transparency, principles, norms, rules, and procedures. In other words, 
international institutions are attempts to create ‘legalistic’ or ‘bureaucratic’ forms of 
authority.  
When students of International Relations discuss the nature of international 
institutions their arguments revolve around two central questions. (1) Why do 
international institutions exist? And (2) Can institutions alter the behavior of states? 
The answers to these questions depend on the theoretical perspective one uses. 
Liberal Institutionalists argue that institutions exist because the ideas and norms 
they embed lead to absolute advantages for all members involved, and that they 
can indeed alter the selfish behavior of players because institutions create 
transparency, trust, and legitimacy. The theory of liberal institutionalism builds on 
the premises that (1) States are willing to tie themselves to international institutions 
that foster cooperation and absolute gains even if the norms and rules of these 
institutions go against their selfish interests, and that (2) Once part of institutions, 
States will neatly operate within their legal boundaries and apply the ‘rule of law’ 
whenever appropriate. Neo-Realists, Social Constructivists, and other critical 
theorists take a darker and more vigilant perspective. They argue that institutions 
exist as a result of (power-) politics, and that they can only be created by hegemons 
who ‘force’ other players into accepting the terms that it dictates. The institution 
itself does not alter the behavior of players; the hegemon does.  
In the 1980s the debate on international regimes led scholars such as Ruggie and 
Krasner to search for a comprehensive definition. On a conference they agreed to 
define international regimes as “sets of explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations.”139 Krasner explained that the main 
ingredients of regimes are the principles and norms, as they form the ideological 
backbone of a regime, whereas the rules and procedures are mere annexes to 
define power relations within the regime. In other words, rules and procedures can 
change without changing the regime itself, but when norms and principles change 
they imply a regime change or shift. Krasner also recognized that regimes can 
grow stronger or weaker in accordance with the respect they enjoy: “If the 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a regime become less 
                                            






coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, 
rules, and procedures, then a regime has weakened”.140  
One of the central questions of the debate about regimes concerned the power of 
institutions. Were institutions mere reflections of regimes that had already come 
into convergence naturally through the forces of history and real-politik, and the 
political hegemony of the United States? Or were they more than simply the 
formalized sum of its member’s interests?  
In his 1984 groundbreaking book ‘After Hegemony’, Robert Keohane explains that 
that International institutions have several ways to project power, that is, to cite the 
author who first defined power in international relations, ‘to make actors do things 
that they would otherwise not do.’141 Keohane recognized that although institutions 
are indeed often established by a hegemon, as realists proposed, they can also 
be facilitated by international regimes, that is, under the circumstances of shared 
principles and implicit agreement on the general norms of a future institution 
between players. Distinguishing between situations of (1) harmony, (2) 
cooperation, and (3) discord, Keohane explains that the interests of selfish actors 
do not necessarily have to be in perfect harmony to create an institution (as 
Realists argue). Cooperation is possible when actors, through negotiations, come 
to a middle ground, in which each has to concede part of their preference to adjust 
to the preferences of the others. In this way, institutions can help players 
coordinate issues of discord, leading to norms and rules that are not in anyone’s 
individual interest, but that do represent a common interest and absolute benefits. 
When liberal institutionalists discuss institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) or the North Atlantic Organization Treaty (NATO), they 
consider them as institutions that might have benefited from US Hegemony, but 
also as institutions that truly reflect cooperation based on negotiations. They would 
also have worked without the Hegemon. For example, even if WTO members 
recognize that eliminating trade barriers will affect some of their domestic 
producers would be better off under a protectionist regime, the promise that other 
countries will reciprocate this elimination, and the promise that on average, 
producers and consumers across the board will benefit from free trade, will still 
lead states to recognize the benefits of joining trade organizations. In Keohane’s 
words, institutions solve the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ through the creation of 
transparency and trust between members. Time and time again, international 
institutions have created sets of norms, rules, and procedures to make 
coordination and cooperation more transparent, more frequent, and safer. Leaving 
aside the geo-political and ideological calculations and miscalculations of the Cold 
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War, the United States has structurally attempted to multilateralize international 
relations and to build frameworks for international cooperation and international 
law. Combining the forces of manifest destiny, the rational supremacy of 
democracy, and the tool of liberal institutions, the US has created, and dominated, 
the institutions and laws that currently dictate debates on free trade, international 
security, since 1990 on governance and state sovereignty. In many ways the WTO, 
EU, NAFTA, the World Bank, the IMF, NATO, and the UN, have made people and 
countries wealthier and safer.  
The second question about international institutions (do they affect the behavior of 
States?) was also answered confirmatively by Keohane. Although realists had 
correctly recognized that most international institutions since WWII were 
established and maintained under the leadership of a powerful and charismatic 
Hegemon, not in the absence on one, the gradual disappearance of a hegemon 
did not necessarily weaken the regime. Institutions do not fall apart in the absence 
of a Hegemon. Despite the declining military and economic hegemony of the US 
since the 1970s, the WTO and IMF have only grown stronger and an increasing 
amount of members is still willing to give up part of their economic sovereignty and 
contribute financially to these institutions in return for the institutional benefits of 
predictability, transparency, and shared gains. Despite the predictions of decline 
in political and security institutions such as the EU and NATO after the threat of 
the Soviet Union vanished in the 1990s142, both organizations have only expanded 
further after the Cold War. US hegemony and geo-strategic security calculations 
of states might have helped establish the EU and NATO, but they certainly can´t 
explain their maintenance and progression.  
The reason for this is that institutions are sticky, meaning that they endure even 
after hegemony.143 Respecting the rules and maintaining the status quo is 
politically easier, safer and more convenient than changing the rules and disrupting 
the status quo. Once rules are fully institutionalized, players will come to consider 
the rules as ‘the new normal’ or a tradition or law that needs to be respected so as 
to maintain order. In other words, as an institution becomes stronger, the political 
cost of breaking the rules or altering them becomes higher.144 The unchanged 
permanent membership of the UNSC, including two second-tier former European 
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Still, Keohane and the like must recognize, and have recognized,145 that some 
international institutions are stronger than others. Both Liberals and Realists have 
recognized that successfully establishing and maintaining an international set of 
norms and rules becomes harder as the stakes grow higher. As a general rule, 
Realists have accepted the fact that cooperation is possible and even desirable in 
the realms of ‘low politics’, including issues of trade, finance, and cultural 
cooperation, among others.146 Matters of discord on trade and economic 
integration can be resolved through negotiation and collaboration between 
likeminded states, and the spoils of transparency and trust can indeed produce 
absolute gains for all players involved.  
Even though Keohane has argued that the institutionalists essentially ‘won the 
theoretical debate’,147 structural realism is still a relevant tool in explaining 
international politics, especially when matters of security and state sovereignty are 
at stake.  
One argument that realists use is that absolute gains are irrelevant in the areas of 
security and governance, and that only relative gains matter. After all, national 
security and state sovereignty only exist in relation to the other players in the 
system. To Realists, issues of security are by definition part of a zero-sum game, 
in which the gains of one player always translates to the relative loss of another 
player. The fact that these calculations take place within the framework of an 
institution does not change anything essential about this logic.  
Secondly, institutions that regulate issues of security also suffer disproportionally 
from the lack of a ‘Leviathan’. Studying the domestic social contract in 17th century 
Europe, Hobbes also came to the conclusion that life is a zero-sum game, but this 
problem could be solved by the State, an all-powerful authority with the legitimacy 
and capacity to punish individuals who veered outside of the borders of the law. 
However, international institutions do not work the same. In international 
institutions the players involved (normally sovereign states) are both the citizens 
and the executives, both the criminals and the police. This leads to potential 
conflicts of interests, and allows for a much higher risk on players cheating the 
system. 
Since international institutions are at their core nothing more than voluntary 
agreements among self-interested states, they cannot truly change the behavior 
of their members in meaningful ways, especially when security is at stake. If states 
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voluntarily enter an international institution, their selfish interests were most likely 
already in harmony with the norms of the institution at hand. For example, Realists 
such as Mearsheimer, Snyder, and Waltz argued in the 1990s that the States that 
joined NATO during the Cold War did so on the basis of already aligned ideological 
and security interests in Western Europe.148 With the threat of the Soviet Union 
gone, NATO would lose its meaning and quickly fall apart. We now know that this 
prediction was wrong; NATO has only grown further since the 1990s.  
But many of the Realist assumptions about the failure of international institutions 
to deal with issues of high politics such as security still stand. Within the United 
Nations, major powers can afford to disobey the rules of the institution without 
getting punished for it, even if they instituted those rules themselves, while minor 
players cannot afford to do the same. Similarly, members of an international 
economic institutions such as the WTO or the IMF only have to adhere to the rules 
that they willingly agreed upon themselves, and any member can revoke its 
membership from the organization if it pleases to do so. Subjects of domestic 
institutions don´t have this luxury.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would be somewhat misleading to use the 
institutional setup of the UN Security Council as an example of liberal 
institutionalism. If anything, the rules that dominate decision-making in the Council 
are an example institutional realism. The fact that the same five permanent 
members have called the shots in the Council since 1945 proves that indeed 
institutions are sticky. Institutions consolidate power as much as they consolidate 
ideas.  
 
Liberalism and Institutions 
A third strain of theorists on international institutions, ideational liberalism, argues 
against both realism and institutionalism when attempting to explain the relevance 
of international regimes and international institutions. In the early 1990s, ideational 
liberalism built on the growing popularity of soft power149 and Institutionalism by 
constructing a more rigid theory for Liberalism in International Relations. Liberalism 
until then had been sidelined by structural realists and neo-liberal institutionalists 
as a pseudo-science, or as a stream of IR theory that contributed to neo-liberalism 
and neo-realism by making it richer, but that should not be recognized as a full-
blown theory of International Relations.  
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Moravcsik, in his critique on institutionalism and realism, exposed that both 
theories were in essence situated on the same side of the coin. 150 Both 
institutionalism and realism agreed that states were central units of analysis in 
international relations, and both agreed that various issues of international politics 
were staged in different-sized arenas in which states competed for power, 
sometimes allowing for cooperation and absolute gains, and sometimes resulting 
in discord, a focus on relative gains, and institutional weakness or decline. In other 
words, in the debate about institutions, the institutions of debate were taken for 
granted, and the selfish interests of actors were assumed to be independent 
variables.  
Moravcsik built his liberal theory of IR on three pillars. Firstly, he argued that 
societal actors were the primary units of analysis in IR, not States. Each state is 
made up of a variety of societal actors, elites, pressure groups, civil society 
organizations, businesses, and other groups, that all try to have their interests 
represented in government. Some of these actors act through the state, others act 
outside of it, parallel to it, or contrary to it. Secondly, the interest of the state itself 
is not preservation or world domination, as realists claim, but rather the result of 
an aggregate of societal interests, some of which are better represented than 
others. In ideal-type full-fledged democracies such interests could be identified as 
the ‘general will’, but in other states the interests are rather identified as the 
interests of dominant ethnic groups, business elites, a dictator and his close 
associates, or a mix of societal groups that effectively turn their pressure into state 
preferences. As Moravcsik put it: “societal actors represent the interests of States 
and their preferences.”151 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, liberal IR theory 
argues that the configuration of independent state preferences determines state 
behavior. In other words, “Liberal theory is analytically prior to both Realism and 
institutionalism because it defines the conditions under which their assumptions 
hold.” The significance of this third pillar is that the core ideas that guide realism 
and institutionalism are not fixed. Preferences of states can be changed, and they 
have changed over time. : It's not so much about creating institutions and imposing 
norms and rules, but rather about changing the actual preferences of States. 
“Variation in ends, not means, matters most.” 
Joseph Nye Jr. agrees that ideas matter. In his work on soft power152 he explains 
that throughout time, the power of ideas and institutions has grown relatively 
stronger than the power to achieve political outcomes through sheer force and 
coercion. Recognizing that power has several different ‘faces’, Nye distinguishes 
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between three faces that are roughly in line with the theories of realism, 
institutionalism, and idealism.  
The first face of power, inspired by realism, is coercive power, hard power that 
helps states in getting others to do things that they otherwise wouldn´t.153 
Traditional Westphalian power politics throughout most of history was 
characterized by this face of power. Having a large army, controlling economic 
resources, and developing superior fire-power mattered to the likes of Truman, 
Napoleon, Genghis Khan, and many before them. Coercive power still matters, but 
as the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq have shown, superior coercive 
strength does not always yield results in the contemporary era. Total wars in which 
both sides put their full military arsenal and soldiers at disposal are a thing of the 
past; other variables have come to matter more. Insurgents in the contemporary 
Middle East are willing to take greater risks in defending their cause than western 
powers in promoting theirs. Battleships and state-of-the-art fighter jets are great 
assets in all-out wars, but are not very useful in establishing the rule of law.  
The second face of power recognized by Nye is inspired by institutionalism. In line 
with the work of Bachrach and Baratz, who recognized two faces of power154, the 
second face of power regards the power of being able to set and dominate the 
agenda and the rules around a certain topic so that the issues of some players 
never make it to the agenda in the first place, or so that the opinions and actions 
of some players come to be perceived as inappropriate or illegitimate. Indeed, 
Keohane commented that the cost of breaking rules is higher than the cost of 
breaking a promise. So in the long run, it pays off for individual players to 
grudgingly keep their promises in the long run. It is important for states and 
politicians to follow policies which make you seem legitimate in the eyes of large 
numbers of people. Those states who have institutional power will be better 
prepared to use their realist power legitimately and effectively. States that boast 
military power without institutional power will be labelled as the ‘bad guys’, severely 
limiting their chances to achieve their preferences.  
The third face of power goes a step further than setting the agenda and 
constraining the actions of competitors in institutions. In line with Moravcsik’s 
account of ideational liberalism, Nye’s third face of power, called soft power, 
regards not the ability to control the actions of other states, but their preferences. 
“If we are trying to make changes on the bottom board of transnational and 
international politics, we can´t do it by ourselves. We have to get others to work 
with us.”155 You can only manage these processes if you have soft power that 
enables you to organize networks, create institutions, to persuade others to join in 
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common endeavors. For a long time during the Cold War, both the Soviet Union 
and the United States were able to project their hard power thanks to their soft 
power. Indeed many African and Asian states that had recently won their 
independence from their former colonizers saw the Soviet Socialist model as 
example to follow. The Cold War was as much a struggle for hard power as it was 
a struggle for soft power. The United States might have been in decline since the 
1970s in terms of military and economic dominance, their institutional power and 
ideational power were to keep on growing until at least the early 1990s. 
It is precisely the surge of soft power that has kept the United States on top of the 
international system. From the late 1940s until the early 2000s, the US did not only 
possess the hard military power to impose its principles and norms of free trade 
and liberal democracy on the rest of the world through international institutions, it 
also possessed a large amount of soft power as the leader of the free world. More 
often than not, the US did not have to force countries into the WTO or the UN; 
countries joined voluntarily because they shared (at least some of) the values of 
neo-liberalism. This was especially the case for the industrialized global north. The 
combination of American hard power and soft power thus helped the US not only 
in setting the agenda, but also in dictating the rules for the world’s major institutions 
from the late 1940s to the early 2000s, ranging from institutions coordinating and 
regulating trade, finance, security, development, governance, and the 
environment.  
To conclude, institutionalists build on the premise that institutions can foster 
collaboration and the adherence to rules as long as the amount of discord between 
States is bridgeable. Cooperation then brings transparency, trust between 
members, and absolute gains. Realists argue that although cooperation might be 
feasible when the stakes are low, when it comes to ‘high politics’ issues such as 
security and sovereignty, institutions lose their relevance and function. If they exist 
and function it’s a reflection of harmony, not cooperation. In case of discord no 
bridges can be built. Finally, ideational liberals argue that ideas and soft power are 
analytically prior to institutionalism and realism. The ends of political actors are 
more important than the means, and they are more malleable than institutionalists 
and realists propose. In other words, even in ‘high politics’ bridges can be built. 
During the Cold War this was obviously not the case, as the ideological and 
strategical interests of States in the international community were highly opposed. 
However, during the 1980s and especially the 1990s, the global shift towards neo-
liberal economics, the spread of democracy, and the merging of development and 
security, among other events, created a window of opportunity for a new 
international regime on security and a new paradigm on sovereignty and the role 
of the UN. This new international regime would come to be known as ‘Liberal 
Peace’ and was based on the definite laws of Kant’s Perpetual Peace. If only 
enough States could be convinced to jump the ideological bandwagon; if a large 






majority of the international community would be able to agree on the general 
norms and principles of this new regime; then the institutions solidifying Liberal 
Peace could be a success. However, after an initial Hegemonic push towards 
implementing the Liberal Peace in the 1990s, the amount of discord in the 
international community proved too great to foster successful collaboration or the 
rule of law.  
Chapter 3 of this book will explain how and why the paradigm of Liberal Peace was 
created, along with a range of ideas that also serve as hypotheses as to to how 
UN sanctions policy changed since the 1990s, including ideas about new wars, 
terrorism, state failure, and the responsibility to protect. Subequently, Chapter 4 
(methodology) will explain how each of these hypotheses was tested. Afterwards, 
Chapters 5 to 9 will present the results of the track-record per type of threat that 
has historically been sanctioned by the UN (Nuclear proliferation, interstate war, 
civil war, terrorism, and coup d’état). Together, these chapters show that, between 
1990 and 2018, the idea of Liberal Peace has successfully penetrated itself into 
the institutions of the United Nations. Simultaneously, the results show that each 
of the ideals institutionalized still has to face the barriers put up by powerful states, 
most notably Russia and China, but also the Western permanent members. A 
complete fulfilment of the liberal peace ideal thus remains a Utopia. Not only are 
there too many States that disagree with its philosophical foundations; even the 
(Western) States that do support it fail to live up to their potential to implement a 




Liberal Peace and Selective Security  
 
 
The theory of liberal peace, or “democratic peace” rests on the premise that liberal 
states subsist in a separate peace.  
In Chapter two we have read how liberal institutionalism and ideological liberalism 
promised the international community a way out of the stark realism of the Cold 
War. The Liberal institutionalism of Keohane offers a way out continuous discord 
and provides tools for cooperation, trust, and safety. The ideological liberalism of 
Moravcsik and Nye promises that any type of discord can eventually be overcome 
by the power of ideas. Rather than focusing on hard power, it is more important to 
change the preferences of States; to conquer the hearts and minds through soft 
power.  
This chapter will show that the paradigm of Liberal Peace was indeed constructed 
through a combination of hard politics, institutional cooperation, and soft 
ideological liberalism. As a matter of fact, many of the assumptions of Liberal 
Peace and the renewed role of the United Nations in establishing this peace are 
based on soft power. The following paragraphs will show that Liberal Peace 
presents itself as a paradigm of morality and neutrality. Interventions in sovereign 
states in the global South are not presented as acts of politics, but as acts that are 
necessary to keep the world safe. Similarly, conflicts of the global South are not 
considered legitimate ‘continuations of politics by other means’, but rather as 
offences or crimes; acts that are punishable by international law. 
However, when the acts carried by the international community under the umbrella 
of Liberal Peace are scrutinized, one quickly discovers that Liberal Peace is a failed 
Utopia at best, and a clever disguise at worst. As Waltz would put it, Liberal Peace 
is a change within the system, not a change of the system. So realism is still 
relevant. The final paragraphs of this chapter will go deeper into the workings of 
security in institutions, and will explain how different states act within institutions in 
order to use the institutions for their own interests. We will conclude that although 
institutions surrounding security and “liberal peace” claim to uphold universal 
standards and international law, the institutions regarding contemporary security 







3.1. The Origins of Liberal Peace  
 
The origins of liberal peace lie with Emmanuel Kant’s essay on Perpetual Peace. 
Whereas the foundations of the League of Nations and the United Nations lay with 
the preliminary articles of Kant’s essay (no secret peace treaties to prepare for 
war, abolish standing armies etc.), the logic behind a truly successful Perpetual 
Peace lay with the expansion of the “Democratic Peace”, that is, a world order or 
Republican States that refrain from international aggression and adhere to a form 
of cosmopolitan law.  
Kant was by no means the first to propose that Republican states were inherently 
more peaceful than non-Republican ones. Thomas Paine, one of the founding 
fathers of the United States, arguing against the right of Monarchs and in favor of 
American independence, wrote in 1776 that: 
  
“The Republics of Europe are all (and may we say always) at peace. Holland and 
Swisserland are without wars, foreign or domestic: Monarchical governments, it is true, 
are never long at rest; the crown itself is a temptation to enterprising ruffians at home; 
and that degree of pride and insolence ever attendant on regal authority, swells into a 
rupture with foreign powers, in instances, where a republican government, by being 
formed on more natural principles, would negociate the mistake”.156 
 
Kant’s first definite article of his essay regarded precisely this critique. Echoing the 
demands of the French and American revolutions, and recognizing the peaceful 
nature of the Republics of his age, Kant prescribed that in order to achieve a 
perpetual peace “the civil constitution of every state should be Republican.” After 
all, truly Republican states, that is states that protect the basic rights and liberties 
of their citizens and in which politics is a reflection of the interests of citizens, will 
not be so irrational as to wage wars, especially on other Republics who share the 
same values.  
 
“If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared 
(and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that they 
would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all 
the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs 
of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves 
behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt 
that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant 
wars in the future. But, on the other hand, in a constitution which is not republican, and 
under which the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the 
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world to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and 
not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasure of his table, the chase, his 
country houses, his court functions, and the like”.157 
 
Kant’s second definitive article regards an article of international law, assuming 
that the first article of constitutional law has been fulfilled by the states that are 
subject to it. It stipulates that international law should be “founded on a federation 
of Free states.” Again, Kant was not the first to suggest a world order of 
Westphalian respect for State sovereignty, as this had already been proposed by 
de Saint-Pierre in the early 18th century. However, Kant was among the first to 
recognize that such a federation would only be feasible between states that had 
fulfilled definite article one. Since Kant recognized the idea of a “world government” 
to be neither feasible nor desirable, and since nation states would always remain 
separated due to differences in culture and language, the balance between states 
and the integrity of each could only be assured in a federation of mutual respect, 
which again could only be achieved between democracies. Over time, Kant 
predicted, the number of Republican states would grow and spread throughout the 
world, ever increasing the number of states enjoying the safety of the liberal peace.  
Many political scientists have since attempted to test this premise, producing list 
of “Republican States” or “Liberal Democracies” throughout history, and showing 
that (1) the number of democracies has indeed spread all over the globe, and that 
(2) with some minor exceptions, democracies do not fight each other.  
 
“The world will not have achieved the "perpetual peace" that provides the ultimate 
guarantor of republican freedom until "very late and after many unsuccessful attempts."158 
 
For example, in his 1983 article on Kant and his liberal legacies, Michael Doyle 
was one of the first influential scholars to show that the number of democracies in 
the world had risen from only three in the late 18th century, to eight by the 1850s, 
thirteen by the 1900s, 29 by 1945, and 49 by the 1980s (Doyle; 1983). According 
to Fukuyama the number increased from 35 to 110 since the 1970s, and although 
the last wave of democracy seems to be retreating since the 2000s, almost all of 
the world’s rich countries are liberal democracies.159 With some minor exceptions, 
many scholars have demonstrated (..), and many politicians have proclaimed (…) 
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that liberal democracies indeed to not wage war with each other, but only with 
states that (still) live outside of the liberal peace framework.  
The states of the world that are regarded as “living outside of the liberal peace” do 
not only fail to fulfil Kant’s first article on Republicanism, but also his third definite 
article that prescribes the application of cosmopolitan law, or a law of “world 
citizenship, which would be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.” According 
to this law, foreigners should have a right not be treated with hostility and should 
be allowed to develop commercial relations with the “old inhabitants” of the country. 
Free trade between countries is encouraged but not mandatory, and foreigners, 
although welcomed as traders or visitors, do not have to be awarded citizenship 
unless they risked being perished upon return to their home country. These 
cosmopolitan aspects of Kant´s third article are widely in line with current 
international conventions on human rights and are reflected in the laws and 
practices surrounding international commerce, travel, and asylum, although often 
exclusively within the zone of liberal peace, not outside of it.  
Kant’s philosophy is embedded in a European tradition, but it’s the United States 
that has brought his ideas to the ground, and turned it into a tool of politics. Liberal 
ideology and the spread freedom and democracy have guided the United States 
since its independence from Britain in 1776. One could even go as far as to say 
that US foreign policy was not inspired by Kant, but rather that Kant was inspired 
by America. After all, Kant’s 1795 essay was published when America already 
firmly proclaimed to be a shining city upon a hill. Thomas Jefferson was convinced 
that America was building an “empire for liberty”, acting for all mankind. Alexander 
Hamilton proposed that the success or the failure of the United States as a new 
democratic state would set a precedent for self-governance all over the world. 
When Kant proposed the abolishment of wars of aggrandizement in Europe, it was 
already implicitly part of US foreign policy. While Napoleon built and lost an old-
fashioned Empire in Europe, John Quincy Adams wrote about the universality of 
American principles: “America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. 
She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion 
and vindicator only of her own.” Even Theodore Roosevelt, recognized by 
historians as a classical Realist trying to maintain a global balance of power in the 
run-up to WWI, was convinced that America was a shining example for the rest of 
the world to follow. However, unlike his successor, Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt 
recognized that America´s manifest destiny could only be achieved if it was backed 
by hard power. “Nothing would more promote iniquity, nothing would further defer 
the reign upon earth of peace and righteousness, than for the free and enlightened 






peoples deliberately to render themselves powerless while leaving every 
despotism and barbarism armed”.160  
 
3.2. Liberal Peace and the Cold War 
 
At the start of the Cold War, Harry Truman believed this too. If the United States 
were to successfully become the leader of the free world, it would need to show a 
demonstrated willingness to use its hard power to deal with threats to the peace. 
The ideology of liberal democracy had become something worth fighting for, and 
the threat of socialism something worth fighting against. So the Cold War was not 
only a time of hard-nosed Realism and geo-politics, but one in which hard and soft 
power had to be mixed. The end of WWII also marked a new stage of a major 
ideological struggle. Just as much as the United States calculated the geo-political 
consequences of Russian and Chinese expansion into Eastern Europe, Korea, 
and Vietnam, and just as much as the Soviets saw the expansion of NATO and 
the propping up of regimes in Indonesia and Pakistan as threats to their strategic 
position, so did both sides regard the war as a war about political ideology. A vital 
war between communism and capitalism, between Marx and Milton, and between 
autocracy and democracy. This interplay between geo-political calculations on the 
one hand and ideological threats on the other helped to reinforce the Utopia that 
had started with Kant in 1795, and that had failed miserably at the hands of 
Woodrow Wilson in the aftermath of WWI.  
Despite the many failures and critiques, the pressures of the Cold War and the 
ambition of the United States to lead the free world undoubtedly reinforced the 
Utopia of a Kant 2.0 world order of Liberal and Republican sovereign states. Since 
the end of WWI, the West, most notably the United States, has travelled a third 
road towards Utopia: Law. Backed by the forces of both God and Reason, the 
United States has used its hard and soft power to institutionalize the ideal of liberal 
peace and an order of democratic states; to construct their Utopia on earth. 
Although it’s philosophical origins lie with Kant and the founding fathers, its 
practical origins for the sake of this study lie with the foundation of the United 
Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the start of American Hegemony on 
the world stage.  
Initially, George F. Kennan, the UN ambassador in Moscow during the aftermath 
of WWII, was convinced that the Kremlin’s view of world affairs was based on a 
traditional sense of geo-political insecurity. However, a few years later in 1947 he 
anonymously published an article in Foreign Affairs titled “The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct”, in which he argued that Stalin’s policies were also motivated by Marxist-
                                            






Leninist ideology, and that the Truman Doctrine should focus more on ideological 
containment, rather than simply geographical containment. In the United States a 
similar duality between ideology and geopolitics existed. NATO was clearly 
established as a military-strategic tool, but the words of many American presidents 
that governed during the Cold War were just as full of idealism and manifest destiny 
as those of Woodrow Wilson. Inspired by Kennan, President Truman, in his 1947 
speech that is often referred to by historians as marking the start of the Cold War, 
stated that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who 
are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." 
The Truman doctrine marked the beginning of a long list of anti-communist policies 
to contain the ideology of communism, rather than the mere geographical 
expansion of Russia. These policies included the rise of NATO, the EU, and the 
Bretton Woods Institutions, but also to financial and diplomatic support for self-
proclaimed anti-communist governments in Africa and Asia, no matter how 
undemocratic or dictatorial. They included trade liberalization and support for multi-
party democracy in geo-politically convenient places like South Korea and Taiwan, 
but also the propping up of dictators from Mobutu in Zaire to Suharto in Indonesia. 
Similarly, the Soviet Union was eager to support many newly independent states 
that pledged allegiance to socialism, whether to promote socialism or simply to 
procure Soviet arms and tighten their grip on power.  
The ‘hot wars’ of the Cold War, most notably in Korea and Vietnam, but also in 
sub-Sahara Africa, were all framed as struggles between dictatorial communist 
regimes on the one hand and democratic liberators of the people on the other. 
Time and time again, the American presidents of the Cold War confirmed that their 
foreign policy was one based on helping friendly nations in their pursuit of liberty 
and the rule of law. In 1961 John F. Kennedy proposed that the US would “pay any 
price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, and oppose any 
foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty”.161 His successor 
Lyndon Johnson promised that the United States of America would stand by the 
side of their peace-loving allies every step of the way. All that allied governments 
needed to do was pronounce themselves as ideological supporters of equality and 
liberty and enemies of communist totalitarianism.  
Whether the American commitment to Freedom and Democracy during the Cold 
War was more than just words remains a topic of debate.162 America’s claims to 
support regimes in Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Somalia, and the Congo against 
communist aggression and totalitarianism might have been justified in some cases, 
but more often than not the Nationalist governments they supported were not much 
different. In Indonesia, General Suharto, who came to power through a 1969 anti-
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communist coup d’état, has gone into history as one of the greatest mass 
murderers of the 20th century.163 Similarly, President Mobutu of Zaire led his 
country into ruin after disposing of his socialist predecessor Lumumba in a CIA 
sponsored coup. 
The Soviet ideology of spreading socialism was similarly misguided at times, but it 
did provide a clear alternative to the Western conception of world order and state 
development. Many African and Asian states pledged an allegiance to socialism 
and the Soviet Union in the course aftermath of their wars of independence from 
their European colonizers. In a mix of political pragmatism and optimistic idealism, 
many leaders of the Pan-African movement of the 1960s proclaimed to unite their 
subjects through nationalism and ‘African Socialism’, including Mengistu in 
Ethiopia, Nyerere in Tanzania, and Nkrumah in Ghana.164  
The ambiguous ambitions behind the proxy wars of the Cold War are exemplified 
by Somalia. When Major General Said Barre of Somalia came to power through a 
coup d’état in 1969, he first proclaimed to be a proponent of scientific socialism, 
inspired by the writings of Marx and highly centralizing state power.165 Not 
surprisingly his Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party had little difficulty in ensuring 
diplomatic and military support from the Soviet Union. However, when in 1977 the 
Ogaden War broke out with neighboring Ethiopia, also a socialist state, and 
Brezhnev decided to side with Ethiopia, Barre expelled all soviet advisors and 
switched his allegiance to the West. The United States, eager to have a strategic 
ally on the Red Sea, happily stepped in and supported Barre´s military dictatorship 
economically and militarily until the end of the Cold War. When the support stopped 
in 1989, the Somali state was quickly torn apart by clan rivalries. The political 
vacuum that ensued has never been successfully filled again until today. 
Whether the third world was truly inspired by the US and the Soviet Union through 
ideology and soft power or whether African and Asian governments were simply 
taking the support in exchange for lip-service remains a topic of debate, but it is 
evident that during the Cold War there were two clearly distinct ideologies 
surrounding the issue of state building and economic development; the Western 
model focused on liberal democracy, trade liberalization, small government, and 
integration into international institutions. The Soviet model proposed a strong 
centralized government, state-led industrialization, and development through 
protectionism and import-substitution.  
Mark Duffield explains that the Cold War also provided for two opposing, but 
equally legitimate ways of looking at the development and troubles of the Global 
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South, then frequently referred to as the third world.166 Whereas the Western view 
of development promoted integration into globalized markets, there was a strong 
and legitimate stream of critical writing inspired by Marxism, for example that of 
Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory. The idea that newly independent States in 
the global south were at a structural disadvantage in the global economy was 
widely accepted. Governments from Cambodia to Cote d´Ivoire did not only have 
to construct and manage their societies politically, they also had to deal with 
economies that lacked competitive infrastructure, an educated workforce, and 
technological knowhow. Their trading profiles, heavily based on exporting 
agricultural produce and primary resources in return for added value goods and 
services from the world’s industrialized core countries, were not economically 
sustainable because of ever-deteriorating terms of trade.  
In the 1980s, however, the alternative explanations of underdevelopment inspired 
by Socialism and World Systems theory, among others, started to fade, starting 
with the countries that had relied on Cold War support from the United States. 
Whereas the 1960s and 1970s had been decades of relative political stability and 
in many cases economic growth through cheap loans and diplomatic support for 
less-than-democratic regimes in countries from Zaïre to Zambia, the oil crisis of 
the early 1980s made an end to cheap credit and forced many developing 
countries to default on their loans. 167 In order to secure new loans from the IMF, 
developing countries were now forced to adhere to a set of policies inspired by the 
neo-liberalism of Thatcher and Reagan, now known as the Washington 
Consensus. Loans that formerly propped up inefficient, protectionist, and corrupted 
regimes with large centralized state-bureaucracies and dozens of subsidized 
parastatal companies were now expected to liberalize trade, privatize parastatal 
companies, and cut government budgets. The third world was now to be held 
responsible for their own development; failure to develop was to become a failure 
of governance, not of the world system.  
The shift from liberal peace as an inclusive system to an exclusive system in the 
1980s also changed the attitude towards refugees from the third world.168 During 
the height of Cold War the United States and its allies were highly willing to bear 
the burden of leading the free world to support governments and individuals 
worldwide in the struggle against communism. Large amounts of diplomatic and 
economic support were not only given to governments who claimed to respect the 
norms of liberal democracy, but also to individuals who tried to flee oppressive 
regimes in South-East Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  
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In response to the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam in 1976, and 
a growing amount of Vietnamese political and economic refugees fleeing the 
country by boat to neighboring countries such as China, Hong Kong, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, the United States and European 
countries made a huge effort in resettling these victims of communism. After a 
1979 conference in Geneva financial pledges to the United Nations High Council 
for Refugees (UNHCR) doubled to USD $160 million, and in the three years 
afterwards the United States, Australia, France and Canada, among others, 
resettled more than 600.000 refugees from Indochina.169 However, as a fatigued 
western public lost interest in Vietnam and grew more intolerant of new waves of 
immigrants not only from Indochina, but also from Ethiopia and Somalia, the 
previous consensus within the UNHCR broke down. Whereas the governments of 
Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, among others, had previously accepted boat-
people to enter their countries temporarily in the knowledge that they would 
eventually be absorbed by the West, the fading Western commitment now led 
South-East Asian governments to change tactics and to let boat-people starve to 
death by keeping them off-shore. Nobody knows how many people died. In 1989 
a new consensus was reached with the Comprehensive Plan of Action, but this 
time the responsibility of dealing with refugees lay much more clearly with the local 
government in Vietnam itself and regional governments. As a UNHCR report 
describes it: “This marked a crossroads in Western attitudes towards refugee 
issues. As the coming crises of the 1990s were to demonstrate all too clearly, 
Western countries, while upholding the principle of asylum, were no longer 
prepared to envisage the resettlement of massive refugee populations”.170 The 
shifting of responsibility, from lying with Western countries of resettlement in the 
1970s and early 1980s towards a system of local and regional responsibility for 
dealing with UNHCR refugees shows that whereas during the height of the Cold 
War the zone of liberal peace was inclusive, in the 1980s, with the numbers of 
refugees growing and the threat of communism waning, liberal peace became 
more exclusive. In order to enter the club, the states of the third world would have 
to deal with their own problems. The best way to do so, the United States argued, 
was by becoming a Republic along the lines of Kant, and to become a Liberal 
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3.3. Liberal Peace as an International Regime 
 
In 1795 at Kant’s publication of his essay on perpetual peace and a total of 3 
Republican States, liberal peace was a theory. In 1919 at the inauguration of the 
League of Nations and a total of 24 Republics, liberal peace became an 
experiment. During the Cold War, with the zone of liberal democracy expanding to 
49 Republics in 1978, liberal peace turned into an ideology, competing with the 
opposing ideology of socialism. In the 1980s, and especially the 1990s, with the 
Soviet threat out of the way and the zone of liberal peace growing to over a hundred 
states, liberal peace became a regime. The following section explains that the 
leaders of the Liberal Peace movement in the 1990s did not only get to decide 
prerequisites for entering the club of liberal democracies, but they also got to 
identify the major threats to the regime and to international peace in general. 
The end of the Cold War was inaugurated with a huge wave of optimism. Despite 
the new security dangers that were looming in former Soviet satellite states, but 
also in sub-Saharan developing states, the general atmosphere was one of 
optimism about a future in which democracy and liberal economics would triumph. 
In the early 1990s over forty countries adopted liberal democratic constitutions for 
the first time in their history.171 Some authors spoke of a democratic revolution, 
with ever more countries holding free elections. One columnist even titled an article 
¨Democracy has won! ¨172 Research on the topic has since been so thoroughly 
supported that the focus has has shifted to trying to explain it.173 
Surfing on the wave of the liberal victory, authors made predictions about what the 
new global order would look like. The definite triumph of liberal democracy over 
competing ideologies of nationalism and communism, and the birth of liberal peace 
as a full-fledged regime of international relations was best interpreted by Francis 
Fukuyama in his 1989 article ‘The End of History?’174 In this article, as well as a 
book published in 1992 with the same title, Fukuyama puts forward the thesis that 
the ideology of Liberal Democracy is now the only viable form of government left 
in the international state system.  
Fukuyama described how the idea of liberal democracy, first recognized as the 
‘final’ form of government by Hegel in 1806, triumphed over all its competitors. 
After two centuries of battling competing ideologies, from absolutism to bolshevism 
and from fascism to an ‘updated Marxism’, liberal democracy had proven the 
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unquestionable winner. With no serious alternatives left, and with the Liberal 
Peace rapidly expanding, Fukuyama argued that “What we may be witnessing in 
not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war 
history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological 
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form 
of human government.”175 
Indeed the ideal of liberal democracy had won a major battle, and Fukuyama´s 
predictions about the spread of democratic values and liberal economies in the 
globalizing world seemed to come true to a certain extent, especially concerning 
the spread of liberal democracy as the only remaining system that enjoyed major 
legitimacy.  
Politicians of the early 1990s were no less optimistic about the triumph of liberal 
democracy. In Central and Eastern Europe former communist regimes fell apart 
and were replaced by democratic governments akin to those of their Western 
European neighbors; multiparty democratic elections and constitutions based on 
that of France and the United States popped up in various states in Asia and Africa; 
the breakout of traditional interstate conflicts saw a sharp decline. Perhaps 
Fukuyama’s prediction had been accurate when he stated that ‘in the post 
historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual care 
taking of the museum of human history.’ Clinton in his 1994 State of the Union 
address, said that: ‘ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build 
a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.’ After all, 
democracies don't attack each other’.176  
International institutions became more influential in peace operations in the 1990s. 
These included the UN and the organizations that fall under its umbrella, but also 
international, national, and sub-national organizations such as the European Union 
(EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of American 
States (OAS), national development agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), and the Bretton Woods Institutions. All together, these agents were 
influential in setting the agenda for contemporary security issues in the 1990s and 
for policy making in order to deal with such threats. All the organizations, however 
distinct, had in common a general line of thinking with regard to the relationship 
between liberal democracy and sustainable peace. All fashioned the idea that 
states with liberal democratic governments that respect human rights and that 
boast representative governments are generally less prone to conflict, both 
internally and internationally, than states that do not adhere to these institutions.  
                                            
175 Idem. Page 1.  






The UN also thrived in the 1990s. With the Cold War deadlock out of the way, the 
United Nations suddenly had the chance to finally take the responsibility it was 
created for. Together with a whole range of other international organizations, 
national development agencies, NGO´s, and other sub-state players, they filled the 
vacuum that had been left behind. The United Nations had always constitutionally 
defended the fundamentals of representative democracy, as the General 
Assembly had adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. 
However, the Cold War had always blocked the effective functioning of the UN in 
defending the will of the people through representative government. The end of 
the Cold War lifted this blockade and gave way to the first post-Westphalian 
peacekeeping mission in 1989 in Namibia, in which the UN actively assisted in 
creating democratic political institutions within a sovereign state. Subsequently, in 
1991, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/137, enhancing the 
effectiveness of the principles of periodic and genuine elections. The Resolution 
stressed its conviction that: 
 
¨periodic and genuine elections are a necessary and indispensable element of sustained 
efforts to protect the rights and interests of the governed and that, as a matter of practical 
experience, the right of everyone to take part in the government of his or her country is a 
crucial factor in the effective enjoyment by all of a wide range of other human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, embracing political, economic, social, and cultural rights¨.177 
 
The UN Secretary General reports from the early and later 1990s follow a similar 
logic; whereas the respect for national sovereignty had before been a central pillar 
of UN peace operations, this principle was trumped by the respect for democratic 
values and human rights issues in the 1990s. As Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros Ghali commented in An Agenda for Peace in 1992:  
 
¨The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was 
never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and 
to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements 
of an ever more interdependent world¨.178 
 
Boutros Ghali´s successor, Kofi Annan, continued this line of policy. In a 1997 
UNDP conference he stated that support for democratization had become one of 
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the UN´s major concerns. In that same conference, he mentioned that good 
governance and sustainable development are indivisible.179 
The UN Development Program (UNDP) also began focusing on issues of 
economic liberalization and ¨good governance¨ in the early 1990s, even though its 
original mandate was rather focused on eradicating poverty in host-states in order 
to promote sustainable human development. In 1992 the UNDP annual 
development report focused on the liberalization of markets and the lifting of 
protectionist restraints in developing countries. In 1997, the report linked good 
governance to poverty eradication, arguing that ¨enabling policies for poverty 
eradication include such fundamental reforms as promoting broader political 
participation, ensuring accountability and transparency of government, preventing 
the criminalization of politics, promoting free flows of information, and ensuring a 
strong role for community groups and NGOs in policy making and legislative 
decision-making.¨180 Eventually, the promotion of good governance became one 
of the UNDPs central goals, with 46% of its budget going to good-governance 
programs in the period 1997-2000.181 
Since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) has also been actively engaged in 
fostering democracy on the European continent and beyond. Initial efforts were 
focused on the EU´s direct easterly neighbors in order to attract former Soviet 
satellites towards western values and political systems. Eastern European 
candidate countries expressly have to adhere to requirements of democracy, civil 
liberty, and the rule of law. Prospective candidates also have to adhere to liberal 
economics. It seems that the looming EU membership has induced many countries 
to make the transition necessary to join the organization. With regard to the 
relationship between the EU and developing countries, the EU has followed similar 
policies of aid-conditionality and trade-conditionality. Aid and trade relationships 
are only strengthened when the countries on the receiving end uphold a certain 
standard of human rights and democratic principles. When such conditions fail to 
sustain, the EU has the policy to suspend relationships, as it has done in the 1990s 
with regard to several African countries in the 1990s.182 As a result of these policies 
of conditionality, the EU has been referred to as a promoter of soft-power, using 
soft tools rather than hard (military) tools to promote liberal democracy.183The 
Organization of American States (OAS) has followed a similar line of policy since 
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the 1990s184, actively monitoring democratic elections in several Latin-American 
countries, and imposing economic sanctions after coup d´états in Haiti and Peru. 
The AOS also set up a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, training politicians 
and development officials and promoting local organizations in order to foster 
democratic institutionalization.185 
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund also added to fortifying the ideal 
of Liberal Peace. In the 1990s the World Bank added a layer of political 
conditionality to their loans, requiring client states to pursue policies of ¨good 
governance¨. A World Bank annual report from 1995 argued that ¨the strategy that 
has provided effective in improving economic and social well-being consists of 
three elements: labour-demanding growth, investments in education and health, 
and safety nets for poor and vulnerable groups. Increasingly, a fourth element – 
good governance – is being added, because governments directly control a 
significant share of national resources and shape the policy environment for private 
economic agents and civil society. In the interest of economic and social progress, 
the use of public resources must emphasize efficiency and equity. Beyond that, 
the most important attributes of good governance are accountability, transparency, 
and participation.¨186 The World Bank´s (and to a lesser extent the IMF´s) 
conceptions of good governance lie in line with the ideals of representative 
government and accountable politics, added with neo-liberal economics, both of 
which are, in the words of Roland Paris, central elements in the Western notion of 
liberal democracy.  
The vacuum that was left behind by the Cold War superpowers thus created a new 
playing field in which various national, international, and sub-national actors set 
the agenda for peace and development in the globalizing world. The nineties, in 
this sense, were a decade of hope, a decade of optimism and freedom.  
However, the 1990s were simultaneously an age of new threats to international 
security. The end of the Cold War also left behind a political and military vacuum 
in the countries that had previously been supported by the US and the USSR for 
decades. These countries, many of them in reality weak states with high levels of 
corruption and institutions that did not provide social protection or sustainable 
economic growth, now found themselves in trouble, with their populations growing 
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increasingly disenfranchised. Threats of civil conflict, corruption, shadow 
economies, and other forms of state failure now faced increasing scrutiny.  
The new international regime dominated by the ideal of Liberal Peace created a 
discussion about the new security threats and the origins of conflicts. Compared 
to the optimism of the Liberal Peace ideal, these analyses were much grimmer, 
portraying the future of the planet as much more dangerous and full of conflicts. 
Population growth, environmental stress, scarcity and inequality would turn the 
world into a systematically more insecure place, especially in the developing world, 
where weak governments without the capacity to shield people from these 
changes would be unable to create the necessary social, technical, and 
economical changes to cope with the coming anarchy.  
 
3.4. Threats to the Liberal Peace 
 
With the Cold War threat out of sight and the demise of communism in many parts 
of the world, the military and economic support for client states of the US and the 
Soviet Union (now Russia) quickly faded. Regimes that had been stable and that 
had been able to boost relatively consistent economic growth between the 1960s 
and 1980s suddenly had to deal with economic decline and political instability.187 
Dictatorial regimes that had been able to successfully suppress their subject 
populations, such as in Cote d´Ivoire, Cambodia, or the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, were suddenly confronted with popular revolts, coup d’états, and 
rebellions.  
Many authors have confirmed that the 1990s brought along a wave of ´new 
conflicts´; conflicts in which people fought within national borders, and in which 
civilians killed civilians rather than soldiers killing soldiers, leading to ethnic strife, 
violations of human rights, hundreds of thousands of refugees, and a surge of illicit 
trade of arms and valuable resources to finance wars. To give an example, one 
UNDP report argued that before 1990 an estimated 90% of war victims were 
professional soldiers in regular state armies. Contrarily, since 1990 the tables have 
turned around; an estimated 90% of war victims are now civilians, more often than 
not killed by fellow civilians.188 Also, civil wars have been argued to constitute 94% 
of all conflicts since the 1990s.189 
The 1990s brought along a range of academic studies and policy reports on how 
the nature of conflict had changed since the Cold War. Recognizing the new age 
                                            
187Schraeder. “Africa in World Politics”. (2004), pp. 288-291. 
188 UNDP. “Human Development Report¨. (2002), page 16. 






of globalization, contemporary security threats were not to be sought only in 
conventional conflicts between states, but rather in sub-state groups in an 
increasingly interdependent world. States were still important agents in the security 
debate, but could not be analyzed without taking into consideration international 
trade, regional and international institutions, civil society organizations, human 
rights issues, scarcity, refugee streams, illicit trafficking of arms and drugs, and 
terrorist organizations, among others.  
Martin van Creveld, an influential military historian and realist scholar, published a 
book in 1991 titled ¨The Transformation of War¨, in which he discussed 
contemporary wars, by whom they are fought, what it is all about, how it is fought, 
and what it is fought for. Creveld predicted that:  
 
¨We are entering an era, not of peaceful economic competition between trading blocks, 
but of warfare between ethnic and religious groups. Even as familiar forms of armed 
conflict are sinking into the dustbin of the past, radically new ones are raising their heads 
ready to take their place. Already today the military power fielded by the principal 
developed societies in both ¨West¨ and ¨East¨ is hardly relevant to the task at hand.¨190 
 
Creveld also destroyed the widely assumed notion that conflict is a phenomenon 
that human beings prefer to avoid. For many people in developing countries, 
conflict is a way of life, a way achieve a sense of liberation, and above all, an end 
rather than a means. ¨Physical aggression is part of being human. In places where 
the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has always been 
mass poverty, people find liberation in violence. Only when people attain a certain 
economic, educational, and cultural standard is this trait tranquilized.¨191 
This grim neo-realist future vision was shared by authors such as Thomas Homer-
Dixon and Robert Kaplan. The first, focusing on environmental change and acute 
conflict, envisioned a planet tortured by scarcity, overpopulation, environmental 
stress, socio-economic shenanigans, and, inevitably in some regions, armed 
conflict. Homer-Dixon took as a starting point of his analysis the physical world of 
population growth, food scarcity, and declining energy resources, rather than the 
utopian notion that ideas would be able to overcome such crucial realities. As a 
neo-Malthusian, warning for the inevitable dangers of population growth and 
scarcity, especially in the developing world, he insisted that although neo-
Malthusians may underestimate our adaptability in today´s environmental-social 
system, their analysis may become ever more compelling as time 
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passes.192Robert Kaplan, another post-Cold War pessimist, or realist, also 
portrayed a future of anarchy rather than liberty. In his 1994 article the Coming 
Anarchy, Kaplan depicted a planet that would more and more resemble that of 
West-Africa, with a withering state, the rise of crime, the unchecked spread of 
disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.193 Fukuyama´s last man and the 
end of history only existed in the rich world, where economic and social pressures 
could be overcome. The rest of the planet, where poverty, lack of clean water, and 
inequality reigned, was much more akin to Hobbes´ first man: 
 
¨We are entering a bifurcated world. Part of the globe is inhabited by Hegel´s and 
Fukuyama´s Last Man, healthy, well fed, and pampered by technology. The other, larger, 
part is inhabited by Hobbes´ First Man, condemned to a life that is ¨poor, nasty, brutish, 
and short.¨ Although both parts will be threatened by environmental stress, the Last Man 
will be able to master it; the First Man will not.¨194 
 
More authors recognized the new types of security threats that emerged during the 
sanctions decade. As relationships between non-state, sub-state, and international 
agents became stronger, the role of the state in international security issues 
seemed to wither away. For example, William Reno focused on the ties between 
foreign firms and African rulers in Sierra Leone, where politicians and warlords 
used private networks that ¨exploit relationships with international businesses to 
buttress their wealth and so extend their powers of patronage.¨195 Later, the term 
¨shadow state¨ was coined, referring to states in which the government delivered 
hardly any services, while tightly controlling illicit trade networks and while 
controlling their subjects through patronage.  
The character of modern warfare was fundamentally different from that of 
traditional warfare. Not only the location of political violence had changed, the 
organizational forms and borders of conflict had also shifted. ¨As militia groups 
replace regular armies, and internal wars transmute into protracted crises, the 
boundaries between such things as war, crime, and peace appear increasingly 
vague and blurred¨.196  
The transformation o conflict was perhaps best captured in Mary Kaldor’s book 
‘New and Old Wars’. Kaldor explains that in an increasingly globalized world, 
governments have increasingly lost the ability to successfully project power within 
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the State. In a world dominated by transnational companies and international 
trade, vertical Weberian government structures can at best sign-post the rules of 
conduct within the State, and at worst serve to rubber-stamp decisions taken by 
international and transnational political, economic, and financial institutions. To the 
winners of Globalization, well-educated cosmopolitans of the global North and 
elites in the global South who thrive in a transnational environment dominated by 
international institutions, NGO´s, transnational corporations, and international 
(social) media, the erosion of state power is not a reason for concern. For the 
losers of globalization, blue-collar factory workers, high school drop-outs, waiters, 
cleaners, and the unemployed, cosmopolitanism does not make sense. 
Globalization affects their lives just as much as it does the winners, but never in a 
positive way. Why strive towards cosmopolitan values of universal human rights 
and inequality in obscure countries on the other side of the world, if your own state 
cannot even provide descent goods, services, and stability at the national level? 
“Zuerst kommt das Fressen, und dann die Moral”.197 Or as Palamarchus claimed 
in Plato´s Republic: “Justice is taking care of your friends and harming your 
enemies”.198 According to Kaldor, the losers of globalization, both in the West, the 
East, and the South, tend to be sensitive to what she calls ´identity politics´.199 
Ethnic mobilization in Sub-Sahara Africa to ´grab´ the state, religious mobilization 
to claim political legitimacy in the Middle East, and nationalist mobilization to 
authorize ethnic cleansing in the Balkans: all are examples of power politics, and 
all are the result of the discontents of globalization. These are the new threats to 
Liberal Peace. 
 
3.5. The Responsibility to Protect and UN Peace Operations 
 
The international regime of Liberal Peace culminated in 2001 in an influential report 
by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
titled ‘The Responsibility to Protect’. The concept of R2P was borne out of the 
atrocities committed in the 1990s in the Rwanda genocide and the Srebrenica 
massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the international community failed 
to intervene effectively. Something needed to be done to allow for humanitarian 
military intervention in certain cases. Critics warned that the concept of the ‘right 
to intervene’ could turn into a cover for gracious interference in the internal affairs 
of sovereign states. Others complained that only weak states would be subjected 
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to foreign interventions, leaving strong states untouched. As the ICISS report 
recognized:  
 
“For some, the new interventions herald a new world in which human rights trumps state 
sovereignty; for others, it ushers in a world in which big powers ride roughshod over the 
smaller ones, manipulating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and human rights. The 
controversy has laid bare basic divisions within the international community. In the 
interest of all those victims who suffer and die when leadership and institutions fail, it is 
crucial that these divisions be resolved”.200 
 
These were important (and to a large extent accurate) criticisms. “But”, asked UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan in a 2000 report: “if humanitarian intervention is, 
indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a 
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that 
offend every precept of our common humanity”?201 The ICISS, established by the 
Canadian government to deal with this question, provided a framework on the rules 
surrounding R2P that has since been adopted by the UN General Assembly (2005) 
as well as the African Union.  
The concept of R2P fully recognizes the changed nature of conflict, and purports 
that the international community has a responsibility to react to situations where 
large scale loss of civilian life or ethnic cleansing is threatened or taking place, but 
also to prevent conflicts from breaking out and to rebuild states in the aftermath of 
a conflict in order to diminish the risk of renewed conflict. All three responsibilities 
(to prevent, react, and rebuild) are fully integrated with the liberal peace ideal. For 
example, the Responsibility to Prevent recognized root causes of conflicts such as 
poverty, human rights abuses, and other political grievances, and provides tools of 
governance and diplomacy to put states on the ‘right track’. Similarly, the 
suggestions regarding the Responsibility to Rebuild are perfectly in sync with the 
prescriptions of Kant’s Republicanism and his disciples.  
The use of sanctions pertains to the realm of the Responsibility to React. Just as 
in the UN Charter, R2P makes a distinction between ‘measures short of military 
action’ and ‘military intervention’, in which the former always has the initial 
preference. “As a matter of first principles, in the case of reaction just as with 
prevention, less intrusive and coercive measures should always be considered 
before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied”.202 The threshold for military 
intervention should be high, whereas the bar for political, economic, and judicial 
measures can be set lower. The sanctions that the ICISS proposes as suitable 
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under suitable circumstances are arms embargoes, ending military cooperation, 
financial sanctions and asset freezes of individuals, restrictions on income 
generating activities such as oil, diamonds, timber, or drugs, restrictions on 
petroleum imports,203 aviation bans and travel restrictions, and diplomatic 
restrictions. 
One of the advantages of sanctions is that they do not directly interfere with the 
concept of State sovereignty, whereas military interventions do. “Sanctions inhibit 
the capacity of states to interact with the outside world, while not physically 
preventing the state from carrying out actions within its borders”.204 This implies 
that States such as China that have traditionally defended the importance of the 
respect for State sovereignty might be more easily persuaded to impose sanctions 
than to intervene militarily. After all, one can justifiably impose diplomatic or 
financial sanctions on a government without violating its (territorial) sovereignty.  
Perhaps most importantly, the R2P report touches upon the issue of Just Cause, 
i.e. the idea that the international community can only intervene, either with 
sanctions or militarily, in case of a situation that surpasses a certain threshold. 
When it comes to military intervention there seems to be a general consensus as 
to when this threshold is surpassed. Military intervention is permitted in order to:  
 
“halt or avert large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, 
which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or 
a failed state situation; or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether 
carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.”  
 
Such situations typically include the actions defined in the 1948 Genocide 
Convention, crimes against humanity as defined in the Geneva Conventions, and 
different manifestations of ‘ethnic cleansing’ or other types of systematic killing or 
physical removal of members from a particular group, but also situations of state 
collapse that cause mass starvation or civil conflict and natural disasters in which 
the government is unable or unwilling to provide care for its people, such as in the 
aftermath of the 2007 Tsunami in South-East Asia. The concept of ‘large scale 
suffering’ is not quantified in any of these matters.  
The concept of R2P was officially (and unanimously) adopted in the Outcome 
Document of the 2005 World Summit of the United Nations. Articles 138 and 139 
stipulated that:  
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“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability”,  
 
And also that: 
 
“The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to 
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means 
be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need 
for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. 
We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States 
build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity and to assisting those under stress before crises and 
conflicts break out.” 
 
R2P, not surprisingly, remains the subject of much scrutiny and debate about its 
selective nature, as well as its intrusive character.  
Regarding the selectivity of humanitarian intervention, how can we explain that 
proponents of R2P never seem to push for military intervention in Gaza to protect 
the Palestinians from Israeli missiles? Or how can one defend the fact that China 
and Russia continually afford themselves the luxury of vetoing resolutions on 
military intervention in Syria? From a humanitarian point of view this type of 
selectivity is morally unacceptable. Nevertheless, R2P has also been recognized 
by political scientists and practitioners as “the most important shift in the definition 
of sovereignty since the treaty of Westphalia”,205 and as a concept that has 
positively influenced the behavior of international society in responding to mass 
                                            






killings.206 For example, Roland Paris argues that the track record of R2P is 
actually more successful and consistent than critics portray.207  
On the other side of the selectivity spectrum, some authors have critically assessed 
the use of the 2011 humanitarian intervention in Libya (carried out by NATO with 
UN approval) to remove Colonel Gadhafi from power, especially since it has only 
brought the country into deeper trouble.208 Such critiques don’t only aim at the 
selective nature of UN peace operations, they also point towards their 
intrusiveness. Whereas traditionally, UN peace keeping operations were politically 
and militarily conservative, respecting the holy trinity of consent, impartiality, and 
the non-use of force, humanitarian interventions breach with all three.209 
Humanitarian interventions require consent from the UNSC, but not from the 
parties to the conflict. They use force per definition, and while they do not 
necessarily breach with the concept of impartiality, in practice they typically choose 
sides to a conflict. This firmly pushes R2P into the UN Charter’s Chapter VII (Action 
with respect to Threats to the Peace), whereas peacekeeping has traditionally 
fallen under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes).  
Whereas military intervention under the guise of R2P has been subject of intense 
debate, the more subtle and primary tool of R2P, sanctions, has been largely left 
outside of the debate. Surely there have been criticisms on sanctions regimes, but 
these typically regard the complaint that they are either too harsh on innocent 
civilians, or that they are ineffective in coercing the behavior of their targets. It is 
however worth digging deeper into the selectivity of UN sanctions regimes, as they 
are politically cheaper to impose, less intrusive than humanitarian (military) 
interventions, and useful tools for governments to signal moral outrage over 
violations of international law or threats to the (liberal) peace.  
 
3.6. Liberal Peace and UN Sanctions 
 
The following paragraphs will show that cosmopolitans in the UN have pushed for 
an expansion of international sanctions to deal precisely with the kinds of ´threats 
to the peace´ that the doctrine of R2P aims at. Civil wars, coup d´état´s, and 
terrorist groups are not only the major contemporary issues of concern when it 
comes to atrocities and crimes against humanity that require military intervention; 
they are also the main ‘sanctionable offences’ of today. Contemporary ‘smart’ or 
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‘targeted’ sanctions are designed to deal precisely with these issues. The 
cosmopolitans (utopians) that have moved the concept of sovereignty towards 
Kant 2.0 have also acquired the tools to sanction actors that are led astray. 
However, how do the rules of R2P, most importantly that of ‘Just Cause’ apply to 
sanctions? And what does the record of imposed sanctions look like when 
compared to other sanctionable offences that were not sanctioned? Can we detect 
any form of consistency in line with the ‘rule of law’? Or do sanctions rather serve 
the interests of those in power?  
As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, the early 1990s were a mix of 
liberalist optimism about the spread of liberal values, and at the same time of grim 
realism about the instability on the ground in developing countries. How did the 
regime of Liberal Peace affect UN Sanctions? United Nations policy mirrored this 
duality. Ideologically, they embraced the idea of the last man and confirmed that 
liberal democratic values were an important requisite for those underdeveloped 
countries that deserved the world´s attention in the early 1990s. As a logical result, 
the rules around when sanctions could be legitimately imposed had to be adapted.  
In 1992 UN Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali recognized that the new sources of 
conflict and war were pervasive and deep. ¨To reach them will require our utmost 
effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to promote 
sustainable economic and social development for wider prosperity, to alleviate 
distress and to curtail the existence and use of massively destructive weapons¨.210 
The 1992 Agenda for Peace also mentions the relation between poverty, 
oppression, pollution, corruption, lack of democracy etc. and conflict. The UN 
reconsidered the sources of conflict, arguing for a different role of the UN; a role 
that allowed the organization to intervene in internal affairs of states. It was the 
task of leaders of States ¨to understand this and to find a balance between the 
needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more 
interdependent world”.211 Together with a wide range of international and sub-
national organizations, they set the agenda for peacekeeping in the nineties. 
Together, they would deal with new wars, bringing peace and democracy to states 
in order to promote security. Sanctions were part of the tools available to ensure 
conflict resolution.  
Twelve UN sanctions regimes were imposed during the 1990s, oftentimes referred 
to by scholars as the ‘sanctions decade: Iraq (1990), Former Yugoslavia (1991, 
1992, 1998), Libya (1992), Liberia (1992), Somalia (1992), Cambodia (1992), Haiti 
(1993), Angola (1993, 1997, 1998), Rwanda (1994), Sudan (1996), Sierra Leone 
(1997), and Afghanistan (1999).212 The diverse range of purposes for which 
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sanctions were employed include: to reverse territorial aggression, to restore 
democratically elected leaders, to promote human rights, to deter and punish 
terrorism, and to promote disarmament. Of the twelve UN sanctions episodes in 
the 1990s, only one (Iraq 1990) concerned a traditional interstate conflict. In three 
cases the UN sanctions were a reaction to terrorist attacks or groups (Libya 1992, 
Sudan 1996, Afghanistan 1999). In another eight instances the issue to which the 
UNSC reacted was an issue that fell under the national sovereignty of the state at 
hand (Former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Somalia, Cambodia, Haiti, Angola, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone).213 Most of these internal issues regarded civil wars. In Haiti the 
sanctions were imposed after a coup d´état. 
 
Table 3. United Nations sanctions regimes since 1945 
Case Name First 
Sanctions 
Resolution 
Year        
Imposed 





UNSCR 232 1966 1979 Apartheid 
regime 
South Africa UNSCR 569 1985 1994 Apartheid 
regime 
Iraq-Kuwait UNSCR 661 1990 2003 Aggression 
FRY: Croatia UNSCR 713 1991 1996 Civil War 
FRY: Bosnia UNSCR 757 1992 1995 Civil War 
Southern 
Rhodesia 
UNSCR 232 1966 1979 Apartheid 
regime 
South Africa UNSCR 569 1985 1994 Apartheid 
regime 
Iraq-Kuwait UNSCR 661 1990 2003 Aggression 
FRY: Croatia UNSCR 713 1991 1996 Civil War 
FRY: Bosnia UNSCR 757 1992 1995 Civil War 
Somalia I UNSCR 733 1992 - Civil War 
Libya UNSCR 748 1992 2003 Sponsor 
Terrorism 
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Cambodia UNSCR 792 1992 1994 Civil War 
Liberia I UNSCR 778 1992 2015 Civil War 
Haiti UNSCR 873 1993 1994 Coup d´état 
Angola UNSCR 864 1993 2002 Civil War 
Rwanda UNSCR 918 1994 2008 Civil War 
Sudan UNSCR 1070 1996 - Sponsor 
Terrorism 
Sierra Leone UNSCR 1132 1997 2010 Civil War / 
Coup d’état 
FRY: Kosovo UNSCR 1199 1998 2001 Civil War 
Al Qaeda / 
Taliban 
UNSCR 1267 1999 - Terrorism 
Eritrea-
Ethiopia 
UNSCR 1298 2000 2001 Aggression 
DRC Congo UNSCR 1493 2003 - Civil War 
Liberia II UNSCR 1343 2003 2016 Civil War 
Cote d’Ivoire UNSCR 1572 2004 - Civil War 
North Korea UNSCR 1718 2006 - Nuclear 
Proliferation 
Iran UNSCR 1737 2006 - Nuclear 
Proliferation 
Somalia II UNSCR 1844 2008 - Civil War 
Eritrea - 
Djibouti 
UNSCR 1907 2009 - Aggression 
Libya II UNSCR 1970 2011 - Civil War 
Guinea 
Bissau 
UNSCR 2048 2012 - Coup d´état 
Central Afr. 
Rep. 
UNSCR 2127 2013 - Civil War 
ISIS UNSCR 2253 2014 - Terrorism 







The UN Sanctions episode of Iraq-Kuwait was an exception in the sense that it 
concerned one of the few cases of interstate aggression since 1990. The other 
eleven cases, especially the African civil wars and the terrorist threats, are all 
cases that seem to come straight out of Kaplan´s The Coming Anarchy, Collier’s 
Greed vs. Grievance, and Kaldor’s Old and New Wars. Bloodthirsty warlords, child 
soldiers, illicit terrorist networks, and arms smuggling dominated the books and 
news-articles about many of these conflicts. Somali refugees, Sierra Leonean 
children with AK-47s, and state-sponsored terrorism dominated the news. The UN 
General Assembly and the Sanctions Committee also recognized these problems, 
hence their policies concerning these conflicts. In the case of Cambodia, a conflict 
that had raged since the 1970´s but was only tended to in 1991 in the Paris 
Accords, the UN found itself attempting to create a politically viable Cambodian 
government with the factions willing to cooperate with the UN mission, while 
progressively isolating the Khmer Rouge, a rebel movement pillaging Cambodia´s 
mineral and forest resources in order to sustain the conflict.214 In Angola, another 
conflict that originated during the Cold War after independence was granted by 
Portugal, two factions (the MPLA government and the UNITA rebel movement) 
had been fighting over power for decades. For both parties, the war had become 
¨commerce by other means¨, with the objective of controlling the country´s vast 
wealth.215 Despite the imposed arms embargo in 1993, three hundred thousand 
people were killed after UNITA´s rejection of the election´s result. According to 
Human Rights Watch, a thousand people died every day, making the Angolan civil 
war the bloodiest war on the planet at that moment.216 In Somalia, perhaps the 
sanctions case that most resembled The Coming Anarchy, clan leaders and 
factional militia struggled over the control of food supplies and access to arms, as 
previous fighting had led to a famine, killing hundreds of thousands. Armed gangs 
ruled the streets, looting whatever they could in Mogadishu as well as the country 
side. Unfortunately, the only sanction imposed regarded an arms embargo in 1992, 
which hardly had any effect.217 All the above examples had to be settled through 
military interventions. The only instance in which UN sanctions were thought to 
have achieved their objective without the need for military intervention is that of 
Libya after the Lockerby bombing of 1988.218  
In terms of widening the scope of international law, the sanctions decade was a 
success. Offences that could previously not be sanctioned by the United Nations 
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were now embedded in its institutional framework; the twelve sanctions episodes 
of the 1990s bear witness to this progress. However, the UN sanctions regimes of 
the 1990s were also largely failures. They failed in the sense that they did not 
project the power that UN policy makers had hoped for. Rather than coercing their 
targets into lawful behavior, UN comprehensive economic sanctions and arms 
embargoes either affected innocent civilians, or were evaded by their targets 
altogether through illegal arms trade networks.219 In order to deal with these 
failures, policy makers of the early 2000s focused on making targeted sanctions 
more effective in actually undermining the financial and military networks of their 
targets: sub-national and transnational actors that facilitate the new wars.220  
If the 1990s are dubbed the ´sanctions decade´, the 2000´s could be referred to 
as the ´targeted sanctions decade´. Targeted sanctions were already used in the 
1990s in cases such as Libya, the Taliban, and Sudan, but became 
institutionalized, and arguably more effective, in the 2000s.221 Much was learned 
about the effectiveness of smart sanctions thanks to three international projects 
around the turn of the millennium, along with the introduction of expert panels to 
monitor targeted sanctions regimes. From 1998 to 2001, the Interlaken Process, 
hosted by the Swiss government, in cooperation with the United Nations and the 
Watson Institute, brought together financial experts, academics, and policy makers 
to discuss the effectiveness of financial sanctions. From 1999 to 2001, the German 
government hosted the Bonn-Berlin process, focusing on travel and aviation 
sanctions. Later, between 2001 and 2003, the Swedish government hosted the 
Stockholm Process, bringing together experts and academics in the field of arms 
embargoes.222 The Interlaken Process recognized that during the previous decade 
(the 1990s) not all sanctions regimes had been successful in inducing the targeted 
leaderships to return to policies respectful of international norms: 
 
Targeted sanctions are designed to focus on groups of persons responsible for the 
breaches of the peace or the threats to international peace and security, while ideally 
leaving other parts of the population and international trade relations unaffected. Such 
sanctions can target financial assets as well as the freedom of movement of the targeted 
persons through travel and aviation sanctions.¨223 
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The targeted sanctions decade is not precisely a decade, but rather a reference to 
the book the Sanctions Decade by Cortright and Lopez, which stands so central in 
the literature on sanctions and has become a widely shared expression in the 
literature. In reality, the targeted sanctions decade starts in the late 1990s and 
continues until this day. As targeted sanctions are closely related with the changes 
made in the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin, and Stockholm processes, it makes sense to 
only count those sanctions cases in which these ´new sanctions´ were applied. In 
some cases, these changes occurred during the sanctions regime. For example, 
the cases of Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Sudan, and Sierra Leone belong both to the 
sanctions decade and the targeted sanctions decade, as the sanctions were 
initiated in the 1990s, but lasted until the late 2000s, or are still in place. 
 
Table 4 - UN Targeted Sanctions Cases 





Somalia 1992-now x x    
Liberia 1992-2016 x x x x x 
Angola 1993-2002 x  x x x 
Sudan 1996-now x x   x 
Sierra Leone 1997-2010 x x x x x 
Al Qaeda/ 
Taliban 
1999-now x x   x 
Eritrea 2000-2001 x x    
Ethiopia 2000-2001 x x    
Iraq 2003-now x x   x 
DRC 2003-now x x x  x 
Ivory Coast 2004-now x x x  x 
North Korea 2006-now x x    
Iran 2006-now  x    
Libya 2011-now x x x x x 
Guinea-Bissau  2012-now     x 







The shift towards targeted sanctions can be explained in two ways. Firstly, the shift 
can be seen as a logical result of the failures of previous comprehensive sanctions 
cases, most notably Iraq. UN Sanctions regimes were not effective because they 
were blunt tools that hurt innocent civilians while leaving the actual targets 
unaffected.224 Many students of international sanctions have argued this, and it is 
certainly true that targeted sanctions are a lot more effective than comprehensive 
sanctions. The second explanation for the shift towards targeted sanctions is that 
they fit much better within the logic of liberal peace. The types of conflicts and 
targets that threaten the liberal peace are typically sub-state actors, non-state 
actors, or transnational actors. warlords, coup leaders, diamond smugglers, arms 
traders, and other actors of the new wars cannot be hurt by comprehensive 
economic sanctions because they don´t represent the state.225 New Wars, 
manifesting themselves in civil conflict and terrorism, not wars of aggression, have 
become the main ‘threats to the peace’; targeted sanctions deal with these new 
threats. New problems ask for new solutions. 
A quick look at the sanctions regimes that have been imposed since 1990 show 
us that indeed only two traditional border conflicts were sanctioned by the UN: Iraq-
Kuwait and Ethiopia-Eritrea. The other 24 cases since 1990 all concern offences 
that could only have been addressed within the wider doctrine of liberal peace. 
Already in 1993 did the UN allow for the imposition of a sanctions regime on Haiti 
in response to the military coup that ousted the democratically elected president 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide.226 The arms embargoes on Liberia, Somalia, and Libya in 
1992, Angola in 1993, and on Rwanda in 1994, although large ineffective, show 
that sanctions were in a way ahead of their time in contesting the idea of state 
sovereignty. R2P did perhaps not exist to justify military intervention, but there was 
an unquestionable consensus that the failed states of the early 1990s were 
undeserving of complete sovereignty. The UN sanctions of the era attest to this.  
During the targeted sanctions decade the track record of UN sanctions improved 
in terms of effectiveness too. Thanks to the efforts of the conferences in Interlaken, 
Bonn-Berlin, and Stockholm, UN sanctions regimes on Sierra Leone, Angola, 
Liberia, Cote d´Ivoire, and the DRC Congo, among others, became more effective 
in undermining the financial and military capabilities of regimes and rebel 
movements such as UNITA in Angola, the regime of Charles Taylor in Liberia, and 
that of Laurent Gbagbo in Cote d´Ivoire.227 The most influential of these sanctions 
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regimes was perhaps that imposed on the UNITA rebel movement in Angola, to 
which I will dedicate a few extra paragraphs for the purpose of illustration.  
The UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) rebel 
movement of Angola had been fighting for political control of the previously 
Portuguese colony since independence in 1975. As a typical Cold War proxy 
conflict, UNITA was backed by the United States and South Africa, whereas the 
MPLA government forces were supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba, which 
sent soldiers and doctors. In the early 1990s UNITA lost support from the West 
and started a renewed military campaign financed largely through the exploitation 
of diamond mines in the interior regions of Angola that it controlled, but also 
through looting and pillaging local populations. Between 1992 and 1994 the war 
killed many thousands and displaced 1.5 million people.228 Initially, a 1993 UN 
arms embargo did little to diminish the access to arms. Jonas Savimbi, UNITA’s 
strongman, had a sophisticated network of diamond smugglers, Eastern European 
arms traffickers, and befriended heads of State from the DRC to Togo and 
Rwanda. It is estimated that UNITA’s revenues from diamond exports amounted 
anywhere between USD $400 million and USD $700 million annually between 
1992 and 1997.  
In 1999, a report by Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler, who led the UN 
Sanctions Committee on Angola, pointed out in much detail how Savimbi’s conflict 
was financed, and who were involved in his network.229 The Fowler Report had for 
the first time employed a Panel of Experts that focused solely on the 
implementation of the sanctions and on finding and fixing the holes in the system. 
Thanks to improved monitoring of Arms trafficking and the establishment of the 
Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for diamonds (KPCS), which only allowed 
the export of diamonds certified by the Angolan government, the war effort of 
UNITA was largely undermined.230 Not long after Savimbi was shot dead in 2001, 
UNITA signed a peace agreement and accepted the role of political opposition 
party in the Angolan government.  
Subsequent UN sanctions regimes have learned a lot from the Fowler Report. The 
KPCS grew out to an international institution with 54 members representing 81 
countries.231 Expert panels have become a standard function in UN sanctions 
committees, and have proposed and established other institutions to monitor and 
regulate the financing of war through export of other products, including the Dodd-
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Frank consumer protection act in the United States,232 and growing membership 
of the the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an organization that 
promotes transparency around the money involved in natural resource exports.  
Finally, the UN targeted sanctions regimes of the new millennium have also 
brought us closer to the Liberal Peace in another way. Since 2003 UN Sanctions 
have also been brought in line with R2P’s responsibility to rebuild. In the aftermath 
of the second Liberian civil war, the UN Security Council agreed to impose 
sanctions on the exports of Liberian Timber after the peace had already been 
signed.233 primarily aimed at diminishing the risk of renewed conflict financed by 
Timber exports, but the requirements that were stipulated for lifting the embargo 
were completely in line with the ideals of the liberal peace regime on governance 
and state building. Not only was Liberia to first hold successful and peaceful 
democratic elections, but the Government of Liberia was also to push through a 
number of reforms in the timber industry that were prescribed by the Liberian 
Forest Initiative (LFI), an initiative led by the US State Department. Similar 
sanctions regimes to improve governance and rebuild the State have since been 
used in Libya and Guinea Bissau.  
The 24 UN Sanctions regimes 1990 leave no doubt that sanctions have contributed 
to bringing the world closer to the ideal of liberal peace. But have they done so 
consistently? Indeed they have been used to deal with the ‘new wars’ of the post-
Cold War era; indeed they have become more targeted and better at dealing with 
dictatorial governments, rebel movements, arms traffickers, and other sub-national 
and trans-national players involved in contemporary conflicts; Indeed they have 
successfully responded to border wars, but also to civil wars, terrorist groups, and 
stagers of military coups; Indeed they have put post-conflict governments on the 
correct track towards sustainable peace and liberal governance. But what about 
all the other cases in which a civil war was not met with UN sanctions? What about 
the Coup d´état’s since 1990 that were not replied to by imposing UN sanctions on 
those who staged it? What about terrorist organizations that have not been 
targeted by UN sanctions, even though they made more victims than some of the 
organizations that were sanctioned? Is there any consistency?  
With regard to military interventions and the R2P, the ICISS report replied to these 
criticisms by saying that: “the reality that interventions may not be able to be 
mounted in every case where there is justification for doing so, is no reason for 
them not to be mounted in any case.” In other words, we sometimes have to accept 
that although we are living in a world that is increasingly driven by cosmopolitan 
humanitarian morals, we are also still living in a world full of strategic and selfish 
interests and a UNSC that is dominated by five permanent members who 
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sometimes vote against the cosmopolitan interest and in favor of their selfish realist 
interests.  
This argument may very well be true of military interventions, but much less so 
when it comes to UN sanctions. After all, UN sanctions are not a direct interference 
with state sovereignty (as China and to a lesser extent Russia often object). 
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, sanctions are politically much cheaper 
to impose than a military intervention. After all, sanctions can be imposed without 
sending any soldiers and without losing much money economically.234 Diplomatic 
sanctions, travel bans, asset freezes of individual targets might not be the most 
effective sanctions, but they are a very cheap and effective way of at least signaling 
the intent to uphold cosmopolitan law. This makes them excellent tools of two-level 
games, satisfying domestic pressure and international interests simultaneously.235 
If a government refuses to intervene militarily based on the argument that the 
political and economic costs of sending soldiers would be too high, the public might 
accept this argument as a legitimate and logical one.236 However, a State cannot 
refuse to impose a travel ban, diplomatic sanctions, or an arms embargo on the 
basis of the same argument. Governments are thus more likely to be convinced by 
humanitarian circumstances or public pressure to push for UN sanctions.237  
Records of sanctions and votes on sanctions are thus a good tool to measure the 
‘intentions’ of States in upkeeping the rule of international law and strengthening 
the regime of Liberal Peace than military interventions. The countries that have led 
the way establishing the doctrine of R2P should have a natural interest in being 
consistent when it comes to sanctioning targets who pose a threat to the Liberal 
Peace. Following the idealism of Kant, Wilson, and Nye, the institutional liberalism 
of Krasner and Keohane’s, and the policies of liberal politicians from Annan to 
Guterres, and from Blair to Obama, in pushing the United Nations towards a more 
ambitious project, the West in general should have an interest in demonstrating 
consistency when it comes to imposing sanctions.  
If the track-record shows that UN sanctions episodes since 1990 were consistent 
with the ideas described in this chapter, then we wouldn’t have needed to look any 
further. We may have then simply congratulated the UN and the players involved 
with a job well done and move on to other matters.  
However, the track record of UN sanctions since 1990 does not unquestionably 
and fully represent on of liberal peace. Progress may have been made, but the 
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record still reflects a policy of selectiveness. Many nuclear proliferators, interstate 
wars, civil wars, state-sponsors of terrorism, terrorist organizations, and coup’s 
d’état remain unsanctioned. How can this selectiveness be explained? Are some 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression objectively 
bigger than others? Is it all about power-politics of the permanent members of the 
Security Council and the UN veto? Are some armed groups and governments too 
powerful to be subjected to UN sanctions? Are the Western proponents of liberal 
peace coherent when it comes to proposing UN sanctions? Or do they sometimes 
act in conflict with the ideals they stand for?  
If we find the answers to the above questions, we also find the answer to the central 
question of this thesis: What are UN sanctions for? Are they tools of justice? Or 
tools of power? If the track record can mostly be explained through vetoes and the 
countervailing power of some players to avoid getting sanctions, we could describe 
the liberal peace project as a process facing obstacles. If, however, the actions 
and intentions of the West go plainly against the ideals they claim to uphold, then 
perhaps one should regard the track record of UN sanctions as one of betrayal, 






















































































Chapters one to three have provided us with a theoretical framework surrounding 
the historical role of the League of Nations and the United Nations, as well as the 
significance of international institutions and the influence of ideas and power within 
them. We have also discussed the doctrine of Liberal Peace and its influence on 
UN sanctions regimes since 1990, concluding that the norms surrounding UN 
sanctions regimes have most definitely changed since the end of the Cold War, 
but that the rules and procedures surrounding decision making have stayed the 
same. As a result, the current regime of UN sanctions allows for a much more 
ambitious sanctions policy, but it doesn’t guarantee a tangible liberal peace on the 
ground. Realism remains relevant. When geo-political stakes are low, 
cosmopolitan ideals sometimes come through; when it comes to hard issues, 
however, muscles matter.  
The task at hand in the chapters to come (5-9) is now to present evidence that 
supports the claims above, and that explains precisely what the underlying 
motivations for the imposition of sanctions are. In other words, our analysis of UN 
sanctions regimes since 1990 needs to provide arguments to back up the claims 
that: 
 
a) The ideas surrounding when the United Nations should impose 
sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN charter have changed since 1990, 
and;  
b) As the geo-political stakes get higher, the likelihood of UN sanctions 
regimes to follow the logic of liberal peace decreases.  
 
Chapters five, six, seven, and eight will scrutinize the track-record of the UNSC in 
imposing sanctions on different types sanctioned offences since 1990. Chapter 
five will look at six states that proliferated nuclear weapons or intended to do so 
outside of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, which ‘legally’ allowed the 
US, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China to possess nuclear 
arms. Out of the six offenders since 1968, three were subjected to UN sanctions 






consider four traditional border conflicts since 1990, two of which were sanctioned. 
Chapter seven will consider fifty-eight civil conflicts since 1990, twenty of which 
were sanctioned. Chapter seven will consider eighty-four terrorist organizations 
since 2001, twenty-one of which were sanctioned. Finally, chapter eight will 
examine thirty-six coups d’état, only three of which received sanctions.  
The idea behind splitting the research up into different types of offences is that 
each offence represents a different type of threat to the peace, as well as different 
geopolitical stakes. Nuclear proliferation and interstate warfare are both classical 
issues of high politics. They both represent grave potential threats to international 
security, and they are typically dealt with at the highest diplomatic level. One would 
therefore expect actors within the Security Council to act in line with a typical neo-
realist logic, sanctioning offenders whenever they pose a threat to the peace, with 
the exception of the P-5 members themselves or their closest allies. Civil wars 
sometimes present a geopolitical threat to the peace because they can induce 
regional instability, but they also represent a threat to human security. This makes 
civil war a type of hybrid between high-stakes and low-stakes issues. From a 
humanitarian point of view large-scale conflicts should receive more sanctions; 
from a geo-political point of view, however, the stability of the sovereign state-
system might be more important, and strong governments might be more 
successful in posing a countervailing power to the UN, decreasing the likelihood of 
sanctions. The issue of international terrorism receives lots of attention in the 
international media, but should in reality be considered a low-stakes issue from a 
geopolitical point of view. Finally, coups d’état perhaps represent an even smaller 
threat to international stability and human security, but a bigger threat to 
‘democratic peace’. We would therefore expect these ‘offences’ only to receive 
sanctions when they serve a specific Western interest.    
To be sure, critical scholars of security studies have argued that the past decades 
have witnessed a range of other security threats that might or should have been 
responded to with UN sanctions. Many low-intensity conflicts between 
governments and non-state groups involve structural discrimination, state 
oppression, and widespread human rights abuses of minorities. Ethiopia under 
Mengistu in the 1980s, Indonesia under Suharto in the 1990s, and Venezuela 
under Maduro since 2013 provide examples. Similarly, while some of those 
involved in coups d’état have been subjected to UN sanctions for illegally 
overthrowing sovereign governments, authoritarian and undemocratic 
governments from Zimbabwe to Iran have been able to stay in power through 
rigged election without ever having to fear (UN) sanctions.238 On the sub-state side 
or the equation, while rebels groups and terrorist organizations have been targeted 
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by UN sanctions, equally bloody organized criminal gangs, drug-traffickers, 
pirates, and other criminals have not.239  
There are good arguments for considering the actors mentioned above as ‘threats 
to the peace’, or at least as threats to human security and democratic peace. By 
all means the UNSC is selective in this sense. From an analytical point of view, it 
does however not make sense to include such ‘offences’ in the research of this 
thesis, as there is no possibility to compare sanctioned cases to non-sanctioned 
cases. For this reason, this thesis does also not include wider and deeper security 
threats such as climate change, disease, or cyber-terrorism.  
The analysis of each of the five chapters of this thesis is based on a central 
‘sanctionable offences database’ (SOD) that has been constructed by the author 
for the purpose of this study. This database contains a list of all nuclear 
proliferators (Ch.5) interstate conflicts (Ch.6), civil wars (Ch.7), terrorist 
organizations (Ch.8), and coups d’état (Ch.9) that are deemed ‘sanctionable’. In 
order words, the SOD includes all the offences since 1990 in which the UNSC 
could, some might even say should, have imposed at least some kind of sanction 
if it wanted to claim uphold a coherent doctrine of R2P and the general ideal of 
Liberal Peace.  
There is currently no consensus or specific quantifiable guideline or threshold to 
define what should be regarded as a ‘sanctionable offence’ and what should not 
be regarded as such in the literature on security or on sanctions. The only existing 
legal guideline can be found in the UN Charter’s article 39, which states that 
sanctions may be imposed when the UNSC determines that an issue represents a 
‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’.240 For obvious 
reasons, for the sake of this thesis this doesn’t get us very far.   
However, for each of the offences that is studied in the following chapters, it is 
possible to extract a general consensus in the literature about when an offence 
becomes serious enough to consider the imposition of a UN sanction. For example, 
scholars of conflict studies generally recognize conflicts that surpass a threshold 
of a thousand casualties as a ‘war’, while defining the rest as ‘minor conflicts’.241 
This doesn´t mean that all major conflicts are automatically eligible for UN 
sanctions, but it provides us with a steady basis for comparative research. 
Similarly, coup d´état’s can only be considered as potentially sanctionable when 
they are successful, and they can be considered to become more sanctionable as 
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more people are killed or displaced in the process. Coups are also considered as 
less legitimate, and thus more sanctionable, if they replace a decent and 
democratic government, whereas they become more legitimate, and thus less 
sanctionable, if they replace a brutal tyrant who violates the human rights of his 
own citizens.  
Defining, grading and scaling sanctionable offences is thus an essential part of this 
thesis. The first section of this chapter will therefore provide a comprehensive 
overview of the choices that were made in the database. Some readers might find 
my definitions too strict, arguing that more cases should have made the database. 
Others might think they are too loose, leading to an inclusion of cases that they 
think should have been left out. Still I am convinced that most readers will generally 
agree with the choices that were made.  
The second part of the methodology regards the design of hypotheses about the 
reasons underlying the selective record of UN sanctions since 1990. I do this by 
comparing sanctioned and non-sanctioned cases within each category on the 
basis of variables, which serve as proxies for each hypothesis. Together, these 
variables can be grouped in several ways to help test each hypothesis. Roughly, 
the two main hypotheses revolve around the pillars of realism and idealism. 
However, each pillar is made up of a range of separate variables, each 
representing a different shade of realism or idealism. For example, variables that 
make up the realist pillar include vetoes in the Security Council, but also state 
strength and strategic alliances. Similarly, the idealist pillar can be divided into 
strains of ‘human security’, ‘state-security’, and ‘democratic security’, among 
others. Finally, some variables help in testing sub-hypotheses, such as the ‘CNN 
effect’, or ‘neo-colonialism’. Each variable and its relevance to the research will be 
explained in section 4.2.  
 
4.1. Sanctionable offences in the SOD 
 
What makes a nuclear proliferator, interstate war, civil war, coup d’état, or terrorist 
group sanctionable?  
The current answer for sanctions imposed under the framework of the United 
Nations is that an internal conflict is ‘sanctionable’ when the Security Council 
decides under article 39 of the Charter that it constitutes a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression. That is it. A conflict or actor in a conflict 
is sanctionable when the Security Council says so. Considering that the 
institutional design of the Council tilts power to its P-5 members, this definition 
leaves us largely dependent on their political interpretations of the terms ‘threat to 
the peace’ and ‘breach of the peace.’  






It must be noted that, were we to simply accept the definition of a sanctionable 
internal conflict as ‘whenever the UNSC agrees’, this thesis would not be 
necessary. The very purpose of this study is to point out that there are plenty of 
conflicts that could or perhaps even should have been identified as sanctionable 
offences, but that were not. The purpose is to point out that the current rules 
surrounding sanctions are unsatisfactory from an idealist’s point of view, because 
they reflect political interests, not international law, or a philosophical ideal. This is 
however not to say that the task of this thesis is to disqualify the track record of UN 
sanctions, or to propose a law that is somehow better than ‘whenever the UNSC 
says so.’ Rather, it is to figure out, and then point out, precisely what UN sanctions 
since 1990 are for. It is then up to the reader to draw conclusions about the morality 
of UN sanctions, or about how the UNSC should change in the future to address 
threats to the peace in other ways. Deciding which offences should have been 
sanctioned and which not is also not an easy task from a practical point of view. 
After all, each conflict is unique, and is the result of a complicated mix of political 
and historical events and interests. Determining who should be sanctioned (or not 
sanctioned) in each conflict cannot be determined by some sort of algorithm or 
magic formula.  
The best way to test the claim that UN sanctions are tools of the states that impose 
them would be by providing a detailed case study of each of the 7 nuclear 
proliferators, 4 interstate wars, 58 civil wars, 88 terrorist organizations, and 54 
deadly coups that are identified in this book as ‘sanctionable’ and that took place 
since 1990. This does however not fit within the scope of this book, as it would 
require more than 200 chapters with in-depth case studies of each one. This is not 
an option.  
However, if some sort of algorithm did exist to determine which conflicts should be 
sanctioned and which should not, we would surely be able to establish at least the 
main ingredients. After all, some variables would undoubtedly be more important 
than others. Therefore, the following section proposes a few simple but powerful 
variables that can help us better define the ambiguous terms ‘threat to the peace’ 
and ‘breach of the peace’ for each of the offences. First we will look at minimum 
thresholds to define each offence. Subsequently we will present variables that do 
not only identify a certain threshold, but that also help us in determining the gravity 
of each offence compared to other offences.  
 
4.1.1. Chapter 5 - Nuclear Proliferators (4/7) 
Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and 






as ‘Nuclear Weapons States’ by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, better known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968.242  
Conveniently, all the P-5 members in the UN Security Council had developed 
nuclear weapons by the time the NPT was signed, making China, France, Russia, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States the only five states that ‘legitimately’ 
possess nuclear weapons. The other states that have proliferated nuclear 
weapons are Israel, India, South Africa, Iraq, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. 
Some of them have done so outside of the NPT, as they were never part of it, 
whereas others either withdrew, or denied having nuclear weapons programs.  
The prospect of nuclear warfare is without a doubt the gravest of all types of 
offences that have been sanctioned by the United Nations. The destructiveness of 
a nuclear bomb threatens the annihilation of whole cities, and even countries. One 
would therefore expect the UN sanctions policy surrounding nuclear proliferators 
to play out along classical realist lines. Allies can develop them. Enemies cannot.  
To test whether this is indeed the case, chapter five will present short case-studies 
of each of the seven nuclear proliferators outside of the P-5, considering whether 
they were sanctioned or not and why. Since the chapter only concerns seven 
cases, it is not possible to conduct any large-N comparisons or statistical analysis. 
The conclusions of the chapter, combined with those of chapter six, are then used 
to construct proxies in subsequent chapters,243 in which quantitative analysis is 
more suitable.  
It must be noted that chapter five is the only chapter that also includes a case from 
before 1990. Since the case of South Africa is one of the two countries that 
received sanctions during the Cold War (along with Southern Rhodesia), the 
development of its nuclear program and the related UN sanctions regimes has 
been included in the analysis alongside the cases of Israel and India, which also 






                                            
242 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/140, 1970. 
243 Quantitative analysis will only be used in Chapters 7 (58 civil wars), Chapter 8 (88 terrorist 
organizations), and Chapter 9 (33 coups d’état).  
244 Officially Israel has never acknowledged being in possession of nuclear weapons. For more 
details, consult chapter 5.  






Table 5 - Nuclear proliferators outside of the UNSC P5 
State Year of Proliferation UN Sanctions? 
Israel Unknown No 
India 1974 No 
South Africa Unknown Yes 
Iraq Unknown Yes 
Pakistan 1998 No 
North Korea 2006 Yes 
Iran Unknown Yes 
 
4.1.2. Chapter 6 - Interstate Wars (2/4) 
Interstate Wars are defined as sanctionable in the SOD database when they reach 
an accumulated death count of minimally 1000 since 1990.  
The Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP) defines an armed conflict as a 
‘contested incompatibility’ that concerns government and/or territory where the use 
of an armed force between two parties, in which at least one of the parties is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 ‘battle related deaths’ in one calendar 
year.245 Interstate conflicts are a subcategory of armed conflicts, along with internal 
conflicts, extra-systemic conflicts,246 and internationalized internal conflicts. 
Interstate conflicts, also known as ‘wars of aggression’, ‘Westphalian wars’, or 
‘traditional wars’ are defined by the UCDP as ‘conflicts between two or more 
governments, i.e. the parties controlling the capitals of sovereign states’.247 
Are all interstate wars sanctionable? In theory, all acts of aggression by 
government or non-government actors against a sovereign state could be 
considered as violations of international law. For example, the sporadic fighting in 
the 1980s and 1990 between Nigeria and Cameroon on the Bakassi peninsula, in 
which small numbers of soldiers were imprisoned and sometimes killed, was by all 
means a violation of international law, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
attested in 2002.248 The same could be said about other minor territorial conflicts 
such as the Indonesian ‘Konfrontasie’ against Malaysia in 1963, the Laotian-Thai 
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border war of 1987,249 or Alto Cenapa War between Ecuador and Peru in 1995. 
Indeed, each of these conflicts represented a violation of state sovereignty and a 
breach of the peace. However, in none of these cases did the situation turn into a 
real threat to international security, and in none of these cases were UN sanctions 
considered or imposed.  
Our task is then to establish a definition for a ‘sanctionable’ interstate conflict. 
There are two ways of doing so. The first is by using the UCDP’s definition of a 
war. An interstate conflict passes the threshold from ‘minor conflict’ to ‘war’ when 
it has caused at least 1000 deaths in a given year. Additionally, the database also 
counts cumulative deaths over the course of the conflict, distinguishing between 
conflicts below 1000 cumulative deaths and that surpass that number. Some 
conflicts reach this threshold directly in their first calendar year, directly causing 
them to be labeled as ‘wars’. Other conflicts surpass the threshold of 1000 
casualties after several years of accumulated deaths.  
In the SOD, all conflicts that surpass a cumulative death-count of 1000 are defined 
as sanctionable. This definition thus allows for the inclusion of conflicts that are 
relatively minor in a given calendar year but that persist over time and accumulate 
more than 1000 deaths. The logic behind applying this definition and not one that 
focuses more on intensity is threefold. Firstly, longer but less intensive conflicts 
that accumulate deaths over time are just as deadly as short and intensive wars. 
At the end of the day it’s the amount of deaths that counts. Secondly, long non-
intensive wars give the international community more time to design and 
implement (UN) sanctions cautiously and effectively. Sanctioning intensive 
conflicts might appear more urgent, but also proves to be more difficult. Thirdly, 
the inclusion of non-intensive wars does not exclude intensive wars from being 
analyzed. As a matter of fact, the inclusion of two different types of intensity allows 
for the use of a dummy variable.  
In any case, the design of a dummy variable is of little importance for this chapter 
on interstate conflicts. Even when we include the interstate wars that were not 
‘intensive’ in any given year but that did accumulate to more than 1000 deaths, the 
database only presents us with four conflicts since 1990. Additionally, the UNSC 
has also imposed sanctions in response to the 2008 border war between Eritrea 
and Djibouti. While this conflict is only minor, with  The only way to say something 
intelligible about the sanctionability of these conflicts and the extent to which 
sanctions were imposed is through qualitative analysis of these four cases. Just 
as in chapter 5 (nuclear proliferation), there will be no quantitative analysis involved 
in this chapter.  
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Table 6 - Interstate wars since 1990 
Interstate Wars 1990-
2018 
Conflict Years UN Sanctions? 
Iraq - Kuwait 1990-1991 Yes 
India - Pakistan 1948 - Ongoing No 
Eritrea, Ethiopia 1998-2000 Yes 
US & Allies - Iraq 2003 No 
Eritrea - Djibouti250 2008 Yes 
 
 
4.1.3. Chapter 7 - Civil Wars (23/58) 
Civil wars are defined as sanctionable in the SOD database when they reach an 
accumulated death count of minimally 1000 since 1990. 
Internal armed conflicts, civil wars, and internationalized internal conflicts are not 
easy to define and are oftentimes used in a confusing and imprecise manner. 
Although any observer can easily distinguish between a typical interstate conflict, 
such as that between Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, and a typical civil war such as the 
1994 Rwanda genocide, there are plenty of armed conflicts that blur the line 
between the two, and that have been identified as both interstate wars and civil 
wars. For example, were the conflicts in the Balkans during the 1990s civil wars 
that took place within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and later within 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, FRY), or 
were they interstate wars between the FRY on the one hand and Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo on the other?251  Similarly, why do we regard the 
second Congo War (1998-2003) as an internal conflict between the Congolese 
government and various Congolese rebel groups, even if the war involved not only 
the DRC Congo, but also Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Chad, Sudan, and 
Rwanda?252 And the confusion also works the other way around. Why is the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan considered a civil 
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conflict, even though many commentators have described the conflict as an act of 
territorial aggression by Armenia?253 
The Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP) defines an internal armed conflict 
as an armed conflict that occurs between the government of a state and one or 
more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states.254  If an 
internal armed conflict also includes the intervention from other states (secondary 
parties), it is defined as an internationalized internal armed conflict. For example, 
the 1998 conflict between Serbia and Kosovo is identified as an internal conflict 
because Kosovo was at that point considered an integral part of Serbia, and it is 
identified as internationalized because of the foreign interference of NATO.  
Aren’t all contemporary civil conflicts to some extent internationalized? Some 
authors have indeed recognized that most so called ‘internal wars’ receive at least 
some kind of foreign support.255 How does one distinguish between an 
internationalized (but internal) war, and an old-fashioned interstate war? The 
answer can be found by considering a conflict’s ‘incompatibility’, i.e. the central 
issue at stake in the conflict. In the case of the Congolese Civil War, just as with 
NATO’s support in the Kosovo War, the objective of the foreign states’ support was 
not the annexation of territory, but rather the support of one of the internal parties 
to the conflict.  In the UCDP database, the Congo War is therefore considered an 
internationalized internal conflict, with the Congolese government and Congolese 
rebel movements listed as the main belligerents, and with other states listed as 
second parties supporting either side A or side B in solving an ‘internal 
incompatibility’ concerning the control of the Congolese state.  
Another difficulty when defining an internal conflict concerns the separation of 
conflicts that seemingly belong together. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, the UCDP identifies the conflict as two separate internal wars. The first 
conflict (1990-91) took place between the Soviet Union and its Soviet Republic of 
Armenia, to which the region of Nagorno-Karabakh wished to be transferred. The 
second conflict (1994) is defined as an internal conflict within Azerbaijan, to which 
the province of Nagorno-Karabakh officially belongs, even though they have never 
enjoyed political control over the region.256 It is clear that both conflicts concern the 
same incompatibility, namely the secession of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan. 
Some commentators would even describe the 1994 conflict as a war of aggression 
                                            
253 Broers. “The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict”. (2016).  
254 An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a 
state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. 
255 Detter. “The Law of War”. (2013). Page 54. 
256 Broers. “The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict”. (2016).  






by neighboring Armenia, which provided much of the military support and soldiers 
to Nagorno-Karabakh, which has an Armenian ethnic majority. However, in the 
UCDP database Armenia is not recognized as an international aggressor, but 
rather as a foreign party that supported ‘side B’ in an internationalized internal 
conflict.    
What about states that are home to a number of civil conflicts simultaneously? It is 
important to distinguish between separate conflicts with separate incompatibilities, 
and to recognize that some conflicts are ‘sanctionable’, whereas others are not. 
For example, the Indian government has been involved in 14 conflicts since 1989, 
in which more than 35.000 people have died. This includes the interstate war with 
Pakistan over Kashmir, but also a number of internal conflicts in Garoland, Assam, 
Bodoland, Kukiland, Manipur, Nagaland, Punjab/Khalistan, Tripura, Western 
South East Easia, as well as armed conflicts against communist groups and 
terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in India. Additionally, another 
approximately 15.000 people have died in India as a result of non-state violence257 
and one-sided violence258. Although the Indian Government is involved in all of 
them, there is no sense in grouping the casualties together. Each conflict concerns 
a separate region and a separate incompatibility. Four259 of the conflicts in India 
are considered sanctionable.  
Based on the limitations and definitions described above, the UCDP database 
provides comprehensive data on conflict casualties between 1945 and 2015, as 
well as an interactive ‘conflict encyclopedia’ that visualizes conflict deaths 
geographically since 1989. All data on conflict deaths and conflict length is taken 
from this database. It recognizes a total of 63 internal conflicts since 1989 that 
produced a minimum of 1000 casualties. These conflicts are recognized by the 
SOD as ‘sanctionable.   
Why the threshold of 1000 deaths? Firstly, this threshold is methodologically 
convenient as it is in line with the UDCP distinction between ‘minor conflicts’ and 
‘wars’. Secondly, the SOD database shows us that the UN has indeed imposed 
sanctions in response to conflicts that just surpassed the 1000 deaths threshold, 
such as in the case of Mali (2012), where the accumulated deaths had just 
surpassed 1500 by the time sanctions were imposed, or as in the case of Ivory 
                                            
257 Non-State Violence: Armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is 
the government of a state (UCDP Codebook Battle-Related Deaths v.18.1. (2017). 
258 One-sided Violence: armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized 
group against civilians (UCDP Codebook Battle-Related Deaths v.18.1. (2017). 
259 India vs. Communist Groups (ID-29), Kashmir Insurgents (ID-169), Sikh Insurgents in 
Punjab/Khalistan (ID-156), and the ULFA in Assam (ID-170). All other conflicts produced less 






Coast (2004), where the casualty count had not reached 2000 yet. The threshold 
of 1000 deaths is therefore also in line with reality.  
Establishing a threshold that is roughly in line with the least bloody sanctioned 
conflict is also in line with moral philosophy. Philosophers generally agree that 
numbers matter.260 We are morally obliged to let one person drown if we can save 
five other people from drowning instead. Similarly, it might be morally justifiable to 
not sanction conflicts that produced less deaths than the least deadly conflict that 
did receive UN sanctions.261  
The names of the conflicts in the table identify the country in which the conflict took 
place. For internal territorial conflicts, the disputed territory is mentioned after a 
colon (:). The conflict between the government of Israel and Palestinian armed 
groups such as Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Hamas is 
therefore simply called Israel: Palestine.262 For conflicts between a government 
and a clearly defined non-state armed group, the group is mentioned after a 
hyphen (-). These include Angola – UNITA, and Sri Lanka – Eelam (Tamil Tigers). 
In conflicts that include several non-state armed groups, or in which the armed 
group is not widely known, the term ‘civil war’ is used. For example, the conflict 
between the government and Colombia and FARC is called ‘Colombia Civil War’ 
because groups such as M19 and the ELN were also involved in the conflict. The 
same goes for the Afghan civil war and the Somali civil war, among others where 
there has been no clear and single opponent. In conflicts that concern an 
incompatibility between a government and military arms of communist parties, the 
term ‘communist groups’ is used after the hyphen. Specific and full names of the 
most important groups involved in each conflict can be found in the full dataset, 








                                            
260 Taurek. “Should the Numbers Count?” (1977) 
261 Although the parallel does not fit completely, as UN sanctions are not imposed in a situation of 
scarcity, where it has to choose one out of two possible options.  
262 The UCDP does not consider the conflict in the Gaza strip as a separate conflict. It does 
recognize the conflict Israel – Hezbollah separately.   







Table 7 - Civil wars since 1990 
Conflict Name Conflict Years UN Sanctions? 
Philippines – Communist 
Groups 
1946-2014 No 
Myanmar: Karen 1949-2013 No 
India – Communist Groups 1948-2014 No 
Myanmar: Kachin 1949-2014 No 
Israel: Palestine 1949-2014 No 
Philippines – Communist 
Groups 
1946-2014 No 
Myanmar: Shan 1993-2015 No 
Nepal – Communist Groups 1996-2006 No 
Congo Civil War (I) 1996-1997 No 
Congo Civil War (II) 1998-2003 Yes 
Myanmar: Shan 1993-2015 No 
Burundi Civil War 1991-2008 No 
Chad Civil War 1990-2010 No 
Colombia Civil War 1964-2014 No 
Peru - Sendero Luminoso 1982-2010 No 
Syria Civil War 2011-Ongoing Yes 
Cambodia Civil War 1967-1998 Yes 
Philippines: Mindanao 1970-Ongoing No 
Sudan: South Sudan 1971-2011 No 
Sudan: Darfur 2003-Ongoing Yes 
Burundi Civil War 1991-2008 No 
Uganda Civil War 1971-2007 No 
Pakistan: Balochistan 2004-2014 No 






Ethiopia: Ogaden 1993-2015 No 
Indonesia: East Timor 1975-1999 No 
Mozambique – RENAMO 1977-2013 No 
Afghanistan Civil War 1978-2016 Yes 
Somalia Civil War 1982-2016 Yes 
Iran Civil War 1979-2011 No 
Liberia Civil War 1989 - 2003 Yes 
India - Punjab/Khalistan 1983-1993 No 
Sri Lanka – Eelam 1984-2009 No 
Turkey – Kurdistan 1984-2013 No 
India - Kashmir Insurgents 1990-2014 No 
India:Assam 1990-2010 No 
Mozambique – RENAMO 1977-2013 No 
Indonesia:Aceh 1990-2005 No 
Rwanda Civil War 1991-1994 Yes 
Senegal: Casamance 1990-2011 No 
Sierra Leone Civil War 2001 Yes 
FRY: Croatia 1991 Yes 




Iraq Civil War 1994-2015 Yes 
Croatia: Krajina 1995 No 
Georgia: Abkhazia 1992-1993 No 
Tajikistan Civil War 1992-2011 No 
FRY: Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1995 Yes 
Russia: Chechnya 1994-2014 No 
Yemeni Civil War 1994-Ongoing No 






Pakistan – Terrorist Groups 2007-Ongoing Yes 
FRY: Kosovo 1998 Yes 
Ethiopia-Oromiya 1977-2013 No 
Central African Rep. Civil 
War 
2000-2015 Yes 
Cote d’Ivoire Civil War 2002-2004 Yes 
Thailand - Patani 2003-2014 No 
Israel - Hezbollah 1990-2006 Yes 
South Sudan Civil War 2011-2013 Yes 
Libya Civil War 2011, 2014 Yes 
Ukraine Civil War 2014-Ongoing No 
 
 
4.1.4. Chapter 8 - Terrorist Organizations (21/84) 
Terrorist organizations are defined as sanctionable in the SOD database when 
they produce more than 100 accumulated deaths. Terrorist organizations are 
considered as subject to UN sanctions when they are placed on the UN designated 
terrorism list pursuant to UNSC 1267 (1999) or 2253 (2015), related to the Taliban, 
Al-Qaida, or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).263  
First of all it must be noted that the focus of chapter 8 is on terrorist organizations, 
not on state-sponsored terrorism. This is however not to say that state-sponsored 
terrorism is completely disregarded in this thesis; the introductory pages of the 
chapter describe the history of UN sanctions in response to state-sponsored 
terrorism by Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan in the 1990s and the UN sanctions 
regimes that were installed in response. The chapter also considers the fact that 
other state-sponsors of terrorism have been left unsanctioned, but it does not go 
deeper than that.  
The threshold of 100 accumulated deaths for terrorist organizations is substantially 
less than in the case of civil conflicts, where the threshold lies at 1000 deaths. The 
reason for this is twofold. The first reason is the practical fact that many of the 
                                            
263 The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is also frequently described as Daesh, the Islamic 
State in Iraq and al-Sham / Syria (ISIS), or simply Islamic State (IS). Various terrorist groups have 
also proclaimed ‘provinces’ of the Islamic State, for example in Libya, Yemen, Sinai, and the 
Caucasus, among others. Throughout this thesis I will use the abbreviation ISIL, except when it 






organizations that were placed on the 1267 or 2253 sanctions list were responsible 
for hundreds of deaths rather than thousands. The threshold for making it on the 
terrorism list is apparently much lower than that regarding civil war. If many of the 
sanctioned groups killed around 100 people when they were listed, it is only fair to 
consider unsanctioned groups that killed similar amounts of people. The second 
reason for setting the threshold at 100 deaths is related to the first, and holds that 
acts of terrorism, especially when international in nature, represents a bigger 
(perceived) threat to international security. Although from a humanitarian point of 
view each conflict-related death is equally tragic, the motivations behind terrorist 
attacks represent a big security threat to the P-5 members, as demonstrated by 
the roughly 3000 people that died in the September 11 attacks of 2001. The 
innocent victims killed by terrorists reverberate much more heavily, generating 
more upheaval and media attention, especially when westerners are involved.  
The data provided on terrorist organizations in the SOD database comes from the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) database, which is run 
by the US Department of Homeland Security in collaboration with the University of 
Maryland.264 This database keeps records of incidents of terrorism since 1970 and 
comprises roughly 150.000 attacks. Since terrorist organizations have only been 
subject of UN sanctions since 2001, the SOD only includes organizations 
responsible for at least 100 deaths since that year.265 The list comprises a total of 
84 organizations, 21 of which received sanctions.  
Whereas the definitions of nuclear proliferation, interstate war, and civil war are 
relatively straightforward, the definition of terrorism, and especially terrorist 
organization, is more problematic. The label of ‘terrorist’ is inherently political, as it 
instantly delegitimizes the target. The Council of Europe as well as the United 
Nations have therefore not been able (and willing) to provide an official definition 
for terrorist organizations, deciding to only define the act of terrorism. The UN’s 
definition of acts of terror is as follows:  
 
"Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a 
group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any 
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify 
them.266  
                                            
264 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2018). 
Global Terrorism Database [Codebook 2016]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
265 This means that organizations such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru are not on the list of 
‘sanctionable terrorist organizations’, even if their conflict with the Peruvian government 
accumulated many thousands of deaths in the 1980s and 1990s.   
266 United Nations A/RES/60/49 







The START dataset follows a similar strategy, defining acts of terrorism as “the 
threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non‐state actor to attain 
a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation”.267 As a result of this definition, many of the organizations listed below 
are not typically recognized as terrorist organizations, but rather as rebels, 
warlords, guerillas, or freedom fighters. Unsurprisingly, many groups use words 
such as ‘freedom fighters’, ‘liberation army’, of democratic front’ in attempt to 
legitimize their actions, some of which fall under the definition of terrorism.268 
These, and other methodological issues, will be discussed in more detail at the 
beginning of chapter 8.  
 
Table 8 - Terrorist Organizations that killed at least 100 people since 2001 
Name Organization State(s) UN 
Sanctions 
Taliban AFG, PAK Yes 
Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL) 
IRQ, SYR, TUR, LEB, FRA, 
JOR, SAU, EGY 
Yes 
Boko Haram NIG, CAM, CHA, NGR Yes 
Al-Shabaab SOM, KEN Yes 
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) PAK Yes 
Al-Qaida in Iraq IRQ, JOR, UK, SYR Yes 
Al-Qaida in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) 
SAU, YEM Yes 
Al-Nusrah Front SYR, IRQ, LEB Yes 
Lord's Resistance Army UGA, DRC, SUD, SSUD No 
Communist Party of India - 
Maoist (CPI-Maoist) 
IND No 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) 
SRI, IND No 
Fulani Militants NIG  No 
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Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) 
COL No 
Huthi Extremists YEM, SAU No 
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) IRQ Yes 
Donetsk People's Republic UKR No 
Chechen Rebels RUS, KAZ, TUR No 
New People's Army (NPA) PHI No 
National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) 
ANG No 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi PAK, AFG Yes 
Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement in Opposition (SPLM-
IO) 
SSUD No 
Tawhid and Jihad IRQ Yes 
Sinai Province of the Islamic 
State (Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis) 
EGY, ISR No 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) IND, AFG Yes 
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Mahgreb 
(AQIM) 
ALG, MAU, NGR, MLI, MOR Yes 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) TUR, GER, IRQ, SYR No 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) UGA, DRC No 
Communist Party of Nepal- 
Maoist (CPN-M) 
NEP No 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) 
PHI No 
Hamas (Islamic Resistance 
Movement) 
ISR, WB, GAZ No 
Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Fighting (GSPC)(AQIM) 
ALG, MAU Yes 
Haqqani Network (Al-Qaida in 
Afghanistan, but separate) 
AFG No 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) ALG, TUN, FRA Yes 






Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) PHI, JAP, US, PAK Yes 
Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement - North (Former 
SPLA) 
SUD No 
United Liberation Front of 
Assam (ULFA) 
IND No 
Anti-Balaka Militia CAR No 
Jundallah IRA, PAK No 
Riyadus-Salikhin 
Reconnaissance and Sabotage 
Battalion of Chechen Martyrs 
RUS Yes 
Seleka CAM, CAR, MLI No 
Al-Qaida YEM, KEN, TAN, USA, AFG, 
TUR, PAK, SOM, TUN 
Yes 
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) IND Yes 
Uighur Separatists CHI No 
National Democratic Front of 
Bodoland (NDFB) 
IND No 
Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan) PAK No 
Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic 
State 
AFG No 
Sanaa Province of the Islamic 
State 
YEM No 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade ISR, WB, GAZ No 
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) PAK No 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) ISR, WB, GAZ No 
David Yau Yau Militia SSUD No 
National Liberation Army of 
Colombia (ELN) 
COL No 
People's War Group (PWG) IND No 








Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom 
Movement (BIFM) 
PHI  No 
Caucasus Emirate RUS No 
Baloch Liberation Front PAK No 
Tripoli Province of the Islamic 
State 
LIB No 
Barqa Province of the Islamic 
State 
LIB No 
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami IND, BAN, PAK No 
Abdullah Azzam Brigades EGY, UAE, PAK, LEB Yes 
M23* DRC No 
Baloch Republican Army PAK No 
Al-Naqshabandiya Army IRQ No 
Party for the Liberation of the 
Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) 
BUR No 
United Baloch Army PAK No 
Movement for Oneness and 
Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) 
MLI, ALG, NGR Yes 
Mujahideen Ansar PAK No 
Hezbollah LEB, SYR, ISR, BUL, ARG No 
Military Council of the Tribal 
Revolutionaries (MCTR) 
IRQ No 
Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade 
(Those who Sign with Blood) 
ALG, MLI Yes 
Ansar al-Sharia (Libya) LIB Yes 
Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM) 
CHI Yes 
Southern Mobility Movement 
(Yemen) 
YEM No 
Haftar Militia LIB No 
 
 






4.1.5. Chapter 9 - Coups d’état (3/36) 
Coups d’état are more difficult to define than one might initially think. Welch in 1970 
described coups as sharp, clear events, easy to date, and possible to document.269 
Subsequent research has however shown that just as with counting battle deaths, 
the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a government is a highly political and 
sensitive topic. Since coups are per definition illegitimate, those who plot them and 
those who are targeted by them both have an interest in using the term in ways 
that suit their particular interests. As a result, coups are oftentimes conflated with 
assassinations, civil wars, revolutions, and transfers of power that fall within the 
legal boundaries of a state’s constitution.270  
The dataset that is used in the SOD on coups is constructed by Jonathan Powell 
and Clayton Thyne of the University of Kentucky. They define a coup d’état as an 
‘illegal and overt attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to 
unseat the sitting executive’.271  In order to construct this definition they focus on 
three important factors. First, the action must be carried out by actors within the 
state apparatus, meaning that regular assassins, foreign powers, or civilian 
insurgents cannot stage coups. Second, the objective of a coup is to unseat the 
sitting executive of a state, meaning that military and political pressures to oust 
cabinet ministers or members of parliament do not count as coups. Third, a coup 
is an ‘illegal’ action, in the sense that events in which a sitting executive is ousted 
in a constitutional manner do not count as coups.  
The literature on coups also pays attention to attempted coups, coding rumors and 
plots in their datasets to be able to distinguish between successful and 
unsuccessful coup attempts. This distinction helps academics in better 
understanding what makes coups successful, and what policy makers can do to 
avoid coups from taking place or in order to deal with them in a peaceful manner. 
However, for the sake of the Sanctionable Offences Dataset attempted coups or 
rumors about coups are not relevant.  
Coups d’état are defined as sanctionable in the SOD database when they are 
successful in unseating a sitting executive. Taking into account the fact that in 
several of the coups since 1990 that were met with UN sanctions nobody was 
killed, the threshold for coup-related deaths is put at zero. Since 1990 there has 
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been a total of 36 successful coups, 4 of which were targeted by UN sanctions 
(Haiti - 1991, Sierra Leone - 1996, Guinea-Bissau – 2012).272  
 
Table 9 – Coups d’état since 1990 
Country Year Coup leader Deaths UN 
Sanctions 
Suriname 1990 Cmd. Iwan Granoogst; 
Col. Desi Bouterse 
0 No 
Chad 1990 Idriss Deby 5000 No 
Thailand 1991 Gen. Sunthorn 
Kongsompong 
0 No 
Lesotho 1991 Col. Elias Tutsoane 
Ramaema 
0 No 
Haiti 1991 Brig-Gen. Raoul Cedras 26 Yes 
Afghanistan 1992 Muhaheddin guerrillas; 




1992 Capt. Valentine Strasser N/A No 
Nigeria 1993 Gen. Sanni Abacha 0 No 
Gambia 1994 Lt. Yahya Jammeh 0 No 
Liberia 1994 Tom Woewieyu N/A No 
Qatar 1995 Sheikh Hamad bin 




1996 BG Julius Maada Bio 0 No 
Niger 1996 Col. Ibrahim Barre 
Mainassara 
2 No 
Burundi 1996 army 6000 No 
Cambodia 1997 Hun Sen 70 No 
                                            
272 The UN Sanctions regime imposed on the Central African Republic mentioned the coup d’état 
by the Seleka Coalition that ousted president Bozize, but the Marshall & Marshall coup dataset 
recognizes this case as a false positive because the executive was ousted by a rebel movement, 
not an internal military force.  













1997 former Pres. Sassou-
Nguesso 
N/A No 
Comoros 1999 Col. Azali Assoumani 0 No 
Pakistan 1999 Gen. Musharraf 0 No 
Guinea-
Bissau 
1999 Gen. Mane 300 No 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
1999 Gen. Robert Guei N/A No 
Nepal 2002 King Gyanendra 0 No 
Guinea-
Bissau 





2003 Gen. Francois Bozize 15 No 
Togo 2005 Military; Faure 
Gnassingbe 
0 No 
Mauritania 2005 Military Council for 
Justice and Democracy 
led by Col. Ely Ould 
Mohamed Vall 
0 No 
Thailand 2006 Gen. Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin 
0 No 
Fiji 2006 Commodore Frank 
Bainimarama 
0 No 
Bangladesh 2007 Chief of Army Staff Lt-
Gen. Moeen U. Ahmed; 
Chief Adviser Fakhruddin 
Ahmed; Maj-Gen. M.A. 
Matin 
0 No 
Mauritania 2008 Gen. Mohamed Ould 
Abdel Aziz 
0 No 
Guinea 2008 Capt. Moussa Dadis 
Camara 
0 No 












2012 Gen. Antonio Indjai 0 Yes 
Mali 2012 Capt. Amadou Haya 
Sanogo 
N/A No 
Egypt 2013 Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi N/A No 







It is difficult to form a single, straightforward, and undisputable thesis claim to guide 
this dissertation. The results of this thesis are based on more than 50 variables, 
described below, to describe over 200 cases in 5 different categories. The 
categories help us in comparing sanctioned cases with non-sanctioned cases that 
belong to the same type of offence, and certain thresholds have been built into the 
SOD to filter out irrelevant cases, but each case remains unique. The 2005 coup 
in Togo is comparable to the 2007 coup in Bangladesh in the sense that in both 
cases a sovereign leader was overthrown by a military official, hence their 
appearance in the SOD. This however says nothing about the legitimacy of the 
incumbent regimes, the political events in the run-up to each coup, or about public 
(international) opinion about each regime change.  
On top of that, while each of the variables upon which the cases are tested helps 
in comparing cases on an objective and unbiased basis, the variables themselves 
are not value-fee, nor are they inextricably linked to only one hypothesis. For 
example, the variable of ‘state fragility’ can be linked to the hypothesis that fragile 
states are more likely receive sanctions because their lack of governance is a 
threat to regional stability, but also because it leads to humanitarian suffering, 
which is a different concern. In a similar vein, the variable of ‘unilateral sanctions’ 
by the US or EU can be used to strengthen the hypothesis that Western P-5 
members do a better job at upholding international norms, but also to argue that 
the West is more likely to use sanctions as a tool of neo-colonialism. Regardless 
of the rigor of the research, many of the assumptions made in this thesis will remain 
debatable. Political science remains a social science.  
That being said, based on the literature review, in combination with the cases and 
variables presented in this chapter, it is possible to design hypotheses about the 






selective nature of UN sanctions. Below I present seven hypotheses. Together, 
these hypotheses help paint a more comprehensive picture of what the selectivity 
of UN sanctions means. They are H1: Selectivity and Countervailing Power, H2: 
Selectivity and Humanitarian Concerns, H3: Selectivity and State Fragility, H4: 
Selectivity and Democracy, H5: Selectivity and Public Pressure, H6: Selectivity 
and Islam, and H7: Selectivity and Africa.  
 
4.2.1. Hypothesis 1: Selectivity and countervailing power 
Let us start with the obvious. All states are sovereign on paper, but not all states 
are equally sovereign in the real world.273 The military, economic, and diplomatic 
strength of the United States or China is substantially larger than that of Turkey, 
and almost infinitely larger than that of Tuvalu. Within the United Nations’ 
institutional design this is reflected in the Security Council, five members of which 
enjoy a permanent status, as well as a right to veto resolutions. This privilege 
makes it practically, although not theoretically, impossible for P5 members to be 
subjected to UN sanctions. This ability to avoid getting sanctioned will be referred 
to as countervailing power.274 Countervailing power is perhaps the most obvious 
obstacle to UN sanctions regimes. Power matters in high politics, and 
countervailing power is a great asset to escape the grip of the international 
community.  
Countervailing power can also be achieved through other means. For example, 
being closely allied or befriended to a permanent member of the UNSC can be 
sufficient in avoiding sanctioned. The United States has traditionally done the 
bidding for Israel, while former Soviet (satellite) states such as Georgia and 
Ukraine can count on the support of Russia. Even economic ties with a P5 member 
can get you a long way, as China’s persistent abstention from voting on the Darfur 
crisis in Sudan, an important oil exporter to China, has proven, leading to very mild 
sanctions on Omar al Bashir’s regime.  
The possession of nuclear weapons is also an excellent way to boast 
countervailing power. While developing a nuclear weapon is likely to increase the 
risk of being targeted by UN sanctions (see the sanctions regimes against Iran and 
North Korea), the actual possession of the bomb gives states an instant status 
upgrade (see India, Pakistan and Israel).  
A final form of countervailing power, albeit less potent, is simply by being a ‘strong 
state’, or a regional hegemon. It is however difficult to determine which states fulfil 
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I owe thanks to Martin Binder (2017), who uses the term in his research on humanitarian 






those requirements, and where the threshold lies. Outside of the states that already 
meet the other requirements (P5 membership or nuclear weapons), the most likely 
candidates are Japan, Brazil, Germany, South Korea, Italy, Turkey, and Indonesia. 
Mexico, Spain, Saudi Arabia and Canada might also be added to the list, although 
it is not clear whether the above regimes have not been sanctioned because of 
their countervailing power, or simply because they have never posed any serious 
threats to the peace.  
States are thus considered to have countervailing power to avoid sanctions if (a) 
they are a p-5 member of the UNSC, (b) a strong ally of a P-5 member, (c) a 
nuclear power, (d) a ‘strong state’ with sufficient national capability. More precise 
definitions for each variable can be found in section 4.3., which provides an 
overview of all variables of the Sanctionable Offences Dataset.  
The general variable of ‘countervailing power’ can methodologically be used for 
two purposes in this thesis. Firstly, it serves as a hypothesis, testing to what extent 
it helps states in avoiding UN sanctions. Secondly, it serves as a filter, allowing to 
test the other hypotheses while filtering out or controlling for countervailing power. 
In other words, it allows us to ask the question: does hypothesis X work if we only 
consider the cases in which countervailing power is absent? This question is 
especially relevant in questions concerning humanitarian threats, state failure, 
democracy, and public pressure.  
 
4.2.2. Hypothesis 2: Selectivity and humanitarian concerns 
The second obvious hypothesis is that the UNSC is more likely to impose sanctions 
as humanitarian threats increase. The SOD sets thresholds of 1000 accumulated 
deaths for wars, and 100 deaths for terrorist organizations, but this doesn’t mean 
that all conflicts and terrorist organizations pose equal threats. The gravity of the 
threat matters.  
Hypothesis 2 considers the selectiveness of sanctions regimes based on ‘human 
security’, using death-counts as a proxy.275 While there are many other ways of 
measuring the humanitarian gravity of a conflict, coup, or terrorist organization, 
including their effect on refugee flows, internally displaced people, famine, and 
disease,276 the most obvious and methodologically practical proxy is measuring 
deaths.    
Hypothesis 2 is clearly and directly related to the policy developments within the 
United Nations and international affairs more broadly since 1990, with an 
intensified focus on human rights, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and other human 
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security issues that go beyond state security. It’s associated with Boutros Ghali’s 
Agenda for Peace,277 the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect,278 and the 
developments in security studies more generally.279  
Deaths related to the different offences are taken from different sources. For 
precise information about the methodology used to get comparable death-counts, 
please consult section 4.3.  
 
4.2.3. Hypothesis 3: Selectivity and state fragility 
A third way to explain the selective nature of UN sanctions may be through the 
concept of state failure. Hypothesis three tests to what extent the fragility of the 
state at hand was a factor in discriminating between cases. The underlying idea of 
this hypothesis is that weaker states are potentially larger threats to regional 
stability and the international community. Weak states are associated not only with 
internal humanitarian suffering, but also with refugee streams, contagious 
diseases, and the trafficking of humans, arms, and drugs.280 Additionally, weak 
states potentially foment radicalization and terrorism, all of which present threats 
to the wider international community.  
There are different ways to measure the fragility of a state. One way would be to 
focus on refugee streams. Another way would be to focus on the ability of the 
government to project authority within its sovereign territory. Yet another would be 
to look into links between state fragility and terrorist activities. While each of these 
separate issues have specific advantages, for this study I have chosen an indicator 
for state fragility that represents an aggregate of twelve variables, published by the 
Fund for Peace.281 While some of the variables used by the FFP do not directly 
represent threats to international security, all variables are indirectly related to 
state failure as well as the outbreak of (renewed) conflict. Variables such as 
economic decline, public services, and demographic pressures thus indirectly say 
something about the potential risk of larger security threats, such as human rights 
violations, refugees, external interventions, and group grievances, all of which are 
variables in the fragile states index.  
It must be noted that fragile states are not necessarily devoid of countervailing 
power. While there is a general correlation between state strength and state 
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stability, it is possible for fragile states to still have countervailing power. Pakistan 
serves as a good example, showing signs of fragility in terms of internally displaced 
people, human rights issues, and group grievances, while simultaneously counting 
as a ‘strong state’ with a potent military, nuclear capacity, and a large population. 
Judging by the fact that Pakistan has not been sanctioned by the UN in response 
to (a) its nuclear proliferation, (b) its interstate conflict with India over Kashmir, (c) 
various civil wars, (d) state-sponsored terrorism, and (e) several coups d’état, one 
might hypothesize that countervailing power (H1) trumps the other hypothesis. 
This is however not to say that state fragility does not matter, especially in the 
many cases in which countervailing power is absent.  
A more detailed account of the variable of ‘state fragility’ and the FFP’s index can 
be found in section 4.3.  
 
4.2.4. Hypothesis 4: Selectivity and democracy 
Hypothesis 4 tests whether, other factors being equal, less democratic states are 
more likely to receive sanctions in response to a sanctionable offence. The majority 
of the states that are represented in the SOD are relatively undemocratic, which is 
in line with theories about the peaceful and stable nature of liberal democracies, 
as well as the association between undemocratic governments, coups d’état, and 
(civil) war. Nevertheless, the SOD does also include relatively strong democracies 
such as India, Indonesia, Colombia, and Turkey, begging the question whether 
democracy helps.  
The expectation with regard with democracy and selective sanctions is that 
Western states are more likely to propose sanctions that support democratic 
values or democratically elected leaders, and that specifically target autocratic 
regimes or non-state groups and individuals who undermine democracy. Taking 
into account the fact that some countries may be filtered out of the SOD because 
they enjoy countervailing power (H1), this leaves us with two relevant questions. 
(1) were non-sanctions cases more or less democratic than sanctioned cases? 
and (2) In the cases in which targeted sanctions were imposed, did they specifically 
target groups and individuals who acted as spoilers of the democratic process?  
To collect comparative data on the democratic strength of all the states in the SOD, 
data was used from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, which 
rates states with a score from 1-7 based on variables including ‘electoral process 
and pluralism’, ‘functioning of government’, ‘political culture’, ‘participation’, and 
‘civil liberties’. While some of these variables show overlap with the FFP’s state 
fragility index, and while most states that score well on democracy also score well 
on state stability, the Economist’s Democracy Index is clearly distinctive in that it 
focuses solely on democratic variables, and leaves out national security issues, 






economic development, public services, and demographic pressures, among 
others.  
A more detailed account of the variable of ‘democratic strength’ and the 
Economist’s Democracy index can be found in section 4.3.  
 
4.2.5. Hypothesis 5: Selectivity and public pressure 
Hypothesis 5 tests to what extent the senders of UN sanctions regimes are 
influenced by public pressure to. Since the end of the Cold War, a major paradigm-
shift in the field of media and foreign policy occurred. The void left by the demise 
of the Soviet Union created opportunities for a more ambitious and liberal project 
of the United Nations. Simultaneously, technological advances saw the 
proliferation of 24hr news and extensive and explicit coverage by media outlets 
such as CNN of major conflicts in Iraq in 1990 and Somalia in 1991, among others. 
Suddenly, everybody was graphically exposed to catastrophes going on abroad- it 
was only natural that an important part of the population felt it was the obligation 
of the West, and the US in particular, to end the human suffering. The ‘CNN effect’, 
coined by Robinson, convincingly described the impact of media over a country’s 
foreign policy. The conflicts in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Kosovo were seen as 
typical instances of media-led intervention.282  
Media attention also has also been said to influence the United Nations Security 
Council, with some scholars speaking of it as the “sixth permanent member”,283 
referring to the international pressure to address conflicts and disasters that media 
causes. Contemporary research suggests that the relation between humanitarian 
suffering, the media, and foreign policy is not as straightforward as is sometimes 
claimed. There seems to be a rather cynical mismatch between the extent of 
humanitarian crises and the amount of attention they receive. For example, major 
conflicts in Africa typically receive less attention than they ‘deserve’,284 whereas 
relatively minor conflicts in the Middle East and Europe tend to get blown up by the 
media. It has been suggested that the CNN effect in cases like Bosnia or Somalia 
(an African exception) helped in setting the agenda of US foreign policy makers, 
whereas much bloodier, but less covered, conflicts in Sudan or Rwanda were 
largely left untouched. As former US Secretary of State James Baker put it: “all too 
often, television is what determines what a crisis is”.285 
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The relationship between sending governments and their domestic audiences may 
thus be key when imposing sanctions. Like other tools of foreign policy, sanctions 
should be understood as two-level games in which the domestic audience can be 
as important as the actual target.286 Building upon earlier work on the tension 
between domestic politics and foreign policy by Haas, Katzenstein,287 and 
Krasner,288 among others, Putnam’s theory of two-level games explains that 
diplomats always simultaneously negotiate on two boards. While the objective on 
the international board might be the primary goal of the negotiation at hand, 
politicians need to continually appease domestic groups and their interests to 
retain political power, especially when elections are nearby.  Indeed, democratic 
governments are sometimes pressured by their own domestic audiences to be 
responsive to humanitarian crises. In other words, states do not only act in 
response to the actual events at hand, but also consider public opinion and 
pressure exerted by (international) media.  
The advantage of sanctions, compared to UN peacekeeping missions, may be that 
they enjoy the advantage of appearing to ‘do something’ about a humanitarian 
crisis, while not burdening the senders with the domestic political and financial 
costs involved in military adventures. After all, David Baldwin already argued in the 
1980s, “it would be a pity – perhaps a global disaster – if a contemporary American 
president were to resort to war solely because the nature, implications, and 
consequences of economic statecraft (sanctions) had been misinterpreted by his 
advisors”.289 If indeed public pressure can mold foreign policy, it is more likely to 
do so with UN sanctions than with stronger types of UN action. Governments in 
favor of action might find it easier to propose sanctions to the SC, while those 
opposing UN intervention will be more likely to accept sanctions so as avoid 
stronger measures. 
It would of course be naïve to expect that all permanent UNSC members are 
equally likely to be influenced by public pressure. In the cases of Russia and China, 
two notorious non-democracies with a tight grip on national media outlets, it is 
nonsensical to measure media pressure. In the cases of the US, UK, and France 
the influence of the media might be bigger, but it is not likely to be a major 
determinant. After all, in conflicts in which key allies or geopolitical heavyweights 
are involved, even a tsunami of newspaper articles pressuring for sanctions is not 
going to make any difference. Cases in which countervailing power (see 
hypothesis 1) obviously stands in the way, sanctions are unlikely anyway. 
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Therefore, under hypothesis 5 I only expect the ‘CNN effect’ after having filtered 
out the obvious geopolitical obstacles.  
In the SOD, the variables on media coverage (4.3.54 and 4.3.55) measure the 
annual amount of newspaper articles published in the New York Times (US), the 
Times (UK), and Le Figaro (France) about each specific conflict, both before and 
after (if applicable) sanctions were imposed. The prediction is that both for conflicts 
that form a big humanitarian threat and those who form a relatively small 
humanitarian threat, public pressure will increase the chance that sanctions will be 
imposed.   
 
4.2.6. Hypothesis 6: Selectivity and Islam 
Hypothesis 6 is strictly related to the chapter on UN sanctions and terrorism and 
holds that organizations that have staged terrorist attacks are more likely to receive 
sanctions when they have an Islamic background. While the activity of terrorism is 
in no way inherently an Islamic one, since the attacks of the 11th of September of 
2001 terrorism has been inextricably linked with Islam in the minds of politicians, 
as well as the public at large. It is also true that a large majority of deadly terrorist 
attacks since 2001 have had a radical Islamist character, and that groups such as 
Al-Qaida and ISIL have been responsible for a climate of fear throughout the 
(Western) world. It is even true that some Islamic terrorist groups have explicitly 
stated goals to establish Islamic Caliphates or to ‘destroy the West’, threatening 
the Westphalian state system as well as the security of innocent citizens in at least 
3 permanent member states of the UNSC.  
Terrorism is however not a fundamentally Islamic activity, and terrorist attacks 
have not been staged exclusively by Islamic groups. Additionally, while many of 
the groups that used tactics of terror may have identified as ‘Muslims’, their political 
objectives could best be categorized as independence, secession, or rebellion 
against a government.  
Academics who have done research about terrorist organizations, terrorist attacks, 
and counterterrorism policies have all recognized that the effort and money spent 
on counterterrorism policies humanitarian threat of terrorism is disproportionate to 
the size of the actual threat.290 In the West you are much more likely to be killed 
by your spouse or a kitchen accident than by a terrorist attack. Moreover, groups 
with political grievances such as the PKK in Kurdistan or the Tamil Tigers in Sri 
Lanka killed many more people over the past 40 years than Al-Shabaab in Somalia 
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or Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. However, the latter two received sanctions 
under UNSCR 1267 / 2253, whereas the former two didn’t.   
Because of the strong association between terrorism and Islam, as well as the 
threat that Islamic terrorism represents in the minds of many western citizens, 
media, and politicians, hypothesis 6 holds that (a) Islamic groups are more likely 
to receive UN sanctions than non-Islamic groups, regardless of the amounts of 
people they have killed since 2001, and that (b) Islamic groups that have killed 
Westerners are even more likely to receive UN sanctions. Variables 4.3.42 until 
4.3.53 of the SOD are all concerned with the background of the most deadly groups 
since 2001, their political objectives, and the people they have killed.  
 
4.2.7. Hypothesis 7: Selectivity and Africa 
Finally, hypothesis 7 tests whether there is a link between UN sanctions in 
response to conflicts, terrorist groups, and coup d’états and the African continent. 
Whereas variables such as countervailing power and geo-politics typically affect 
the ability to sanction powerful countries in the Americas, Europe, and Asia, Africa 
seems to be large free of major geopolitical alliances or heavyweights. Being the 
continent in which European colonial powers were able to hold on their 
possessions until the 1950s, 1960s, or even the 1970s in some cases, it seems 
that especially France and the United Kingdom still have an inexplicit right to 
intervene in the affairs of their former subjects whenever it suits their interest.  
The ‘neocolonial hypothesis’ can easily be aligned with common complaints from 
African leaders that national sovereignty does not mean the same for African states 
as it does for rich industrialized ones. Since the 1990s western governments have 
been apt in targeting African economies with structural financial reforms, trade 
liberalization, aid conditionality, and the imposition of liberal democracy and good 
governance.291 Western countries have also intervened in African civil wars on 
many occasions, both unilaterally and multilaterally.292 France has done so in 
Rwanda, Cote d’Ivoire, and the Central African Republic. The UK has done so in 
Sierra Leone, Kenya, and Uganda. The US has done so in Somalia and Liberia. 
Complaints of the arbitrariness of the International Criminal Court, which has so 
far only indicted Africans, point towards the same direction.  
It would thus be no surprise if the selectiveness of UN sanctions since 1990 also 
pointed towards a policy of neocolonialism. Many African governments, rebels, and 
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other armed actors have been subject to UN targeted sanctions.293 Russia has 
been mostly absent in Africa since the 1990s. China is ratcheting up its economic 
ties with Africa but has no major geopolitical stakes to defend.294 The Western 
permanent members do have interests to defend, both in terms of economic ties 
as in terms of their liberal peace project. If they can maintain African states on the 
road towards liberal democracy, their liberal project will reap many fruits.  
The only variable in the SOD that supports the quantitative analysis of the neo-
colonialist hypothesis is that of ‘continent’ (4.3.37).  
 
4.3. Variables in the SOD 
 
There are many variables that help us better understand why some offences were 
sanctioned while others were not. For example, if UN sanctions are to some extent 
consistent with the ideals of liberal peace and the responsibility to protect, we 
would expect more deadly and longer conflicts to be sanctioned more often than 
short and minor conflicts. A lack of consistency with regard to accumulated deaths 
might point toward a more Realist track-record of UN sanctions. Other variables 
that might help us get a deeper insight into the consistency of sanctions regimes 
are by looking at ‘State Strength’ and ‘Continent’, as will be explained below. Not 
all variables are relevant to all offences. The following section will first go deeper 
into the most important variables of this thesis. Subsequently all other variables 
will receive a short explanation.  
 
 
4.3.1. Total Deaths since 1990 
The variable of ‘Accumulated Deaths’ measures ‘simply’ how many deaths have 
occurred as a result of the offence at hand. For each type of offence (interstate 
conflict, internal conflict, coup d’état, terrorism) a different methodology is used. 
For example, for the first two offences the SOD uses data from the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program by the University of Uppsala (Sweden) in coordination with the 
Peace Resource Institute Oslo (Norway). Their database has been a respected 
source of information on security issues since the 1970s and collects general data 
on different types of conflicts that have occurred since 1946. The data on 
accumulated deaths is taken from the UCDP conflict encyclopedia, which is an 
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interactive database that allows the user to chart death counts per conflict and per 
year. The definition they use for battle-related deaths is as follows:  
 
“Battle-related deaths refer to those deaths caused by the warring parties that can be 
directly related to combat. This includes traditional battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities 
(e.g. hit-and-run attacks/ambushes) and all kinds of bombardments of military bases, 
cities and villages etc. Urban warfare (bombs, explosions, and assassinations) does not 
resemble what happens on a battlefield, but such deaths are considered to be battle-
related. The target for the attacks is either the military forces or representatives for the 
parties, though there is often substantial collateral damage in the form of civilians being 
killed in the crossfire, indiscriminate bombings, etc. All fatalities – military as well as 
civilian – incurred in such situations are counted as battle-related deaths.”295 
 
That being said, measuring battle-related deaths is by no means an easy task. 
Counting deaths in a conflict is extremely difficult because of practical constraints 
as well as political interests. Scholars don’t even seem to agree on whether the 
20th century was the bloodiest century in history296 or whether new wars since the 
1990s have produced more deaths than conflicts during the Cold War. Deaths in 
warzones don’t tend to be reported to the local authorities, and independent 
journalists and researchers oftentimes lack access to warzones because they are 
either too dangerous, or because government officials or rebel groups prohibit 
them from nosing around. As a result, many estimates on battle deaths are based 
on analyses of collections of reports by human rights agencies, local authorities, 
the media, and independent monitors, each with their respective limitations and 
incentives to inflate of deflate the numbers.297  Other methodologies focus on 
mortality surveys in the aftermath of a conflict, typically leading to higher estimates 
of casualties,298 but suffering from their own methodological flaws.299   
When it comes to coup d’état’s, deaths arguably also matter. The 1996 coup in 
Burundi which left approximately 6000 people dead was without a doubt a larger 
threat to the peace than the coup in Niger that occurred in the same year, but which 
only produced two deaths. The 1991 coup in Haiti, which was the first one to 
receive UN sanctions, only produced 26 deaths, indicating that coups can be 
defined as ‘sanctionable’ more easily than civil wars, which is logical because 
coups by definition involve the overthrow of a government, which can more easily 
lead to a threat to the peace or breach of the peace. The data that is used on ‘coup-
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related deaths’ comes from the ‘Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010’ 
dataset from the University of Kentucky.300  
Finally, the ‘Accumulated Death’ count for terrorist groups comes from the START 
Database.301 Counting terror deaths is also a difficult task, as many attacks are left 
unclaimed or claimed by several groups at the same time. Furthermore, the mere 
task of defining whether an attack qualifies as an act of terrorism is difficult. Groups 
that commit acts of terrorism never identify themselves as such, and many groups 
use a mix of military strategies and acts of terrorism to achieve their political goals. 
Despite these limitations, measuring accumulated deaths is relevant in the sense 
that more deadly terrorist groups are in principle more sanctionable (i.e. a bigger 
threat to the peace) than terrorist groups responsible for smaller amounts of 
deaths. 
 
4.3.2. Offence Length 
Just as the amount of deaths that an internal conflict produces is an obvious and 
practical variable to determine sanctionability, so is the length of a conflict. Other 
variables being equal, conflicts that continue for longer are more in need of UN 
sanctions. The same logic might apply to terrorist organizations that are active for 
long periods of time, or coups d’état that take a long time to be reversed, but the 
focus is rather on civil conflicts.  
Just as with conflict deaths, determining the start-date and end-date of a conflict is 
more difficult than it may seem, and has been subject of fierce discussion. After 
all, the question of when a conflict started is closely related to who started it, and 
typically nobody wants to be labelled as an instigator of a conflict. For example, in 
the 1967 Football War between El Salvador and Honduras it is not clear whether 
the conflict started with the violence against El Salvadorians citizens in Honduras 
throughout June, which El Salvador labelled as “acts of genocide”, or with the 
military invasion of Honduras by the El Salvador army on the 14th of July. Most 
studies recognized the latter of the two.302 Similarly, in the Syrian civil war (2011- 
) one could mark the start of the conflict with the popular protests that began on 
the 15th of March 2011 and in which resulted in the deaths of several police officers 
and protesters, or with the defection of Syrian military officers at the end of July 
2011 and the start of a militarized conflict.  
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The UCDP dataset puts the start-date at the first battle-related death in the conflict, 
even if the conflict only reaches the minimum of 25 annual deaths in a posterior 
year. For example, even though the interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
only reached the official status of a conflict in 1964, the first battle-related death 
had already occurred in 1961.303 For the sake of this research however, this start-
date is unsatisfactory. The objective of this variable is to measure how much time 
passed between the day on which UN sanctions became an obvious possibility 
and the day on which they were actually imposed. To use the case of Ethiopia and 
Eritrea again, it would be unfair to put the start-date in 1961 if during the three 
years after the first casualty no serious threat to the peace existed.  
The most practical and relevant alternative is therefore to take the threshold of 
1000 accumulated deaths again, at which point a conflict is serious enough to be 
considered for UN sanctions, and which is also in line with the widely accepted 
definition of war. The disadvantage of this variable is that it is not possible to 
provide a specific date or month in which a conflict reached the 1000 accumulated 
deaths threshold, forcing us to use the year, always using the 1st of July for the 
sake of consistency and fairness. Subsequently, the length of each conflict is 
calculated by measuring the amount of time that passed between the start-year 
and the month in which sanctions were imposed, as well as between the start-year 
and the month of the official end of the conflict.  
The end of a conflict is equally difficult to establish. Does a civil war finish when 
the fighting has stopped? Or when a peace-agreement has been signed? When a 
conflict is ended with the signing of a peace-agreement, but after a year the 
agreement is violated and another conflict breaks out, should we consider it as a 
new conflict, or should we erase the previous ‘end-date’ from the dataset and 
replace it with a new date as soon as a new peace-agreement is signed? For 
example, the Angolan civil war was formally ended three times with the 1991 
Bicesse Accords, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, and the 2002 Lusaka Protocol II.304 
Since each of the breaches of the peace represented a continuation of the same 
conflict (ID-131) between the same parties (UNITA and MPLA) and about the same 
incompatibility (Government of Angola), the conflict is registered as having started 
in 1975 (July), finished in 2002 (April), having lasted for 321 months (26 years and 
9 months).  
When it comes to responding to internal conflicts with UN sanctions, however, it is 
not relevant to use starting dates of the 1970s and 1980s. After all, during the Cold 
War the use of sanctions on internal conflicts was considered a breach of national 
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sovereignty, and did not form part of the UN’s institutional mission or toolkit. For 
calculating the ‘reaction time’ of UN sanctions in response to internal conflicts that 
started during the Cold War the start-year is put at 1992. This year is chosen 
because it marks the publication of ‘An Agenda for Peace’ by former Secretary 
General Boutros Ghali, a document that comes closest to officiating the legitimate 
use of article 39 of the UN charter with regard to internal conflicts. The document 
was published on the 14th of June, but for the sake of consistency with the rest of 
the dataset I have chosen July 1992 as a starting date. In other words, if the first 
UN arms embargo on Angola was imposed in September 1993 (UNSCR 864), the 
‘reaction time’ is calculated to be 14 months, even though the conflict had at that 
time been active for almost two decades. The shortest reaction times for UN 
sanctions concern those on Liberia (UNSCR 788, 4 months), Cambodia’s Khmer 
Rouge (UNSCR 792, 4 months), and those on Serbia and Bosna-Herzegovina 
(UNSCR 713 and 757), both of which were actually imposed before the publication 
of ‘An Agenda for Peace’, and are recognized as one of the factors warranting this 
institutional change in the first place.305 
The starting date for terrorist organizations is equally difficult to determine. Should 
the starting date be placed at the establishment of the organization? The date of 
the first attack? The date of the first deadly attack? And when does a terrorist 
organization cease to form a threat? When they officially dissolve? Or rather when 
they haven’t committed any attacks in over a year? These are all questions that 
are hard to answer. For the sake of this thesis I only include organizations that 
have produced at least 100 deaths since the year 2000, as organizations that were 
more active in the 1990s were not on the UN’s sanctions radar. In reality the ‘War 
on Terror’ began either in 1999 with UNSC 1267 when Al-Qaida was listed in 
relation to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, or in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. For 
the sake of consistency we have chosen the year 2000 as a starting point.  
Coups d’état do tend to have a clear starting point. As a matter of fact, the dataset 
of Powel and Thyne mentions the dates on which each coup took place, as well as 
the amount of days it took to reverse the coup.306 Many coups d’état are however 
not reversed at all, allowing the new regime to stay in power for years. In the cases 
in which the UNSC imposed sanctions in response to a coup (Haiti 1991, Sierra 
Leone 1997, Guinea Bissau 2012), it took anywhere between a few days and two 
years for the UN to act. For the offences of terrorism and coups this thesis does 
not analyze ‘conflict length’ as a variable to determine why some cases were 
sanctioned and others not.  
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4.3.3. State Strength 
One reason to decide to impose UN sanctions on in response to some breaches 
to the peace and not to others might have to do with state strength. In Chapter 
three of this book we discussed the thesis of Liberal Peace, which is closely related 
to that of state-failure and state-building. Arguably, the threat to the peace is larger 
in internal conflicts that take place in ‘weak states’ than those conflicts that take 
place in stronger states. This might for example explain why India has not been 
the subject of any UN sanctions regimes, even though it is by far the State with 
most internal conflicts within its borders since 1989. However, since none of these 
conflicts have seriously endangered the stability of the Indian State itself, sanctions 
were perhaps not deemed necessary. Somalia on the other hand, has been 
recognized as a failed state since the early 1990s, and has not had a credible 
central government for decades. The imposition of UN sanctions might therefore 
be more appropriate.  
It must be noted here that the logic of only sanctioning ‘weaker’ states is in line 
with the theory of liberal peace, but certainly not with the doctrine of R2P. 
According to the logic behind the R2P there is no reason to make a distinction 
between a thousand deaths in India or Somalia. However, when it comes to 
preserving the liberal peace or democratic peace, the distinction between 1000 
deaths in India and 1000 deaths in Somalia can actually be made, because 1000 
deaths in India are not a threat to democracy and state stability in India, whereas 
in Somalia it is.  
There is still another problem with the variable of state strength: It is also consistent 
with the theory of structural realism. Stronger states are less likely threats to the 
peace because they are more stable, but also because self-interested P-5 
members of the UNSC oftentimes consider sanctioning strong states as 
geopolitically imprudent. The other edge of the knife works precisely the same. 
Small and weak states are easier to sanction geo-politically, but are also more 
consistent with liberal peace, because weak states are more likely to turn into failed 
states and breeding grounds for terrorism, and thus larger threats to the peace.  
Despite the limitations mentioned above, it is still worth investigating the question: 
“Is there a relationship between ‘sanctionability’ on the one side and ‘state strength’ 
on the other”?  Are stronger states in which sanctionable offences occurred since 
1990 indeed less likely to be targeted by UN sanctions than weaker states? Or is 
there no correlation between the two? And if there is a correlation, what does it 
mean?  
In the Sanctionable Offences Database, the variable ‘State Strength’ has been 
taken from the National Material Capabilities dataset by the Correlates of War 






Project.307 This dataset identifies state strength by looking solely at states’ hard 
power rather than at its legitimacy or democratic power. It combines six variables 
that give an indication of a State’s national material capabilities: military 
expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, 
urban population, and total population, weighing each variable equally. The 
combined Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score indicates a state’s 
share of power as part of the world as a whole. In the early 1990s the United States 
clearly the world’s strongest material capabilities with almost 15% of the world’s 
material power. Currently China has taken over the top spot with close to 20% of 
the world’s material capabilities in 2007, the latest year for which data are 
available.  
The variable of State Strength is also used in the chapter on coups d’état to test 
whether coups in strong states are less likely to receive UN sanctions than weaker 
states. A more relevant variable for the chapter on coups is however that of 
‘Adverse Regime Change (ARC), which will be discussed further below.  
 
4.3.4. State Fragility 
If State Strength measures hard power and the material capabilities of states, State 
Weakness looks at the internal stability of a state and its ability to successfully 
deliver goods and services to its citizens. State Weakness is about internal 
governance, not the projection of power towards other states. Nigeria and Pakistan 
are weak strong states; their strong militaries, large share of regional GDP, and 
large populations give them high scores on the CINC index, but their failure to 
govern successfully within their own borders gives them a bad score on State 
Weakness. Countries like Luxemburg and Singapore on the other hand are ‘weak 
strong states’, as they are internally strong but geopolitically insignificant.   
State Weakness is relevant because states that are closer to failure or collapse as 
a result of civil war or a coup d’état represent a bigger threat to international 
security than states that are internally strong. State failure is associated with 
refugee streams, regional instability, organized crime, and terrorism. One would 
therefore expect conflicts in weak states to be a greater concern that similarly 
bloody conflicts in politically stable states.  
There are many organizations that index governance. The Index of State 
Weakness by the Brookings Institution is made up of a total of twenty different 
indicators that are divided into four groups: economic, political, security, and social 
welfare. Other Indices such as the Freedom Index by Freedom House and the 
Economist Democracy Index focus more on the democratic process and civil 
liberties, whereas organizations such as Transparency International tend to focus 
                                            






on more specific issues such as corruption. The SOD makes use of the Fragile 
States index by the Fund for Peace (FFP) (formerly the Failed States Index).308 
This index measures a total of twelve variables to establish a risk-score between 
0 (no risk) and 120 (highest risk). Variables include Demographic Pressures, 
Group Grievances, Economic Decline, Public Services, Human Rights, and 
Security, among others.  
There are two methodological issues surrounding the variable of State Weakness 
that need to be mentioned. Firstly, the PPF Fragile State index include variables 
that directly link to civil conflict and foreign intervention. In other words, states that 
have been home to civil conflicts, interventions by the international community, and 
indeed UN sanctions, will receive lower governance scores than those who do not 
score points on these variables. This is completely logical, but leads to the 
methodological problem of endogeneity when comparing cases that have been 
sanctioned to those which have not been sanctioned.  
The second call for caution regarding indices on governance is that none of the 
indices provides data on all years since the early 1990s. The concept of state 
failure only entered the academic literature towards the end of the century, and 
most comprehensive datasets don’t go further back than 2005. The PPF index 
indeed goes back to 2006 only, creating a methodological problem for cases of the 
1990s. For those conflicts that started in the 1990s, the 2006 value has been used.  
 
4.3.5. Adverse Regime Change 
For the chapter on coups d’état, the variable of Adverse Regime Change indicates 
the impact of each coup on its Polity IV score.309 The Polity IV project is an index 
on political regime characteristics and transitions between 1800 and 2015, giving 
scores on both variables of ‘Democracy’ and ‘Autocracy’ between 0 and 7 in the 
aftermaths of world events, including coups d’état. The combined score results in 
an index that runs from -7 (Autocracy) to +7 (full democracy). Since coups d’état 
are events that can relatively easily be pinpointed to a specific date or at least year, 
the Policy IV score before and after the coup is indicative of the impact of the coup. 
Assuming that the UNSC (especially its Western members) have an interest in 
promoting democracy and punishing autocracy, coups that are more detrimental 
for democracy might be more likely to receive sanctions.  
 
4.3.6. Stated Objectives 
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For Terrorist Organizations the SOD includes a variable that measures the states 
objectives of each organization. Following the hypothesis that terrorist 
organizations are more likely to get sanctioned when they aim to establish an 
Islamic State or when they aim to overthrow western institutions, destroy the United 
States, or kill westerners in general. The data is based on analysis of a collection 
of articles in international newspapers, and concerns claims about ‘stated 
objectives’, not targets hit or assumed objectives.  
  
4.3.7. UNSC Vetoes 
Article 27 of the UN Charter states that a Resolution in the United Nations Security 
Council is passed when a minimum of 9 out of 15 members vote in favor of the 
Resolution, including the concurring votes of the 5 permanent members, the United 
States, United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, China, and France. On top of 
this, the permanent members also have the option to block a Resolution from being 
passed by issuing their “right to veto”, something which all of the P-5 members 
have done repeatedly since 1945.  
The Russian Federation has used its power to veto Resolutions, including those 
regarding the imposition of UN sanctions, most often since 1945, followed by the 
US, UK, France, and China. Most of the Russian vetoes were however issued in 
the 1945-1965 era, in which they boycotted the Security Council in protest against 
the Chinese seat being given to Taipei rather than to Beijing. Ever since, the United 
States has by far been the most fervent user of the veto, mainly using it regarding 
issues concerning Israel and the Middle East in general. China only started using 
the power to veto more regularly since the 1990s, whereas France and the UK 
have not used their vetoes since 1989. In 2013 France and Mexico put forward an 
initiative to refrain from using the veto in cases of mass atrocities. It has been 
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Table 10 - UNSC Vetoes since 1946 
Country 1946-89 1990-2018 
USSR/Russia 103 13 
USA 90 16 
France 16 0 
UK 29 0 
China 9 9 
 
P-5 members that have openly supported the ideal of Liberal Peace and the 
doctrine of R2P are expected to have refrained from using their veto in manners of 
sanctionable offences since 1990 in the database. Veto’s used by China and 
Russia can be defended because their IR policy focuses on the respect for 
sovereignty. Vetoes on sanctionable offences used by the United States, France, 
or the United Kingdom, however, can only be seen as a betrayal of the values 
these countries claim to uphold. If such inconsistencies are found the credibility of 
these countries in upholding the international rule of law and constructing a world 
of peace according to the guidelines of Kant 2.0 would be seriously damaged. After 
all, if the leaders of the free world don´t adhere to the rules they have imposed on 
the rest, then why would anyone else respect them?  
 
The problem with vetoes is that oftentimes the mere threat of a veto is sufficient to 
prevent a draft from being written. Potential sanctions regimes in response to 
conflicts in Pakistan, Ethiopia or Myanmar are bound to end up in a deadlock 
between P-5 members who have traditionally supported the regimes in power in 
these countries. The failure to impose sanctions in these instances can be 
attributed to the so-called ‘silent veto’, which normally consists of a threat of a veto 
behind closed doors during negotiations in the UNSC.311 For example, potential 
sanctions regarding conflicts in states and regions that were formerly (or still are) 
part of the Soviet Union, such as Chechnya, Georgia, or the Ukraine, never made 
it to the negotiating table, and therefore never needed to be vetoed either.  
 
4.3.8. Countervailing Power  
Some states are ‘too big to sanction’. These states naturally include the five 
permanent members of the Security Council (see 4.3.7.), but also their closest 
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allies, states that have access to nuclear weapons, and states that sufficient 
geopolitical weight otherwise. Therefore, ‘countervailing power’ serves as a 
dummy variable to filter certain conflicts out, allowing for comparative research 
among cases in which this obstacle is absent. A state is considered to have 
‘countervailing power’ if (a) it has a formal alliance with a non-western P-5 member, 
(b) has a ‘Composite Index of National Capability’(CINC) score of at least 0,015,312 
or (c) is a nuclear power. 
 
4.3.9. Unilateral Sanctions 
Arguably the most valuable variable in dealing with the issue of ‘silent vetoes’ is by 
asking whether those states that claim to uphold the ideals of liberal peace and the 
responsibility to protect at least managed to imposed sanctions unilaterally. Since 
the P-5 members that have claimed to do so are the US, UK, and France, the 
Sanctionable Offences Database looks at sanctions imposed by the US and by the 
EU.  
Did the EU and US at least impose their own sanctions on those civil conflicts in 
which most people were killed and displaced? And did the UN at least sanction 
those terrorist organizations and coup stagers responsible for the most victims? If 
the answer is yes, then there exists an argument for defending the consistency 
and loyalty to the Liberal Peace when it comes to UN sanctions. Simultaneously 
one could then argue that the threshold for defining offences as sanctionable in 
the UN was perhaps too low. If the answer is no, then we must conclude that the 
ideal of Liberal Peace has been betrayed, either as a result of ignorance or as a 
result of politics.  
If for some reason the United Nations was not capable or willing as an institution 
to implement sanctions, one would at least expect those countries who intend to 
uphold cosmopolitan values of human security and liberal peace to impose 
sanctions unilaterally. The SOD therefore includes a variable in which we indicate 
whether individual P-5 members (or the EU) have imposed sanctions unilaterally. 
 
4.3.10. Case Code SOD 
A number from 1 to 198 to give each sanctionable offence in the database a unique 
code 
 
4.3.11. Case Code UCDP 
                                            
312 Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major 






For the offences of Interstate War and Civil War. The code corresponds with the 
code each conflict has in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Encyclopedia.313  
 
4.3.12. Offence Type Code 
Interstate War (1), Civil War (2), Coup d’état (3), Terrorism (4), Nuclear 
Proliferation (5).  
 
4.3.13. Offence Type Text  
Textual description of offence type code 
 
4.3.14. Case Name Official 
In the categories of interstate wars and civil wars, these are the official names of 
the conflicts.  
 
4.3.15. Nickname 
Short name for each of the offences. Interstate wars are indicated with a ( - ) 
between the participating states, whereas civil wars are indicated with a ( : ), first 
indicating the state and then the issue. In some cases the names of the main rebel 
movement is mentioned (e.g. Angola: UNITA), whereas in other cases a region is 
mentioned (e.g. Azerbaijan: Nagorno-Karabakh) to indicate that the conflict 
concerns control over a specific region. In cases in which there is no clearly defined 
armed group opposing the government the conflict is simply called according to 
the state at hand and the text ‘civil war’ (e.g. Liberia Civil War).  
 
4.3.16. Country 
Country in which the offence took place. In some cases more than one country is 
mentioned.  
 
4.3.17. Offence Years 
The years during which the event took place. In the cases of interstate wars, civil 
wars, and terrorist organizations, these can be several years. In the cases of coups 
d’état and nuclear proliferation the year in which the event took place is mentioned.   
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4.3.18. UN Sanctions 
Did the United Nations Security Council impose sanctions under Chapter VII of the 
charter? (0 = no, 1 = yes, 2 = listed as terrorist organization).  
 
4.3.19. First UNSC Resolution 
The first United Nations Security Council Resolution in which sanctions under 
Chapter VII were imposed in relation to the sanctionable offence at hand.  
 
4.3.20. Date First UNSC Resolution 
Date on which the first sanction under Chapter VII was imposed (DD/MM/YYYY). 
 
4.3.21. Target Description 
Short description of the target(s) of the sanctions. 
 
4.3.22. Target Code 
Coded version of the target(s) of the sanctions. (S = State, SS = Sub-State, NS = 
Non-State). 
 
4.3.23. Type of Sanction 
Types of sanctions imposed under sanctions regime (AR = Arms Embargo, CU = 




Was an unsanctioned offence vetoed by a permanent member of the Security 
Council? And if yes, which one(s)? 
 
4.3.25. Against 
In the first UNSCR in which sanctions were imposed or proposed, how many 








In the first UNSCR in which sanctions were imposed or proposed, how many 
members of the Security Council abstained from voting on the motion?  
 
4.3.27. Favor 
In the first UNSCR in which sanctions were imposed or proposed, how many 
members of the Security Council voted in favor of the motion?  
 
4.3.28. UNGA SES 
Were sanctions imposed by the UN General Assembly in a Special Emergency 
Session?  
 
4.3.29. EU Sanctions 
Did the European Union impose sanctions with regard to this offence unilaterally? 
 
4.3.30. US Sanctions 
Did the United States impose sanctions with regard to this offence unilaterally? 
 
4.3.31. Deaths since 1990 – State Based 
According to the UCDP encyclopedia, how many people died from state based 
conflict in the offence at hand? (Only for interstate wars and civil wars).  
 
4.3.32. Deaths since 1990 – None-State 
According to the UCDP encyclopedia, how many people died from none-state 
based conflict in the offence at hand? (Only for interstate wars and civil wars).  
 
4.3.33. Deaths since 1990 – One-Sided 
According to the UCDP encyclopedia, how many people died from one-sided 
conflict in the offence at hand? (Only for interstate wars and civil wars).  
 
4.3.34. Large vs. Small 
Does the offence at hand constitute a large or a small conflict or offence. This 
variable only applies to civil wars and interstate wars and the threshold lies at 
10.000 deaths. 







4.3.35. CINC Percentage 
CINC Score of each state as a percentage of the world’s total CINC score (100%) 
 
4.3.36. Continent 
Continent to which a sanctionable offence or offender belongs to. The Middle East, 
although officially part of Asia, is recognized as a separate continent, and ranges 
from Israel to Iran. Turkey is considered part of the Middle East. Egypt is 
considered part of Africa. 
  
4.3.37. Reaction Time 
Time in months between the outbreak of the conflict and the imposition of sanctions 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
 
4.3.38. Coup Deaths 
Amount of deaths produced by the coup d’état according to the Coup d’État Events 
1946-2015 dataset by Marshall and Marshall.314  
 
4.3.39. Adverse Regime Change (Binary) 
Coup’s d’état that provoke an adverse regime change of larger than -5 are marked 
as ‘1’. All other instances are marked as ‘0’.  
 
4.3.40. Coup Leaders 
Name(s) of the coup leaders involved in the coup d’état. Data comes from the 
Marshall and Marshall Coup d’État Events 1946 – 2015 dataset.  
 
4.3.41. Terror Deaths 1990 – 2015 
Amount of deaths resulting from terrorist attacks per organization between 1990 
and 2015. Data comes from the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
Database (START).  
 
                                            






4.3.42. Terror Deaths since 2001 
Amount of deaths resulting from terrorist attacks per organization since 2001.  
 
4.3.43. Deaths at Time of Sanction 
Amount of deaths resulting from terrorist attacks per organization at the time the 
organization was listed under UNSCR Regime 1267 or 2253.  
 
4.3.44. Deaths after listed 
Amount of deaths resulting from terrorist attacks per organization after the the 
organization was listed under UNSCR Regime 1267 or 2253. 
 
4.3.45. Doubt Terror Deaths 
Not all deaths produced by ‘terrorist organizations’ in the SOD are recognized as 
acts of terrorism. Whenever the nature of the attack is not clearly terroristic, the 
START database marks it either as an act of rebellion, guerrilla warfare, or another 
type of event. The ‘Doubt Terror Deaths’ in the SOD database counts the amount 
of deaths that are not clearly produced by acts of terror.  
 
4.3.46. No Doubt Terror Deaths 
The amount of deaths produced by each organization that are fully recognized in 
the START database as acts of terrorism.  
 
4.3.47. No Doubt Terror % 
Percentage of deaths per ‘terrorist group’ that were without a doubt produced 
through acts of terrorism, and not through acts of rebellion, guerrilla, or other 
attacks (see above).  
 
4.3.48. Western Deaths 
Deaths produced per organization of Western citizens, including those from the 
United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the European Union.  
 
4.3.49. Western Deaths Story 
Summaries of attacks in which westerners were killed (see above).  








Affiliation of each terrorist organization. (No affiliation = 0, Affiliated with Al-Qaida 
= 1, Collaborate with Al-Qaida = 2, Affiliated with ISIS = 3).  
 
4.3.51. Stated Objectives Categorized 
 
4.3.52. Islamic? 
Is the terrorist organization at hand Islamic in nature? (0 = yes, 1 = no) 
 
4.3.53. Media Coverage 
Annual amount of articles per newspaper covering a sanctionable conflict. Data is 





The methodology of this thesis faces a number of limitations, some of which are 
content-related and others of which are rather practical. 
In terms of content, the main limitation of the method of comparing sanctioned 
cases to comparable non-sanctioned cases is that the list of sanctionable offences 
is not a widely acknowledged list. As a matter of fact, such a list does not exist 
anywhere and will without a doubt be subject to academic discussion. The author 
of this thesis is fully aware of the fact that the list of sanctionable offences is 
arbitrary, and that it does not count as a source of authority. Rather, readers should 
consider it as a first academic attempt to establish an academic consensus. Critics 
are therefore more than welcome to debate the premises on which the list of 
sanctionable offences is built.   
The thresholds to make it to the list of sanctionable offences have already been 
explained earlier in this chapter. There are however some extra issues that 
deserve mention. With respect to interstate wars and civil wars that produce at 
least a thousand deaths, some critics might ask which party to the conflict should 
be sanctioned. Counting casualties may help us in recognizing the biggest ‘threats 
to the peace’ since 1990, but it doesn´t help us in establishing who is to blame for 
the violence, and which groups or individuals should be on the receiving end of the 






violence legitimately. How can we establish which side is poses a threat to the 
peace? Which side, if any, should be sanctioned? Why did the UNSC sanction the 
regime of Muammar Gaddafi and not the rebels that tried to overthrow the 
government? Why were various rebel movements and individuals in the eastern 
DRC Congo subject to travel sanctions and asset freezes, and not the ruthless and 
(arguably) illegitimate regimes of Joseph and Laurent Kabila?  
For the sake of this thesis this doesn’t matter much.  If UN sanctions were to some 
extent a reflection of international law and the ideals promoted by Liberal Peace, 
one would at least expect someone, or even both sided to be sanctioned. As a 
matter of fact it is perfectly normal for the Security Council to impose an arms 
embargo on both sides of a conflict. It has done so in response to conflicts in 
Rwanda, Angola, Ivory Coast, and many other places. The same goes for asset 
freezes, travel sanctions, and export restrictions. In other words, the argument that 
it is difficult to establish who is the main ‘breacher of the peace’ or ‘threat to the 
peace’, is not a good excuse for failing to impose sanctions.  
Another critique on the list of sanctionable offences is that sometimes imposing 
sanctions on countries might be outright dangerous to international stability. For 
example, if Pakistan was not sanctioned in response to its aggression towards 
India in the 1998 Kargil War (part of the wider Kashmir conflict), this had much to 
do with the fact that Pakistan had just become the world’s seventh nuclear power. 
The absence of sanctions should not be seen as a failure of the UNSC in upholding 
the rule of law, but rather as an act of political prudence.   
Indeed, such prudence is at times necessary; ‘sanctionable offences’ cannot 
always be met by UN sanctions. Such cases thus somehow have to be filtered out 
of the database in order to prevent methodological distortions. There are two ways 
of doing so. Firstly, it is possible to earmark all the non-sanctioned cases in which 
there was a very obvious and clear-cut risk to imposing sanctions, for example 
when nuclear war is at stake. By doing so we can allow cases such as the Kargil 
War to be exempted. Such exceptions should however only be permitted in 
extremely sensitive cases.  
Across the board, however, the excuse that the imposition of sanctions might 
further destabilize a conflict is not very relevant. First of all, UN arms embargoes, 
asset freezes, diplomatic sanctions, and travel bans are relatively minor 
instruments of politics. They are non-violent means to deal with violations of 
international law that cannot only be used a tools of effective punishment, but also 
to simply ‘signal’ to the target that their actions represent a ‘sanctionable offence’. 
As a matter of fact, signaling was a purpose of all UN targeted sanctions episodes 
since 1990, albeit almost never the primary purpose.315 Second of all, failing to 
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impose sanctions potentially has much bigger consequences than imposing them. 
Admittedly sanctions have the potential to alienate a target when it perceives that 
the international community is turning against it. The consequences of such 
reactions must be taken into account.316 However, the failure to impose sanctions 
sends an even more dangerous signal: it legitimizes the continuation of conflict. As 
long as some violators receive sanctions while others do not, the credibility of UN 
sanctions as legitimate tools of law will be criticized.  
Related to the above arguments, the reader should keep in mind that the objective 
of this thesis is not to convince the audience that all sanctionable offences should 
have been sanctioned. Rather, the objective is simply to give an approximate 
answer to the question of what UN sanctions are for. If our observation is that many 
‘sanctionable offences’ were left untouched, it means that either the list is arbitrary, 
or that UN sanctions themselves are. Assuming that the list is based on a solid 
argumentative foundation, our task is then to tease out what moves the arbiters. If 
the answer does not lie with humanitarian variables, we have to consider other 
variables that represent a more Realist perspective on UN sanctions.  
Some readers might point out that besides the five types of sanctionable offences 
(nuclear proliferation, interstate war, civil war, terrorism, and coups d’état), other 
offences should have been included. Although Saudi Arabia, Zimbabwe, and 
Venezuela have not been home to any wars since 1990, readers might argue that 
their human rights records, oppressive governments, and disappearances of 
government critics are also worthy of UN sanctions. Whereas an ethical argument 
can certainly be made to sustain this point, the SOD database does not include a 
list of “Oppressive Governments” or “Opposition Deaths”. The most important 
reason for this decision is that the UNSC has never recognized such issues as 
threats to the peace under Chapter VII of its Charter. The number of sanctioned 
cases in the SOD would be zero. Additionally, the number of unsanctioned cases 
would be difficult to determine, as establishing a threshold of “oppressiveness” 
would not be a straightforward task. Similarly, other potentially sanctionable 
offences such as cyberwarfare, actions of intelligence agencies, or other security 
threats are not included in this thesis.  
A final methodological limitation in terms of content is related to the fact that this 
thesis uses a list of variables that serve as proxies for hypotheses. This brings 
along three types of limitations.  
Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, the method of using proxy variables rather 
than detailed case studies for each of the 200 or so sanctionable offences means 
that this thesis does not provide deep insights into each of the cases. Readers that 
are interested in the ins and outs of a specific conflict and the reasons for which it 
                                            






was or wasn’t sanctioned will not find any satisfying answers in this thesis. Some 
experts of specific cases might even find that the short case studies used in this 
thesis to illustrate the conclusions of the research are insubstantial or factually 
inaccurate. The former of these flaws is a necessary consequence of the method 
used; this thesis looks at a rather big and general issue and tries to pull across-
the-board conclusions. Providing a full case study for each case would 
undoubtedly make the work richer, but is practically unfeasible within the scope of 
this thesis. The latter of the flaws (factual inaccuracy) is also a consequence of the 
method, but it is not inevitable. Readers are kindly encouraged to correct any 
mistakes that the author has committed in his ignorance.  
Secondly, the use of proxy variables to draw conclusions about the reasons behind 
UN sanctions regimes only provide us with approximate answers, not with 
conclusive ones. The thesis claim that UN sanctions have moved closer towards 
ideas of Liberal Peace while still being ruled by Realist interests is backed by a 
number of convincing exhibits, but not by conclusive evidence. It looks at the UN’s 
track-record regarding a list of offences, not at the words spoken by UN 
representatives in Security Council meetings or the thoughts present in their minds 
when voting in favor or against sanctions. If a conclusion of this thesis is that state-
strength matters when it comes to sanctioning civil wars, it is because the data 
suggests so, not because P5-ambassadors to the UN repeatedly urged those 
words in meetings. If a conclusion of the thesis is that Salafist terrorists are 
considered a bigger threat to the peace than separatist terrorists, it’s because the 
track record of UN sanctions since 1990 implies this conclusion, not because Ban 
Ki Moon issued an official statement announcing that separatists should not be 
sanctioned.  
Thirdly, during the research I have come to realize that the method of using proxies 
provides an almost inexhaustible list of other variables that are worth studying. For 
example, participants in conferences have suggested considering variables that 
measure deaths per capita in civil wars, a friends vs. foes index that measures 
states’ relations with the West, or the amount of recruits of terrorist groups. Many 
of these suggested variables are worth looking at, and readers are encouraged to 
use the SOD database to study these variables in relation to UN sanctions regimes 






























Selective Sanctions and Nuclear Proliferation 
 
 
Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and 
weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized 
as “Nuclear Weapons States” by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, better known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968.317  
The prospect of nuclear warfare is without a doubt the defining and most serious 
‘threat to the peace’ that the United Nations face. The destructiveness of nuclear 
bombs gives those who possess them the possibility to wipe out cities, states, or 
even the world as a whole. After they were used for the first time with the US 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, it was clear that nuclear warfare was 
to be avoided at all times, and that the Great Powers were to use extreme caution 
with nuclear technology.  
This chapter will show that when it comes to imposing UN sanctions, the offence 
of nuclear proliferation is the embodiment of structural realism. Decisions about 
who gets sanctioned and who doesn’t can be fully explained through geopolitical 
calculations of the P-5. During the Cold war, this led to the successful proliferation 
of nuclear weapons by Israel and India, but not South Africa, which received UN 
sanctions in response to its nuclear ambitions combined with its internal Apartheid 
policies and acts of aggression against its neighbors. After the Cold War, Iraq’s 
nuclear ambitions were successfully contained, even though it was not clear 
whether such ambitions truly existed. The proliferation of nuclear weapons by 
Pakistan in 1998 was perhaps the UNSC’s biggest miscalculation. Not only did it 
bring Pakistan on the brink of a nuclear war with India, it also indirectly benefited 
North Korea and Iran, both of which benefited from the transfer of nuclear 
technology through Pakistan, bringing them closer to reaching their nuclear 
ambitions. The UN sanctions regimes against North Korea and Iran show that the 
P-5 are currently on the same geopolitical line when it comes to nuclear 
proliferation: keep the status-quo.  
 
 
                                            








At the time the NPT was established, five States had already developed nuclear 
weapons stockpiles, and one state had already used atomic bombs in an interstate 
conflict. The United States was the first and only State to use a nuclear weapon 
when it bombed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 6th and the 9th of 
August 1945, killing an estimated 200.000 people and marking the end of WWII. 
Although US President Truman argued that the use of the atomic bomb had 
actually saved the lives of many soldiers in so abruptly ending the war and forcing 
the surrender of the Japanese Empire, it also shaped a precedent for extreme 
caution. The words of the ‘father of the atomic bomb’ Robert Oppenheimer upon 
completing the first nuclear test, “Now I am become death, the destroyer of 
worlds”318, reverberated across the world. Full-out nuclear warfare was to be 
avoided at all cost in order to save the world from annihilation.  
Nuclear proliferation was on the top of the agenda of the United Nations. On the 
24th of January 1946, the very first Resolution of the General Assembly established 
the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), which was tasked with 
making proposals for the control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only and 
the elimination of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
as well as establishing rules for inspection and compliance.319 In June of that same 
year, US representative Bernard Baruch presented the Baruch plan, proposing that 
States destroy their nuclear stockpiles and that the development of atomic 
weapons would automatically be sanctioned by the UN, without the option for a 
veto in the Security Council. The Soviet Union however abstained from voting on 
the proposal, leaving the Baruch Plan as well as the UNAEC do die a slow death. 
Unsurprisingly, in August 1949 the Soviet Union was the second State to become 
a nuclear power, marking the first milestone in the Cold War arms race between 
the US and the USSR. The United Kingdom followed in 1952, and France and 
China followed in 1960 and 1964, respectively, leading to a situation in which all 
P-5 members of the United Nations Security Council were nuclear states. In 
subsequent decades, both the US and the USSR shared their nuclear technology 
in cooperation agreements, signing treaties with states including South Africa and 
Spain in the case of the US, and a range of Soviet satellite states and communist 
allies in Africa, Latin America, and Asia in the case of the USSR. In 1957 the United 
Nations founded a more realistic successor to the UNAEC, named the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA has the difficult task of on the one hand 
promoting the use of civilian nuclear energy and its international spread, while on 
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the other hand preventing and detecting the spread of nuclear technology aimed 
at developing nuclear weapons. This proved to be a difficult task, with as IAEA 
inspections from South Africa to Iran would later prove.  
In 1968 a group of eighteen nations negotiated the final text for the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force officially in 1970. Forty three 
parties signed the agreement, which recognized five so-called nuclear-weapon 
states320 (the UNSC P-5 members), and agreeing that all other signatories were to 
refrain from proliferating nuclear weapons. The NPT also became instituted within 
the United Nations when the Security Council voted in favor of UNSCR 255 (1968), 
recognizing that “aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such 
aggression against a non-nuclear weapon State would create a situation in which 
the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-State permanent members, would 
have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the UN 
Charter”.321 Currently, 190 states are party to the NPT, making them eligible for 
UN sanctions under chapter VII of its Charter. States that have not signed the NPT 
and are therefore not bound to its rules are India, Israel, North Korea,322 Pakistan, 
and South Sudan. All of them except South Sudan have since developed nuclear 
weapons.323  
Table 11 - Nuclear proliferators outside of the UNSC P5 
State Year of Proliferation UN Sanctions? 
Israel Unknown No 
India 1974 No 
South Africa Unknown Yes 
Iraq Unknown Yes 
Pakistan 1998 No 
North Korea 2006 Yes 
Iran Unknown Yes 
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5.2. Nuclear proliferators before 1990 
 
Israel – not sanctioned 
Including Israel on a list of nuclear proliferators is controversial, as Israel has never 
officially admitted to owning or having developed nuclear weapons. Ever since its 
birth in 1948, Israel has been surrounded by enemies who have openly called for 
its destruction or failed to recognize its statehood, including Iran, Lebanon, Syria, 
Saudi Arabia, and Palestine. After the experience of the Holocaust and the Arab-
Israeli war of 1948, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was convinced that acquiring 
nuclear weapons was the only way for Israel to guarantee its future existence. 
When he came to power for the second time in 1955, his Defense Minister Shimon 
Peres established close relations with France, which was eager for an ally in the 
Middle East to balance against Egypt’s Abdel Nasser, especially after Egypt 
nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. The common interest of Paris and Tel Aviv 
led to a nuclear collaboration in which France supported the construction of a 
nuclear power plant at Dimona, a city in the desert west of the Dead Sea. 324 In the 
1960s France’s position under Charles de Gaulle became more conservative as 
Paris became suspicious of Tel Aviv’s true intentions. As France’s Arab allies 
increased the pressure on de Gaulle, France briefly pushed for IAEA inspections 
at the Dimona plant. Eventually Israel and France reached a compromise in which 
France officially disengaged from the project while still allowing French companies 
to remain involved. France itself conducted its first nuclear test in 1960. Israel 
followed in 1966, just in time to deter its enemies in the 1967 Six-Day War and the 
1973 Yom Kippur War from overplaying their hands.325 In 1968, when the Great 
Powers concluded negotiations on the NPT, Israel decided not to join. 
Both Tel Aviv’s allies and enemies are of course well aware of Israel’s possession 
of nuclear weapons. Estimates since the 1980s based on intelligence leaks range 
between 60 and 400 nuclear weapons. Former US President Jimmy Carter put the 
number at at least 150 in a 2008 interview.326 The official policy of Tel Aviv is 
however one of ‘nuclear ambiguity’ or ‘opaqueness’, meaning that Israel has not 
officially denied or confirmed anything about its nuclear status.327 In official 
statements the Israelis have consistently declared that Israel would not be the first 
country to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East, conveniently leaving its 
enemies in the dark about the truth.  
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If Israel has not been subjected to UN sanctions in response to their nuclear 
proliferation, it is of course not because of their ‘nuclear opaqueness’ strategy or 
because they are not party to the NPT, but because Israel’s allies allowed for it to 
happen. While Paris was initially most active in its nuclear collaboration with Tel 
Aviv, Washington and London were perfectly aware of the developments at 
Dimona. When Israel attempted to purchase heavy water for its nuclear plant 
through the somewhat hesitant government of Norway, the British under Prime 
Minister Macmillan were happy to serve as an intermediate.328 The Americans go 
as far as to pressure their own government officials to adhere to Israel’s nuclear 
opaqueness strategy, censuring critical publications and firing academics who 
write unfavorably about Israel as a nuclear power. A State Department official 
under the Bush Jr. administration explained that they would “never say flatly that 
Israel has nuclear weapons”, censuring allegations to the contrary by using softer 
terms such as ‘we presume’ or ‘it is reported’.329  
Israel’s position as the first State to proliferate nuclear weapons in the Middle East 
has not only given a strategic advantage to Tel Aviv, but has also had major 
consequences on a wider geopolitical scale. For Israel itself the nuclear option 
works an insurance against regional enemies and allows them to project its 
strength. The Israeli airstrikes against Syrian nuclear reactors in 1981 and 2007 
and the strong language directed against Iran show that Israel would like to keep 
its unique position as the region’s sole nuclear power. From a geopolitical 
standpoint Israel’s regional nuclear hegemony has also been considered as the 
safest option. Whereas on a global scale the nuclear arms race between the Soviet 
Union and the West created an awkward type of stability through the theory of 
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the same logic can arguably not be applied 
in the Middle East. The history of conflict in the region and frequent threats by Iran 
to annihilate Israel make that any change to the status quo would only destabilize 
the situation further.  
 
India – not sanctioned 
The first State to officially proliferate nuclear weapons since the establishment of 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT) was India, which detonated 
‘Smiling Buddha’ in 1974. Just like Israel, India had not signed the NPT, even if it 
was actively involved in its design. Prime Minister Nehru, who had already 
authorized a peaceful Indian nuclear program in 1948 under the Atomic Energy 
Act, saw India’s nuclear program as a source of anti-colonial pride, describing the 
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US-led nonproliferation regime as a system of “nuclear apartheid”.330 With regard 
nuclear weapons he stated that although India’s goal was to develop a nuclear 
program for peaceful purposes, “of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use 
it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation 
from using it that way.”331 Unsurprisingly Pakistan, which had just split from British 
India in one of the bloodiest wars of decolonization and which would be India’s 
nemesis for the decades to come, did not sign the NPT either.  
As the Nixon administration had given India’s nuclear program a relatively low 
priority, focusing rather on the Vietnam War and a grand strategy vis-à-vis Moscow 
and Beijing, the 1974 “Smiling Buddha” test came somewhat as a surprise.332 India 
was not allied with the West at the time, initially proscribing to a neutral status in 
the Cold War and signing a treaty of friendship with Moscow in 1971. The West 
and China both sided with Pakistan, India’s arch-enemy, integrating Pakistan in 
the American Atoms for Peace program. India did however not immediately 
weaponize their arsenal, referring to the Smiling Buddha test as a peaceful nuclear 
explosion. It was only in the late 1970s, when it became clear that a Pakistani 
scientist had stolen nuclear technology from the Netherlands and that Pakistan 
might have forged a nuclear alliance with China that India started to take the matter 
seriously.333 Having successfully kept the rest of the world in the dark about its 
nuclear capabilities, in 1998 it launched five nuclear test missiles under the name 
of Pokhran II, leading to widespread condemnation. The United States under 
President Bill Clinton imposed unilateral sanctions, Japan suspended 
humanitarian aid, and Canada pulled back its ambassador.334 The United Nations 
Security Council reacted with words only; UNSCR 1172 expressed grave concern 
about the nuclear proliferation of both India and Pakistan and urged both parties 
to exercise maximum restraint to avoid threatening situations of provocations that 
could escalate the situation.335 It was the closest the world had ever come to 
nuclear warfare. The prospect of Mutually Assured Destruction between the two 
regional powers did not make the world a safer place. UN sanctions against 
Islamabad or Delhi were however not an option; they would only risk further 
escalation of the conflict. As we will see in the following sections, UN sanctions 
only make sense in earlier stages of nuclear development.  
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South Africa - Sanctioned 
When the Republic of South Africa came on the radar of the UNSC related to its 
apartheid regime, it was not a signatory to the NTP yet. Already in 1960 the Council 
passed Resolution 134 in response to the killings of protestors, recognizing that 
the situation in South Africa was causing internal friction. In the 1960s and 1970 
this was followed up by a voluntary arms embargo in response to South Africa’s 
arms build-up, the imprisonment of Nelson Mandela, and the ‘evil and abhorrent 
policies of Apartheid. It was only in 1977, however, when South Africa became 
suspected of transforming its nuclear technology from its (US promoted) Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions program (PNE) into a weapons program that the UNSC 
imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa.336 From now on States were 
to refrain from cooperating with South Africa in the development of its nuclear 
program, in addition to the embargo on the sale or shipment of arms, ammunition, 
and military vehicles and equipment. The fact that South Africa was not a signatory 
to the NPT did not seem to make any difference. South Africa would later receive 
further sanctions for its armed aggression against neighboring Namibia, Lesotho, 
and Botswana, as well as additional targeted (but) voluntary economic and 
financial sanctions, including a ban on the sale of uranium, oil, coal, computers, 
and foreign currency. UNSCR 569 (1985) also recommended a (again voluntary) 
ban on investments in the nuclear sector and on cultural and sports events, all with 
the objective of freeing political prisoners (specifically Nelson Mandela), the 
abolishment of Apartheid, and the organization of free and democratic elections. 
Already before the 1992 establishment of the UN Observer Mission in South Africa 
(UNOMSA), the government under F.W. de Klerk signed the NPT on the 10th of 
July 1991, marking the beginning of South Africa’s ‘voluntary’ dismantling of its 
nuclear arsenal and its return from pariah-statehood to normalcy.  
 
5.3. Nuclear Proliferators after 1990 
 
Iraq - Sanctioned 
Just as South Africa, Iraq was subjected to UN sanctions in response to its nuclear 
ambitions and WMD-program after it had already been sanctioned for its 
aggression against Kuwait. After UNSCR 660 of 1990 had already imposed 
comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq, Resolution 687 of the 8th of April 1991 
dealt specifically with Saddam Hussein’s weapons program. During and prior to 
the war with Kuwait, Iraq had used and threated to use weapons in violation of its 
obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
                                            






Warfare (1925). Furthermore, Iraq had used ballistic missiles in unprovoked 
attacks and had attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons program 
contrary to its obligations under the NPT of 1968, which Iraq had ratified in 1969. 
Resolution 687 decided that Iraq should unconditionally accept “the destruction, 
removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all chemical 
and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles with a range of more than 
150km.337 The Resolution also decided that Iraq should unconditionally agree not 
to acquire nuclear weapons or develop its nuclear program, and mandated the 
IAEA to organize immediate on-site inspections throughout Iraq.  
Throughout the 1990s sanctions on Iraq became tighter, with the UN practically 
controlling all of Iraq’s imports and exports through the Oil For Food Program 
(OFFP), which had been installed under UNSCR 706 (1991) to alleviate the 
humanitarian suffering of civilians that the economic embargo had caused. Under 
the OFFP Iraq was allowed to export oil, its main source of income, under the 
condition that revenues were paid into an escrow account managed by the UN. 
Indirectly, Iraq ended up contributing to its own humanitarian support, inspections 
and auditing of the OFFP, and the operating costs of the inspections by UNSCOM 
and the IAEA.338 In the late 1990s, as the monitoring mechanisms of UNSCOM 
became stricter, Iraq began to interfere with the work of the inspectors, prohibiting 
people from entering sites and tampering with surveillance equipment. The UN 
replied with UNSCR 1137 (1997), further expanding the sanctions regime to 
include travel sanctions against individuals (mostly military officials) involved. 
Three months later, noting that the Government of Iraq did not cooperate fully in 
the preparation of a report of the Secretary General related to the inspections, the 
Council (UNSCR 1153) decided to cap the oil exports of Iraq at roughly US$ 5.2 
billion for a 180-day period, including a specific breakdown of the allocation of the 
money. In 1999 the inspection activities into Iraq’s WMD program were expanded 
when UNSCOM was replaced by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and 
Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC)339, under the leadership of Hans Blix (Sweden), 
a former director general of the IAEA. While the language in subsequent 
Resolutions became stronger and stronger, the inspections were equally fruitless. 
On paper UNMOVIC ordered Iraq to give immediate and unimpeded access to and 
from the country, its inspections sites, and Presidential sites. In reality, inspection 
personnel was frustrated with stolen luggage, flat tires of vehicles, and 
bureaucratic obstruction, provoking Blix to warn Hussein that there must be no “cat 
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and mouse” games340, and that Iraq would face serious consequences as a result 
of its continued violations of its obligations.  
In February 2003 Blix briefed the UN Security Council on the findings of 400 
inspections (without notice) on approximately 300 sites with 100 UNMOVIC 
inspectors, 15 IAEA inspectors, 50 aircrew, and 65 support staff. Access to the 
sites had been without problems. The inspectors found more than 200 chemicals 
more than 100 biological samples, including 50 liters of mustard gas, which was 
subsequently destroyed. Related to WMDs or related items or programs, 
UNMOVIC had however not found any such weapons. Blix also made a comment 
referring to US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presented material collected by 
the CIA and other intelligence agencies pointing to a contrary conclusion. In 
response to this information, Blix said that his inspectors must base their reports 
“only on evidence, which they can, themselves, examine and report publicly. 
Without evidence, confidence cannot arise”.341  
The decision of the United States and the United Kingdom to intervene militarily in 
Iraq without the consent of the UN Security Council greatly hurt the UN authority 
as the world’s most important institution to deal with issues of international security. 
In an attempt to disassociate itself from the US-led coalition that invaded Iraq, the 
UNSC dissolved the 661 Committee and replaced it with a new committee and 
sanctions regime (UNSCR 1518). This regime cancelled the sanctions on the 
previous government of Saddam Hussein, and only focused on Iraq’s WMD 
program and the Oil for Food Program. In 2007, UNMOVIC’s mandate was 
terminated, and in 2010 all sanctions related to Iraq’s WMD and nuclear-related 
programs were lifted. The arms embargo and asset freezes against individuals 
listed pursuant to resolution 1518 are still in place.  
 
Pakistan – Not Sanctioned 
The third State to proliferate nuclear weapons outside of the P-5 was Pakistan, 
which had been trying to obtain the bomb ever since its nemesis India had acquired 
one in 1974. Just like India and South Africa, Pakistan had not signed the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968. Pakistan had also abstained from voting on 
UNSCR 255 that institutionalized the NPT in the United Nations.342 Pakistan’s 
nuclear ambitions started already in the 1950s, when Islamabad joined the US 
Atoms for Peace project, which also laid the foundations for Iran’s peaceful nuclear 
program. The search for nuclear weapons only ignited in the aftermath of 
Pakistan’s 1971 war with India, which led to the split of East Pakistan (now 
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Bangladesh) from West Pakistan (now Pakistan), and which led to the deaths of 
hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi, as well as a geostrategic downgrade of 
Pakistan. In 1972 Pakistan’s Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto established the 
Pakistan nuclear program, remarking that her people would eat grass to keep up 
with India.343 The West was not keen on Pakistan becoming another nuclear state, 
but could not prevent Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist to steal 
nuclear centrifuge designs from a Urenco enrichment plant that employed him in 
the Netherlands. Returning to Pakistan, Khan established a network including 
scientists from Iran, Libya, and North Korea, creating further trouble down the road. 
Pakistan’s first successful nuclear test was carried out on the 28th of May 1998, 
just weeks after Indian nuclear tests approximately 100km from India-Pakistani 
border in the province of Rajasthan. A year later, when the Kargil war between 
India and Pakistan over Kashmir broke out, the world was arguably closer than 
ever to the outbreak of a nuclear war.  
The nuclear proliferation of Pakistan was perhaps the biggest geopolitical mistake 
of the P-5 in its history of nuclear nonproliferation. Just as in the case of Israel, as 
long as India was the only regional power with the nuclear option, the risk of 
nuclear escalation was minimal. This obviously gave India a large strategical 
advantage over Pakistan in its conflict of Kashmir, among others, but this was a 
relatively small-stakes game. Pakistan might have been an ally of both China (to 
balance against India) and the United States (in the war on Islamic extremism and 
to balance against Iran), but these stakes too were much smaller than that 
represented by nuclear weapons.  
The UNSC was obviously ‘gravely concerned’ at the nuclear tests by India and 
Pakistan and the ‘danger to peace and stability’ in the region (UNSCR 1172), but 
it was unable to identify the situation as a ‘threat to the peace’ or ‘breach of the 
peace’ under Chapter VII, even after the Kargil war (a war of aggression) broke 
out. It was already too late to undertake any forceful action, so soothing the 
situation was the best option. The Council demanded that India and Pakistan 
refrain from further nuclear tests and called upon all states not to carry out any 
nuclear weapon test explosion in accordance with the provisions of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and encouraging all states to prevent the 
export of equipment, materials or technology related to India and Pakistan’s 
nuclear programs.344 Sanctions were however never an option. Even if Pakistan 
had been a signatory to the NPT, UN sanctions on Pakistan might have only further 
escalated the situation. Once Pakistan had joined the group of States possessing 
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nuclear weapons, there was no way back. Reason the more to prevent future 
aspirants from doing the same.  
 
North Korea – Sanctioned 
Although North Korea’s first nuclear test was only carried out in November of 2006, 
the story of North Korea and its ambitions to become a nuclear power go further 
back. North Korea initially joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 under 
the leadership of its Supreme Leader Kim Il-Sung.345 In the 1960s and 1970s North 
Korea was a relatively stable country enjoying Soviet support and economically 
outperforming South Korea, from which it had split after the Korean War of 1950-
1953. In the 1980s, however, Soviet support waned and the planned economy of 
North Korea started failing, leading Kim Il-Sung to create a personality-cult in order 
to cling on to political power, further isolating North Korea from the rest of the world. 
In 1993, North Korea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs announced the country’s 
intention to withdraw from the NPT under its article X, which allows a state to leave 
the treaty if “extraordinary events (…) have jeopardized the supreme interests of 
its country.” In response, the UN Security Council passed resolution 825 (1993), 
in which it urged North Korea to reconsider. US ambassador Madeleine Albright 
announced that the US, UK, France, and Russia were also preparing a resolution 
to impose sanctions on North Korea, to which Pyongyang responded aggressively, 
threatening that they would regard such actions as ‘acts of war’, and also 
threatening to turn Seoul, the capital of South Korea, into a ‘sea of fire’.346 
Negotiations with the United States however convinced the North Korean’s to put 
their official withdrawal from the NPT on hold in return for US support to replace 
North Korea’s old nuclear plant with modern nuclear plants that made it more 
difficult to proliferate nuclear weapons.347 Under the Agreed Framework, North 
Korea would take steps towards implementing the Joint Declaration on the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula348, remain party to the NPT, and allow 
IAEA inspections on its old nuclear sites, among others. In return, the US would 
normalize relations with North Korea, which had been tense since the 1950s.  
In the years following the 1994 Agreed Framework, new nuclear power plants did 
not materialize, and normalized relations between the US and North Korea 
emerged only very slowly, leading Pyongyang to pursue strategies not dissimilar 
from those used by Baghdad under Saddam Hussein. In 2002, when US assistant 
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Secretary of State James Kelly confronted his North Korean counterparts with 
intelligence indicating that Pyongyang was secretly developing nuclear weapons, 
North Korea dismissed the agreement and expelled all IAEA inspectors from the 
country. On the 10th of January 2003, two months before the US invasion or Iraq, 
North Korea announced it its real withdrawal from the NPT. A military intervention 
of North Korea along the lines of that in Iraq, whether unilateral or through the 
United Nations, was not an option. Although the regime of Kim Jung-Il, Kim Il-
Sung’s son and successor, was named in the same breath with Iraq’s Saddam 
Hussein and Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as part of George W. Bush’s ‘Axis of 
Evil’, more geopolitical caution was warranted in the case of North Korea. China 
has been a traditional ally of North Korea, and although ideological relations 
between Beijing and Pyongyang have strained as China pursued a strategy of 
state-capitalism while North Korea stuck to old-fashioned communism, North 
Korea remains China’s “little brother”.349  
North Korea’s 2003 withdrawal from the NPT led the US to pass on the ball to 
China, eventually leading to negations not only between China, North Korea, and 
the United States, but also including Japan, South Korea, and Russia, creating the 
Six-Party Talks. Although each party had different secondary objectives vis-à-vis 
North Korea, the objective that bound all of them was to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear 
ambitions.350 The Six-Party talk were however unsuccessful, and in July 2006 
Pyongyang test-launched a series of seven ballistic missiles. Although the long-
range Taepodong-2 missile failed after about 40 seconds of flight, it was estimated 
to be able to reach the West coast of the United States.351 The tests clearly 
offended the members of the Six-Party talks, but since they were not a nuclear 
proliferation the ensuing UNSCR 1695 represented a half-hearted and ambiguous 
attempt to impose sanctions on North Korea. Since the resolution invoked neither 
article 39 (identifying a ‘threat to the peace or breach of the peace) nor article 41 
(regarding measures short of military force), Russia and China interpreted the 
requirement to prevent the transfer of missiles or missile-related items, materials, 
goods, and technology to North Korea as non-binding. Three months later 
however, when Pyongyang tested a real, albeit small, nuclear weapon on its 
Punggye-ri nuclear test site, both Russia and China were forced to let go of their 
secondary objectives vis-à-vis North Korea and strongly condemn the event. 
UNSCR 1718 of 14 October 2006 expressed the ‘gravest concern’ at the test, and 
acting under Chapter VII and article 41 of the Charter, imposed an embargo on 
military equipment, vehicles, technology, spare-parts, or anything that could 
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“contribute to North Korea’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related, or other 
weapons of mass destruction-related programs.”352 Sanctions also included an 
export ban on military goods and technology353, as well as an embargo on luxury 
goods and asset freezes and travel sanctions on a list of individuals within the 
regime. In order for the sanctions under the 1718 regime to be lifted, Pyongyang 
was required to abandon its ballistic missile and nuclear programs, rejoin the NPT, 
and allow IAEA inspectors into the country to verify its actions.  
In the years following the 1718, Pyongyang seemed to be willing to negotiate giving 
up its nuclear program in exchange for removal from the US State Department’s 
State Sponsors of Terrorism list. However, negotiations were slow, and when 
North Korea decided to launch a second Taepodong-2 ballistic missile disguised 
as a satellite in April 2009 followed a month later by an underground nuclear test, 
it marked the beginning of a downward path towards further isolation of North 
Korea and ever-stricter sanctions. UNSCR 1874 of June 2009 further extended the 
arms embargo to include light arms and training of North Korean military officials, 
authorized UN member states to inspect North Korean vessels even on the high 
seas, and imposed financial sanctions on North Korea as a whole, prohibiting any 
investments, loans, or financial assistance to Pyongyang with the exception of 
humanitarian and developmental aid.354  
Between 2009 and 2016, North Korea conducted further tests, including ballistic 
missile launches in 2012 and 2016, as well as nuclear tests in 2013 and 2016. As 
a response, UN sanctions have become even stricter, including a growing list of 
targeted individuals and entities, a ban on sending bulk-cash to North Korea 
(UNSCR 2094, 2013), the training of police-forces, and efforts by the Panel of 
Experts of the Sanctions Committee to shut down front companies and shell 
companies used by North Korean authorities to access cash, as well as efforts to 
prohibit not only the training of nuclear scientists, but also teaching or training 
people in advanced physics, computer simulation, computer sciences, geospatial 
navigation, nuclear engineering, aerospace engineering, and aeronautical 
engineering, among others (UNSCR 2270, 2016). While all these measures have 
indeed further isolated North Korea from the rest of the world, economic relations 
with China and foreign direct investment from rest of the world seem to continue 
anyway, keeping Pyongyang and the regime afloat while citizens in the countryside 
continue to suffer. Kim Jung-Un, who succeeded his father to become the third 
generation of his family to rule the country in 2011, does not seem willing to open 
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up North Korea or to reestablish the Six-Party Talks or relations with South Korea. 
China has steadily hardened its diplomatic stance towards its little brother, but is 
still rather reluctant when it comes to sanctions.355 The end of the 1718 sanctions 
committee is not in sight.  
 
Iran - Sanctioned 
Just like North Korea, Iraq, and South Africa, Iran was a member of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, ratifying it in 1970 under Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Iran’s 
last Shah. The Iranian nuclear program, much like that of South Africa and 
Pakistan, was established in the 1950s with the support of the United States as 
part of the Atoms for Peace program. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution that 
brought to power Ayatollah Khomeini and established the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
the country retained its membership of the Treaty. In 1980 the United States 
proposed the imposition of UN sanctions against Iran in response to the Iran 
Hostage Crisis of 1979, in which 52 Americans were held hostage for over a year 
in the US embassy in Tehran. US Secretary of State Vance urged the members of 
the Council “to demonstrate that the rule of law has meaning, and that our 
machinery of peace has practical relevance.” The proposal to impose 
comprehensive economic sanctions, financial sanctions, and diplomatic sanctions 
did however not pass the Security Council, with the Soviet Union using its veto and 
China abstaining from the vote.356 The United States discontinued its collaboration 
with Iran, but its nuclear power program continued to operate.  
In response to the 1988 interstate war between Iran and Iraq, both States were 
subjected to a voluntary ban on products to make chemical weapons (UNSCR 612 
and 620, 1988), but as stability returned to Iran in the 1990s the country did not 
follow the same path as its neighbor. It was only under the presidency of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, the conservative and religious hardliner that came to power in 2005 
that Iran fully reappeared on the international community’s radar again as a “rogue 
state”. With his disregard for human rights and openly hostile language towards 
the West, most notably the United States, Ahmadinejad brought back international 
attention on Khomeini’s 1989 fatwa against British-Indian author Salman Rushdie, 
as well as his continuous referral to America as “the Great Satan”. 
In September 2003 the International Atomic Energy Agency Board adopted a 
resolution regarding “concerns over failures by the Islamic Republic of Iran to 
report material, facilities, and activities as it was obliged to do pursuant to its 
safeguards agreement”, noting that information and access were at times slow in 
coming and incremental, and that “some of the information was in contrast to that 
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previously provided”. For example, inspectors found two types of highly enriched 
uranium at the Natanz nuclear power plant.357 In the following years, IAEA reports 
were somewhat milder, but after the election of Ahmadinejad the IAEA Resolutions 
returned to a more serious note, expressing concern about activities at a Uranium 
Conversion Facility in the city of Esfahan, at which personnel removed the seals 
on process lines to mislead the inspectors.358  
In 2006, when IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei lost confidence that 
Iran’s nuclear program was exclusively for peaceful purposes, the UN Security 
Council started preparing a draft resolution to impose sanctions. Just two weeks 
after first sanctioning North Korea for its 2006 nuclear test, the UN Security Council 
imposed similar sanctions against Iran with UNSCR 1695, albeit voluntary and not 
under Chapter VII or article 41 of the UN Charter. The subsequent UNSCR 1737 
of December 2006 was however much stricter, imposing a mandatory arms 
embargo, financial sanctions, and travel sanctions, and creating a sanctions 
committee. The Resolution also included a detailed list of banned items, banned 
activities, and twelve designated individuals and ten entities whose assets were to 
be frozen.  
Iran’s reaction to the sanctions regime was different from that of North Korea. 
Whereas Pyongyang was initially persuaded to return to the negotiating table, 
Tehran’s reaction only further antagonized the IAEA. Ahmadinejad, maintaining 
that Iran’s nuclear power program served peaceful purposes only, dismissed the 
major powers as bullies trying to deprive Iran of its legal and natural rights.359 In a 
2008 speech, just two days after Russia completed the delivery of nuclear fuel for 
Iran’s first nuclear power station in the city of Bushehr, he stated that Iran was 
moving towards the “summit of its nuclear path”, and warned Western leaders that 
their “mighty palaces would fall through the grace of God.360 In response, the UN 
Security Council imposed ever stricter sanctions. UNSCR 1803 (2008) called upon 
member states to inspect ships and aircraft to and from Iran and urged Iran to 
continue negotiations with the P5 + Germany, which aimed to persuade Iran to 
give up its nuclear ambitions and collaborate with IAEA inspections diplomatically. 
Attempts to combine carrots and sticks however failed, leading to UNSCR 1929 
(2010), further tightening the sanctions, including a stricter arms embargo, a ban 
on investments or acquiring of interests in any type of sector related to Iran’s 
nuclear program, and a ban on the transfer of technology related to Iran’s ballistic 
missile program. Furthermore, the call on member states to inspect cargo of 
Iranian vessels was expanded to include the high seas, and designated individuals 
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listed on the 1737 Sanctions Committee’s list were banned from travelling. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Resolution called upon states to prohibit the 
opening of branches of Iranian banks in their countries and vice versa, leading the 
Iranian economy to contract in subsequent years.361  
The negotiations between Tehran and the P5 + Germany were further complicated 
by actions of unidentified spies who killed a number of Iranian nuclear scientists in 
car-bombings between 2010 and 2012, as well as the 2010 Stuxnet computer virus 
that infected computers within Iran’s nuclear facilities. Strict unilateral sanctions by 
the United States and the European Union don’t help either.  
In 2012, as US President Barack Obama announced that all elements of American 
power remained an option to stop Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and as Israel warned 
that time for a diplomatic resolution was running out, threatening to take nuclear 
action, Iran’s stance somewhat softened. In 2013, when Hassan Rouhani is 
elected President of Iran and phoned with President Obama, representing the first 
official contact between the heads of those states since the 1979 Iranian revolution, 
the prospect of returning to normalcy became more realistic. In July 2015 Iran and 
the P5 + 1 announced a framework deal to restrict Iran’s nuclear program and to 
lift some of the sanctions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), under 
which Iran would drastically reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and its 
number of gas centrifuges, led the Security Council to lift the sanctions on Iran in 




There is perhaps no better way to explain geopolitical relations between the Great 
Powers than through the lens of their actions in the United Nations Security 
Council. The decisions behind imposing UN Sanctions regimes in response to 
issues of nuclear proliferators, or rather their ambitions to develop nuclear 
weapons, are fully in line with the teachings of structural realism. First of all, it is 
no coincidence that the five permanent members of the Security Council, China, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are also the only five 
original nuclear-weapons states that are legally allowed to have nuclear weapons 
under the NPT. The institutional configuration of the Security Council is therefore 
conveniently in line with the distribution of legally possessed nuclear arsenals in 
the world. Whether this is fair from a moral or legal point of view is only of 
secondary importance. 
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That Israel was allowed to upgrade its nuclear power plant at Dimona into a nuclear 
weapons program can also best be explained through the geopolitical interests of 
the Great Powers and the regional politics at the time. The fact that Israel had not 
signed the NPT, making their actions legally clean, was irrelevant, as the later 
cases of South Africa, Iraq, and Iran would prove. If the Western powers had had 
different interests in the region, Israel would probably not have acquired the bomb 
when they did.  
India’s path towards acquiring nuclear weapons could perhaps have been slowed 
down, but arguably not avoided due to the country’s political weight, essentially 
making it another Great Power. If the other Great Powers during the Cold War had 
been able to reach a compromise on India things might have worked out differently, 
but the alliance between the Soviet Union and India on the one hand and that 
between China and the US and Pakistan on the other did not allow for this. Even 
if India’s nuclear program before the 1974 launch of Smiling Buddha had been less 
secretive they would have been able to do what they did.  
The case of South Africa is somewhat of an outlier, in the sense that the country 
was already on the United Nation’s radar because of its voluntary sanctions regime 
in response to its Apartheid policy and its related human rights abuses. Together 
with Southern Rhodesia South Africa was already in the spotlights when it became 
clear that de regime of de Klerk was developing a nuclear weapons program. Being 
a long-time ally of both the United States and the United Kingdom, South Africa 
might have gotten the geopolitical benefit of the doubt as Southern Africa’s regional 
hegemon were it not for Apartheid.  
Iraq arguably shows that a State doesn’t even have to possess a serious nuclear 
weapons program to be subjected to UN sanctions. There was no doubt that Iraq’s 
1990 invasion of Kuwait constituted an act of aggression and thus a “breach of the 
peace”, opening the door for a the UNSCR 661 sanctions regime. Iraq had also 
clearly proven to breach other international conventions regarding chemical 
weapons, as witnessed in the 1981 was against Iran as well as the weapons 
stockpiles controlled by Baghdad. Iraq however had few allies in the Security 
Council, making it easy to tighten the screws on Saddam Hussein in an attempt to 
topple his regime and completely dismantle Iraq’s WMD program. The fact that 
Iraq’s nuclear capabilities were nowhere near those of Pakistan, North Korea, or 
Iran, seemed relevant to the IAEA as well as to China, France, Russia and most 
of the rest of the world, but not to the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Considering that the WMD’s in question were never found, the decision to 
intervene outside of the UN framework was a high geopolitical price to pay.  
Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation of 1998 could, and should, have been avoided by 
the P-5. Although from a legal and moral point of view there was no reason for 
Pakistan not to follow India’s nuclear path, from a structural realist point of view it 






destruction to emerge on the Indian subcontinent. Beijing’s motives to back 
Islamabad in an attempt to balance against India, as well as the United States 
support of Musharraf’s regime in the fight against Islamic extremism, were 
understandable, but the threats these interests represented were only minor 
compared to the prospect of nuclear warfare between India and Pakistan. The fact 
that Pakistan’s development of the bomb indirectly helped North Korea and Iran in 
developing theirs only adds to this geopolitical miscalculation.  
The political history of the Korean peninsula is a geopolitical artefact in itself. The 
United Nations sanctions regime pursuant to UNSCR 1718 is too. Had the P-5 not 
learned anything from the nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan, the 
position of Russia and more importantly China towards North Korea might have 
been softer. Had it been up to the United States, the reaction might have been 
harsher. A military mission akin to that in Iraq is however unthinkable, as China will 
not allow this type of interference in its direct sphere of influence. Despite the ever-
widening ideological gap between Beijing and Pyongyang, UN sanctions will only 
go as far as China allows.  
Finally, Iran, the third state in George W. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ was also not allowed 
by the P-5 to develop its nuclear weapons program. Just as Pyongyang, Tehran’s 
language towards the United States was openly hostile, and just as in the case of 
North Korea and Iraq, Iran gave the IAEA inspectors a hard time in trying to verify 
the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. While it is not clear whether the threats 
of military action by the United States and Israel were real or a case of nuclear 
brinkmanship, the pressure exerted by UN sanctions in combination with unilateral 
sanctions and the threat of further escalation finally brought Iran back into the 
P5+Germany negotiations. For now, Iran under president Rouhani seems to be 
steering away from further confrontation, making Israel, India, and Pakistan the 
only states to have successfully proliferated nuclear weapons without being 
subjected to UN sanctions. North Korea might be the first and only to proliferate 





Selective Sanctions and Interstate Conflicts 
 
 
6.1. Defining the offence 
 
The Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP) defines an armed conflict as a 
‘contested incompatibility’ that concerns government and/or territory where the use 
of an armed force between two parties, in which at least one of the parties is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 ‘battle related deaths’ in one calendar 
year. 362 Interstate conflicts are a subcategory of armed conflicts, along with 
internal conflicts, extrasystemic conflicts, and internationalized internal conflicts. 
Interstate conflicts, also known as ‘wars of aggression’, ‘Westphalian wars’, or 
‘traditional wars’ are defined by the UCDP as ‘conflicts between two or more 
governments, i.e. parties controlling the capitals of sovereign states.’  
Are all offences of interstate wars sanctionable? In theory, all acts of aggression 
by government or non-government actors against a sovereign state could be 
considered as violations of international law. For example, the sporadic fighting in 
the 1980s and 1990 between Nigeria and Cameroon on the Bakassi peninsula, in 
which small numbers of soldiers were imprisoned and sometimes killed, was by all 
means a violation of international law, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
attested in 2002. The same could be said about other minor territorial conflicts such 
as the Indonesian ‘Konfrontasie’ against Malaysia in 1963, the Laotian-Thai border 
war of 1987363, or Alto Cenapa War between Ecuador and Peru in 1995. Indeed, 
each of these conflicts represented a violation of state sovereignty and a breach 
of the peace. However, in none of these cases did the situation turn into a real 
threat to international security, and in none of these cases were UN sanctions 
considered or imposed.  
Our task is then to establish a definition for a ‘sanctionable’ interstate conflict. 
There are two ways of doing so. The first is by using the UCDP’s definition of a 
war. An interstate conflict passes the threshold from ‘minor conflict’ to ‘war’ when 
it has caused at least 1000 deaths in a given year. Additionally, the database also 
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counts cumulative deaths over the course of the conflict, distinguishing between 
conflicts below 1000 cumulative deaths and that surpass that number. Some 
conflicts reach this threshold directly in their first calendar year, directly causing 
them to be labeled as ‘wars’. Other conflicts surpass the threshold of 1000 
casualties after several years of accumulated deaths.  
In the ‘Sanctionable Offences Database’ all conflicts that surpass a cumulative 
death-count of 1000 are defined as ‘sanctionable’. This definition thus allows for 
the inclusion of conflicts that are relatively minor in a given calendar year but that 
persist over time and accumulate more than 1000 deaths. The logic behind 
applying this definition and not one that focuses more on intensity is threefold. 
Firstly, longer but less intensive conflicts that accumulate deaths over time are just 
as deadly as short and intensive wars. At the end of the day it’s the amount of 
deaths that counts. Secondly, long non-intensive wars give the international 
community more time to design and implement (UN) sanctions cautiously and 
effectively. Sanctioning intensive conflicts might appear more urgent, but also 
proves to be more difficult. Thirdly, the inclusion of non-intensive wars does not 
exclude intensive wars from being analyzed. As a matter of fact, the inclusion of 
two different types of intensity allows for the use of a dummy variable.  
In any case, the design of a dummy variables is of little importance for this chapter 
on interstate conflicts. Even when we include the interstate wars that were not 
‘intensive’ in any given year but that did accumulate to more than 1000 deaths, the 
database only presents us with four conflicts since 1990. The only way to say 
something intelligible about the sanctionability of these conflicts and the extent to 
which sanctions were actually imposed is through qualitative analysis of these four 
cases.  
 
6.2. A history of the offence 
 
In contrast with all other cases in the Sanctionable Offences Database (SOD), the 
offence of traditional interstate wars is one that belongs to the traditional role of the 
UN as a Westphalian Peacekeeper. The respect for territorial sovereignty of States 
and the prohibition of waging war on other states is one that finds its origins in 
1648 with the peace treaties of Münster and Osnabruck, and finds its philosophical 
grounds in Kant’s preliminary articles for a perpetual peace. Territorial aggression 
was first institutionalized as a sanctionable offence by Woodrow Wilson with the 
establishment of the League of Nations.  
For a very long time however, there seemed to be no relation whatsoever between 
the stipulations of the moral laws of Kant and Wilson on the one hand and the 
actions of States on the other. As Kissinger explained in his book World Order, the 






tides of war and peace were not determined by ideas about justice but rather by 
the balance of power. When the States of Europe were at war with each other it 
was because they thought they could exploit a weakness of an adversary or 
because they thought it imminent to balance against an expanding France or 
Germany. All the major wars in continental Europe since Westphalia attest to this 
logic. Even when the architects of the League of Nations attempted to turn the 
doctrine of non-aggression into international law (albeit non-binding) it seemed to 
have little effect on the behavior of states.  
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the International Peace Research 
Institute in Oslo (PRIO) have collected data on different types of conflicts since 
1948. It counts 46 interstate conflicts since the end of WWII, 22 of which are 
defined as ‘major conflicts’, meaning the accumulated deaths surpass one 
thousand. Out of these 22 major conflicts, 19 started during the Cold War and 3 
started in or after 1990. During the Cold War none of these conflicts were met with 
UN sanctions, although the UN did send peacekeeping missions and monitors in 
response to the Arab-Israeli War, the Korean War, the Suez Crisis, and the Six 
Day War, and was also involved in negotiating peace settlements in various 
conflicts. For example, after the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus the United 
Nations was able to adopt, after an initial Veto by Russia364, Resolution 353, which 
demanded the immediate withdrawal of all foreign military personnel and called 
upon Greece and Turkey to enter into peace negotiations and established a green 
line monitored by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 
which had already been present in Cyprus for a decade.365 However, when Turkey 
launched a second military offence later that same year, occupying 40% of Cyprus 
territory and declaring Cyprus as a Federated Turkish State, The UN was unable 
and unwilling to impose sanctions on Turkey, which had clearly been the aggressor 
of this episode. The UN General Assembly adopted various Resolutions in order 
to promote the independence of Cyprus and in order to demand the withdrawal of 
foreign military forces, but the option of imposing UN sanctions never reached the 
General Assembly or the Security Council. The United States did impose an arms 
embargo on both Turkey and Cyprus, and the EU imposed a trade embargo on 
Northern Cyprus that is still partly in place. Athletes from Northern Cyprus that 
compete in the Olympics are forced to do so as independent athletes under the 
Olympic flag.  
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Table 12 - Interstate Wars since 1945 
Conflict Years of conflict 
1945-1989 
India, Hyderabadh 1948 
ISR - EGY, IRQ, JOR, LEB, SYR 1948-1949 
China, Taiwan 1949-1950, 1954, 1958 
North Korea - South Korea 1949-1953 
Hungary - Soviet Union 1956 
France, Israel, UK – Egypt (Suez Crisis) 1956 
France -Tunisia 1961 
China - India 1962, 1967 
Israel - Jordan 1967 
Ethiopia - Somalia 1964, 1977-1978, 1980 
South Vietnam - Vietnam 1965-1975 
Israel - Syria 1967, 1973 
Egypt - Israel 1967-1973 
El Salvador - Honduras (Football War) 1969 
China - Vietnam 1974 -1988 
Iran - Iraq 1974, 1980-1988 
Cyprus - Turkey 1974 
Chad - Libya (Toyota War) 1987 
Since 1990 
Iraq - Kuwait 1990-1991 
India - Pakistan (Kargil War) 1998 
Eritrea - Ethiopia 1998-2000 
Australia, US, UK - Iraq 2003 
 
 






UN Sanctions were thus not imposed on any of the interstate conflicts of the Cold 
War. In some cases this failure to impose sanctions was logical if one takes into 
account the players involved. For example, it is only logical that the UN was unable 
to sanction the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary or China’s annexation of India’s 
Aksai Chin region in 1962. The former case was vetoed by the Soviet Union, 
whereas the latter case never even made it to the UNGA.366 Similarly, attempts to 
deal with interstate conflicts involving Israel were structurally blocked by the United 
States, and conflicts involving France and the UK in Tunesia and the Falklands 
were blocked by France and the UK. Some of the other conflicts could however 
easily have been met with UN sanctions. However, typically the interstate wars 
that were fought outside of the core interests of the Cold War never made it to the 
agenda. For example, the 1969 ‘Football War’, in which El Salvador was clearly 
the aggressor against neighboring Honduras, never made it to the General 
Assembly. Similarly, the 1977 Somali invasion of the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, 
the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988, and the 1987 ‘Toyota War’ between Libya and 
Chad, played out largely outside of the framework United Nations, even though 
there were clear indications that those wars had been started by Somalia, Iraq, 
and Libya, respectively.   
 
6.3. Offences since 1990 
 
Since 1990 only four sanctionable interstate conflicts have occurred, out of which 
two were actually sanctioned by the UN. Additionally, in 2008 the UN also 
sanctioned an minor interstate conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti that is not 
included in the Sanctionable Offence Database as a sanctionable offence. The 
small number of sanctionable interstate conflicts is good news for the doctrine of 
non-aggression, but for the sake of this book it does not allow for a quantitative 
analysis. I will therefore provide a short description of each of the four sanctionable 
interstate conflicts, as well as a description of the case of Eritrea-Djibouti. The 
value for the reader is that each of the five cases discussed in this chapter 
represents the thesis of this study in general, as well as the historical 
circumstances in which the UN found itself during each episode. For example, the 
Iraq-Kuwait case greatly reflects the general sense of euphoria about the renewed 
role of the UN in the early 1990s. The cases of Eritrea-Ethiopia and Eritrea-Djibouti 
show us that Africa is historically an easy target of UN sanctions. Finally, the cases 
of the Kashmir conflict and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 show that the rules 
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regarding sanctionable interstate conflicts do not apply to states that are 
sufficiently powerful.  
 
Table 13 - Interstate Wars since 1990 
Case Years UN Sanctions? 
Iraq, Kuwait 1990-1991 Yes 
India, Pakistan 1948 - Ongoing No 
Eritrea, Ethiopia 1998-2000 Yes 
Australia, US, UK, Iraq 2003 No 
Eritrea-Djibouti367 2008 Yes 
 
 
Iraq-Kuwait (1990-1991, sanctioned) 
President Saddam Hussein of Iraq was hoping that the world would be reluctant to 
act in favour of a small country such as Kuwait. However, the response of the 
international community was strong. As Kuwait owned about 10% of global oil 
reserves, and as the occupation of Kuwait might also threaten Saudi Arabia to the 
South, Iraq was not going to get away with it. France and India, traditional allies of 
Iraq, condemned the annexation and called for an Iraqi withdrawal. Russia and 
China, among others, imposed arms embargoes.  
Only four days after the invasion of Kuwait UNGA reacted almost unanimously. 
´Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and 
to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait´, the 
UNSC installed Resolution 661 (1990). The Resolution mandated the complete 
isolation of Iraq, blocking all exports from Iraq and all financial and economic 
resources towards it, except for ´supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, 
and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs´.368 The sanctions were 
accompanied by a military alliance of over 30 states, led by the US and UK, which 
had stationed soldiers to defend Saudi Arabia and to prepare a military invasion if 
Iraq did not comply.369 
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The sanctions were effective in isolating and starving Iraq economically. However, 
US military attacks on factories and infrastructure also contributed to this isolation. 
As activist Ramsey Clark put it in a speech:  
 
We demonstrated the capacity of technology to cripple a country, without ever setting foot 
on it. […] it is important to recognize that because it goes hand in hand with the sanctions. 
[…] We destroyed every silo for grain or anything else storing food in the whole country. 
We destroyed all the storage and processing of food plants throughout the country. Even 
dates, the world´s biggest exporter of dates. Famous processing and packaging plants in 
Bagdad; deliberately destroyed. We didn´t want them to be able to feed themselves for a 
long long time.370 
 
It was estimated that Iraq’s GDP decreased by nearly two-thirds in 1991.371 Power 
shortages, sky high inflation, malnutrition, diseases, famine, and premature death 
of children were all direct consequences of this effectiveness. In 1995 the FAO 
estimated that over 500.000 children might have died as a result of the sanctions.  
Initially the willingness of the international community to form a bloc against 
injustice, and the consensus among the P-5 in the UNSC, created a sense of 
euphoria. Some scholars comment that the P-5 had already lived through an 
informal reaproachment since the late 1980s, with the Security Council proposing 
a cease-fire and UN observer mission in response to the Iran-Iraq war in 1987 and 
with Gorbachev calling for the P-5 to become ‘guarantors of international 
security’.372 The UN sanctions regime on Iraq in combination with operation Desert 
Storm (which was also authorized by the UNSC), thus represented a real 
breakthrough. Former constraints on UN sanctions and peacekeeping seemed to 
have disappeared. In the roughly two and a half years after the sanctions on Iraq 
the UNSC passed 186 Resolutions and launched 15 new peacekeeping 
operations.373 All of these operations regarded internal conflicts, however. The 
next interstate conflict broke out only in 1998. 
 
 
Ethiopia-Eritrea (1998-2000, sanctioned) 
Between 1998 and 2000 Eritrea and Ethiopia, two formerly friendly neighbours, 
fought a border war about a relatively small stretch of disputed territory, but that 
turned out to bigger and bloodier than any of the other conflicts that captured the 
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world’s attention, such as those in Kosovo or Sierra Leone. The International Crisis 
Group estimated that between 70.000 and 100.000 people were killed in the war, 
which has been described as Africa’s first ‘total war’ since WWII. The UNSC 
eventually imposed an arms embargo on both sides with UNSCR 1298, but only 
did so at the end of two devastating years of full-scale trench warfare, and mere 
weeks before the signing of a Peace Agreement. The case of Ethiopia-Eritrea 
should thus be considered as a failure, not a success.  
When Eritrean forces moved across the Ethiopian border into the disputed Badme 
region in May 1998, constituting an act of international aggression,374 the country 
of Eritrea had only existed as a sovereign State for 5 years. After having been a 
UN trust territory under British rule and as federal component of Ethiopia, Eritrea 
had only won its independence in 1993 thanks to the Eritrean People’s Liberation 
Front’s (EPLF) support in toppling the Derg regime under Haile Mariam 
Mengistu.375 In the aftermath, President Meles Zenawi allowed for Eritrea to vote 
for independence, which they did overwhelmingly. Many in the Ethiopian 
administration were however deeply unhappy with Zenawi’s decision to grant 
Eritrea its independence, and by 1998 Ethiopian forces became involved in a 
series of incidents around Badme, killing several Eritrean officials. When the 
Eritrean army replied by invading Ethiopia, it marked the start of the war. A month 
later the conflict had turned into a full scale war, with both sides spending millions 
of dollars on tanks and military equipment, launching air attacks on strategic ports, 
and digging long trenches along the common border in preparation for a sustained 
war. Thousands had already died.  
On the 26th of May 1998, just three weeks after the start of the conflict, the UNSC 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1177, in which the conflict was clearly recognized 
as an interstate war, and in which the Council demanded an immediate ceasefire. 
In a subsequent Resolution of February 1999 the Council ‘strongly urged all states 
to end immediately all sales of arms and munitions to Ethiopia and Eritrea’.376 
However, by this time both Eritrea and Ethiopia had already spent years arming 
themselves to the teeth, allegedly spending $1 billion in the two years leading up 
to the war. Why did the UN not impose an arms embargo right away? What was 
keeping them from imposing sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter?  
One explanation of the failure to impose sanctions in a time manner is that, even 
as the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict was the deadliest in the world at that time, the focus 
of the international community lay elsewhere. In Africa, the United States was 
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much more concerned with the war in Sudan, supporting Sudanese rebels in their 
fight against Omar al-Bashir’s authoritarian government in Khartoum. As a matter 
of fact, the US did manage swiftly to impose sanctions against Sudan in 1996 in 
response to the refusal of al-Bashir to extradite the terrorists responsible for the 
assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995. Both Eritrea and 
Ethiopia supported the US in their campaign against Sudan, so the US happily 
provided loans to both in the run-up to the war.  
Another explanation for the failure to impose an arms embargo seems to be the 
legacy of the tight sanctions on Iraq, which had inadvertedly killed more civilians 
than the government of Saddam Hussein in their war against Kuwait. The claim of 
US secretary of state Madeleine Albright that the death of 500.000 children in Iraq 
as a result of its economic isolation was ‘worth it’ did not help in improving the 
reputation of UN sanctions either. When an arms embargo on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
two of the world’s poorest countries at the time, was proposed, both Russia and 
France warned against the indirect impact on civilians, pushing for the imposition 
of an arms embargo with a time-limit of twelve months.377 Unfortunately, by the 
time this reform was finally pushed through at least 70.000 people had already 
died and many more displaced. In 2001, twelve months after the imposition of 
Resolution 1298, the UNSC did indeed lift the arms embargo again. The UN led 
Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission finally established that the disputed 
Badme region is part of Eritrea, but until today it is still controlled by Ethiopia, which 
has grown into a regional power during the past decade. Despite continuing 
tensions, the UK has returned to selling arms to Ethiopia. Eritrea is currently 
subject of another UN arms embargo regarding the support of terrorist groups in 
Somalia, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
India-Pakistan (Kargil War, 1999) 
The 1999 Kargil War between Pakistan and India is in reality part of a larger conflict 
in the Northern Indian region of Kashmir that has been going on intermittently since 
the partition of British India into a Hindu-majority India and a Muslim-majority 
Pakistan in 1947, during which hundreds of thousands died and during which large 
masses of people were abducted, sexually assaulted, and displaced, creating one 
of the major humanitarian disasters since WWII. Part of the conflict concerned 
control of the province of Kashmir and Jammu, a Muslim-majority region that had 
been granted to India by the last British Viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten. In 
October 1947, only two months after the division and independence of both India 
and Pakistan, local Muslim tribal forces, supported militarily and logistically by 
Pakistan, launched an attack on the region, but were unsuccessful in resisting 
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India’s counteroffensive. In 1948 the UN established a Commission for India and 
Pakistan (UNCIP) and the UNSC called for a cease-fire and called for a withdrawal 
of troops. Kashmir and Jammu have remained divided since, and also India enjoys 
the official recognition of the region, the conflict has been an ongoing issue of 
concern until today.  
Although Pakistan was widely regarded as the aggressor in the Kashmir conflict, 
the geo-political circumstances throughout the Cold War did not allow for 
consensus within the United Nations during the Cold War. After two centuries of 
humiliation and imperialism under the British, Gandhi and Nehru were not keen on 
allying themselves with the West. As India turned towards Soviet Socialism after 
independence, Britain and the United States responded by supporting the 
Pakistani side. In 1962 China could get away with annexing a small part of 
Kashmir’s northern region of Aksai Chin in the Sino-Indian border dispute, and 
during the 1970s and 1980s the Kashmir issue remained unresolved, with 
Pakistani and Indian soldiers patrolling an agreed-upon Line of Control and 
occasionally killing soldiers and civilians of the other side.  
With the Cold War blockade out of the way in the 1990s and the P-5 members 
finding it easier to reach consensus on pressing issues, the UN was presented with 
an opportunity to show more resolve with regard to Kashmir. While Pakistan 
remained a US-ally in the fight against terrorism in the 1990s, India had also found 
its way back into friendly relations with the West. In case of another break-out of 
conflict over Kashmir, the P-5 members could finally afford to look at the matter in 
a more neutral manner, guided by international law rather than geo-political 
considerations.  
However, when in 1999 Pakistan launched a renewed military effort in the district 
of Kargil, passing the de facto border line that had been recognized since 1972, 
the UN was silent. No votes were held about the issue in the UNGA. The Pakistani 
aggression marked the start of the Kargil War, also known as the fourth Indo-
Pakistani war. The war lasted for two months and killed about a thousand 
people.378 Surely the Kargil war was relatively minor in comparison to other 
sanctionable interstate wars, but it also presented an obvious opportunity for the 
UNSC to finally respond decisively to the Kashmir conflict and uphold international 
law. The imposition of sanctions on Pakistan would have an excellent signal 
towards this commitment, demonstrating consistency and continuity after Iraq and 
Ethiopia-Eritrea. The P-5 members all condemned Pakistan’s actions. Even China, 
                                            
378 The UCDP database considers the Kashmir conflict as one large conflict, with the Kargil war 
just representing an episode of it. Since the conflict in general has killed many thousands over 
people over time, and since the 1999 Kargil war killed approximately 1000 people, we can include 
it in the SOD.  






a traditional enemy of India and ally of Pakistan, called for a military withdrawal. 
Why did the UNSC not even consider the sanctions?  
Two explanations seem noteworthy, both of which concern geopolitical interests. 
For example, India was reluctant to draw too much international attention to the 
Kashmir conflict. Although India clearly benefited from the international outrage 
over Pakistan’s recklessness in the Kargil War (India’s first televised war), they 
had been against UN interference from the start of the conflict, grudgingly 
accepting the UNMOGIP monitoring mission of the LOC in 1972. Secondly, and 
most importantly, Pakistan had just successfully turned itself into the world’s 7th 
state to possess nuclear weapons in 1998 (after the UNSC P-5 members and 
India, which carried out its first test in 1974). The Kargil conflict was thus the first 
direct interstate conflict between two nuclear powers, making the Kashmir conflict 
one of the most dangerous potential conflicts on the planet. Imposing sanctions on 
Pakistan would have demonstrated the intention to respect international law, but 
would also certainly have antagonized Pakistan in an extreme, and dangerous, 
manner. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s commander of the army at the time, once 
asked a British official in the Blair to remind the Indians that it would take Pakistan 
only eight minutes to ‘get the missiles over’.379 Bill Clinton too was convinced that 
both sides were on the brink of nuclear war.380 The United States did consider 
imposing unilateral sanctions on Pakistan if they continued with their ‘intransigent 
posture’381, but UN sanctions were out of the question.  
 
US, UK, Australia, Poland – Iraq (2003, not sanctioned) 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a strange case. Although ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ 
was justified by the coalition of invading forces as a pre-emptive war, the UCDP 
database identifies it as a war of aggression. By pushing forward the military 
intervention of Iraq without international consensus and without a mandate of the 
United Nations, the ‘coalition of the willing’ did not only damage the image of the 
United States as a protector of the international order ruled by international 
institutions and respect for international law, but it also laid bare once again one of 
the fundamental weaknesses of the UN as an institution.  
The idea to ‘do something’ about Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s regime had been 
lingering in the minds of US policy makers for some time. In the aftermath of the 
1991 Gulf War and the harsh UN economic sanctions that crippled Iraq’s economy 
and led hundreds of thousands to starve to death, the Iraqi regime still seemed to 
have the ambition to expand and upgrade its stockpiles of biological and chemical 
                                            
379 Watt. “Pakistan Boasted of Nuclear Strike on India within Eight seconds.” (2012).  
380 Branch. “The Clinton Tapes – Conversations with a President, 1993-2001”. (2010). 






weapons. Indeed Iraq had on various occasions denied access to the United 
Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) that inspected for weapons of 
mass destruction, indicating a violation of various UNSC Resolutions. Already in 
1998, the US congress under Bill Clinton approved the ‘Iraq Liberation Act’, which 
stated that Iraq had committed various violations of international law and had 
ignored UNSC Resolutions. The Act’s expressly stated purpose was that “it should 
be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed 
by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.”382 Just two months later, in December 
1998, the United States in coordination with the United Kingdom started aerial 
attacks on Iraq in ‘Operation Desert Fox’. 1400 people died in 4 days of bombing.  
The UN Security Council was livid. The bombings had taken place without the 
approval of the Council. The US and UK had tried to legitimize the bombing on the 
basis of an UNSCOM report, but as Russian representative Lavrov said, the 
Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, had ‘grossly abused his 
authority’383 and had presented a distorted picture of what was going on in Iraq. 
The Chinese delegate said there was no reason for the use of force against Iraq. 
The US and UK had acted independently on behalf of the United Nations, without 
even putting the attack to a vote. It was a sign of things to come.  
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Bush 
administration was eager to include Iraq in the wider ‘war on terror.’ After the 
International Security Assistence Force (ISAF) military invasion of Afghanistan, 
which was not put to a vote in the UNSC and was only legitimized by the UN in 
2003, Iraq was to be next. Members of the Bush administration, including President 
Bush himself, had already been pushing for another military intervention in Iraq 
since 2001, trying to link Saddam Hussein to Al-Qaeda and arguing that Iraq’s 
stockpile of chemical and biological weapons asked for the authorization of a pre-
emptive strike. The UN Security Council did however not approve of the ‘Bush-
Doctrine’, with France and Germany proposing a compromise of renewed UN 
sanctions and stricter UN monitoring of Iraq’s weapons programme. UNSCR 1441 
promised that non-compliance would have “serious consequences” for Iraq, but 
also that a failure to comply would not automatically legitimize military action. 
When US Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UN General Assembly in 
February 2013, presenting (later proven incorrect) evidence of Iraq’s weapons of 
mass destruction programme and Saddam Hussein’s links to Al-Qaeda, it seemed 
as if UN approval of a military intervention was within reach, with the UK, Poland, 
Italy, Denmark, Japan, Spain, and Australia proposing a Resolution. However, as 
the resolution encountered resistance from many countries, most importantly P-5 
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members France and Russia, it never came to a vote. At this time the United States 
took what has perhaps been the biggest stab to the legitimacy of the UN in history. 
George W. Bush announced in a televised speech that: 
  
“The United Nations Security Council had not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will 
rise to ours. Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal 
to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing”.384  
 
As the ‘coalition of the willing’ prepared for an attack outside of the UN framework, 
popular demonstrations broke out all over the globe, with tens of millions of people 
in more than 600 cities participating. It did not help.  
The failure of the United Nations to deal with the Iraq crisis is does not only teach 
us that major powers can enjoy the luxury of disregarding international law and 
acting without UN approval; it also shows that they can do so without being 
punished for it. Even if Operation Iraqi Freedom can only be identified as an act of 
aggression, and thus a ‘sanctionable offence’, it is of course unthinkable that the 
UN would impose sanctions on the aggressors, most importantly the United States 
and the United Kingdom, both P-5 members. Not a single country seems to have 
proposed even unilateral sanctions against the US or UK in response to the Iraq 
intervention. Once again, the United Nations proved very well when sparrows 
shout, but no good at all when eagles fall out.  
 
Eritrea – Djibouti (2008, Sanctioned) 
Just like Eritrea’s 1998-2000 border war with Ethiopia was sanctioned after the 
conflict had already come to an end, so did the UNSC impose sanctions on Eritrea 
over its aggression against neighbouring Djibouti only 18 months after the breakout 
of the conflict. In fact, it can be argued that the 2008 border war at Ras Doumeira, 
with only about a hundred casualties, was not the real reason for the imposition of 
sanctions, but rather a pretext to constrain Eritrea’s support to Al-Shabaab and 
other groups that were destabilizing Somalia.  
The Ras Doumeira peninsula that marks no more than one kilometre of border 
between Eritrea and Djibouti has been a source of conflict since the colonial era, 
during which the Northern, Eritrean side of the hills belonged to Italy’s Eritrean 
colony, while the Southern, Djiboutian side belonged to what was then called 
French Somaliland. As the peninsula was nothing more than a few barren hills, the 
border never needed precise settling, eventually leading to tensions between 
Eritrea and Djibouti after Eritrea had become independent from Ethiopia. In the 
                                            






spring of 2008 Eritrea started digging trenches alongside the border, and in June 
tensions exploded into a four day conflict, killing a claimed 100 Djibouti and less 
than 50 Eritreans. In the aftermath of the conflict Eritrea refused to withdraw its 
troops and refused to allow a UN fact finding mission to enter the country. UNSC 
Resolution 1826, ‘urging a dialogue’ between the parties did not exhort any 
influence. When the UNSC finally adopted Resolution 1907, imposing an arms 
embargo on Eritrea and asset freezes and travel bans on several government 
officials, eighteen months had passed. Eritrea did eventually pull its troops in 2010, 
but this achievement should rather be credited to the government of Qatar, which 
acted as a mediator in the conflict and finally managed to establish a Qatari 
monitoring mission on the Ras Doumeira peninsula and the nearby island. The UN 
sanctions on Eritrea have not been lifted yet.  
Why did the United Nations impose sanctions only in 2009? And why are they still 
in place? The answer lies with the fact that Eritrea was in reality sanctioned for 
another offence, namely that of destabilizing neighbouring Somalia by supporting 
and harbouring fighters of the ‘Mujahedeen Youth Front’, a terrorist group based 
in East Africa better known as Al-Shabaab. UNSCR 1907 specified that the 
embargo on Eritrea was not only a response to the Ras Doumeira border conflict, 
but also recalled its resolution 1844 (2008) in which it decided to impose measures 
against individuals or entities designated as engaging in or providing support to 
acts that threaten peace, security and stability in Somalia, acting in violation of the 
arms embargo or obstructing the flow of humanitarian assistance to Somalia. 
Eritrea was thought to be engaged in such matters. It was sanctioned even before 
Al-Shabaab itself, which only happened in 2010.  
Resolution 1907 also extended the mandate of the United Nations Monitoring 
Group (UNMG). This group was initially created in 2002 to monitor events within 
Somalia, but since Eritrea played a destabilizing role the UNMG also received a 
mandate to monitor Eritrea’s compliance with the new set of sanctions. A 2012 
report by the Monitoring Group did not only confirm Eritrean support for groups in 
Somalia, but also for rebel groups in Ethiopia and occurrences of human trafficking 
from Eritrea to Israel through Sudan and Egypt.385 In recent years the 
representatives of Russia and China have called for a lifting of the sanctions on 
Eritrea, as the Monitoring Group has not been able to present any evidence of 
Eritrean support for Al-Shabaab. Russian representative Iliichev talked about 
“intrusive provisions that undermined national sovereignty.”386 The British and 
American representatives have however argued that finding more evidence has 
been impossible since 2011 because the Monitoring Group has been denied 
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access to Eritrea for years. The sanctions on Eritrea remain in place today and 
form one of the keys to rebuilding the Somalian State.  
The UN sanctions regime on Eritrea shows that even though 2008 the border 
conflict with Djibouti cannot be considered as a sanctionable offence in itself, 
political opportunism can still lead to the imposition of sanctions if the P-5 members 
deem it convenient. Eritrea is clearly a sanctions spoiler, and clearly constitutes an 
obstacle to achieving peace and stability in Somalia. Eritrea is also not the only 
country that has been sanctioned as a result of a failure to comply with UN 
sanctions regimes in neighbouring countries. Still, there seems to be something 
aching when a sanction is imposed eighteen months after a minor border conflict. 
The sanctions would have been more convincing if the Ras Doumeira conflict had 
been left out of the equation, leaving no room for ambiguity about the nature of the 
true defence. As we will see in the next chapter, imposing UN sanctions in 
response to civil conflicts and government and non-government groups that act as 
sanctions spoilers has become perfectly legitimate as part of the R2P doctrine. 




The track record of UN sanctions in response to interstate conflicts reveals a logic 
that is not dissimilar to that of nuclear proliferation. Wars of aggression do not only 
present a threat to the peace in terms of international law and humanitarian 
suffering, but also in the sense that they threaten the international system of 
sovereign states as such. Border wars, like nuclear proliferation, are high-stakes 
issues, and as such require UN sanctions to act accordingly. However, precisely 
because of the high states involved, they also ask for geopolitical caution.  
Initially there was great optimism about the role of sanctions in the 1990s. After 
decades of Cold War deadlock, the aggression of Iraq against Kuwait and the 
decisive action of the UNSC to impose comprehensive economic sanctions 
shaped a hopeful precedent for future cases. Despite the criticism on the 
humanitarian consequences of the UNSCR 661 regime, it was clear that interstate 
conflicts would not be tolerated anymore in the post-Cold War era.  
The late UN sanctions in response to the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea reveals 
a more realist truth. The UNSCR 1298 regime shows that when an interstate 
conflict occurs between two countries of little geo-political importance, sanctions 
risk the chance of being imposed after all the harm has already been done.  
The realist truth of UN sanctions in response to interstate wars becomes even 
clearer with the Kargil War between Pakistan and India. It reveals the hard truth 






nuclear weapons it is sometimes better to practice geo-political prudence and not 
to antagonize it by imposing sanctions. An idealist might see this as a loss for 
international law and a blow to the UNSC’s credibility, but the UNSC’s actions in 
response to the Kargil War teach us that they considered it a loss worth taking. As 
we will see in upcoming chapters, stronger states tend to stay out of the reach of 
the UNSC; State power matters. The best exhibit to the argument that state power 
matters when it comes to UN sanctions is undoubtedly the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003. P-5 members can not only afford to intervene military without explicit consent 
from the United Nations Security Council, thereby committing an act of 
international aggression, but they can also do so without being sanctioned for it.  
The realist logic that allows powerful states to get away with acts of international 
aggression applies inversely to small states. When Eritrea fought a border war with 
Ethiopia that resulted in at least 70.000 casualties, sanctions were only imposed 
after the fact. However, when a much smaller conflict broke out with Djibouti, killing 
less than 150, the UNSC regarded it as an ad hoc legitimization to impose 
sanctions that were in reality about something else. This is a logic that we will also 
find again in following chapters, most notably with regard to the 2012 coup d’état 






Sanctionable Offence Three: Civil War 
 
 
The United Nations Security Council has imposed sanctions in response to a total 
of twenty three civil wars since 1990. Although there has been some criticism on 
sanctions regarding their effectiveness as tools of coercion and their unintended 
consequences, UN sanctions regimes since 1990 are generally considered to be 
progressively successful in signaling violations of international norms and coercing 
targets towards compliance. However, the Sanctionable Offences Database 
(SOD) that forms the backbone of this thesis shows that in fact there have been 
fifty eight civil wars in which the Security Council could, some would even say 
should, have responded with sanctions. Considered as such, twenty three out of 
fifty eight doesn’t sound very impressive at all.  
What is the logic behind sanctioning civil wars? How did the idea of imposing UN 
sanctions in response to civil wars come into being in the first place? And most 
importantly, were all the fifty eight ‘sanctionable civil wars’ since 1990 really equally 
sanctionable? Or were some conflicts truly more eligible for UN sanctions than 
others, for example because they were much bloodier, lengthier, or a larger threat 
to state collapse? And if there is no convincing evidence that the sanctioned 
conflicts were more ‘sanctionable’ than the non-sanctioned conflicts, could be that 
the explanation lies with the ‘senders’ rather than the ‘receivers’? And if so, who is 
to blame?  
This chapter shows that although the record of twenty three out of fifty eight can 
surely be seen as an indicator of progress in dealing with many of the most bloody 
and serious internal conflicts, UN sanctions have been, and will remain, tools of 
politics. The seriousness of the offence matters, but the fact that several serious 
civil wars have remained unsanctioned shows that it also matters who you are. 
Even unilateral sanctions by the EU and US on conflicts that were left unsanctioned 
in the UNSC can’t always escape this reality.  
 
7.1. Defining the offence 
 
The Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP) calls civil wars “internal armed 






of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from 
other states”. 387 If an internal armed conflict also includes the intervention from 
other states (secondary parties), it is defined as an internationalized internal armed 
conflict. For example, the 1998 conflict between Serbia and Kosovo is identified as 
an internal conflict because Kosovo was at that point considered an integral part 
of Serbia, and it is identified as internationalized because of the foreign 
interference of NATO. In the Sanctionable Offences Dataset, internal armed 
conflicts are defined as those conflicts in the UCDP encyclopedia that have 
produced a minimum of a thousand accumulated deaths since 1990. Based on the 
limitations and definitions described in chapter 4, the UCDP database provides 
comprehensive data on conflict casualties between 1945 and 2015, as well as an 
interactive ‘conflict encyclopedia’ that visualizes conflict deaths geographically 
since 1989. All data on conflict deaths and conflict length is taken from this 
database. It recognizes a total of sixty three internal conflicts since 1989 that 
produced a minimum of a thousand casualties throughout the conflict. Fifty eight 
of these conflicts produced at least a thousand deaths since 1990. These conflicts 
are recognized by the SOD as ‘sanctionable’.388  
Why the threshold of 1000 deaths? Firstly, this threshold is methodologically 
convenient as it is in line with the UDCP distinction between ‘minor conflicts’ and 
‘wars’. Secondly, the SOD database shows us that the UN has indeed imposed 
sanctions in response to conflicts that just surpassed the 1000 deaths threshold, 
such as in the case of Mali (2012), where the accumulated deaths had just 
surpassed 1500 by the time sanctions were imposed, or as in the case of Ivory 
Coast (2004), where the casualty count had not reached 2000 yet. The threshold 
of 1000 deaths is therefore also in line with reality. This is of course not to say that 
conflicts that did not reach the threshold did not constitute local political and 
personal dramas for the people involved in them. As a matter of fact, besides the 
58 civil wars that took occurred since 1990 there UCDP counts another 95 minor 
conflicts in which over 26.000 people died.389 None of these conflicts however 
constituted a threat to the peace or international security, and they are therefore 
not considered as sanctionable offences.  
 
7.2. A History of the Offence 
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Civil wars are of all times. From the Medieval Europe to the Chinese Ming dynasty, 
and from African pre-colonial kingdoms to the Aztec Empire, people have fought 
over the control of political units and against corrupted, violent, and oppressive 
governments and tyrants. The civil wars discussed in this chapter however begin 
with the establishment of modern states. The British civil war, the French 
revolution, and the American Civil war show us that many successful modern 
states were home to civil conflicts, and were to a certain extent founded on civil 
conflict. As sociologist Charles Tilly put it, “war made the state, and the state made 
war”.390 
In the aftermath of World War I and World War II the international community was 
clearly more pre-occupied with the prevention of new interstate conflicts and 
preventing a World War III from breaking out than with internal conflicts. As a 
matter of fact, the design of both the League of Nations and the United Nations 
provided for legitimate interventions and sanctions in response to wars of 
aggression, but most certainly not in response to internal conflicts. Indeed, neither 
of the organizations dealt with internal conflicts during the 1920-1990 period, with 
the exception of sending UN observer missions in response to the Lebanon Crisis 
(1958), the Yemeni Civil War (1963-64), and a verification mission to the Angolan 
Civil War (1989-91). Sending UN soldiers or imposing sanctions was however 
unthinkable, as it would breach the doctrine of state sovereignty, which was highly 
respected in the United Nations during the Cold War. As Jeremy Farrall explains 
on the role of traditional UN peacekeeping: 
 
“The idea [...] that the Council might initiate action to promote democracy or build the rule 
of law would have seemed not only fanciful, but highly dangerous. For what happened 
within the boundaries of a state was considered to be the business of that state and that 
state alone.”391 
 
Of course this doesn’t mean that there were no civil conflicts during the Cold War, 
or that the belligerents of the Cold War did not interfere in civil wars across the 
world. To the contrary, both the Soviet Union and the United States were heavily 
involved in civil conflicts throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America, supporting 
governments or rebel movements economically and militarily, and at times even 
putting boots on the ground, such as in Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Angola.392 
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Although many of these conflicts led to international outcries about civilian 
casualties, refugee streams, genocide, and other human atrocities, many conflicts 
were either framed as ideological battlegrounds between socialists and capitalists, 
or were simply regarded as humanitarian disasters. None of them was however 
considered as a ‘threat to the peace’ or a ‘breach of the peace’, and UN 
intervention or the imposition of sanctions was never an option.  
During the 1945-1990 period, the UCDP dataset counts 66 civil conflicts, 34 of 
which continued into the 1990s. That’s an average of some 15 civil wars per 
decade. These conflicts were typically bloodier than those of the post-Cold War 
era. Although accurate death counts on Cold War conflicts are even harder to find 
than statistics on casualties in conflicts since 1990, academics generally agree on 
the fact that wars have become less deadly since the end of World War II, and also 
when one takes a longer perspective.393 For example, although the Rwanda 
genocide is typically regarded as the deadliest civil conflict since World War II with 
over half a million victims, the Chinese civil war of 1946-1949 killed perhaps ten 
times that number. Similarly, the conflict that ensued after the partition of India in 
1947 also killed anywhere between 200.000 and 2 million people. The Vietnam 
War (1955-75), which would be defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program as 
an internationalized internal conflict, produced anywhere between 1.5 million and 
3.8 million deaths.  
When UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali presented his agenda for peace in 
1992, promoting a new and more active role for the UN Security Council and for 
preventive diplomacy, peace keeping, and peace building, the deadliness of civil 
wars had already declined substantially. The first ‘internal’ conflict that had been 
responded to with a UN arms embargo, that on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia, 1991), had produced just over 3.000 deaths.394 This places the conflict 
among the less deadly ones to receive UN sanctions.  
The early 1990s did see a clear spike in the number of civil conflicts that broke out, 
42but almost all of these conflicts were very minor conflicts at the time. By the time 
Boutros Ghali presented his Agenda for Peace, ten new internal conflicts had 
already broken out,395 eight of which were still minor conflicts at the time because 
they had produced less than 1000 accumulated deaths. The only new conflicts that 
had surpassed the 1000 deaths threshold were those in Rwanda, which had 
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produced an estimated 3700 deaths by the end of 1991, and indeed the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.  
 
7.3. The first sanctioned civil war – The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
 
The United Nations sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) are 
symbolic in several ways. First, they represent the strategical and ideological shift 
from sanctioning interstate conflicts to internal conflicts in the sense that the 
Yugoslav conflict of the early 1990s was a type of hybrid conflict, characterized by 
some as a series of internal secessionist conflicts within the FRY, and by others 
as a set of interrelated interstate wars between formerly federated, but 
internationally recognized separate states, most notably Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, and the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro).396 Second, the 
conflict is also symbolic because it represented a threat to the peace in the very 
region that ignited World War I, after which the League of Nations was established, 
and after which, ironically, the state of Yugoslavia first came into existence. Third, 
the lessons learned from sanctioning the FRY contributed to the shift towards 
smart sanctions in the 2000s. 
Since the beginning Yugoslavia was a troublesome marriage of convenience 
between Croat and Slovenian “Yugoslavists” on the one hand and Serbian 
Nationalists on the other. Finding each other in the aftermath of WWI, with Croatia 
and Slovenia freeing themselves from the Austria-Hungarians and with the Serbian 
Kingdom completing their final steps out of the influence of the Ottomans, the 
newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians (later renamed Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia) was troubled from the start.397 The 1948 change towards the 
‘Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ under Josip Broz (Tito) for a while 
seemed to diminish ethnic rivalries during the economically successful 1960s and 
1970s, but as economic growth dwindled and unemployment rose in the post-Tito 
1980s the richer republics of Croatia and Slovenia became less willing to pay for 
Federal expenditures, especially as they were increasingly misspent, in their eyes, 
in the late 1980s. In the Republic of Kosovo the grievances of ethnic Albanians 
resurged, challenging Serbia’s regime under Slobodan Milosevic through 1989 and 
1990. Throughout 1990 both the Croatian and Slovenian Republic increasingly 
distanced themselves from the Yugoslavian Federal Republic. Initially many 
                                            
396 All the conflicts started with a claim of independence, although the official independence and 
international recognition occurred during or after the conflicts. Especially the case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina is normally recognized as an interstate conflict between the two sovereign states of 
Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  






Croats and Slovenes expressed a preference for a confederal state with multi-party 
elections, but as negotiations deteriorated the option of secession became more 
imminent. On the 25th of June both Slovenia and Croatia declared their 
independence,398 leading the Serb-dominated government to start internal armed 
conflicts in both cases.  
In the case of Slovenia, the so-called ‘Weekend War’ only lasted for ten days and 
produced less than a hundred casualties until the signing of the Brioni Accords on 
the 7th of July, which suspended the official independence until December of that 
year. In the case of Croatia, the Brioni agreement suspended official independence 
until the 8th of October. In the meantime, the death toll surpassed 3000 over the 
course of just a few months, although some sources claim numbers of over 10.000 
deaths399, most notably in the regions of Dalmatia and Eastern Slavonia.   
The UNSC imposed an arms embargo on the FRY on the 25th of September of 
1991 with UNSCR 713, when the hostilities between Serbs and Croats had turned 
into a full-scale war. Unilateral sanctions by the US and EU were already in place 
since July 1991. The Resolution, sponsored by France and Austria, was first 
confronted with a Chinese attempt to block the sanctions because it would 
constitute a breach of Yugoslavian sovereignty, but the block was lifted because 
the Serbian representative himself welcomed the resolution. The Serbs knew that 
although the embargo was politically directed against them, it was precisely the 
Serbs that were relatively unaffected by the embargo as they were in control of the 
Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which had plenty of weapons and ammunition 
stockpiles. Indeed the UN embargo has been recognized as being ineffective in 
stopping the Serbs in Croatia from fighting, while being counterproductive for the 
Croatians, who were supposed to be protected by the sanctions.400 
As one conflict came to an impasse, the next was about to start. While the conflict 
between Serbia and Croatia came to an impasse with a peace agreement that was 
signed in Sarajevo on the 2nd of January 1992 and that allowed for a UN peace 
force (the Vance plan), Muslim and Croat politicians in the very same city were 
preparing for the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Already in December the 
Bosnian government under Alija Izetbegovic had formally applied for recognition 
at the EC. A subsequent referendum in February, in which Muslims and Croats 
overwhelmingly voted in favor of independence and in which the Serbs felt that 
they had lost an integral part of their heritage, sealed the deal. However, 
Izetbegovic knew that he had also made new bloodshed inevitable.401 The official 
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recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign State by the EU and US in April 
1992 did not help in avoiding renewed Serbian aggression either.  
The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was much bloodier than those in Croatia and 
Slovenia. The ethnic mix of Muslims (42%) Serbs (31%), Croats (17%) and 
Yugoslavs (6%) that had for many decades lived peacefully within the Yugoslav 
borders turned into a conflict of intercommunal hatred and unsettled accounts 
between neighboring families and communities. With the effective monopoly on 
legitimate violence gone, the Bosnian conflict represents what Mary Kaldor has 
recognized as a typical case study of a ‘New War’. Bosnia had no official army, so 
the militants that fought in the Army of Bosnia-Herzergovina (ABiH) was in reality 
a motley crew of paramilitary bands, gangsters, and self-defense forces, almost 
half of which were not armed. Besides the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) and the 
Croatian Defense Council (HVO), which were both better organized because they 
received support from Serbia’s JSA and Croatia, respectively, the UN Commission 
of Experts identified another 83 paramilitary groups.402 
According to the UCDP database the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina produced 
approximately 26.000 deaths between 1992 and 1995, although other estimates 
put the death-toll at 100.000 or higher. Paramilitary groups were responsible for 
many of the atrocities that occurred, including mass executions, rape, and torture. 
Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced. Census statistics show that by 
1995 Croats and Muslims had almost completely disappeared from Northern 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas the region of Bihac had been practically cleansed 
of Serbians.  
In response to the Bosnian conflict, the UNSC extended the sanctions on 
Yugoslavia and imposed comprehensive trade sanctions on Serbia and 
Montenegro with UNSCR 757 of 30 May 1992. The Resolution had been drafted 
by Belgium, France, Hungary, Morocco, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, with abstentions from China and Zimbabwe. The objective of the sanctions 
was not only to signal that the atrocities in Bosnia presented a breach of the peace, 
but also to coerce the Serbs to stop fighting and to end Serbian ´outside 
interference’ in what the UN described as an internal conflict in Bosnia. In other 
words, strictly spoken the Security Council did not impose any sanctions on the 
fighting parties within the newly formed state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but rather on 
a secondary party (Serbia and Montenegro) in an ‘internationalized internal 
conflict.’403 Subsequent to Resolution 757, the Security Council adopted extra 
Resolutions to freeze financial assets of the Yugoslav government and to limit the 
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transshipment of goods through Yugoslavia (UNSCR 820, 1993) and later to shift 
some of the restrictions towards Serbs in Bosnia while easing sanctions on Serbia 
itself as a reward for Milosevic’s agreement to limit external involvement in the 
conflict (UNSCR 942 and 943, 1994).  
Whereas the role of the international community in general in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
has been largely regarded as a failure, the sanctions have been described 
relatively effective in terms of their implementation as well as a negotiating tool to 
limit Serbia’s involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.404 The main criticism has been 
that, just as in Iraq, the trade sanctions had significant unintended consequences 
for civilians. The Serbian economy collapsed in 1992 and 1993, with real income 
and industrial production dropping to half of their pre-war numbers. The Yugoslav 
currency (dinar) completely lost its value, and Yugoslavia suffered the largest 
humanitarian crisis in Europe since WWII, with hundreds of thousands of people 
depending on humanitarian aid as a result of the trade embargo. To what the 
sanctions on Yugoslavia were successful will remain a topic of debate.  
The question that this thesis attempts to answer is however not whether the 
sanctions regimes in response to civil conflict were effective, but whether the 
conflicts at hand were indeed the biggest threats to the peace of the early 1990s? 
Indeed the war in Bosnia created a huge amount of international outrage. 
Occurring on the border of the European Union, it was without a doubt the single 
biggest threat to stability in the West, and by far the conflict that received most 
coverage in the media. But as UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali, rather crudely, 
pointed out in a speech in Sarajevo in December 1992, ‘I understand your 
frustration buy you have a situation that is better than ten other places in the world 
…. I can give you a list.’405 
 
7.4. UN Sanctions and Humanitarian Concerns 
 
The list that Boutros Ghali had in mind at that event in Sarajevo at the end of 1992 
arguably included conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan (Nagorno-
Karabakh), Colombia, Liberia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Peru, the Philippines, 
Tajikistan, Somalia, Sri-Lanka, and Sudan, all of which were conflicts that had 
produced many thousands of deaths in the years prior, and some of which had 
been unresolved for many years.406  
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After the UNSCRs 713 (1991) and 757 (1992) many UN sanctions regimes 
followed to deal with other civil wars of the 1990s, most notably Somalia, 
Cambodia, Liberia, Angola, and Sierra Leone, all of which suffered grave 
humanitarian crises as well as conditions of state failure, destabilizing the region 
and at times providing breeding grounds for terrorist groups or narco-traffickers. In 
several of the conflicts child soldiers were recruited, for example to fight in the 
ranks of the UNITA rebel movement in Angola, or for the Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia. The experiences of these sanctions regimes taught the respective 
sanctions committees how to make arms embargoes more effective, how to 
mitigate unintended consequences for innocent civilians, and how to use 
commodity sanctions and asset freezes to undermine the financial flows of rebel 
groups and other spoilers.  
However, of the fourteen conflicts mentioned above that Boutros Ghali might have 
had in mind in 1992, only those in Angola (UNSCR 864, 1993), Bosnia-
Herzegovina (UNSCR 757, 1992), Liberia (UNSCR 788, 1992) and Somalia 
(UNSCR 733, 1992) received UN arms embargoes in the years directly following 
them. Afghanistan and Sudan did eventually become subject to UN sanctions 
regimes, but only many years later and in relation with terrorism (see chapter 8), 
not in response to civil conflict. Sudan was also sanctioned in 2005 in response to 
the civil conflict in the region of Darfur, but by this time tens of thousands of people 
had already died in a long list of conflicts between the government and armed 
groups, most notably the Sudan’s People Liberation Front (SPLM). In the 
remaining conflicts on Boutros Ghali’s hypothetical list of 1992 (Azerbaijan, 
Colombia, Myanmar, Peru, Philippines, Tajikistan, and Sri-Lanka), UN sanctions 
were never imposed. 
To be sure, the track record of UN sanctions has improved over time. One of the 
most influential books on UN sanctions dubbed the 1990s as the ‘sanctions 
decade’,407 but in reality this title befits the 2000s much better than the 1990s. Of 
the twenty two civil conflicts that broke out in the 1990s, only seven received UN 
sanctions. In contrast, out of the fourteen civil wars that broke out since 2000, nine 






                                            






Table 14 - Civil wars since 1990 – in order of deadliness 
Case Code 
UCDP 







179 Rwanda Civil War 1993-1994 520.569 Yes 
102 Syria Civil War 2011-Ongoing 326.495 No* 
137 Afghanistan Civil War 1978-2016 200.582 Yes 
113 Sudan Civil War 1971-2014 89.794 Yes 
62 Iraq Civil War 2002-Ongoing 87.945 No* 
157 Sri Lanka – Tamil Tigers 1984-2009 63.298 No 
86 Congo Civil War (I) 1996-1997 48.937 No 
141 Somalia Civil War 1982-2016 41.363 Yes 
131 Angola - UNITA 1975-2002 32.862 Yes 
86 Congo Civil War (II) 1998-2003 31.568 Yes 
159 Turkey: Kurdistan 1984-2013 29.474 No 
209 Pakistan: Waziristan 1990-Ongoing 28.634 No* 
194 FRY: Bosnia 1994-1995 26.336 Yes 
146 Liberia Civil War 1989-2003 23.244 Yes 
92 Colombia Civil War 1964-2014 22.140 No 
207 Yemen Civil War 2011-Ongoing 20.863 Yes 
191 Algeria Civil War 1991-2014 20.942 No* 
187 Sierra Leone Civil War 1991-2001 20.543 Yes 
169 India: Kashmir 1990-2014 20.228 No 
206 Russia: Chechnya 1994-2007 21.129 No 
118 Uganda Civil War 1971-2007 17.021 No 
90 Burundi Civil War 1991-2008 16.488 No 
222 CAR Civil War 2000-Ongoing 11.015 Yes 






271 Libya Civil War 2011-Ongoing 10.710 Yes 
72 Nepal: Communists 1996-2006 9.925 No 
270 South Sudan Civil War  2011-Ongoing 9.922 Yes 
91 Chad Civil War 1990-2010 9.718 No 
156 India: Khalistan 1983-1993 9.531 No 
200 Tajikistan Civil War 1992-1998 9.089 No 
112 Philippines: Mindanao 1970-2014 8.300 No* 
95 Peru - Sendero Luminoso 1982-2010 8.120 No 
10 Philippines - Communists 1969-2014 7.960 No 
283 Ukraine Civil War 2014-Ongoing 6.371 No 
37 Israel: Palestine 1949-2014 6.362 No 
29 India - Communists 1948-Ongoing 6.107 No 
193 Azerbaijan: Nagorno-
Karabakh 
1991-Ongoing 5.288 No 
103 Cambodia Civil War 1967-1998 5.082 Yes 
23 Myanmar: Karen 1949-2013 4.550 No 
171 Indonesia: Aceh 1990-2005 3.377 No 
190 FRY: Croatia 1991 3.060 Yes 
274 Mali Civil War 2009-Ongoing 2.699 Yes 
203 Bosnia: Herzeg Bosnia 1994 2.657 No 
218 Serbia: Kosovo 1998 2.648 Yes 
197 Georgia: Abkhazia 1992-1993 2.180 No 
219 Ethiopia: Oromiya 1977-2013 2.131 No 
74 Iraq: Kurdistan 1961-1996 2.036 No 
67 Myanmar: Shan 1993-2015 2.030 No 
180 Senegal: Casamance 1990-2011 1.949 No 






248 Thailand: Patani 2003-Ongoing 1.823 No 
170 India: Assam 1990-2010 1.721 No 
251 Israel - Hezbollah 1990-2006 1.606 No 
34 Myanmar: Kachin 1949-2014 1.545 No 
133 Ethiopia: Ogaden 1993-2015 1.454 No 
143 Iran Insurgency 1979-2011 1.282 No 
129 Pakistan - Balochistan 2004-2014 1.221 No 
 
*The conflicts with a *were sanctioned under UNSCR 1267 related to terrorist organizations. This is an 
important observation, as the difference between rebel groups and terrorist groups seems to become 
increasingly vague, and more and more armed insurgencies are nowadays recognized as terrorists, 
whereas before they were recognized as rebels.  
 
 
7.4.1. Battle related deaths 
 
Boutros Ghali’s statement in Sarajevo was politically insensitive, but factually 
correct. There were indeed several other places in the world that were worse off 
than the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that were not as closely monitored 
and protected by the United Nations or the international community in general. This 
observation in no way excuses the horrific events of the Bosnian war, in which 
many more people would die in subsequent years, but it does beg the question 
whether United Nations sanctions regimes are a reflection of the biggest conflicts, 
or rather to those conflicts that are closest to home or most likely to outrage the 
public. In order to test this question, the list of sanctionable civil conflicts since 
1990 lists the accumulated deaths of all civil wars that produced at least 1000 
deaths since 1990.  
Humanitarian suffering can clearly be a reason for the UN to impose sanctions. On 
average, the conflicts that were sanctioned produced approximately 56.000 
deaths, compared to approximately 9.000 for those conflicts that were not 
sanctioned, pointing towards a general concern for humanitarian suffering. Indeed, 
in the Rwanda Genocide as well as the Congolese civil war, humanitarian concerns 
about the thousands of innocent civilians suffering that were killed, raped, or 
displaced played a major role in mobilizing UNSC support for action under chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. The same can be said about conflicts in Afghanistan, Sudan, 
Somalia, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Liberia, among others. The fact that 






sanctions were sometimes imposed after much of the harm had already occurred 
is a cynical reminder that conflict-related deaths matter, but that they sometimes 
have to occur first for anyone to notice.  
Humanitarian concerns and conflict deaths however can’t sufficiently explain the 
track record of UN sanctions in response to civil war since 1990. There are two 
reasons for this. Firstly, there are too many exceptions in the upper halve of the 
table. Of the twenty civil wars that killed at least 10.000 people only nine received 
UN sanctions. Five of the eleven deadliest civil wars (Syria, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Turkey, 
and Pakistan) were not responded to with UN arms embargoes, commodity 
sanctions, or smart sanctions on armed groups or government officials.408 In order 
to understand why these conflicts were outside of the reach of UN sanctions were 
have to look for other explanations.  
The second argument that backs up the claim that humanitarian concerns and 
conflict deaths can’t sufficiently explain what UN sanctions are for can be found in 
the bottom halve of the table. The conflicts in Cambodia, South Sudan, Croatia, 
Kosovo, Libya, Cote d´Ivoire, and Mali were all responded to with UN sanctions 
despite the fact that the humanitarian suffering in these conflicts was relatively 
minor. As a matter of fact, the civil war in Sri Lanka produced three times as many 
battle related deaths (63.298) than all of the sanctioned conflicts mentioned above 
(20.052). This is not to say that these relatively ‘minor’ conflicts should not have 
been sanctioned, but sufficient reason to suspect that humanitarian concerns are 
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7.5. UN Sanctions and Other Concerns 
 
In section 7.4 we learned that although there seems to be some sort of correlation 
between the amount of deaths produced in a civil war and the likelihood of that 
being sanctioned by the UNSC, there are too many exceptions to fully accept the 
claim that the UN has been consistent in sanctioning the biggest threats to the 
peace since 1990 when it comes to civil wars. On the upper end of the list the main 
exceptions to this rule were Sri-Lanka, Turkey, Colombia and India with more than 
20.000 accumulated deaths according to the UCDP encyclopedia, and to a lesser 
extent Russia, Uganda, Burundi, with over 10.000 accumulated deaths, placing 
them among the deadliest civil wars since 1990. None of these cases received UN 
sanctions. On the lower end of the list we found a number of conflicts that did 
receive UN sanctions despite the fact that these conflicts were only minor in 
comparison, sometimes barely surpassing the 1000 deaths threshold. These 
cases include Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, and FRY-Croatia, whereas similar 
conflicts in Indonesia, Myanmar, and Georgia were let off the hook.  
The following section will consider  a number of variables. We will consider whether 
it matters in which continent the conflict took place, whether the state in question 
had any countervailing power to block sanctions from being imposed, and to what 




A quick look at the map seems to point towards a bias in favour of (or 
against) African states. It was to be expected that African states have been 
subject to more UN sanctions regimes than other continents. The African 
continent is notorious for underdevelopment, post-colonial instability, 
corruption, weak states, rebellions, warlords, and civil unrest in general. 
Indeed, up to 20 different states in Africa have been home to sanctionable civil 
wars since 1990.409 The rate of civil wars that were responded to with UN 
sanctions is significant. Out of 20 African States that experienced civil war 
since 1990, only six (Mozambique, Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad, Burundi, and 
Senegal) were left off the hook, whereas the other fourteen (70%) (Algeria, 
Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote 
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d’Ivoire, Nigeria, DRC, CAR, Rwanda, Angola) all received UN sanctions, even 
if some of them were relatively small-scale.  
 
If one adds up all the separate civil conflicts that surpassed the threshold of 
1000 deaths in Asia the list counts 22 sanctionable offences, although only in 
14 different countries.410 The only Asian states that have been subject to UN 
sanctions regimes, however, are Cambodia and Afghanistan.411 States that 
were let off the hook include Syria, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Nepal, Tajikistan, Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey. This puts the sanctioning rate in Asian civil wars at only 
14%.  
 
It is important to note that armed (terrorist) groups in several Asian countries 
did receive targeted sanctions under UNSCR 1267/1989/2253, as they were 
listed on a UN designated terrorist organizations list. The civil wars in which 
terrorist groups participated include those in Syria, Iraq, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Pakistan, and Russia, in which Al-Qaida, ISIS, Abu Sayyaf Group, 
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and Chechen terrorist groups were listed, among 
others. This finding is interesting because compared to African cases, all these 
states are relatively strong, relatively stable, and predominantly Muslim. It is 
not clear whether armed groups in Asian countries are more likely to be listed 
as terrorists because of the nature of their activities or rather because doing 
so is politically more convenient for those who want to impose sanctions.  
 
Until recently Europe had a full score when it came to sanctioning civil wars 
within its continent.  The conflicts in Yugoslavia were not only humanitarian 
tragedies, but they also directly threatened the security of Europe, providing 
an extra urgency for the EU to push for sanctions, both in the UN and within 
the CSFP framework.412 The 2014 conflict that broke out in Ukraine in the 
aftermath of the Ukrainian revolution and the Russian annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula changed this, as well as the fighting between pro-Russian 
separatists in the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk. Since both Russia, the 
European Union, and the United States were directly or indirectly involved in 
the conflict in Ukraine, supporting opposing sides to the conflict, UN sanctions 
                                            
410 Russia and the Caucasus are categorized as part of Asia in this account, whereas Iran, 
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Pakistan (2), Liberia (2), and the DRC Congo (2). 
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threat of international terrorism, not the civil war.   
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were never an option. Neither was a peacekeeping mission. The UN General 
Assembly managed to pass a Resolution (A/RES/68/262) condemning the 
annexation of the Crimea peninsula by Russia, but not with regard to the 
internal conflict in Eastern Ukraine.   
 
In Latin America, the civil conflicts that have been ongoing for several decades 
in Colombia and Peru have not been subjected to UN sanctions. Neither has 
any other Latin American state. In the case of Peru, the civil conflict between 
the government of Peru and ‘Sendero Luminoso’ killed many thousands of 
people in the early 1990s. In Colombia, the conflict between the government 
and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), started in 
1964 and is currently coming to an end. Since 1990 more than 27.000 people 
were killed, with peaks in the early 2000s. Although the civil war in Colombia 
is in many ways reminiscent of those in West and Central Africa, UN sanctions 
were never proposed. In the cases of both Sendero Luminoso and FARC, the 
EU and the US did list both organizations on their lists of designated terrorist 
organizations. Both have since been suspended, with FARC having been de-
listed in 2016.  
 
Considering the different track records of sanctions on different 
continents one might conclude that UN sanctions serve neo-colonial purposes. 
However, the previous sections have shown that there are clear differences 
between the civil wars in Africa and those in other continents. These 
differences reveal that UN sanctions serve to deal with humanitarian concerns, 
the protection of state-sovereignty, and international stability rather than pure 
neo-colonial interests. For example, table 1 shows that the conflicts that 
occurred in ex-colonies in Africa were on average substantially bloodier than 
those in ex-colonies in Asia (approx. 34.000 vs 17.000), and also that conflicts 
in Africa were a larger threat to state-fragility than those in Asia.413 
 
 
7.5.2. State Fragility 
 
If UN sanctions in response to civil wars since 1990 have not been completely in 
line with the extent of humanitarian suffering that occurred in each conflict, the 
variables of ‘state fragility’ and ‘state strength’ help us in explaining a number of 
the outlier cases in the SOD. The following section shows that UN sanctions are 
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mainly imposed to maintain and stabilize the international state system, rather than 
to simply deal with humanitarian suffering.  
The variable of ‘State Fragility’ helps us in understanding why some relatively 
minor conflicts received UN sanctions whereas relatively deadly ones did not. On 
average, regardless of the amount of conflict-related deaths involved, those 
conflicts that received UN sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter received 
a score of 94.7 on the Fragile States index of the Fund for Peace, placing them in 
the category of Alert or High Alert. Those states that did not receive sanctions in 
response to their civil conflicts scored an average of 86.3, still placing them in the 
category of High Warning, but putting them significantly further away from state 
collapse and closer to relatively healthy states such as Morocco (74.2) or Tanzania 
(81.8).414 
State failure or state collapse have indeed been recognized as being particularly 
dangerous to international security, although the UNSC does not explicitly mention 
state failure as a reason for imposing sanctions in its Resolutions regarding 
sanctions. State failure is however widely associated with other types of security 
threats. For example, failed states create streams of refugees, warlordism, drug 
trafficking, and safe-havens and training grounds for international terrorism, among 
others, all of which contribute to the risk of regional and/or global insecurity.415 A 
good example of how a failed state can create security issues in the region is 
Somalia. Having suffered from a power vacuum for over 20 years, the civil war in 
Somalia has not only killed many thousands of Somali, but it has also increased 
pressure on neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya and other states in the region, where 
many refugees have fled. Somalia has become a training ground for international 
terrorism, with the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization allying itself to the Al-Qaida 
network in 2012 Furthermore, the Indian Ocean in and near the territorial waters 
of Somalia has for many years been notorious for being one of the most dangerous 
international shipping routes on earth, with Somali pirates hijacking merchant ships 
and kidnapping sailors for ransom.  
Somalia is by no means the only failed state that has increased insecurity outside 
of the state. The first Congolese civil war has also been dubbed Africa’s World 
War, as it dragged in neighboring countries including Rwanda, Uganda, the Central 
African Republic, Zimbabwe, and Angola most notably. The civil wars in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia were connected to arms-trafficking and commodity-smuggling 
networks that spanned the globe, including arms shipments from Eastern Europe 
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and exports of diamonds and timber to New York, Antwerp, and Kuala Lumpur, 
among others. The power vacuums that were left behind in the civil wars in 
Afghanistan and Syria have largely contributed to the expansion of terrorist 
organizations such as Al-Qaida and ISIS. Once a government loses its ability to 
successfully project a legitimate monopoly on violence within the boundaries of the 
state, threats to the peace accumulate. State failure is therefore a good reason to 
impose sanctions.  
The least deadly conflict that was nevertheless sanctioned by the UN in order to 
prevent state failure occurred in Mali. Although the UCDP encyclopedia only 
recorded a little over 1700 deaths since 2011, the conflict that included Tuareg 
rebel groups Ansar Dine and the secessionist National Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) as well as support from the originally Algerian al-
Qaida Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Mouvement pour le 
Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) quickly formed a threat to 
Malian sovereignty and state stability. In just a matter of months during the first half 
of 2012, Mali had lost control over the government in Bamako due to a coup d’état 
on the 22nd of March, as well as the Northern region of Azawad, which proclaimed 
its independence a few weeks later. The coup was relatively quickly mitigated by 
the international community, with the African Union (AU) expelling Mali, the World 
Bank suspending funds, and the Economic Unity of West African States 
(ECOWAS) imposing asset freezes and travel bans. Two weeks later a new 
transitional government was established. The political vacuum in Northern Mali 
however continued to be a source of unease for western countries, as they worried 
that the Azawad region would be used as a safe-haven and training ground for 
terrorists linked to al-Qaeda. AQIM had already been added to the UN list of 
terrorist organizations pursuant to UNSCR 1267 on al-Qaeda. By the end of 2012, 
in coordination with a French-led UN military mission, the UNSC decided to also 
add MUJAO (December 2012) and Ansar Dine (March 2013) to the list of 
designated terrorist groups. 
The logic of state fragility and UN sanctions also works the other way around. 
Those conflicts that were not sanctioned by the UN were on average better at 
projecting power within their borders than those who did receive sanctions, even if 
they killed thousands of people. In strong states, rebel groups and secessionist 
groups might cause trouble and produce deaths, but they don’t tend to threaten 
the sovereignty of the state itself. For example, nobody fears that the Indian central 
government will implode, even if India has been home to more civil conflicts than 
any other state since 1990. The war in the north-western region of Kashmir has 
cost over seventeen thousand lives since 1990 produced by Kashmiri secessionist 
insurgents and the Indian government. As a matter of fact, Kashmiri insurgents, 






independence, have killed many more people than the Pakistani army.416 Similarly, 
the conflict in the region of Punjab/Khalistan that lasted until 1994 also killed over 
eight thousand people, but never threatened the stability of the state. The same 
goes for conflicts in the north-eastern appendix of India that circumvents 
Bangladesh and that borders China and Myanmar. Together, a range of insurgent 
groups in the regions Assam, Bodoland, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura and Garoland 
have been involved in conflicts that produced close to ten thousand deaths since 
the end of the Cold War, many of which at the hand of the government. If one were 
to add up all the conflict related deaths of the various conflicts within the Indian 
state, only a handful of countries have produced more casualties since 1990. India 
has however never been subject to a UNSC resolution, let alone a sanctions 
regime. India is the world’s largest democracy, and with over a billion inhabitants 
the second most populous country on earth. With economic growth rates between 
4-10% annually since 1990 it is one of the world’s most important economic 
engines, and with a defense budget of over $50 billion in 2016417 it has overtaken 
France and Japan as the 6th largest military spender in the world. The conflicts with 
(mostly Muslim) insurgents in its border regions with Pakistan and Bangladesh 
might constitute humanitarian disasters; they don’t form a threat to the Indian State.  
 
 
7.5.3. State Strength 
 
The example of India also points towards another potential relation between the 
strength of states that are home to civil conflicts and the likelihood that the UN 
imposed sanctions in response to these conflicts: geo-political power. After all, 
even if the UNSC had been more concerned with humanitarian suffering than with 
the dangers of state-failure, India would probably still have been untouchable, 
along with a range of other states that carry sufficient geo-political weight to stay 
outside of the grasp of the Council. So are geo-politically strong states less likely 
to receive sanctions, other factors being equal? 
In order to answer this question I used the National Material Capabilities dataset 
by the Correlates of War Project. This dataset identifies state strength by looking 
solely at states’ hard power rather than at its legitimacy or democratic power. It 
combines six variables that give an indication of a State’s national material 
                                            
416 It must be noted that the internal conflict in Jammu and Kashmir and the interstate conflict 
between India and Pakistan in the same region are heavily intermixed. The Pakistani army has 
been less actively involved in a direct manner, but is known to have supported Kashmiri 
insurgents militarily and financially in their struggle against India.   
417 Global Security. “India Military Budget”. (2016). 






capabilities: military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and 
steel production, urban population, and total population, weighing each variable 
equally. The combined Composite Index of State Capability (CISC) score indicates 
a state’s share of power as part of the world as a whole. In the early 1990s the 
United States clearly the world’s strongest material capabilities with almost 15% of 
the world’s material power. Currently China has taken over the top spot with close 
to 20% of the world’s material capabilities in 2007, the latest year for which data 
are available.  
Looking at the graph below one can observe a general trend in which more capable 
states are less likely to receive sanctions, whereas less capable states are more 
likely to receive UN sanctions in response to the outbreak of civil war. The average 
CINC score of a non-sanctioned state is 1.3%, compared to only 0.3% for states 
that did receive sanctions. India (6.6%), Russia (6.5%), Turkey (1.6%), Pakistan 
(1.3%) Indonesia (1.3%), and the Philippines (0.5%) were never sanctioned 
despite being home to a number of relatively bloody civil wars, some of which have 
been going on for decades. Similarly, many of the less capable states in the list did 
receive sanctions in response to the civil wars that broke out. Liberia, Mali, Ivory 
Coast, Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Somalia are again the list of usual suspects, 
even though some of these conflicts produced significantly less deaths than those 
in India or Turkey.  
Although none of the strong states (except Russia) has the power to veto UNSC 
Resolutions, states such as India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Indonesia carry sufficient 
geo-political weight as regional hegemons to avoid outside interference into their 
internal conflicts. If one adds to this the fact that the conflicts in these states don’t 
pose a threat to international security or the sovereign state system, there is no 
reason for the UNSC to put their foot down based purely on humanitarian 
concerns. Interfering in the internal affairs of strong sovereign states would be 
imprudent, and might only risk further destabilization. This claim is backed by the 
fact that among big (+10.000 deaths) conflicts, those states that did receive 
sanctions scored an average of only 0.2% CINC score, whereas those who didn’t 
receive sanctions were on average ten times as powerful, at 2%. On top of that, 
the decision not to sanction strong states might also be related to the fact that they 
are less likely to be effective.  
Even if you are not a regional hegemon yourself, being friends with one can be 
sufficient to avoid being subjected to a UN sanctions regime. Both governments 
and rebel groups can use this tool. For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (Tamil Tigers) that fought against the Sri Lankan government for 26 years 
and that produced an estimated 63.000 deaths (both sides) were supported by 
India during many years418, and later by Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, most 
                                            






importantly. Although the Secretary General and the UN Human Rights council 
produced several reports on the humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka, a UN 
sanctions regime was never imposed. Similarly, even though the civil wars 
between communist insurgents in the Philippines (CPP), Nepal (CPN-M), 
Colombia (FARC/ELN), and Peru (Sendero Luminoso) and their respective 
governments produced tens of thousands of deaths, the ideological support from 
Russia and/or China proved sufficient to avoid UN sanctions regimes. Separatist 
groups in Georgia (Abkhazia), Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), and Ukraine 
(Donetsk and Lugansk) also benefit from having a strong ally in the UNSC. The 
United States, United Kingdom, and especially France419 have used their 
geopolitical weight less often in this sense, but they cannot be fully acquitted either, 
hence the lack of sanctions in response to conflicts involving Israel, most notably. 
The west has however rather used its geo-political weight since 1990 to impose 
sanctions, not to block them.420  
Finally, the thesis that UN sanctions serve international state stability rather than 
humanitarian concerns is further strengthened by the fact that some relatively 
strong states have received sanctions in favor of the state and against terrorist 
organizations that threaten both state stability and international security. Terrorist 
organizations in Pakistan, Nigeria, Algeria, and the Philippines have all been 
placed on the UN’s designated terrorism list related to UNSCR 1267 (Taliban, Al-
Qaida, ISIS). In the case of Nigeria for example, sanctions were imposed in 
response to the bloody rise of Boko Haram since 2014, which has become the 
terrorist organization responsible for more deaths than any other terrorist 
organization in 2014 and 2015, including ISIS. Earlier civil conflicts in Nigeria 
however, such as that in the Niger Delta that killed many thousands of people in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, were never sanctioned by the UN. In the case of 
Pakistan, the United Nations have sanctioned two terrorist organizations. In 2005 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was added to the designated sanctions list for its 
association with Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, as well as for its links to several 
terrorist attacks in neighboring India, including attacks in New Delhi, Bangalore, 
and Mumbai between 2001 and 2008. In 2011 the organization Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 
was added to the list in response to the explosion of violent terrorist attacks in the 
                                            
419 France has pledged to refrain from using its veto power.  
420 In the cases of Burundi and Chad, two African conflicts in which sanctions were not imposed, it 
must be noted that the UN did have a presence in these states in the form of UN monitors or 
peacekeepers. In the case of Burundi, by far the most deadly of the non-sanctioned conflicts in 
the bottom of the table, the African Union and the UN had a significant presence until 2007. By 
the end of 2015 the UNSC also passed Resolution 2248 in which it threatened the imposition of 
sanctions in response to a constitutional crisis and an attempted coup, although sanctions were 
never really imposed.  
 






region of Waziristan on the border with Afghanistan. Finally, in Algeria Al-Qaida in 
the Islamic Maghreb was added to the list of designated terrorist organizations in 
2005, but this was done in response to terrorist attacks on western targets, rather 
than on the civil war that killed over 20.000 people since 1990. In none of the cases 
mentioned did the UNSC impose sanctions on state-actors. A deeper 
understanding of UN sanctions in response to international terrorism is provided in 
Chapter 6.  
 









India - Communists 5.861 70,4 6,60% No 
India: Assam 1.721 70,4 6,60% No 
India: Kashmir 20.228 70,4 6,60% No 
India: Khalistan 9.531 70,4 6,60% No 
Russia: Chechnya 21.129 87,1 6,50% No 
Turkey: Kurdistan 28.524 74,4 1,60% No 
Indonesia: Aceh 3.377 103,1 1,30% No 
Indonesia: East Timor 1.461 89,2 1,30% No 
Pakistan: Balochistan 1.212 89,2 1,30% No 
Pakistan: Waziristan 27.626 103,1 1,30% No* 
Ukraine: Novorossiya 5.570 84 1,20% No 
Iran Civil War 1.282 67,2 1,20% No 
Thailand: Patani 1.730 74,9 0,70% No 
Nigeria - Boko Haram 10.330 94,4 0,70% No* 
Iraq Civil War 46.325 109 0,60% No* 
Iraq: Kurdistan 2.036 109 0,60% No 
FRY: Croatia 1.329 91,1 0,50% Yes 
Algeria Civil War 20.942 91,9 0,50% Yes* 






Philippines: Mindanao 8.300 79,2 0,50% Yes* 
Bosnian War 26.336 91,8 0,50% Yes 
Bosnia: Herzeg Bosnia 2.657 61,9 0,50% No 
Ethiopia: Ogaden 1.454 N/A 0,50% No 
Colombia Civil War 22.140 88,5 0,50% No 
Ethiopia: Oromiya 2.131 77,8 0,50% No 
FRY: Kosovo 3.628 79,2 0,50% Yes 
Israel - Hezbollah War 1.606 96,5 0,40% No 
Israel: Palestine 6.319 96,5 0,40% No 
Syria Civil War 326.459 79,4 0,40% No* 
Myanmar: Kachin 1.545 96,5 0,40% No 
Myanmar: Karen 4.550 79,4 0,40% No 
Myanmar: Shan 2.030 110,1 0,40% No 
Congo Civil War (I) 48.937 94,5 0,40% Yes 
Congo Civil War (II) 31.568 94,5 0,40% Yes 
Peru - Sendero Luminoso 8.120 79,2 0,30% No 
Libyan Civil War 2.408 92,4 0,20% Yes 
Angola - UNITA 32.862 84,9 0,20% Yes 
Sri Lankan Civil War 63.298 88,3 0,20% No 
Sudanese Civil War 89.794 112,3 0,20% Yes 
Senegal: Casamance 1.949 66,1 0,10% No 






Cambodian Civil War 5.082 105,9 0,10% Yes 
Rwanda Genocide 520.569 94,5 0,10% Yes 
Uganda Civil War 17.021 81,9 0,10% No 






Nepal Civil War 9.925 95,4 0,10% No 
Afghanistan Civil War 200.582 109,2 0,10% Yes 
Yemen Civil War 16.789 105,9 0,10% No 
Chad Civil War 9.718 92,9 0,10% No 
Somalia Civil War 41.363 85 0,10% Yes 
First Ivorian Civil War 1.890 99,8 0,10% Yes 
Mali Civil War 1.698 82,2 0,05% Yes 
Georgia: Abkhazia 2.180 77,9 0,05% No 
Burundi Civil War 16.488 108,4 0,04% No 
South Sudan Civil War 3.447 96,7 0,04% Yes 
Tajikistan Civil War 9.089 87,7 0,03% No 
Sierra Leone Civil War 20.543 97,5 0,02% Yes 
CAR Civil War 8.447 96,6 0,02% Yes 
Liberian Civil War 23.244 99.0 0,02% Yes 
 
 
7.6. Who is to blame? 
 
In the previous sections we have come to the conclusions that humanitarian 
suffering matters when it comes to imposing sanctions in response to civil war, but 
that considerations of state strength and state fragility also play an important role 
in deciding who gets sanctioned and who doesn’t. To put it bluntly, as long as you 
are a sufficiently sovereign state or as long as you have a loyal friend in the UNSC, 
humanitarian concerns in civil wars are largely irrelevant.  
Those who are more persuaded by the Realist school of international relations 
might be satisfied with this answer. After all, the role of the UNSC is not, and should 
not be, to interfere in civil wars and humanitarian crises everywhere and all the 
times without taking into account the political circumstances that surround each 
unique conflict. Imposing UN sanctions regimes as if they were speeding tickets 
might seem fair in theory, but is both impracticable and imprudent in the arena of 
international security. Mussolini’s claim that the League of Nations is “very well 






relevant, so politicians have to pick their battles wisely. If as a result only 20 out of 
58 civil wars received sanctions, there is probably a perfectly good explanation for 
this. Realists might argue that although China and Russia did adopt the Secretary 
General’s 1992 report and the guidelines for R2P, both are widely known to pursue 
a foreign policy ideal based on much more traditional concepts of peacekeeping, 
focusing on diplomacy and the respect for state-sovereignty. It would to some 
extent be meaningless to consider the Security Council as an organic whole, 
because the differences between the P-5 members are not only strategical, but 
also ideological, or at least so they claim. 
Those who are inspired by liberal institutionalism and the power of ideas in 
international relations might however hold the UNSC to a higher standard, and ask 
why certain internationally established norms have not always been upheld. After 
all, the United Nations as an institution has most definitely made moral progress 
since 1990, hence the increasing amount of sanctions in response to humanitarian 
suffering, sanctions to restore democratically, and sanctions to assure good 
governance in post-conflict situations. Official UN policy documents are teeming 
with language that stresses the importance of democratic elections, protection of 
human rights, good governance, and the responsibility to protect.421 The moral 
framework for a more ambitious UN sanctions regime is fully in place. If the biggest 
humanitarian crises and threats to the sovereign state system we were not always 
sanctioned, then who is to blame for this failure? Can the failure be attributed to 
the persistent use of the veto in the UNSC? Can those 38 failures out of 58 
sanctionable offences all be blamed on China and Russia? And if the veto does 
not provide us with sufficient answers, did the permanent members of the UNSC 
that claim to uphold the norms of R2P and Liberal Peace at least impose sanctions 
in response to these conflicts unilaterally? If the answers to these questions are 
yes, then the alliance of Western democracies might take seriously the question of 
Security Council reform, the abolishment of the Veto, or the establishment of a an 
alternative ‘League of Democracies’, as has been proposed by some.422 However, 
if a substantial part of the failure to impose UN sanctions resides with those states 
who claim to represent the vanguard of liberal peace, the US, France, and the UK, 
then we ought to be more critical of those states before criticizing those states who 
never rooted for it in the first place.  
Since it is not possible within the methodological scope of this thesis to provide 
deep qualitative analyses for each of the 58 sanctionable internal conflicts since 
1990, the following section considers three variables that help us allocate blame; 
UNSC vetoes, General Assembly votes, and US & EU unilateral sanctions. These 
variables help us in confirming that the liberal ambitions of the United Nations to 
                                            
421 See chapter 1.3 
422 Kissinger. “World Order”. (2014). 






use sanctions for objectives related to humanitarianism and democracy are 
inherently Western ambitions. However, if the Western P-5 members want to 
expand their legitimacy as leaders in the fight against humanitarian suffering and 
in favor of liberal democracy, they will need to commit more fully to the norms they 




Article 27 of the UN Charter states that a Resolution in the United Nations Security 
Council is passed when a minimum of 9 out of 15 members vote in favor of the 
Resolution, including the concurring votes of the 5 permanent members, the United 
States, United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, China, and France. On top of 
this, the permanent members also have the option to block a Resolution from being 
passed by issuing their “right to veto”, something which all of the P-5 members 
have done repeatedly since 1945.  
The Russian Federation has used its power to veto Resolutions, including those 
regarding the imposition of UN sanctions, most often since 1945, followed by the 
US, UK, France, and China. Most of the Russian vetoes were however issued in 
the 1945-1965 era, in which they boycotted the Security Council in protest against 
the Chinese seat being given to Taipei rather than to Beijing. Ever since, the United 
States has by far been the most fervent user of the veto, mainly using it regarding 
issues concerning Israel and the Middle East in general. China only started using 
the power to veto more regularly since the 1990s, whereas France and the UK 
have not used their vetoes since 1989. In 2013 France and Mexico put forward an 
initiative to refrain from using the veto in cases of mass atrocities. It has been 
supported by 80 countries, but not by any of the other P-5 members.  
Related to the sanctionable offences dataset, sanctionable internal conflicts that 
fail to receive sanctions because of a veto clearly go against the ideals of liberal 
peace and the responsibility to protect. The most clear-cut example seems to be 
the civil conflict in Syria, in which United Nations sanctions against the regime of 
Assad were blocked by both Russia and China, who have repeatedly used their 
vetoes.423 Another often-mentioned example is that of Israel’s ‘internal’ conflict with 
Palestine, in which the US (and to a lesser extent the UK) have repeatedly used 
their vetoes.  
A quick look at the list of vetoes since 1990 however teaches the observer that 
most of the vetoes used did not concern the internal conflicts of the sanctionable 
                                            
423 The UNSC has imposed sanctions on ISIS, Al-Qaeda in Syria, and other terrorist 






offences database. Besides the situations in Syria and Israel/Palestine, most 
vetoes concerned human rights violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, 
the extension of UN observer or peacekeeping missions in Georgia and Cyprus, 
and violence and intimidations in the aftermath of the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe. 
Although Zimbabwe is not part of the sanctionable offences database (less than 
300 people were reported killed), a large number of countries proposed the 
imposition of UN sanctions on Zimbabwe. The draft resolution was blocked both 
by China and Russia. Recording vetoes is thus unsatisfactory when it comes to 
explaining the many failures to impose sanctions.  
 
 
7.6.3. Unilateral sanctions 
 
Arguably the most valuable variable in dealing with the issue of ‘silent vetoes’ is by 
asking whether those states that claim to uphold the ideals of liberal peace and the 
responsibility to protect at least managed to imposed sanctions unilaterally. Do 
China and Russia indeed impose sanctions unilaterally less often than the other 
members? And do the United States and the European Union impose sanctions 
unilaterally if the UN framework fails to serve their interests? To a large extent the 
answer is yes, although the unilateral sanctions records of the US and EU seem 
to reflect their political interests as much as the ‘general’ interest.  
China and Russia have both long pronounced a foreign policy strategy based on 
respect for state sovereignty internationally, with exceptions in their direct spheres 
of influence. In the case of Russia this sphere of influence includes the Baltic 
States, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. In the case of China, its 
direct sphere of influence includes its neighboring regions in East and South-East 
Asia, and to a lesser extent in China’s interior neighbors in South and Central Asia.  
Russia’s sanctions policy is indeed largely in line with its general foreign policy. 
Within the UNSC it has mostly voted along or abstained from voting with 
resolutions regarding civil conflicts in Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, and 
Central Asia outside of its direct sphere of interest. However, when it comes to 
conflicts in states that Russia considers to be historically and culturally part of 
‘Greater-Russia’, such as is the case in former Soviet Republics, their sanctions 
policy changes accordingly. For example, in the aftermath of the 2008 election of 
the pro-European President Saakashvili in Georgia and the subsequent civil 
conflict in the regions of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, UN sanctions were not on 
the table. Although the Georgian foreign minister called on the UN Security Council 
to take action against Russia, whose soldiers had been involved in the fighting, his 
request was in vain. As a matter of fact the only sanctions that were imposed 






effectively were those imposed unilaterally by Moscow. The energy sanctions, 
trade and financial sanctions, and restrictions on migrant workers from Georgia to 
Russia are thought to have been largely effective in pushing Georgia back on a 
more pro-Russian trail.424 More recently, the UN’s efforts to impose sanctions in 
response to the civil war in Ukraine, perhaps of even larger geo-political interest to 
Russia, have equally been in vain.  
China’s sanctions policy in the UNSC is largely similar to that of Russia, the 
difference being that China tends to be more conservative when it comes to 
respecting state sovereignty. Traditionally, China’s foreign policy has been 
characterized by non-interference, a stance that is reflected in the large amount of 
abstaining votes in the UNSC on resolutions regarding sanctions. Since 1990 
China has abstained from voting to impose sanctions in response to civil wars in 
the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Kosovo, Sudan. This tradition of 
non-interference is exemplified by China’s initial threat to use its veto on UNSCR 
713 (1991) in response to the Croatian war for independence in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. It was only when the Serbian UN representative indicated 
that he would consent to the UN arms embargo that China withdrew its objections 
and voted for the Resolution.425 Similarly, China has consistently blocked 
sanctions against the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Robert Mugabe in 
Zimbabwe, and the military junta in Myanmar, claiming that such sanctions would 
interfere with the sovereignty of these governments.  
Much like Russia, China too considers itself a great power with a historical and 
cultural sphere of influence, most notably in North Korea and Taiwan. China’s 
sanctions policy with regard to civil conflicts has however not been as controversial 
as that of Russia. Rather, the unilateral sanctions that China has imposed on other 
states regard ‘punishments’ for states that have tried to interfere with China’s 
internal politics. For example, China has punished French, American, and 
Norwegian companies and products in response to critique over China’s human 
rights record in Tibet, arms sales to Taiwan, and the rewarding of a Nobel Prize to 
Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese dissident, respectively.426  
The United States and the European Union427 have been much more active when 
it comes to imposing sanctions unilaterally in response to civil conflicts. Whereas 
the United Nations as an organization has imposed at least some sort of sanction 
                                            
424 Newnham. “Georgia on my mind? Russian sanctions and the end of the Rose Revolution”. 
(2015). 
425 The arms embargo on Yugoslavia is now largely regarded as a mistake, as it gave Serbia a 
clear military advantage over Croatia, leading the conflict to be prolonged.  
426 Reilly. “China’s unilateral sanctions”. (2012). pp. 121-133. 
427 Rather than considering France and the United Kingdom separately, this research presents 






in 23 out of 58 conflicts, the United States did so in 40 cases. The EU imposed 
unilateral sanctions in 39 cases. Taking into account the fact that the UN sanctions 
regimes on Rwanda and Cambodia were not accompanied by unilateral sanctions 
from the EU and US428, this leaves us with 19 cases in which the EU and the US 
imposed sanctions while the UN didn´t, but also with another 15 cases in which 
























                                            
428 The United States imposed an arms embargo on Angola until 1993 where the EU didn´t. 
Neither the US nor the EU imposed unilateral sanctions in response to the conflicts in Rwanda 
and Cambodia.  

















































The analysis of the 58 sanctionable civil conflicts that occurred between 1990 and 
2015 provides us several conclusions that together present a mixed picture of the 
motivations that steer the imposition of United Nations sanctions regimes.  
In 20 out of the 58 potential cases, the UN Security Council indeed imposed 
sanctions under Chapter VII of its Charter, ranging from arms and trade embargoes 
to restrictions on financial assets, travel of individuals, and the export and import 
of specific products. Compared to the other sanctionable offences that are 
discussed in this book, the rate of 20 out of 58 (35%) is relatively high.429 
Considering that the use of UN sanctions in reaction to internal conflicts has only 
been part of the UN’s institutional framework since the early 1990s, the 20 cases 
that were sanctioned can only be regarded as 20 victories for the philosophy that 
was first proposed by UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali in his 1992 ‘Agenda for 
Peace’ and the actors that supported this shift of regime.430  
Despite the failures to impose sanctions in all of the humanitarian crises, 
humanitarian concerns matter. This claim only becomes stronger when one takes 
into consideration the fact that the cases that were sanctioned were considerably 
larger humanitarian crises than the cases that were left unsanctioned. Across the 
board the most deadly conflicts since 1990 have indeed been sanctioned by the 
UN Security Council. The conflicts in Rwanda, Syria, Afghanistan and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, all of which represent at least 100.000 deaths in 
the UDCP encyclopedia, were all met with sanctions. The same goes for those 
conflicts in Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Angola, Colombia, Liberia, and many other 
conflicts that produced at least 20.000 deaths. A large share of the conflicts that 
were not met with UN sanctions were conflicts that were relatively small-scale, and 
therefore arguably smaller ‘threats to the peace’, such as those in Pakistan 
(Balochistan), Senegal, Yemen, and Thailand, among others. The analysis of 
conflicts deaths therefore also points towards a somewhat consistent regime when 
it comes to sanctioning civil wars.  
Concerns about state sovereignty however matter more than those about 
humanitarian suffering. State fragility and the risk on state collapse as a result of 
civil war prove to be a strong predictor of UN sanctions. The sanctions imposed in 
response to relatively small-scale conflicts that nevertheless led to power vacuums 
in countries such as Mali, Cote d´Ivoire, and South Sudan confirm that state failure 
is sometimes considered a larger threat to the peace than a death-count. After all, 
                                            










state failure, even in a relatively unimportant part of the world, can lead to all sorts 
of other international security threats, ranging from terrorism and narco-trafficking 
to regional instability. Following the same logic, deadly conflicts in large sovereign 
states are not considered threats to the peace, especially if the state at hand 
carries sufficient geo-political weight, or if a party to a conflict is allied with a 
regional hegemon. India, Russia, and Turkey seem to have had this advantage 
thanks to their own strength, whereas Syria, Sri Lanka, and Israel owes the 
absence of sanctions to Russia, India, and the United States, respectively.  
 
Outside of the United Nations, China and Russia have not actively imposed 
sanctions unilaterally, but that is only logical considering their stated policies of 
non-interference. Both the EU and the US have been much more active in 
imposing sanctions unilaterally where the Security Council failed to do so. The EU 
did so in 19 cases and the US in 20 bringing their totals to 42 and 43 out of 58. 





Selective Sanctions and Terrorism 
 
 
Between 2001 and 2015 the United Nations sanctioned 26 major terrorist 
organizations under 1276/1989/2553 regimes. However, in total there were 88 
organizations that were responsible for at least 100 deaths through terror attacks, 
arguably making them ‘sanctionable’. So why have some terrorist organizations 
been subjected to UN sanctions, while others have not? Why some individuals, 
entities, and groups associated with Al-Qaida and ISIL, and not a single terrorist 
organization unrelated to these groups? Did the sanctioned organizations 
represent a bigger humanitarian concern? Did they pose a bigger threat to the 
international state system? Did they pose a bigger threat to Westerners? Are UN 
sanctions on terrorism part of the ‘clash of civilizations?’  
Based on the definitions on terrorism and how it's distinct from other forms of 
political violence, one would expect the 'threat' of terrorism to be determined by 
the tactics of terrorists and their destructiveness. However, the track record of UN 
sanctions in response to terrorism since 1990 shows a different logic. Sanctions 
are imposed largely on Islamic extremist terrorist organizations, regardless of the 
amount of people they killed or the tactics they used.  
The focus on Islamic extremism may be partly defendable; After all, the stated 
objectives of Al-Qaida, ISIL, and their affiliates are more incompatible with the 
modern state system than the objectives of separatists, communist, and others. 
Other explanations for a potential bias are both institutional and political. 
Institutional because the UNSCR 1267/2253 regime only allows for certain groups 
to be listed and not others. Political because (1) the West has successfully framed 
the threat of Islamic terrorism as a bigger and more urgent security issue, and (2) 
because P5 members have been able to use the 1267/2253 institution to list 
groups that in reality have more local objectives than appears. 
 
8.1. Defining the Offence 
 
Terrorism is arguably the most ambiguous sanctionable offence in this thesis to 
define. Whereas interstate wars and civil wars encounter some methodological 
hurdles when it comes to thresholds of conflict-related deaths, and whereas coup’s 
d’état are sometimes confused with other types of regime-change, the terms 






wide range of events, actors, and actions. The definitions surrounding terrorism 
are highly politicized and oftentimes used loosely by politicians, journalists, and 
other commentators alike. A comprehensive definition is therefore necessary if one 
wants to explain why some groups have been sanctioned by the United Nations 
Security Council and others not.  
Definitions about terrorism have changed radically throughout history and continue 
to shift. The word terror was first coined during the French revolution under de 
Robespierre’s Regime de la Terreur in the early 1790s. Terror had a positive and 
democratic connotation as a method to revolutionize France and to get rid of 
members and supporters of the Ancien Regime. Similarly, in many 19th century 
European revolutions, the anti-monarchical and anarchist groups that used tactics 
of terror to democratize Imperial Russia and Habsburg were not ashamed of their 
terrorist label.431 During the early 20th century the Irish Republican Brotherhood 
and the Bosnian Black Hand group (that assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
of Austria in 1914 and ignited WWI) were not regarded as illegitimate. In the early 
20th century terrorism became associated with totalitarian and fascist regimes in 
Germany, Italy, and Russia, who unleashed terror on minorities and political 
opposition at will, killing scores of their own citizens. Similarly, state-imposed 
violence by autocratic regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe during the 
cold war was labeled terrorism, with governments from Greece to Guatemala 
intimidating and killing their own citizens.  
Since the end of WWII terrorism has however mostly become associated with 
violence perpetrated by non-state groups. Terrorism has been employed by 
national liberation movements against colonizers across Africa, the Middle East, 
and Asia. Indeed many terrorist groups originated during independence struggles, 
hence the names Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the 
Philippines. Many groups now labelled as terrorist organizations started out as 
communist opposition parties linked to militant insurgent groups, including the 
Communist Parties of Nepal (CPN), India (CPI-Maoist), or Peru’s Sendero 
Luminoso.  
Since the attacks on New York and Washington on the 11th of September 2001 
terrorism has mostly become associated with Islamic terrorism. The planes that 
flew into the World Trade Center in New York were responsible for 2603 deaths432, 
by far the deadliest terrorist attack in modern history.433 In response, the 
government under US president George W. Bush announced a ‘war on terror’, 
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432 Not including the deaths of 11 hijackers. 
433 The START database on terrorism incidents keeps records of terrorist attacks since 1970. 






pushing terrorism to the top of the international security agenda. Whereas in the 
1960s the words ‘rebel’ and ‘guerilla’ were used about ten times as often as the 
word ‘terrorist’, since 2000 the word ‘terrorist’ is used three times as much as the 
word ‘guerrilla’ and almost two times as much as the word ‘rebel’.434 The ‘war on 
terror’ however also further complicated the question of what terrorism is in the first 
place. The mid-1990s saw an explosion of the use of the term terrorism, but the 
amount of terrorist attacks and resulting deaths hardly changed between 1970 and 
2010. Despite the consistent and enduring focus on the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan and the Al-Qaida terrorist organization as major threats, terror-related 
deaths have only started significantly increasing since 2012, mainly due to the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria 
and neighboring regions. 435  
 
Figure 1 - Terror attacks 1970 - 2015 
 
 
Despite the growing urgency to deal with terrorism in international relations, there 
is no clear, comprehensive and widely accepted definition. Dictionary definitions 
are of little help. Merriam Webster describes terror as ‘violent or destructive acts 
(such as bombing) committed by groups in order to intimidate a population or 
government into granting their demands’, and terrorism as the systematic use 
of terror, especially as a means of coercion. This definition fails to explain which 
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types of actions should be regarded as terrorist attacks and which would be better 
defined as acts of rebellion or guerrilla warfare, or even of narcotics-traffickers, 
gangs, or bank robbers. The Oxford dictionary is somewhat more helpful, 
describing the term as ‘the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially 
against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims’, in the sense that it recognizes 
terrorism as a political activity.  
Indeed, Bruce Hofmann, an influential student of terrorism, recognizes that acts of 
terrorism are inherently political.436 Mafia groups, pirates, and lone wolves 
responsible for mass shootings in public places may very well terrorize citizens, 
but if their motives are not political they are not recognized as terrorists. For 
example, narco-traffickers in Colombia and Mexico, oftentimes responsible for 
thousands of civilian deaths, many of which are innocent victims, are not 
recognized as terrorists because their objectives are primarily economical, 
primarily political. The 2011 mass shooting in Norway by Anders Breivik, who killed 
69 people on a summer camp and 8 in a bomb-attack in Oslo, can however be 
regarded as an act of terrorism, as his objectives were stated an act against Islam 
and Cultural Marxism.437 
If the objectives of terrorists are by definition political, the task of labelling terrorist 
organizations and distinguishing them from rebels or guerrillas is even more 
politically motivated. Definitions provided by the US State Department, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) leave the 
question wide open, allowing for policy makers to label violent non-state 
organizations as ‘terrorists’ as they please. The EU and UN, in an attempt to be 
more politically sensitive to grievances of perpetrators, have chosen to define 
terrorist ‘acts’, but not terrorist ‘organizations’ although both organizations do 
publish designated lists of terrorist organizations that should receive targeted 
sanctions.  
The US State Department and the CIA both use Title 22 of the US Code to define 
terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-
combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”.438 The FBI’s 
definition adds that terrorism is by definition ‘unlawful’, but leaves out the 
requirement of the perpetrator being a non-state actor, allowing for some ambiguity 
as to whether governments can be terrorists.439 Regardless, the official Designated 
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Foreign Terrorist Organizations list of the Bureau of Counterterrorism includes a 
number of organizations that have been recognized by others as rebel groups or 
guerrillas, including Sendero Luminoso in Peru, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers), and Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya.   
The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism does not provide 
a definition for terrorism, but nevertheless criminalizes acts surrounding terrorist 
activities, including recruitment, training, and sponsoring of terrorism. Just as the 
US State Department, the European Commission has a designated Terrorist List, 
established in December 2001, listing persons, groups, and entities involved in 
terrorist acts and subject to restrictive measures.440 This list is separate and more 
comprehensive than that of the United Nations, and has listed organizations such 
as the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Communist Party 
of the Philippines, groups that have not been listed by the UN and that have been 
associated with rebellion and insurgency rather than pure terrorism.  
Attempts within the United Nations to push for a comprehensive convention on 
international terrorism have stumbled upon two issues. The first issue deals with 
the complaint that state-actors have terrorized citizens without being defined as 
terrorists. Why is Hamas labelled a terrorist organization and the Israeli 
government not? And what about governments from Myanmar to Sudan? The 
answer to such complaints is that the international legal system provides sufficient 
means to deal with such violations and that there is therefore not reason to include 
governments in definitions about terrorism.441 The second issue is that labelling 
political violence as ‘terrorism’ wholly and directly delegitimizes and criminalizes 
the perpetrators. The label ‘terrorist’ is very powerful because it censures and 
stigmatizes them in the worst way possible, denying them of any legitimate social 
grievances or political objectives. This explains why politicians find it convenient to 
use the terrorist label as a tool of policy, as well as the reaction of groups who feel 
that they are labelled as terrorists unjustly.  
The United Nations have been sensible to the argument that minority groups and 
national liberation movements should have the right to resist against oppressive 
regimes or other political enemies. Being labelled a terrorist organization 
effectively eliminates this right. UN conventions have therefore focused on the act 
of terrorism, rather than defining groups as terrorist organizations. For example, in 
1994 the UN General Assembly stated that "criminal acts intended or calculated to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular 
persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or 
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any other nature that may be invoked to justify them”442. Similarly, the Convention 
of Combating International Terrorism by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC) in 1999 stated that terrorism is “any act of violence or threat thereof […] 
perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of 
terrorizing people, notwithstanding its motives or intentions”443. The UN’s reply to 
issues of legitimacy of terrorism is thus to look at the type of attack, not the political 
grievances or objectives of the perpetrators. To use the terminology of Just War 
Theory, it is not about being able to claim ‘Jus Ad Bellum’ or a ‘Just Cause’, but 
rather about ‘Jus In Bello’ doctrines such as the distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants, proportionality, and the types of weapons or attacks used.  
The importance of the distinction between acts of terrorism and terrorist 
organizations is also recognized in the academic literature. It makes no sense to 
distinguish between terrorists and rebels in terms of their grievances and political 
objectives, because terrorists don’t consider themselves terrorists. As Konrad 
Keller put it: “A terrorist without a cause (at least in his own mind) is not a 
terrorist”.444 Bruce Hoffman has argued that terrorists never agree with the label 
‘terrorist’, as they all see themselves as fighting for a righteous cause in which 
attacks against their enemies are justified. Indeed, scary-sounding names as Al-
Shabaab and Al Nusrah, and Al-Qaida simply mean ‘the Youth’, ‘the Supporters’, 
and ‘the Base’, and all see themselves as freedom fighters who are left with no 
other choice than to stage public attacks to promote their goals. How is that 
different from resistance movements or rebel groups such as the National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) or the Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK) in Turkey and Northern Iraq and Syria?  
The answer lies with the nature of the act. According to Hoffman’s definition, 
terrorism is “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the 
threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.” The advantage of such a 
definition is that it only recognizes terrorist activities, not terrorist organizations. It 
is not a relevant question to ask whether Boko Haram is a terrorist organization; 
what matters is whether the acts they have perpetrated were acts of terrorism or 
acts of insurgency, civil conflict, or other types of violence, such as criminal 
violence. 
The database on terrorist attacks and UN sanctions on which this chapter is based 
comes from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START), headquartered at the University of Maryland. Their Global 
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Terrorism Database (GTD) records data on terrorist attacks since 1970, counting 
156.772 incidents since 1970, defining terrorism as “the threatened or actual use 
of illegal force and violence by a non‐state actor to attain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation”.445 In addition to this 
definition, at least two of the three criteria below must be fulfilled: 
• The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal.  
• There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience(s) than the immediate 
victims.  
• The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare 
activities.  
The START database also recognizes that there is often a definitional overlap 
between acts of terrorism and other forms of political violence and ordinary crime, 
such as insurgency, organized crime, or intra/inter-group conflict. For example, 
several of the attacks by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines have been 
identified as acts of insurgency or guerrilla against the national military forces. The 
same goes for Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Donetsk People’s 
Republic in Ukraine. Similarly, a majority of the attacks by Al-Qaida in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) carried out in Yemen in 2014 and 2015 were identified by the 
GDT analysts as acts of inter-group violence against Huthi extremists rather than 












                                            






Figure 2 - Deadliest Terrorist Groups 1990 - 2017 
 
 
Based on the definitions used to distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence, 
one could reasonably expect that the United Nations’ counter-terrorism strategy 
focuses on the act of terrorism rather than the political motives that lie behind the 
attacks. After all, it is possible to distinguish acts of terror from more legitimate acts 
of violence. However, the track-record of UN sanctions on state-sponsors of 
terrorism since 1990 and on terrorist groups and individuals since 2001 shows a 
rather different picture. It most definitely matters what the terrorists want. The 
‘threat to the peace’ seems to be determined not by the nature of the attacks or 
the number of people killed, but rather by the objectives of the groups. Separatists, 
communists, and armed groups that use tactics of terror don’t get sanctioned; 
Islamic extremists do.  
 
8.2. State-Sponsored Terrorism and UN Sanctions since 1990 
 
The UN sanctions against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1992-1998), Sudan (1996-
ongoing), and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (1999-ongoing) represented the 
first UN sanctions regimes in response to acts of international terrorism. In all three 
cases, they were targeted against states who sponsored terrorism or harbored 
terrorists rather than the perpetrators themselves.   






The attacks that led the UN to impose sanctions were two bombings of airplanes 
on Pan Am Flight 103 over the Scottish town of Lockerbie in 1988 and on UTA 
flight 772 over Niger in 1989, killing 270 and 170 people respectively, many of 
which were American and French. In both cases Libyan security officials under the 
regime of Muammar Qaddafi were suspected to be involved, including in one case 
Qaddafi’s own brother in law.446 Unilateral sanctions by the United States had 
however been in place since the early 1980s in response to concerns about Libyan 
support for international terrorist attacks in Italy, Greece, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. On the 31st of March 1992 the United Nations imposed Security 
Council Resolution 748, installing aviation sanctions, an arms embargo, diplomatic 
sanctions, and travel sanctions for officials suspecting of terrorist activity. 
Interestingly, the first UN sanctions regime in response to terrorism was thus not 
aimed at a specific terrorist organization, but rather at a government that supported 
terrorism and gave them refuge. It is unknown how many terrorist attacks in the 
1980s were sponsored by Qaddafi’s regime, but Libya has indeed been known as 
a military training ground for liberation movements and terrorists across Africa and 
the Arab world, including Abu Nidal Organization, the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, the Irish Republican Army, and the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola.447 The UN Sanctions against Libya have been 
regarded as relatively successful, as they eventually succeeded in bringing 
Qaddafi to the negotiating table and agreeing to extradite the indicted suspects to 
the United States and France.448 Most of the real pressure came from the United 
States, as they unilaterally imposed an additional oil embargo on Libya. European 
states did not want to go as far as to stop importing Libyan oil as they were 
relatively dependent on Libyan oil imports.449  
The UN Sanctions on Sudan under Resolution 1054 in 1996 are another exhibit in 
the claim that the ‘war on terror’ started long before US President George W. Bush 
coined the term in 2001. Sudan’s government was subjected to sanctions in the 
aftermath of an assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 
1995 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Organization of African Union (OAU) 
requested Sudan to extradite the three suspects of the attack who were allegedly 
in Sudan. When Sudan’s government under Omar Al-Bashir did not comply, the 
UN Security Council considered Sudan’s ‘harboring’ of terrorists as a threat to the 
peace, and imposed diplomatic sanctions, for example by calling on member 
states to reduce the number of diplomatic staff in Sudan and telling international 
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institutions to refrain from convening conferences in Sudan. Later that year, after 
Sudanese officials had denied that the suspected plotters of the assassination 
were in Sudan, UNSCR 1070 was imposed to install travel sanctions, although 
these were never implemented due to concerns about Sudan’s humanitarian 
situation.450 Although the sanctions never achieved their goal of catching the 
suspects, the Sudanese government did force Osama Bin Laden, a major 
supporter of international terrorism, to leave the country and to move to 
Afghanistan.  
UNSCR 1267 on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 1999 shows that 
international terrorism against Western targets can sometimes be perceived as a 
bigger threat to the peace than a civil war in central Asia. Whereas during the Cold 
War Afghan Mujahedeen ‘freedom fighters’ were backed by the United States in 
their fight against a Soviet invasion, Western interests in Afghanistan soon faded 
in the early 1990s, allowing for the country to disintegrate politically, leading to a 
the third bloodiest civil war since the end of the Cold War after the Rwandan 
genocide and the Syrian civil war. In 1996 the war brought to power the Taliban 
regime, which became known for its grave human rights abuses and strict 
enforcement of Sharia law in the territory they controlled. The international 
community did not approve of the Taliban, and the United Nations did not 
recognize its leader Mohammed Omar as Afghanistan’s official sovereign leader, 
but no decisive action against the Taliban was taken until 1999, when it became 
clear the Taliban had forged a relationship with Osama Bin Laden. Bin Laden had 
been on the radar of US anti-terrorism agencies for longer, but only became a 
prime target in 1998 after bombing US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania, killing a total of 224 people, twelve of which were American 
officials. Earlier that year Bin Laden had publicly announced a ‘fatwa’ against the 
West, calling upon his followers to kill American citizens. Later that year, after 
retaliatory US attacks on Bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan, Taliban 
Leader Omar officially backed Bin Laden and declared that the United States was 
their biggest enemy. UNSCR 1267, currently known as the basis of the sanctions 
regime against the Taliban and Al-Qaida, was a strange mix between 
condemnation of the Taliban as a regime and coercing the Taliban to extradite 
Osama Bin Laden. The Resolution first expressed concern about the regimes 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights and the illicit 
production of opium. Subsequently, it condemned the Taliban for sheltering and 
training terrorists, and for providing a safe haven for Osama Bin Laden. The 
sanctions included a travel ban, an arms embargo, and diplomatic sanctions. The 
requirements for lifting the sanctions however were completely unrelated to the 
Taliban’s governance in Afghanistan, and focused exclusively on combatting 
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terrorism and having Bin Laden extradited. Al-Qaida as an organization was not 
mentioned at all in the Resolution. 
Why were these state-sponsors of terrorism subjected to UN sanctions regimes? 
Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan indeed sponsored terrorism activities in the 1990s 
that formed a threat to the international community, although arguably this threat 
was much smaller than those posed by more than a dozen civil conflicts and 
interstate conflicts during the same decade. The bombings of Pan Am flight 103 
and UTA flight 772 killed 440 people.451 The failed assassination attempt on Hosni 
Mubarak killed two Ethiopian police officers and two of the assailants. The 1998 
US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam killed 224. In the same year, 
the civil conflict in Sudan had already produced over 40.000 deaths in Darfur and 
Southern Sudan, and the Afghan civil war had produced at least 50.000 deaths 
since 1990. UN sanctions with regard to the harbouring of terrorists were imposed 
swiftly. Those related to civil war materialized much slower. In the case of Sudan’s 
conflict in Darfur the UNSC only succeeded in imposing targeted sanctions in 2005 
under Resolution 1591.  
It is also imperative to consider other state-sponsors of terrorism that were not 
sanctioned under the UN framework, most notably Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, 
and Pakistan, but also India, Israel, Malaysia, the Philippines, Qatar, Russia, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all of which are known to have 
sponsored terrorist groups in the past. Iran, Iraq, and Syria have all been officially 
recognized by the US State Department as state sponsors of terrorism since the 
late 1970s or 1980s, but were never sanctioned as such by the UN. More 
interestingly, the two states that have perhaps been most influential in supporting 
Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida (Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) don’t appear even on 
the US State Department list. Considering the fact that the majority of the 9/11 
attackers were of Saudi nationality, and that both the Taliban and Al-Qaida in 
Afghanistan received substantial military and financial support through Pakistan, 
one can only reach the conclusion that the UN track record on sanctioning state-
sponsored terrorism is far from consistent.  
The focus of the rest of this chapter is on UN sanctions in response to terrorist 
organizations themselves as part of the ‘war on terror’ since 2001. The following 
sections will go deeper into the ‘war on terror’ as a phenomenon, the UN Global 
Counter Terrorism Strategy, and the policies of the UN Security Council Committee 
pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL 
(Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. 
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Subsequently we will compare the sanctioned organizations that were listed on the 
UN designated terrorism list with those who weren’t listed.  
 
8.3. Al-Qaida and the War on Terror 
Al-Qaida came on the radar of the US - and subsequently the UN – several years 
before 9/11 as the first non-state target of terrorism-related sanctions. After the 
2001 attacks on the United States targeted sanctions against Al-Qaida and 
associates were put at the helm of UN targeted sanctions policy through the UN 
sanctions committee pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1267.  
Al-Qaida was established in 1988 in the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan against 
Soviet invaders. Osama bin Laden had been involved with the Afghan Mujahidin 
since the early 1980s, running a Mujahidin Services Bureau (Maktab Khidamat al-
Mujahidin) and guesthouse for Arab fighters wishing to join the Jihad in 
Afghanistan or to receive training for their own struggles against Arab apostate 
governments in Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, most notably.452 As a matter of fact, Al-
Qaida (the Base) was established for bureaucratic reasons in order to administer 
the arrivals and conflict-deaths of Arab jihadist fighters varying from the Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) that 
fought the regime of Muammar Gadhafi, and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and 
al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) that fought the regime of Hosni Mubarak. Although 
most of the groups related to Al-Qaida shared a general ideology of Islamic Jihad 
and proposed a version of Sharia law, the interactions between groups were full of 
disagreements and internal conflicts about leadership and objectives. Each group 
clearly had their own local objectives against what they saw as local apostate and 
illegitimate governments, typically backed by the West.  
It was only in the late 1990s in Sudan that Al-Qaida began to significantly expand 
its activities. Having received a warm welcome by the Sudanese government 
under Omar al-Bashir, Bin Laden increased Al-Qaida’s financial strength, allowing 
his organization to establish more training facilities and attract more fighters. Still, 
the organizations that received training through Al-Qaida were not keen on 
outsiders meddling in their local struggles. When GIA’s senior mufti Abou Bassir 
visited Bin Laden in Khartoum in 1995 he made it very clear that Al-Qaida or other 
affiliates were not to interfere in Algeria without consulting the GIA leadership first, 
threatening Bin Laden to kill any Jihadist who entered Algeria without their 
consent.453 Similarly, when the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) under Al-Zawahiri 
attempted to assassinate Hosni Mubarak in 1995 in Addis Ababa, Al-Qaida was 
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only involved in an indirect manner. When the EIJ trialled and sentenced to death 
two suspected spies without involving the Sudanese authorities, it was reason for 
al-Bashir to expel the EIJ, not Al-Qaida. Al-Qaida and Osama Bin Laden were only 
expelled from Sudan in the aftermath of the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Nairobi 
and Dar es Salaam, after which the Sudanese government received UN sanctions 
and Bin Laden went back to Afghanistan. It was in this same year that Bin Laden 
had publicly announced a fatwa against the West, calling on his followers to kill 
American citizens worldwide.  
When Bin Laden moved back to Afghanistan in 1998, the United Nations was 
already involved with the Afghan civil war and the Taliban regime, although 
sanctions had not been imposed yet. When the first sanctions were imposed on 
the Taliban regime with UNSCR 1267 (15 October 1999), the extradition of Osama 
Bin Laden was one of the requirements for the lifting of sanctions, along with a 
general ceasefire related to the civil war. Whereas most other Security Council 
members saw the sanctions as being related primarily to the humanitarian situation 
in Afghanistan and the excesses of the Taliban regime, US representative Nancy 
Soderberg was clearly more concerned with seeking justice for the US embassy 
bombings of the preceding year. She called the Resolution a courageous step in 
combating international terrorism, sending a direct message to Osama bin Laden, 
and terrorists everywhere: “You can run, you can hide, but you will be brought to 
justice.”454  
 UNSCR 1333 of 19 December 2000 explicitly mentioned the Al-Qaida 
organization as part of the 1267 sanctions regime, freezing the financial assets of 
the Al-Qaida organization, including: 
 
“funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by 
Usama bin Laden and individuals and entities associated with him, and to ensure that 
neither they nor any other funds or financial resources are made available, by their 
nationals or by any persons within their territory, directly or indirectly for the benefit of 
Usama bin Laden, his associates or any entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, 
by Usama bin Laden or individuals and entities associated with him including the Al-Qaida 
organization.”455 
 
Additionally, the Council requested the Committee to maintain an updated list, 
based on information provided by States and regional organizations, of the 
individuals and entities designated as being associated with Osama Bin Laden, 
including those in the Al-Qaida organization. This list of designated terrorist 
organizations would however only become a reality on the 15th October of 2001, 
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after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of the 11th of September of 
that year.  
In the 9/11 attacks nineteen Al-Qaida terrorists hijacked four passenger airplanes 
and flew them into the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, 
killing 2763 people and injuring many thousands more. It was the deadliest and 
most spectacular terrorist attack in modern history, defining not only the US 
counterterrorism strategy for the years to come, but also the very manner in which 
international security is perceived and studied.  
In the years following the 9/11 attacks everything related to the issue of Islamic 
terrorism exploded, except for the actual number of terror attacks. In 1997 the 
words terrorist, rebel, and guerrilla were used roughly equally frequently by 
authors; by 2007 the word terrorist was used three times as often as rebel and six 
times as often as guerrilla. Al-Qaida, Bin Laden, and the War on Terror dominated 
headlines. Al-Qaida seemed to be everywhere. In 2002 Al-Qaida claimed 
responsibility for an explosion in Tunisia that killed 14 German Tourists and five 
locals, as well as for the bombings of two night clubs in Bali, killing 202. In 2003 
Al-Qaida claimed attacks around the world, including Kenya, Saudi-Arabia, Spain, 
Morocco, and Turkey. In 2004 the most important attack was the bombing of the 
Atocha train station in Madrid, Spain, killing 191 people and leading the Spanish 
government to withhold its support for the US invasion in Iraq. In 2005 an explosion 
in the London metro system killed 52. The attacks were not just considered acts of 
terrorism, but acts of war. The actual number of deadly terrorist attacks worldwide 
between 2001 and 2005 actually declined however, from 242 in 2001 to 120 in 
2005.  
In the United States, the War on Terror defined US foreign policy. The 
establishment of the US department of Homeland Security was a direct result of 
the 9/11 attacks, and after 2001 the activities of the FBI and CIA pivoted largely 
towards counter-terrorism activities.456 If it had not been for 9/11, the US PATRIOT 
act and the Guantanamo Bay prison might not have existed. In the decade after 
the 9/11 attacks the US spent between US$ 100 billion and US$ 235 billion 
annually on the War on Terror, totalling over US$ 2 trillion between 2001 and 
2018.457 Shortly after 9/11 George W. Bush said to the US Congress that “Our war 
on terror starts with Al-Qaida, but it does not end there.”458 That was an 
understatement.  
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8.4. UN Sanctions and on the War on Terror 
 
Just as 9/11 and the war on terror completely dominated US foreign policy since 
2011, the United Nations also made some significant policy shifts in order to deal 
with the threat of international terrorism. The establishment of the Counter 
Terrorism Committee (CTC), the UN Counter Terrorism Strategy, and the dramatic 
expansion of the 1267 sanctions regime created a comprehensive framework to 
combat Al-Qaida and their associates and later the Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL).  
Before 9/11 the United Nations’ focus on terrorism was relatively minor. UNSCR 
1267 of 1999 might have remained its focus on the Taliban regime and the civil 
war in Afghanistan, rather than on Al-Qaida, which until then had posed a relatively 
minor threat.459 There were at least seventeen organizations that had been 
responsible for more deaths in terrorist attacks between 1990 and 2000, none of 
which had been subjected UN sanctions until then, and most of which never 
would.460 The first mention of Al-Qaida as a terrorist organization occurred in 
UNSCR 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan, deciding that all States should take 
measures to freeze funds and financial assets of Osama Bin Laden and entities 
associated with him, including Al-Qaida. Interestingly, Al-Qaida had until that point 
been a relatively unimportant terrorist organization. The START dataset on acts of 
terrorism only counted five attacks by Al-Qaida between 1990 and 2000 of which 
only one killed more than twenty people. It is also interesting to note that the first 
mention of Al-Qaida in UNSCR 1333 happened a mere seven days after a suicide 
attack in the port of Aden, Yemen, killing seventeen American sailors. Add to this 
the American casualties of the 1998 attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and Al-
Qaida had become the terrorist organization responsible for most American deaths 
since the Cold War, with the exception of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 
Algeria.461 The 1267 sanctions regime focused on the use of targeted sanctions to 
get Bin Laden brought to justice; the war on terror was yet to break out.  
Directly after the 9/11 attacks the United Nations Security Council started building 
a more comprehensive policy framework to combat international terrorism. 
UNSCR 1368 on the 12th of September expressed general outrage about the 
attacks as well as the Council’s determination to combat by all means threats to 
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international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.462 Two weeks later, 
UNSCR 1373 laid the foundation for the United Nations Counter Terrorism 
Committee, which was tasked with monitoring implementation of resolution 1373 
(2001), which requested countries to: 
 
“implement a number of measures intended to enhance their legal and institutional ability 
to counter terrorist activities at home, in their regions and around the world, including 
taking steps to criminalize the financing of terrorism, freeze funds related to persons 
involved in acts of terrorism, deny all forms of financial support for terrorist groups, 
suppress the provision of safe haven, sustenance or support for terrorists, share 
information with other governments on any groups practicing or planning terrorist acts, 
cooperate with other governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, extradition and 
prosecution of those involved in such acts, and criminalize active and passive assistance 
for terrorism in domestic law and bring violators to justice.”463 
 
In 2004 the CTC also established an executive directorate (CTED), in addition to 
five technical working groups to deal with technical assistance, border control and 
arms trafficking, the financing of terrorism, legal issues, and human rights issues. 
In 2006 the UN General Assembly also adopted a Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, based on four pillars to (I) address the conditions conductive to the 
spread of terrorism, (II) preventing and combatting terrorism, (III) building states’ 
capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nations, and (IV) ensuring human 
rights and the rule of law.464  
The United Nations institutional framework is thus completely prepared to deal with 
international terrorism in all its forms and in all corners of the world. When it comes 
to sanctioning terrorist organizations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
however, only the Al-Qaida network and the Islamic State have been subjected. 




8.4.1. 1267/1989/2253 Committees 
One of the CTC’s major responsibilities related to the 1267 ‘Al-Qaida and Taliban 
Sanctions Committee’ was to maintain an updated list of designated terrorist 
organizations eligible for sanctions. The process of listing was ambiguous; UN 
member states could submit listing requests for Al-Qaida and Taliban-related 
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entities and individuals at any time, and the decision-making process to either 
accept or reject requests was vague.  
A week after its establishment, on the 6th of October of 2001, the CTC added four 
individuals and fifteen entities to the list.465 Some of the entities listed were part of 
Bin Laden’s direct network, including the Afghan Services Bureau that preceded 
Al-Qaida (Makhtab al-Khidamat), Al Rashid Trust (a financial facilitator), and the 
WAFA Humanitarian Organization, which was considered as an integral 
component of Al-Qaida involved in raising money, organizing trainings, and 
distributing manuals for attacks. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which had officially 
joined forces with Al-Qaida in 2001 under the leadership of Aiman Muhammed 
Rabi al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s successor, was also listed. The other organizations 
that were listed were either militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan involved 
in the Afghan civil war (Harakat Ul-Mujahidin, Jaish-i-Mohamed), or Islamist 
militant groups in other countries that had received various levels of support for 
their local struggles through Al-Qaida, including the Abu Sayyaf Group in the 
Southern Philippines, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Salafist Group for Call 
and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria, Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) in Somalia, the Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the 
Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) in Yemen.  
By the end of 2003 the list had already grown to 71 individuals and 36 entities. By 
this time the relationship between the sanctions regime and the Al-Qaida link 
became more ambiguous. Western nations used the 1267 committee to list Islamic 
organizations in their countries that has somewhat vague organizational ties to Al-
Qaida. For example, the US succeeded in listing the Global Relief Foundation, an 
organization linked to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which funds Islamists active across 
South East Asia and which was inspired by Bin Laden’s ideology. France and the 
UK pushed for the listing of Moroccan and Tunisian Combatant Groups affiliated 
with the GSPC that were thought to have terrorist sleeper-cells in Western Europe, 
as well as a number of Islamic foundations based in Bosnia-Herzegovina. One 
organization (al Furqan) was listed because one former employee had ties to the 
Armed Islamic Group. The ease with which entities could be listed also helped 
China, Russia, India, and Pakistan in listing organizations such as the Eastern 
Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in China’s eastern Xinjiang Province, several 
Chechen groups responsible for attacks across Russia, Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) in 
India, and Lashkar I Jangvi (LJ) in Pakistan’s Punjab region. All of these 
organizations were only loosely and indirectly associated with Al-Qaida, but that 
was sufficient to make it to the list.  
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In response to the ambiguity surrounding the 1267 list, human rights activists and 
legal scholars started to point out that there were no procedures in place for 
delisting, and that listed individuals and entities were denied due process.466 These 
critiques might help explain the fact that between 2005 and 2010 only four new 
entities were added to the list. To deal with these issues, in 2009 the CTC created 
an office for an Ombudsperson to deal with de-listing requests. There are currently 
also clear listing criteria to help decide whether acts of activities or individuals or 
groups associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida are eligible for inclusion on the list, 
including: 
 
a) Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or 
perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, 
on behalf of, or in support of; 
b) Supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to; 
c) Recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida, 
ISIL, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof;467 
 
For twelve years between 1999 and 2011, the UN sanctions regime against the 
Taliban, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals and organizations was managed 
under the UNSCR 1267 regime. The list that started out as a tool to deal with the 
in the Afghan civil war and the extradition of Osama Bin Laden had turned into an 
all-you-can-eat buffet in which anything could be placed on the menu. After the 
2003 invasion of Iraq the 1267 committee served to sanction Ansar al Islam as well 
as Al-Qaida in Iraq. Between 2010 and 2015, when conflict moved to the Maghreb 
region and Sub-Sahara Africa, 1267 served to sanction Al-Qaida in the Arabian 
Peninsula, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Al-Qaida in 
the Islamic Maghreb,468 and Boko Haram, respectively. Conveniently, these 
organizations had all publicly pledged allegiance to Al-Qaida in order to attract 
recruits, even if their objectives were rather local.  
In 2011 the UNSC adopted Resolutions 1988 and 1989, essentially splitting the 
1267 sanctions regime in two, one focusing on the Taliban regime and governance 
and security in Afghanistan, and the other dealing with international terrorist groups 
linked to Al-Qaida, meaning that organizations such as AQIM and Boko Haram 
were in reality listed under UNSCR 1989. By this time, however, Al-Qaida had 
already seized to be the biggest terrorist threat; the war in Syria and the rise of the 
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Islamic State in Syria and Iraq asked for yet another adaptation to the 1267/1989 
sanctions committee.  
In 2015, when the world’s biggest terrorist threat had shifted from Al-Qaida to the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), UNSCR 2253 expanded the sanctions 
regime to also include organizations associated with this organization. In reality 
this change was rather superficial, as ISIL had been listed on the original 1267 list 
as a terrorist organization since 2004, under the name of Al-Qaida in Iraq. By the 
time the 2253 Committee was established, the split between Al-Qaida and the ISIL 
had however already materialized. ISIL’s predecessor, Al-Qaida in Iraq (IQI), or 
also called Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), had initially started out as an Al-Qaida affiliate 
in the war in Iraq, with its initial leader Zarqawi pledging allegiance to Osama bin 
Laden and Al-Qaida acknowledging ISI leadership. Both organizations pursue a 
Salafist branch of Islam and both share the same ultimate goal of establishing an 
Islamic Caliphate, but as Al-Qaida’s international allure faded in the mid-2000s IQI 
leader al-Zarqawi started pursuing a much more radical path, attacking a wide 
range of moderate Muslims and trying to control territory.  
After Bin Laden’s death in 2011, his successor Zawahiri did not acknowledge ISIL’s 
new leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who already announced his objective to 
restore the Islamic Caliphate in 2011, when ISI was still a relatively minor terrorist 
group in Iraq and Syria. In 2013, when another al-Bagdadi (Abu Bakr) officially 
established the al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham (Daesh), translated to the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and also known as the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or simply Islamic State (IS), the organization already 
controlled a vast amount of territory in Iraq and Syria. Whereas Al-Qaida’s core 
organization killed only 374 people since the 9/11 attacks, ISIL killed close to 
20.000 people between 2013 and 2015. Currently the list established and 
maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1267/1989/2253 counts 402 
individuals and 151 entities and groups that are subject to sanctions. 
 
8.5. Sanctioned vs. Unsanctioned 
 
The efforts of the United Nations to impose targeted sanctions in response to 
terrorism are fully focused on the Taliban, Al-Qaida, ISIL, and their affiliates. 
Between 2001 and 2015 the United Nations sanctioned 26 major terrorist 
organizations under 1276/1989/2553 regimes, all of which were linked one way or 
another with these ‘big three’.  
So did these 26 sanctioned organizations truly form the biggest ‘threat to the 
peace’? Or should other terrorist organizations since 2001 also have been 






we interpret the term ‘threat to the peace’. One could argue that terrorism is a 
threat because of its brutal tactics against civilian targets to spread fear and chaos. 
In that case the most ‘terroristic’ terrorist groups should be sanctioned. Another 
way of determining the gravity of the threat of terrorism is through the lens of 
human security. In that case the terrorist groups that killed most people should get 
sanctioned. A third way of interpreting the ‘threat’ posed by terrorists is by asking 
‘what do the terrorists want?’ After all, some terrorist groups, despite their awful 
tactics, might have understandable grievances or political objectives that we can 
identify with, whereas other groups might have objectives that are fully 
incompatible with the international state-system.  
As a starting point, let us consider a terrorist group as ‘potentially sanctionable’ 
when they have killed at least 100 people since 2000. The threshold of 100 deaths 
is lower than that used to define war, but then again the threat posed by terrorism 
is arguably more terrifying than that posed by other forms of political violence. This 
is not to say that a terror-related death is ten times graver than a civil-war related 
death, or that terrorist groups that killed less than 100 people since 2001 can clean 
their conscience. It also doesn’t mean that all groups that killed more than 100 
people should definitely have been sanctioned. The threshold of 100 deaths simply 
serves to get approximate answers to our questions about what the UN considers 
a ‘threat to the peace’ when it comes to terrorism. The choice of the year 2000 is 
based on the fact that the UN only started listing terrorist groups under its UNSCR 
1267 regime since 6 October 2001. Terrorist groups that were mostly active in the 
1990s, such as Peru’s ‘Sendero Luminoso’, are thus not considered.  
The table below lists the most deadly organizations responsible for terrorist attacks 
since 2000, including the amount of deaths for which each of the sanctioned 
terrorist organizations was responsible at the time the organization was listed. In 
total there were 88 organizations that were responsible for at least 100 deaths. 
The Taliban, the organization responsible for the most deaths, comes close to 
20.000, with most deaths occurring since 2012. The organization that was 
responsible for the least deaths and that was still placed on the UN’s 1267 list is 
Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade (Those who Sign with Blood), which was added in 
2014. At the time of the listing, they had been responsible for one attack in which 
assailants held hostage 800 people at a British Petroleum gas complex, eventually 
killing 69 people. Besides the amount of people killed, the columns of ‘no doubt 
terror’ and ‘objectives’ help us in testing to what extent the tactics and objectives 
are influential in determining the threat.469  
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Table 16 - Terrorist organizations that killed at least 100 people since 2000 
– in order of deadliness 









Taliban yes 06/10/2001 19.465 90% C 
Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL) 
yes 14/10/2004 19.224 83% C 
Boko Haram yes 22/05/2014 17.093 92% C 
Al-Shabaab yes 12/04/2010 5.804 69% C 
Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) 
yes 29/07/2011 5.347 83% C 
Al-Qaida in Iraq yes 14/10/2004 4.357 95% C 
Al-Qaida yes 06/10/2001 3.370 97% C 
Al-Qaida in the 
Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) 
yes 19/01/2010 3.197 63% C 
Al-Nusrah Front yes 14/05/2014 2.690 73% C 
Lord's Resistance 
Army 
no N/A 2.500 95% B 
Communist Party of 
India - Maoist (CPI-
Maoist) 
no N/A 2.172 94% B 
Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
no N/A 2.138 61% A 
Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) 
no N/A 1.785 82% B 
Islamic State of Iraq 
(ISI) 
yes 14/10/2004 1.720 100% C 
Donetsk People's 
Republic 
no N/A 1.602 62% A 
New People's Army 
(NPA) 










no N/A 992 83% B 





no N/A 861 81% A 
Tawhid and Jihad yes 14/10/2004 843 96% C 
Lashkar-e-Taiba 
(LeT) 
yes 02/05/2005 822 87% A 
Al-Qaida in the 
Islamic Mahgreb 
(AQIM) 
yes 06/10/2001 786 88% C 
Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK) 
no N/A 767 53% A 
Allied Democratic 
Forces (ADF) 
no N/A 731 94% B 
Communist Party of 
Nepal- Maoist (CPN-
M) 








no N/A 635 92% B 
Sinai Province of the 
Islamic State (Ansar 
Bayt al-Maqdis) 
no N/A 623 87% B 




yes 06/10/2001 575 93% C 
Haqqani Network no N/A 574 76% C 






Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG) 
yes 06/10/2001 515 92% A 
Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) 
yes 06/10/2001 515 98% C 
Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement 
- North (Former 
SPLA) 
no N/A 513 64% A 
United Liberation 
Front of Assam 
(ULFA) 
no N/A 475 97% A 
Anti-Balaka Militia no N/A 430 86% B 
Jundallah no N/A 414 100% A 
Riyadus-Salikhin 
Rec. and Sabotage 
Battalion of Chechen 
Martyrs 
yes 04/03/2003 412 100% A 
Seleka no N/A 398 77% B 




yes 06/10/2001 575 93% C 
Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDLR) 
no N/A 373 95% B 
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) yes 25/10/2002 341 100% C 
National Democratic 
Front of Bodoland 
(NDFB) 
no N/A 329 99% A 
United Self Defense 
Units of Colombia 
(AUC) 
no N/A 326 96% B 
Lashkar-e-Islam 
(Pakistan) 
no N/A 312 58% C 
Khorasan Chapter of 
the Islamic State 






Sanaa Province of 
the Islamic State 
no N/A 304 98% C 
Movement for the 
Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) 
no N/A 290 96% A 
Islamic Front (Syria) no N/A 287 45% B 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigade 
no N/A 285 99% B 
Baloch Liberation 
Army (BLA) 
no N/A 285 90% A 
Free Syrian Army no N/A 279 61% B 
Hizbul Mujahideen 
(HM) 
no N/A 262 56% N/A 
Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) 
no N/A 261 100% B 
Luhansk People's 
Republic 
no N/A 249 27% A 
Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ) 
no N/A 224 96% A 
David Yau Yau 
Militia 
no N/A 218 53% A 
National Liberation 
Army of Colombia 
(ELN) 
no N/A 218 79% B 
People's War Group 
(PWG) 
no N/A 217 97% B 
Barqa Province of 
the Islamic State 




no N/A 211 65% A 
Caucasus Emirate no N/A 210 100% A 
Abu Hafs al-Masri 
Brigades 
no N/A 198 100% C 








no N/A 197 52% A 
Deccan Mujahideen no N/A 184 100% A 
Tripoli Province of 
the Islamic State 




yes 04/03/2003 184 92% A 
Harkatul Jihad-e-
Islami 
yes 06/08/2010 183 100% B 
Abdullah Azzam 
Brigades 
yes 23/09/2014 181 100% B 
M23 no N/A 177 3% B 
Baloch Republican 
Army 
no N/A 172 71% A 
Al-Naqshabandiya 
Army 
no N/A 165 87% B 
Ansar al-Sunna no N/A 163 87% B 
National Liberation 
Front of Tripura 
(NLFT) 
no N/A 162 80% A 
Party for the 
Liberation of the 
Hutu People 
(PALIPEHUTU) 
no N/A 158 77% B 
United Baloch Army no N/A 149 97% A 
Mujahideen Ansar no N/A 141 60% B 
Movement for 
Oneness and Jihad 
in West Africa 
(MUJAO) 













no N/A 126 90% A 
Hezbollah no N/A 125 74% B 




no N/A 122 66% B 
Islambouli Brigades 
of al-Qaida 
no N/A 120 100% C 
Al-Mua'qi'oon 
Biddam Brigade 
(Those who Sign 
with Blood) 
yes 02/06/2014 117 98% C 
Ansar al-Sharia 
(Libya) 
yes 19/11/2014 117 85% B 
Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) 




yes 06/10/2001 113 100% A 
Southern Mobility 
Movement (Yemen) 
no N/A 112 26% A 




no N/A 103 100% B 
Haftar Militia no N/A 101 50% B 
 
 
So what are some of the insights that the above table gives us? 
 
8.5.1. Terror Tactics 
First of all, UN sanctions on terrorist organizations have nothing to do with the 
brutal tactics of terrorism. While terrorism is undoubtedly a more despised tactic of 
conflict than guerrilla warfare or rebellion, which aim at government or military 






targets rather than civilian ones, the UN does not appear to sanction groups 
because of their tactics. The START database keeps record of each attack and 
defines to what extent it can be recognized as a true terror attack and not as a 
different type of violent action, for example a guerrilla attack against a military base 
or an act of violent crime. For non-sanctioned group their true percentage of 
attacks that were undoubtedly terrorist attacks is 81%. For sanctioned groups this 
is somewhat higher at 90%, but there is a large range of exceptions that invalidate 
the hypothesis that UN sanctions are only imposed on organizations that are 
undoubtedly terrorist organizations. For example there are eight organizations470 
that score 100%, meaning that in none of their attacks there was any doubt about 
the nature of the attack, and that were not sanctioned nevertheless. Other 
organizations that are undoubtedly terrorist organizations and that were not 
sanctioned nevertheless include the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (India, 
99%), the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Israel, Gaza, West Bank, 99%), the United 
Baloch Army (Pakistan, 97%), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (Ethiopia / 
Somalia, 97%), the People’s War Group (India, 97%), and the Communist Party of 
Nepal (96%). Some of the organizations that did make it to the designated 
terrorism list even though a substantial amount of their attacks were not clearly 
defined as acts of terrorism include the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West 
Africa (50%), Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (63%), Al Shabaab (69%), and al-
Nusrah Front (73%).  
 
8.5.2. Terror Deaths 
Second of all, while terror deaths seem to matter somewhat, they are not decisive 
either. Those organizations that were sanctioned under the 1267/1989/2253 
regime killed an average of 3186 people since 2000, whereas those that were not 
sanctioned killed only 554 people on average. The eight deadliest terrorist 
organizations since 2001 were all placed on the 1267/1989/2553 list, most notably 
the Taliban, ISIL, and Boko Haram, each responsible for more than 17.000 deaths. 
There are however too many exceptions, both at the top and at the bottom of the 
SOD list, to conclude that the UN imposes sanctions in order to stop or prevent 
organizations from killing people. If human security had been the top priority of UN 
sanctions, organizations such as the Communist Party or India (CPI-Maoist), the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), the Donetsk People’s Republic in Ukraine, and the New 
People’s Army (NPA) in the Philippines should also have been listed as terrorist 
organizations, since each of them killed at least 1000 people since 2000. The 
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United States and the European Union did list most of these groups as designated 
terrorist organizations unilaterally. The United Nations didn’t. At the bottom of the 
list there several terrorist organizations that are relatively harmless in terms of 
deaths, but that were listed nevertheless. For example, When the Al-Mua'qi'oon 
Biddam Brigade (Those who Sign with Blood), an AQIM offshoot, was listed in 
2014, they had been responsible for a mere 69 deaths. The Eastern Turkmenistan 
Islamic Movement (ETIM), a group of Uighur separatists in Western China, had 
killed 113. Human security cannot have been the primary motivation for 
sanctioning these groups.471  
 
8.5.3. Objectives 
UN Sanctions are not anti-Islamic. Looking at the origin of the groups and the 
countries in which they are active, one might come pull the erroneous conclusion 
that UN sanctions are anti-Islamic. Listed groups tend to come from Islamic 
countries such as Afghanistan and Algeria, not Colombia or India. However, while 
practically all sanctioned groups are Islamic, not all Islamic groups were 
sanctioned. For example, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), Hezbollah, and Hamas by all means identify themselves 
as Muslims. The same goes for terrorist groups in Balochistan and the Caucasus.  
The true issue that makes terrorism a sanctionable threat is not with Islam as a 
religion as such, but rather with Islamic extremist groups that aim to promote a 
worldview that is incompatible with the international state system. Whereas the 
stated objectives of communists and separatists seem to be accepted as legitimate 
struggles by the international community, the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate 
is not.  
In order to test whether the objectives of terrorist organizations matter, we first 
have to ask ourselves: What do the terrorists want? Analysis of the 88 most deadly 
groups since 2000 shows us that different terrorist groups want different things. 
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• Gain Rights within State (Rights) 
• More autonomy for region (Autonomy) 
• Separate from state (Independence) 
 
B. Overthrow 
• Overthrow national government (Overthrow) 
• Establish communist government (Communism) 
• Fight armed group within state (Civil war) 
 
C. Islamic Extemism 
• Eliminate Western Influence (Anti-West) 
• Kill / Expel Minorities (Anti-Minority) 
• Establish Sharia Law within state (Sharia) 
• Establish Islamic Caliphate / Emirate (Caliphate) 
 
Groups that aim at objectives that fall roughly within categories A and B are never 
sanctioned. Groups whose aims fall within category C are almost always listed 
under UNSCR 1267 / 2253, especially if their ultimate goal is to pursue a type of 
political entity in which religion is prior to the State.  
Let us first consider the terrorist organizations that largely fall within category A. 
Terrorist groups that fight for greater autonomy within the state or separation from 
the state of which they are part exist across the world. The most deadly separatist 
terrorist organizations since 1990 include the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (8735 
deaths), and the Kurdish PKK in Turkey (3820 deaths). Although these 
organizations have been recognized by various governments as terrorist 
organizations, they have also received political support from governments that 
support their cause or that recognize their right to struggle against oppression. For 
example, while the PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by the US State 
Department, the United Kingdom’s Home Department, and NATO, Russia, 
Greece, and Iran, among others, do not recognize it as such. The European Union 
lists the PKK merely as “having been involved in terrorist attacks”, but many 
countries do recognize the Kurdish oppression at the hands of the Turkish 
governments. Similarly, while the Tamil Tigers were widely recognized as a 
terrorist group, including by India, The US, UK, and EU, many governments have 
recognized the Tamil cause as such, calling on the LTTE to allow for political 






Lanka.472 Between the lines, the message seems to be that while the tactic of 
terrorism is not approved of, the objective of autonomy or separation as such is 
considered to be a valid one.  
Terrorist groups in category B (Overthrow Government) seem to enjoy a similar 
approach. While governments denounce the terrorist attacks of groups fighting civil 
wars or attempting to overthrow their governments, the aim seems to be at the 
tactics rather than the objectives themselves. Colombia’s FARC, the most deadly 
group in its category since 1990 (3744 deaths), has been listed as a terrorist 
organization by many governments, but not by the United Nations. Since the 2016 
peace-agreement between FARC and the Colombian government, a UN 
verification mission to monitor the disarmament of former combatants is trying to 
reintegrate its members into Colombian society.  
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Christian terrorist organization in Uganda 
and regions of the Central African Republic and the DRC Congo, further illustrates 
the point that the UN’s beef with terrorist organizations focuses specifically on 
Islamic Extremism, not separatism or civil war. While the LRA and its infamous 
leader Joseph Kony did receive UN targeted sanctions 2016 for “engaging in or 
providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the 
CAR”, they were not recognized as a terrorist organization, but rather as an armed 
group. Even though 95% of the LRA’s deaths are recognized in the START 
database as terrorist attacks, the language of UN Resolution 2262 revealed that 
the LRA was considered as a rebel group in an African civil war, not a terrorist 
group. 
In order to be listed as a designated terrorist organization under UNSCR 
1267/2253, groups thus need to have objectives of category C (Islamic 
Extremism). Indeed, all groups that were listed since 10 October 2001 could be 
identified as Islamic extremist groups with stated objectives related to (a) the killing 
of westerners or other non-Sunni minorities (b) installing Sharia Law, (c) 
establishing an Islamic Emirate or Islamic State. All these objectives are 
incompatible with the modern international state-system, and therefore present a 
threat to the peace, even if the amount of deaths is at times negligible.  
The terrorist organization that started it all, Al-Qaida, had promoted explicitly anti-
western objectives long before being listed on the UNSCR 1267 list on the 10th of 
October of 2001. Osama Bin-Laden had not only been involved in a number of 
attacks on western targets, including the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam in 1998, but he had also been responsible for popularizing Jihad against 
the United States among Salafists across the Islamic world. In an interview with a 
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Pakistani newspaper in 2001, he said that “Jihad will continue even when I am not 
around.” In a video tape that same year he addressed his followers saying: 
 
"We stress the importance of martyrdom operations against the enemy, these attacks that 
have scared Americans and Israelis like never before." 
 
Terrorist groups across the world identified with Al-Qaida’s message, or at least 
saw the strategic advantage of affiliating themselves with them. Some groups even 
changed their name to become recognized as official representatives of the Al-
Qaida franchise. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb originated as the Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC); Al-Qaida in Iraq originated in 1999 as the 
Group of Monotheism and Jihad. Its leader Al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Al-
Qaida in 2004 in response to the US-invasion of Iraq, after which they changed 
their name to Organization of Jihad’s Base in Mesapotamia (Tanzim Qaidat al-
Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn), which subsequently became known in the West under 
the name Al-Qaida in Iraq.  
Just as Al-Qaida quickly managed to extend its network throughout the Islamic 
world, so has the Islamic State created ‘Provinces’, or ‘Emirates’ ranging from the 
Philippines to Libya. In 2015 ISIL’s leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi told his followers:  
 
“Do not think the war that we are waging is the Islamic State’s war alone. Rather, it is the 
Muslims’ war altogether. It is the war of every Muslim in every place, and the Islamic State 
is merely the spearhead in this war. It is but the war of the people of faith against the 
people of disbelief...”473 
 
In subsequent years, Salafist groups across the world have used the label of IS to 
create the Sinai Province of the Islamic State (Egypt, Israel), the Sanaa Province 
of the Islamic State (Yemen), the Tripoli and Barqa Provinces of the Islamic State 
(Libya), and the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State (Afghanistan), and the 
Philippines Province of the Islamic State.  
 
8.5.4. Selectivity 
The conclusion that the stated objectives of terrorist organizations are the 
determining variable for receiving UN sanctions still needs to be treated with 
caution. Whereas the objectives of Al-Qaida and ISIS themselves are undoubtedly 
a big threat to the international community, not all their associates are as 
dangerous as they claim. Due to the institutional architecture of the UNSCR 
                                            






1267/2253 regime, even the faintest association with Al-Qaida can get you listed, 
allowing for political interests to interfere. Some groups seem to have been listed 
directly after specific attacks on western targets or against western interests, rather 
than their affiliation with Al-Qaida or ISIL. Other listed groups had only minor 
support from or contact with Al-Qaida in their local struggles, but were listed 
nevertheless because it suited a P-5 member or their allies. Yet others have openly 
associated themselves with Al-Qaida or ISIL for strategic reasons rather than 
ideological ones, for example to attract more recruits or attention to their local 
cause. Not all terrorist groups that were sanctioned under the UNSCR 1267/2553 
regime for their association with Al-Qaida or ISIL should thus be blindly accepted 
as threats to the peace.  
Take the example of Al-Shabaab, a militant organization in Somalia. Al-Shabaab 
originated in 2006 after the Islamic Courts Union, its mother organization, lost 
power to the Transitional Federal Government. Ever since it has been fighting the 
Federal Government, as well as the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). 
Al-Shabaab only pledged loyalty to Al-Qaida in 2012, at which time they had 
already killed over 1100 people. The UN had however already listed them two 
years prior in 2010, just five days after Al-Shabaab fighters seized a UN operations 
compound.474 Whereas the language of Al-Shabaab is one of Jihad, their 
objectives and targets essentially remain local.  
The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) provides an example of power-
politics by a P-5 member. The Uighur separatists in China’s Western Xinjiang 
province had been active terrorists since 1990, being responsible for over 200 
terrorist attacks in the decade prior to 2001. Although ETIM fighters had indeed 
trained in neighboring Afghanistan and allegedly received some funds from Bin 
Laden in 1999, ETIM’s objectives remain related to autonomy, not a Crusade 
against the West. While ETIM never posed a real threat, China was quick to 
propose to list ETIM to the UNSCR 1267 upon its creation in October 2001.  
Much like ETIM, the Philippines Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has fought for 
independence of the islands of Jolo and Basilan for over four decades, using a mix 
of insurgency and terrorism against the Filipino government as well as foreign 
tourists. The ASG however pursues a very much local agenda among a relatively 
small and tight-knit group of followers. In the 1990s the ASG received some funds 
through Osama Bin Laden’s brother-in-law, as well as through other radical Islamic 
charities, but most of its funding comes through local extortion and ransom from 
kidnappings. The members of the ASG can hardly be said to be devout Salafists. 
According to two kidnapping victims who were held by ASG members for over a 
year, their captors were not familiar with the Quran and could hardly be described 
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as devout Muslims.475 Although the ASG killed only 224 in the previous decade, 
the Philippines government and the United States successfully listed the group 
under UNSCR 1267 directly after its establishment. In 2014 and 2015 the ASG has 
become increasingly active. Although their separatist objectives remain the same, 
they have started calling themselves the “Philippines Province of the Islamic 
State.” This name however reflects the ASG’s own agenda than a true threat to 




The history of UN sanctions in response to terrorism shows that the Security 
Council was already concerned with Islamic extremist terror before 9/11. The UN 
sanctions regimes of the 1990s on Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan showed that the 
United Nations took the threat of Islamic terrorism seriously, but also that similar 
sanctions on other state sponsors of terrorism such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan 
was politically unfeasible. The 1267/2253 list of designated terrorist organizations 
only made this clearer. Analysis of the 88 deadliest terrorist organizations since 
2001 however shows that the selectiveness of UN sanctions is not only biased 
against Islamic Extremism, but that within the 1267/2253 regime there is also room 
for political agendas.  
The track-record of UN sanctions on terrorist groups since 2001 shows that it does 
not matter how many people you kill or whether your acts reflect tactics of terror or 
other, more legitimate, forms of violence. Even though the academic community 
as well as the United Nations themselves make it clear that terrorism can only be 
defined on the basis of tactics, not objectives, UN sanctioning policy shows quite 
the opposite.  
In order to receive UN sanctions, a terrorist group has to be only slightly related to 
Al-Qaida or ISIL, the two most prominent terrorist networks since 2001. Some 
groups can only blame themselves for pledging allegiance to Al-Qaida to further 
their own agenda; others are designated as guilty by association, especially when 
their listing is politically convenient for those who call the shots. The 22 terrorist 
organizations that received UN sanctions under the 1267/2253 regime all had 
Islamic extremist agendas. However, whereas Al-Qaida and ISIL themselves 
arguably truly formed threats to international stability, many of their so-called 
associates did not. Al-Shabaab could have perfectly just been sanctioned under 
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the UN sanctions regime related to Somalia’s civil war. The same goes for MUJAO 
in Mali.  
Part of the bias against Islamic extremism could be explained through the fact that 
the objectives of the groups sanctioned pose conceptually bigger threats to the 
peace than those posed by separatists and communists. After all, attempting to 
establish an Islamic Caliphate that transcends the borders of the international 
sovereign state system is fully incompatible with the modern world. Similarly, it is 
understandable that groups such Al-Qaida and ISIL, whose leaders call on its 
followers to kill all non-believers and even fellow Muslims who are not sufficiently 
devout, form a threat to the peace. The ‘war on terror’ against these groups is 
essential, and UN sanctions can contribute in naming and shaming those 
organizations who pledge allegiance to them. We must however not confuse Al-
Qaida’s and ISIL’s core organizations with armed groups with local objectives who 
simply got caught up in the Al-Qaida storm after 9/11. At the end of the day, terrorist 






Selective Sanctions and Coups d’état 
 
 
The United Nations Security Council has imposed sanctions under Chapter VII of 
its Charter in response to three coups d’état since 1990. Although there has been 
some criticism on sanctions regarding their effectiveness as tools of coercion and 
their unintended consequences, UN sanctions regimes since 1990 are generally 
considered to be progressively successful in signaling violations of international 
law and coercing targets towards compliance. However, the Sanctionable 
Offences Database (SOD) that forms the backbone of this thesis shows that in fact 
there have been thirty six coups d’état in which the Security Council could have 
responded with sanctions.. 
What is the logic behind sanctioning coups d’état? How did the idea of imposing 
UN sanctions in response to coups come into being in the first place? And most 
importantly, were all thirty six ‘sanctionable coups’ since 1990 equally 
‘sanctionable’? Were some coups larger threats to the peace than others, for 
example because they were bloodier or because they instigated civil wars? Or 
could the sanctioned coups be identified as the largest threats to the ‘democratic 
peace’? And if there is no convincing evidence that the sanctioned conflicts were 
more ‘sanctionable’ than the non-sanctioned conflicts, could be that the 
explanation lies with the ‘senders’ rather than the ‘receivers’? And if so, who is to 
blame?  
The data presented in this chapter will show that the three coups that were met 
with UN sanctions since 1990 (Haiti 1991, Sierra Leone 1997, Guinea-Bissau 
2012) all represented threats to the ‘democratic peace’ and a threat to the interests 
of those who imposed the sanctions rather than a real threat to international peace. 
A comparison of the sanctioned cases versus the non-sanctioned cases since 
1990 also shows us that UN sanctions in response to coups reflect a policy of 
cherry picking rather than a consistent policy to uphold international norms.  
 
9.1. Defining Coup d’état 
 
A coup d’état is a sudden attempt by a small group of people to take over the 






best translation for the word coup is ‘stroke’, although the words ‘hit’ and ‘blow’ are 
also used in translations. A coup d’état is thus a stroke of the state, as in the strike 
of a sword. The Germans refer to it as a ´Putsch’, and the Spanish as a ‘golpe de 
Estado’. There is no satisfactory English term, hence the use of the French one.  
In the late 1960s coups d’état were described as sharp, clear events, easy to date 
and, if successful, possible to document.477 Indeed, coups have played a popular 
role in history and politics, and it doesn’t take much effort to recognize a coup when 
it happens. The Ancient Greeks recognized it when the Athenian democracy was 
replaced by the Thirty Tyrants in 404BC; the Romans when Julius Caesar came to 
power after defeating (and later assassinating) his predecessor Pompey. He was 
later famously assassinated in a plotted coup too. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 
in England that overthrew King James II and replaced him with William III of 
Orange was one of many coups in Monarchical Europe.  
In the beginning of the 20th century coups were associated mostly with Latin 
America, with military coups in Costa Rica (1917), Mexico (1920), Chile (1925, 
1932), Brazil (1930, 1937, 1945), Dominican Republic (1930), Argentina (1930, 
1943), Uruguay (1933), Cuba (1933), and Venezuela (1945). Southern Europe is 
also prone to coups, with military takeovers in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. 
As a matter of fact, Greece and Spain were home to 17 and 11 coups and 
attempted coups throughout the 20th century, respectively.  
Serious research on the phenomenon of coups d’état however only started in the 
second half of the 20th century in response to the ‘wave of coups’ that occurred 
throughout ‘black Africa’, as sub-Sahara Africa was then referred to, in states that 
had recently become independent from their European colonizers. In just a matter 
of years, the governments of Congo-Kinshasa (25 Nov. 1965), Dahomey (22 Dec. 
1965), Central African Republic (1 Jan. 1966), Upper Volta (4 Jan. 1966), Nigeria 
(15 Jan. 1966), Ghana (24 Feb. 1966), Nigeria once again (29 Jul. 1966), Burundi 
(28 Nov. 1966), Togo (13 Jan. 1967), and Sierra Leone (23 Mar. 1967) fell victim 
to coups d’état (Welch; 1967). In response to these events, Edward Luttwak (1969) 
wrote a handbook on coups d’état in which he tried create a deeper understanding 
of the strategies and tactics that lead to a successful coup, as well as the 
circumstances that typically lead to a coup attempt in the first place. With regard 
to tactics he explained that:  
 
“The Coup d’état relies on precisely those parts of the state which guerrilla warfare seeks 
to destroy, the armed forces, the police, and the security agencies. The technique of the 
coup d’état is the technique of judo: the planners of the coup must use the power of the 
state against its political masters. This is done by a process of infiltration and subversion 
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in which a small but critical part of the security forces are totally subverted, while much of 
the rest is temporarily neutralized.”478  
 
Most academics were however more interested in discovering which 
circumstances were most conducive to the occurrence of a coup. Whereas Luttwak 
had described coups as a-political events in the sense that they are not by 
definition undesirable or morally wrong, research since the 1970s has mainly 
focused on the symptoms and tell-tale signs that a coup might be in the making. 
Academics have considered governance (Goodspeed: 1962, Zolberg: 1969), 
macro-economic variables and military variables (Wells: 1974, Morrison & 
Stevenson: 1976), and social mobilization and cultural and political pluralism 
(Huntington: 1968, Jackman: 1972, Lunde: 1992), among others. Thanks to this 
body of research it became clear that the probability of a military coup was greater 
in states that score lower on indicators of socio-economic strength, as well as in 
states that are home to high levels of urban inequality, ethnic and linguistic 
diversity, and a high rate of militarization. 
A consensus also formed around the idea that coups d’état are not as easy to 
define and recognize as was proposed initially. The Thirty Tyrants and Julius 
Caesar came to power through civil wars, not through swift coups. President 
Carranza of Mexico was ousted (and assassinated) in a popular revolt rather than 
a coup in 1920. The 1933 coup of Uruguay should be defined an ‘auto-golpe’, or 
auto-coup, as president Terra was already President when he dissolved 
parliament. The same goes for the 1937 auto-coup of President Vargas in Brazil. 
Almost all of the coup events in Spain in the 20th centuries were failed attempts.  
So what exactly is a coup d’état then? Powel and Thyne (2010) made an effort to 
answer this question comprehensively by summing up the definitions used in the 
fourteen most important studies on coups and considering common trends and 
ambiguities. They looked at (1) who may be targeted? (2) Who can be the 
perpetrators? (3) Which tactics can be used? And (4) can plots and rumors be 
counted as coups? The definition that was proposed as a result is “illegal and overt 
attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the 
sitting executive.” A coup is considers successful if the perpetrators “seize and 
hold power for at least seven days.” 479 
The definition of Powel and Thyne is largely in line with that used by Marshall and 
Marshall (2016), whose dataset forms the backbone of this chapter.480 The 
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definition they use for their dataset on coup d’état events between 1946 and 2015 
is as follows:  
 
“A coup d’état is a forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a 
dissident/opposition faction within the country’s ruling or political elites that results in a 
substantial change in the executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime.”  
 
A good way of getting a deeper understanding of a definition is by looking at the 
events it excludes. Marshall and Marshall’s database excludes transfers of power 
through social revolutions, civil wars, and popular uprisings. For example, the 1996 
ousting of the Rabbani regime in Afghanistan by the Taliban is considered an 
armed conflict, not a coup. Similarly, the Seleka rebel coalition that ousted 
President Bozizé in 2013 did so through a rebellion, not a coup. Voluntary transfers 
of executive authority or transfers of office due to the death or incapacity of a ruling 
executive are, likewise, not considered coups d’état. For example, Bolivian 
President Carlos Mesa voluntarily resigned in 2005 in response to anti government 
protests. In the Central African Republic, President Djotodia stepped down in 2014 
due to international pressure. Finally, the forcible ouster of a regime accomplished 
by, or with the crucial support of, invading foreign forces is also not considered a 
coup d’état in Marshall and Marshall’s dataset. Examples include the 1994 
restoration of Haitian President Aristide, which was achieved through military 
pressure from the US and comprehensive sanctions by the UN, and the ousting of 
the Sierra Leonean military leader Koroma in 1998 by an ECOWAS military 
operation.  
 
9.2. A history of the offence - Coups d’état since 1946  
 
As Samuel Finer remarked in his foreword of Luttwak’s 1969 practical handbook 
on coups d’état:  
 
“…on Luttwak’s count, which goes back 23 years, there have been successful coups in 
no less than 70-odd countries, which is to say well over half of the total sovereign states 
in existence today. The coup is a more widespread way of changing governments than 
elections.”481 
 
While such a claim cannot be defended anymore nowadays, coups d’état still occur 
much more frequently than many students of international politics may think. 
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Between 1946 and 2015, Marshall and Marshall observe a total of 840 successful 
coups, attempted (failed) coups, coup plots, and alleged coup plots. Admittedly, 
these observations include 147 alleged coup plots and another 142 ‘proven’ coup 
plots that were never carried out. Of the remaining 551 actual attempts, 327 failed, 
leaving us with 224 successful coups d’état, the last of which occurred in Thailand 
during May 2014, when the Thai Armed Forces under General Prayuth Chan-o-
cha overthrew the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and installed 
a military junta.  
The 1960s were indeed a coup d’état decade, with a total of 61 successful coups. 
The 1970s follow with 56 coups. After that the amount of successful coups per 
decade has kept on falling, with only 36 observations since 1990, and only five 
during the period 2010 – 2015.  
 
Table 17 - Successful coups d’état since 1946 










Some of the countries that were most prone to successful coup d’état’s since 1946 
include Thailand (10), Bolivia (8), Syria (8), Argentina (7), Haiti (6), and Nigeria (6). 
Africa has however been home to the most coups compared to other continents. 
During the Cold War coup d’état’s occurred much more frequently and throughout 
the world, but since the 1990s they have become an almost entirely African 
phenomenon with more than two thirds of all successful attempts as well as total 
attempts. The states most affected since 1990 include Guinea-Bissau (3 








Table 18 - Successful coups d’état per continent 
Continent Coups 1946-1989 Coups 1990-2015 
Africa 65 24 
Asia 28 8 
Europe 7 0 
Middle East 24 1 
North America 25 1 
Oceania 1 1 
South America 31 1 
 
 
9.3. Coups d’état and Liberal Peace since 1990 
 
During the Cold War coups were not necessarily considered as unlawful acts. As 
a matter of fact, politicians and academics alike recognized that coups were a tool 
of politics, and that supporting a putsch could be of great political and strategic 
value to the United States or the Soviet Union. International legal scholars could 
best be described as ‘agnostic’ when it came to coups. Although a general 
consensus had formed around the idea that coups tended to happen as a result of 
bad politics, there was no clear consensus on whether the action of staging a coup 
d’état should by definition be condemned. When Joseph-Desiré Mobutu overthrew 
the leftist government of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo in 1960 it was widely 
regarded as a victory for the West in the global fight against Communism. As a 
matter of fact, it later became clear that the coup was sponsored by the CIA. It 
would be one of many US-supported coups d’état during the Cold War, many of 
which occurred in Latin America.482  
The end of the Cold War, however, kindled a great enthusiasm for the principle of 
democracy and democratic transitions of power. In the early 1990s a doctrine 
began to form in which the legitimacy of governments was no longer confined to 
the unquestioned and unlimited respect for national sovereignty. Rather, state 
legitimacy was to be evaluated on the basis of universal norms and values of 
democracy. As a result of this change of perspective, the “democratic entitlement 
school” was established, defending the theory that States and governments had to 
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‘earn’ their sovereignty. As UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali stated in 1992, 
the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty had passed. It was now the task of 
leaders of states to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance.  
Coups are per definition irreconcilable with the democratic entitlement theory or 
the doctrine of liberal peace. They are inherently undemocratic. Civilians cannot 
vote for coups in popular elections and constitutions of States do not provide laws 
for legal coups. All coups are then wrongful acts, even if they are not fully 
recognized as violations of international law per se.483 Even so-called ‘democratic 
coups’ in which the military overthrows a dictatorial regime and organizes 
democratic elections, cannot be considered as legal, even if proponents of 
democratic entitlement consider them in a favorable light. 
International organizations throughout the world have condemned coups as 
unlawful and sanctionable acts. Already in 1826 a Treaty proposed by Simon 
Bolívar between several North and South American countries stipulated that a 
“dramatic change in the nature of a government” could lead to the suspension of a 
member state.484 The more contemporary Organization of American States (OAS) 
recognizes any “sudden or irregular interruption” of democracy in a member 
country as a reason for suspension. Similarly, the British Commonwealth of 
Nations and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) have on 
several occasions condemned the overthrowing of democratic governments and 
proposed sanctions in response. The Organization of African Union (OAU) and its 
successive African Union (AU) have also institutionalized their condemnation of 
coups d’état, providing an institutional framework for the suspension of member 
states and the imposition of sanctions. States that have been suspended by the 
AU include Burkina Faso (2015), Egypt (2013), Central African Republic (2003, 
2013), Guinea-Bissau (2012), Mali (2012), Niger (2010), Mauritania (2005, 2008), 
and Togo (2005). The AU’s reaction to military coups has been rather consistent, 
hence the fact that all coups since 2005 led to suspension from the AU.485  
The United Nations have also made steps towards condemning coups as 
‘internationally wrongful acts’, and have demonstrated their support for the 
prevention of coups and the reversal of coups to re-install democratically elected 
governments. In addition to the support for Liberal Peace during the 1990s, UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2004 also defended that the United Nations 
should build on the experience of regional organizations to protect democratically 
elected governments from coups.486 Indeed, the UN Security Council has regularly 
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supported the suspension of States from international organizations such as the 
AU in its Resolutions. The UNSC has however not consistently imposed UN arms 
embargoes or individual sanctions on coup leaders in response to the coups d’état 
that have occurred since 1990.  
Since 1990 a total of 222 alleged coup plots, ‘proven’ coup plots, and actual coup 
attempts were observed by Marshall and Marshall. In 126 cases an actual coup 
was attempted, 36 of which were successful. For the sake of this thesis we only 
regard these 36 successful coups as ‘sanctionable offences’.487 The United 
Nations however only imposed sanctions under Chapter VII of its Charter in three 
cases: Haiti (1993), Sierra Leone (1997), and Guinea-Bissau (2012).  
 
Table 19 - Coup attempts since 1990 per continent 
Continent success failure total 
Africa 24 75 99 
Asia 8 17 25 
Europe 0 4 4 
Middle East 1 5 6 
North America 1 5 6 
Oceania 1 2 3 
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Table 20 - Successful coups d’état since 1990 
Country Year Coup Leader(s) Deaths ARC* UNS** 
Chad 1990 Idriss Deby 5000 No No 
Suriname 1990 Cmd. Iwan 
Granoogst; Col. Desi 
Bouterse 
0 No No 
Thailand 1991 Gen. Sunthorn 
Kongsompong 
0 No No 
Lesotho 1991 Col. Elias Tutsoane 
Ramaema 
0 No No 
Haiti 1991 Brig-Gen. Raoul 
Cedras 
26 No Yes 
Afghanistan 1992 Muhaheddin 
guerrillas; Ahmed 
Shah Masud 
N/A No No 
Sierra Leone 1992 Capt. Valentine 
Strasser 
N/A No No 
Nigeria 1993 Gen. Sanni Abacha 0 No No 
Gambia 1994 Lt. Yahya Jammeh 0 Yes No 
Liberia 1994 Tom Woewieyu N/A N/A No 
Qatar 1995 Sheikh Hamad bin 
Khalifa at Thani 
0 No No 
Sierra Leone 1996 BG Julius Maada Bio 0 No No 
Niger 1996 Col. Ibrahim Barre 
Mainassara 
2 Yes No 
Burundi 1996 army 6000 No No 
Sierra Leone 1997 Maj. Johnny Paul 
Koroma 
N/A No Yes 
Cambodia 1997 Hun Sen 70 Yes No 
Congo-
Brazzaville 
1997 former Pres. 
Sassou-Nguesso 
N/A Yes No 
Comoros 1999 Col. Azali 
Assoumani 








1999 Gen. Mane 300 No No 
Pakistan 1999 Gen. Musharraf 0 Yes No 
Cote d'Ivoire 1999 Gen. Robert Guei N/A No No 
Nepal 2002 King Gyanendra 0 Yes No 
Central 
African Rep. 
2003 Gen. Francois 
Bozize 
15 Yes No 
Guinea-
Bissau 
2003 Gen. Verissimo 
Correira Seabre 
0 Yes No 
Togo 2005 Military; Faure 
Gnassingbe 
0 No No 
Mauritania 2005 Military Council for 
Justice and 
Democracy led by 
Col. Ely Ould 
Mohamed Vall 
0 No No 
Thailand 2006 Gen. Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin 
0 Yes No 
Fiji 2006 Commodore Frank 
Bainimarama 
0 Yes No 




0 Yes No 
Mauritania 2008 Gen. Mohamed Ould 
Abdel Aziz 
0 Yes No 
Guinea 2008 Capt. Moussa Dadis 
Camara 
0 No No 
Niger 2010 Supreme Council for 
the Rest. of 
Democracy (CSRD); 
Maj. Salou Djibo 
10 No No 
Mali 2012 Capt. Amadou Haya 
Sanogo 
N/A Yes No 
Guinea-
Bissau 
2012 Gen. Antonio Indjai 0 Yes Yes 






Egypt 2013 Gen. Abdul-Fattah 
el-Sisi 
N/A  No 
Thailand 2014 General Prayuth 
Chan-ocha 
0 Yes No 




9.4. Sanctioned vs. unsanctioned 
 
So what sets the cases of Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau apart from the 
other 33 coups d’état that occurred since 1990? Were the three sanctioned cases 
indeed larger ‘threats to the peace’ than the non-sanctioned cases? Were they 
bloodier? Did they instigate brutal civil wars? Or should they rather be interpreted 
as larger threats to the ‘democratic peace’? Did they push democracies into 
autocratic and suppressive regimes? Or, finally, does the track record of UN 
sanctions reflect a policy of political cherry-picking, in which coups are met with 
UN sanctions when it suits those who impose the sanctions?  
 
9.4.1. Coup Deaths 
Just as in the previous chapters that analyzed interstate wars and civil wars, it 
might very well be the case that the cases that were sanctioned were indeed 
objectively larger ‘threats to the peace’ or ‘breaches of the peace’ than the cases 
that were not sanctioned. The same logic could also help us explain why only three 
out of thirty-six cases were sanctioned: after all, compared to wars of aggression 
and civil wars, coups are normally only minor acts of organized violence. As a 
matter of fact, many successful coups are bloodless, and there for constitute no 
breach of the peace in the same way as a war does.  
A quick analysis of coup-related deaths since 1990 as observed by Marshall and 
Marshall however shows us that there is no relation whatsoever between the 
amount of deaths and the likelihood to receive UN sanctions. The 1991 coup that 
ousted Haitian President Bertrand Aristide produced a total of 26 deaths. The 
deaths produced by the 1997 Sierra Leonean coup are not available, probably due 
to the fact that the coup occurred during an ongoing civil war in which Johnny 






Front, and the Kamajor factions were sometimes hard to distinguish.488 The 2012 
coup in Guinea-Bissau in which General Antonio Indjai grabbed power two weeks 
before the second round of the presidential election was bloodless. 
If the UN Security Council had wanted to make a point of imposing sanctions in 
response to the most bloody coups, those that took place in Chad (1990; 5000 
deaths) and Burundi (1996; 6000 deaths) would have made more sense. In the 
case of Guinea-Bissau, it would have been more sensible to respond to the 1999 
coup that involved 300 deaths, rather than the bloodless coup of 2012. Coup 
deaths can thus be quickly discarded in our search for a consistent policy.  
 
9.4.2. Civil War 
A second way to consider the ‘gravity’ of a coup is by asking whether it induced a 
civil war. Coups d’état are recognized by the UN within the framework of conflict 
prevention, indicating that the overthrow of the government is as much a concern 
as the potential consequences. Many authors have warned for the dangerous 
consequences of coups, linking them to graver forms of internal aggression and 
civil war, so UN sanctions are a logical and appropriate tool of signaling 
disapproval as well as a tool of conflict prevention. The failed military coup in 
Turkey of July 2016 for example, was widely condemned as illegitimate and 
dangerous to the stability of the region. If the coup had been successful, UN 
sanctions would have been a feasible option.  
Analysis of the list of 36 coups d’état since 1990 however teaches us that there is 
no clear relation between coups, civil conflict, and sanctions. Of the three coups 
that were met with sanctions, only that in Sierra Leone (1997) can be linked to 
igniting (or rather extending) the civil war that had already been raging since 1991. 
The same can however be said of the 1992 coup staged by a group of young 
soldiers led by Valentine Strasser, who came to power at the age of only 25 and 
only aggravated the conflict with the RUF. Other coups that took place during civil 
wars or that contributed to the ignition of civil wars include those in Liberia (1994), 
Burundi (1996), Cambodia (1997), and Mali (2012), but the respective coup 
leaders were never sanctioned.  
The UN sanctions episodes on Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau can thus 
also not be explained by considering their impact on civil war. Clearly the ‘threat’ 
caused by coups should be interpreted as a threat to either democratic peace, or 
the political interests of the imposers.  
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9.5.3. Adverse Regime Change 
To legal scholars it might not matter whether a coup promotes or disrupts the 
democratic process as all coups are by definition unlawful, but to proponents of a 
Liberal Peace it does. Seen from the perspective of those who support the 
democratic entitlement school, not all coups are the same. A well-designed coup 
to oust a government that is considered to be ´failing´ or ‘illegitimate’ could indeed 
be a very effective and non-violent way of regime change. For example, when in 
2013 the Egyptian Armed Forces successfully responded to popular protests to 
bring down President Hosni Mubarak, they received widespread praise for their 
role in bringing down a dictatorial regime and preparing the road for democratic 
elections. Similarly, many commentators would arguably view a coup d’état in 
contemporary Venezuela in a favorable light if president Maduro were to be ousted 
in a bloodless manner. ‘Democratic coups’, in which the armed forces respond to 
a popular demand, overthrows a dictator or authoritarian regime, and facilitates 
free and fair elections,489 might then be let off the hook.  
In order to deal with the above issue, it is interesting to ask which successful coups 
since 1990 constituted ‘democratic coups’ and which would better be defined as 
‘anti-democratic’ coups. In order to help solve this question, I use Marshall, Gurr, 
and Jaggers’ variable of ‘Adverse Regime Change (ARC), 490 which indicates how 
coups (and other world events) caused increases or decreases in the regime’s 
‘Polity IV’ score.491 The Polity VI score is an aggregated score between +10 (full 
democracy) and -10 (full autocracy) made up of a list of variables including 
executive recruitment, checks and balances, and political participation. By 
comparing the Polity VI score of a state before a coup to its score after the coup 
one can get an understanding of how it was affected in terms of democratic 
governance.   
Indeed all UN sanctioned coups have in common that they were imposed after a 
clear adverse regime change. After the 1991 coup of Haiti the Polity IV score 
dropped from +7 to -7, indicating a clear reversal from a democratic regime to an 
autocratic one. Similarly, in Sierra Leone’s 1997 coup that was met with UN 
sanctions the Polity IV score had dropped substantially from +4 to -77 (indicating 
anarchy / civil war). Guinea-Bissau’s drop from +6 to +1 in the aftermath of the 
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2012 coup was less notable, but still sufficient to warrant a UN sanctions regime 
with the imposition of UNSC Resolution 2048.  
The Coups in Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau are however far from the 
only cases that induced adverse regime changes. The 1994 coup in the Gambia, 
the 1996 coup in Niger, and the 2014 coup in Thailand, among others, were at 
least equally detrimental for democratic governance in these countries. So the 
question remains. Why Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau and not the other, 
arguably equally sanctionable coups?  
 
9.5.4. State Capability 
A glance at the Correlates of War CINC index teaches us that powerful states that 
experienced coups have not been sanctioned under chapter VII of the UN charter, 
even if they experienced a notable adverse regime change. Typical examples 
include the various coups in Thailand (CINC score of 0.8%), the 2013 coup in 
Egypt (0.9%), and the 1999 coup in Pakistan (1.3%), right after the conclusion of 
the Kargil War, and after Pakistan had successfully upgraded their nuclear 
capacity. Failing to sanction these relatively strong states under the UN framework 
can be considered geopolitically prudent.  
Sanctions thus tend to be imposed on states with relatively low CINC scores. This 
doesn’t however mean that the states that were sanctioned in response to coups 
d’état, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, were necessarily the ‘weakest’ on 
the list. Haiti (0.04%), Sierra Leone (0.02%), and Guinea-Bissau (0.01%) are 
indeed states that boast little geo-political significance, but the same can be said 
of Comoros (0.001%), Suriname (0.003%), Fiji (0.01%), the Gambia (0.01%), 
Lesotho (0.01%), Central African Republic (0.02%), Mauritania (0.02%), Congo-
Brazzaville (0.03%), Togo (0.03%), and Guinea (0.04%).  
 
9.5. Unilateral sanctions 
 
Just as in the previous chapter on civil conflicts, vetoes in the UN Security Council 
could provide an explanation as to why some coups d’état since 1990 were met 
with UN sanctions and others not. However, in none of the thirty three cases that 
were not sanctioned did UN vetoes play a role. There are also no known cases in 
which P5 members threatened to use their veto, which would make them count as 
a ‘silent veto’.  
Western states have however used unilateral sanctions regimes in response to 
coups on several occasions, just as they have imposed sanctions in response to 
human rights violations and autocratic regimes generally. As a matter of fact, the 






US Foreign Assistance Act explicitly states that the US government must cut aid 
to “any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military 
coup or decree".492 The European Union’s legal framework doesn’t mandate a 
specific reaction in response to coups, simply stating that restrictive measures are 
imposed “to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country, part of 
country, government, entities or individuals”, in line with the objectives set out in 
the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.493  
While the US State Department’s instructions regarding coups are more explicit on 
paper, there is still plenty of political maneuvering space to waive the imposition of 
sanctions. First of all, only those coups instigated by a military leaders that replace 
a democratically elected leader count, enabling the US government to stay on the 
sidelines in cases of revolutions or in ‘democratic coups’. In case that doesn’t work, 
there is always the option of waiving sanctions because of a ‘national security 
threat’, or simply by labelling the event differently. Take for example the 2012 
revolution in Egypt that ousted Hosni Mubarak, a dictator, and that brought to 
power the Muslim Brotherhood leader Morsi. The US state department did not 
count this as a coup, but rather a democratic revolution. A year later, when Morsi 
was ousted by Egyptian defense minister General El-Sisi in a textbook example of 
coup d’état, the Obama administration’s reaction called it a ‘couplike event’, but 
not a real coup.494 Military aid remained untouched. The European Union had an 
easier job legitimizing their sanctions policy towards Egypt, already having 
imposed sanctions on the Mubarak regime during the 2011 Arab Spring revolution, 
and renewing them after the 2013 coup.  
All in all, the United States and European Union imposed some sort of sanction in 
respectively 14 and 8 out of the 36 successful coups that occurred since 1990. The 
EU imposed sanctions in response to the coups in Nigeria (1993), Haiti (1994), 
Congo Brazzaville (1997), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea (2008), Guinea-Bissau 
(2012), Egypt (2013), and Thailand (2014). The US additionally sanctioned 
Thailand (1991, 2006), Gambia (1994), Cote d’Ivoire (1999), Pakistan (1999), 
Nepal (2002), Fiji (2006), Mauritania (2008), and Mali (2012).495 It must however 
be noted that in many of these cases the sanctions were largely symbolic, 
suspending (some) military aid, temporarily ceasing diplomatic cooperation, or 
suspending loans. In practically all other (non-sanctioned) cases, the EU and the 
US did publish statements condemning the coups, but took no further action.  
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9.6. Five Short Case Studies 
 
As in the previous chapters, the answer seems to lie with the strategic political 
interests of the permanent members of the UNSC, most notably the United States, 
France, and the United Kingdom. China and Russia seem less concerned with 
imposing UN sanctions in response to coups. State strength does seem to matter 
when it comes to imposing sanctions after coups. Stronger states that were subject 
to coups since 1990, including Thailand, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt, were not 
sanctioned by the UN.496 Haiti, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, all small states 
with Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores of less than 0.1%, did 
receive sanctions. However, this still leaves us with a list of small states that 
experience a large drop in their Polity VI score after a coup and that were not 
sanctioned nevertheless. In order to provide some deeper understanding about 
why some coups were met with UN sanctions while others were not, some deeper 
analysis on a case by case basis is necessary. The following pages will therefore 
provide short case studies of the coups in Haiti (1991), the Gambia (1994), Sierra 
Leone (1997), Central African Republic (2003), and Guinea Bissau (2012), in an 
attempt to better understand the local realities surrounding these coups and the 
actions of the international community in dealing with them.   
 
9.6.1. Coup in Haiti (1991, Sanctioned) 
Haiti was the first colony in the new world to receive its independence from France, 
with Napoleon withdrawing his troops from Port au Prince in 1804. Ever since, the 
island dominated by former African slaves has been an independent and sovereign 
states in the backyard of the United States, firmly subjected to the Monroe 
Doctrine. As a matter of fact, after the 1915 assassination of president Guillaume 
Sam the US occupied the island for 19 years. Under the watchful eye of the United 
States, post WWII Haiti was dominated politically by the Duvalier family, with 
Francois Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude ruling the country in a dictatorial 
fashion between 1957 and 1986, whose reign was followed by a series of coups 
d’état and popular uprisings. When the general election of 1990-1991 took place, 
the Organization of American States as well as the United Nations were deeply 
involved in assuring the elections’ legitimacy, with United Nations Observer Group 
for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) monitoring the elections on 
the ground.  
Former priest and pro-democracy leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide was the favored 
candidate among the Haitian poor as well as the international community, but 
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certainly not among the Haitian political and economic elites that had been in 
charge of the country for decades. Land owners and military elites involved in the 
international drug trade were to lose out if Aristide won the elections. Aristide’s 
National Front for Change and Democracy (FCND) won the elections by a 
landslide (67.5%), but his presidency lasted for only 8 months. The coup d’état led 
by General Raoul Cédras of 29 September 1991 was followed by a large-scale 
release of alleged drug-traffickers and frequent assassinations and 
disappearances of Aristide supporters.497  
The coup was immediately condemned by governments and international 
organizations worldwide. The Organization of American States (OAS) demanded 
adherence to the Constitution and the safe return of Aristide to power. Diplomatic, 
economic and financial sanctions combined with a suspension of aid would follow 
if the democratically elected president was not reinstated immediately. A week 
later, on the 11th of October 1991, the UN General Assembly also condemned the 
coup and the violations of human rights under the new regime. Indeed some 
sources estimate that some 3000 people were killed during Cédras’ reign.498 In 
1992 and 1993 the OAS and UN sent a civilian mission of human rights observers 
(MICIVIH), but sanctions were not imposed until the summer of 1993 with UNSCR 
841. By this time, Haiti had become subject to a severe humanitarian crisis with 
large numbers of internally displaced people and grave violations of human rights, 
leading the UN to recognize the situation as a threat to the peace.499 The sanctions 
imposed regarded the prevention of sale and supply of petroleum products and 
arms and related materials. The sanctions succeeded in bringing Cédras to the 
negotiating table, and by July 1993 negotiations between representatives from the 
OAS, the UN, the Clinton administration, and the Cédras regime on Governors 
Island (NY) seemed to bring Aristide’s return closer. However, the agreement 
broke down and a full-fledged trade embargo was imposed in 1994 (UNSCR 917), 
followed by another resolution (940) that authorized Operation Uphold Democracy, 
a US led military intervention under President Bill Clinton.500 General Cédras 
capitulated under US military pressure before the first plane had landed in Haiti. It 
later became clear that Cédras had succumbed at the very last moment after 
retired US General Colin Powell had explained to him in great detail the potential 
of the US military’s 82nd airborne division that was already on its way to Haiti.501 
On 15 October 1994 Aristide was reinstalled.  
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The economic and humanitarian impacts of the sanctions were grave. Although 
the unintended consequences were not as severe as those in Iraq in the aftermath 
of the invasion of Kuwait, they have been described as inducing a significant 
deterioration in the quality of life of ordinary Haitians.502 An approximated 30.000 
jobs in the export sector directly disappeared after the OAS sanctions, and up to 
300.000 formal jobs had disappeared by the end of 1994.503 Economic output 
dropped, commodity prices soared, and the currency depreciated by 200%. 
UNICEF figures estimate that acute malnutrition doubled in the country that 
already struggled with feeding children before the crisis.  
  
9.6.2. Coup in the Gambia (1994, not sanctioned) 
Not long after the UNSC imposed Resolution 917 on the Cédras regime in Haiti, 
President Dawda Jawara of the Gambia was ousted in a military coup led by 
Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh on the 22nd of July 1994. The Gambia had a reputation 
for being Sub-Sahara Africa’s longest standing multi-party democracies, and was 
widely regarded as an exemplary case of stability together with countries such as 
Botswana and Mauritius. In a continent that was widely associated with 
authoritarianism, rebellions, and political instability, the Gambia stood out, 
adhering to principles of human rights, boosting an open economy, and attracting 
tourists from Britain, it former colonizer, and elsewhere.504  
The coup did not come out of nowhere. Although the Gambia was recognized as 
a multi-party democracy, the same People’s Progressive Party (PPP) had been in 
power since independence in 1965, using tactics of co-optation and patronage to 
appease opposition parties. In the years before the coup the ruling PPP party had 
come under popular pressure due to corruption scandals in the Gambia 
Commercial and Development Bank (GCDB) and the Gambia Cooperative Union 
(GCU). Together with a declining economy, growing economic and social 
inequalities, and disgruntled soldiers who felt underpaid, the coup was not a 
complete surprise.505  
From the beginning it was clear that the new Armed Forces Provisional Ruling 
Council (AFPRC) under Jammeh was not going to benefit democratic governance. 
They suspended the Constitution, banned political parties, and imposed a curfew. 
Critical journalists and opposition members were arrested and jailed, and in 1995 
two former ministers died under suspicious circumstances. The Gambia’s Policy 
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IV score dropped 15 points from +8 on the democracy scale in 1990 to -7 on the 
Autocracy scale in 1994. President Jammeh stayed in power for four consecutive 
presidential terms and has been described as a stereotypical African dictator, 
boosting authoritarian policies, cracking down on political dissent, and leading a 
lavish lifestyle. Rather than celebrating the Gambia’s 1965 independence as a 
national holiday, Jammeh’s regime commemorated the 1994 coup. After he lost a 
2016 election he was pressured by the international community to step down, 
which he finally did in January 2017.506  
The 1994 response to the military coup of 1994 by the international community 
was however much milder. In a year that saw over 150 Resolutions passed in the 
UN Security Council, the Gambia was not mentioned once. Many Gambians are 
convinced that Jammeh’s coup was supported by the United States, whose navy 
forces assisted the Gambian military in a training operation in early 1994. US 
ambassador Winter did assist in bringing former president Jawara to safety on the 
day of the coup, but nothing was done to prevent the coup from being successful. 
In the direct aftermath, both the US and the EU, alongside with unilateral donors 
and international institutions such as the WB and IMF, temporarily suspended aid 
to the Gambia. Real sanctions were however never imposed, and after Jammeh 
won the 1996 Presidential elections things largely turned back to normal. European 
tourists already came back by the end of 1995, and in the US Jammeh generally 
received red-carpet treatment until he lost the 2016 election.  
To conclude, the abrupt reversal of democratic governance in the Gambia after the 
1994 coup d’état was not considered important enough to qualify for a UN 
sanctions regime. In a year that saw over 150 Resolution passed in the UNSC, the 
coup in the Gambia, a small democratic state of minor geo-political importance, 
was internationally condemned, but most of all permitted.  
 
9.6.3. Coup in Sierra Leone (1997, sanctioned) 
Similar to Haiti and the Gambia, Sierra Leone too is a small state of little geo-
political importance. Much like its West-African neighbors it has a history of coups 
d’état, with ten coup attempts since independence from Britain in 1961, five of 
which were successful, and three of which occurred after the Cold War 
(1992/1996/1997). The latest of the three, led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma in 
1997, took place in the midst of the Sierra Leonean civil war that had been ravaging 
Sierra Leone since 1991 and that ended in 2002, leaving an estimated 20.000 
dead.  
The first coup d’état took place after the start of the Sierra Leonean civil war, in 
which the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel movement fought against the 
                                            






government of Joseph Momoh. Momoh was overthrown in April 1992 by his own 
disgruntled soldiers, who felt they did not receive sufficient support in their fight 
against the rebels. The coup leader, Valentine Strasser, was only 25 years old 
when he came to power and formed the National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC). A UN arms embargo was imposed on neighboring Liberia with UNSCR 
778 that year, but Sierra Leone was let off the hook. In the coup that replaced one 
autocratic regime for another, neither Strasser’s military junta nor the RUF rebel 
movement was sanctioned.  
Strasser himself was also ousted in a coup. After four years of presidency, during 
which the civil war continued, in 1996 he was overthrown by Julius Maada Bio, a 
close friend. Bio promised to bring an end to the war, and to return Sierra Leone 
to democracy, which effectively happened that same year when Ahmad Tejan 
Kabbah was elected president in March 1996. With his background as Chief of the 
West Africa division of the UN Development Program (UNDP), Kabbah enjoyed 
widespread international support, and his inclusive politics led to a peace 
agreement with the RUF, promoting rebel leader Foday Sankoh to Vice President 
in the new government.  
Kabbah’s first presidency led to a relative peace, but didn’t last long. In May 1997 
he was overthrown in a military coup by yet another group of disgruntled soldiers 
who had been fighting the RUF, this time led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who 
had broken out of prison and who similarly installed a military junta, banning the 
constitution, abolishing political parties, and cracking down political dissent. Sierra 
Leone’s Polity VI score, which had just recovered from a -7 Autocracy score to a 
+4 Democracy score thanks to Kabbah’s inclusive politics, dropped back to a 
historical low, with the war experiencing its bloodiest years in 1998 and 1999. The 
neighboring regime under Charles Taylor in Liberia financed the RUF rebels 
through diamond trade, and hundreds of thousands of Sierra Leoneans (and 
Liberians) had been displaced, finding refuge in the region, most notably Guinea.  
The 1997 coup led to widespread condemnation and international action. UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan stated at a 1997 OAU summit that the crimes 
against humanity in Sierra Leone under Koroma’s Military Junta should not go 
unpunished. In October of that year the UNSC unanimously imposed Resolution 
1132, installing an oil and arms embargo on Sierra Leone, which would later be 
followed by an embargo on diamond exports as well as smart sanctions on RUF 
leaders. Resolution 1132 also authorized a military intervention by the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), who sent in a peace keeping 
mission that reinstalled President Kabbah into office in 1998. In 2000, the UN 
authorized a British military intervention to bring a final end to the conflict.  
 
 






9.6.4. Coup in Nepal (2002, not sanctioned) 
Nepal has a history of autocratic government. Between 1951 and 2007 Nepal’s 
government was in the grip of absolute monarchs who occasionally experimented 
with multi-party democracy but who always kept firm control over the country’s 
people and politicians. In 1959 Nepal adopted a multi-party constitution, but 
directly after the 1960 elections King Mahendra suspended the parliament and 
installed a no-party system in which the King enjoyed all executive power. After 30 
years of political repression, 1990 saw new multi-party elections, but in the 14 
subsequent years 14 governments were dissolved by the Monarchy, allowing King 
Mahendra and his successor Bihendra to keep a tight grip on power.507 The 
continued political repression ignited a civil war between the state and Maoist 
rebels that lasted for 10 years between 1996 and 2006 and that produced an 
estimated 12.000 deaths.508 In the midst of the civil war in 2001 King Mahendra 
was assassinated by his own son in a bloody palace massacre that also killed the 
queen and six other royal family members, including Crown Prince Dipendra 
himself.509  
On the 4th of October 2002 his brother Gyanendra, who had ascended to the 
thrown after the massacre, fired Prime Minister Deuba and took over power. Since 
King Gyanendra also enjoyed the position of head of the Royal Nepalese Army, 
the Marshall and Marshall Dataset defines the event as a military coup. In a 
subsequent ‘autocoup’ in 2005, in which an interim government was sacked and 
in which the King ordered a shutdown of Nepal’s phone and internet networks as 
well as the country’s newspapers and radio stations, the return to Absolute 
Monarchy was complete.  
The 2002 coup induced a 12-point drop in Nepal’s Polity VI score, with the 
country’s democracy score dropping from +7 to +1 and its autocracy score 
changing from -1 to -7. Between 2001 and 2005 nine governments were dismissed 
by the King. In April 2006 nineteen citizens were killed in a popular protest.510 The 
2002 coup also ignited the bloodiest years in the Nepalese civil war against the 
Maoist insurgents, with over 4400 people killed in 2002 alone and over 100.000 
people internally displaced because of the conflict.  
Why was Nepal’s coup, or the civil conflict in general, not subjected to a UN 
sanctions regime? The answer seems to have to do with the interests of the 
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permanent members of the UN Security Council. The United States, United 
Kingdom and India have traditionally been allies of the Nepalese Monarchy, 
supporting the governments under various Kings with arms shipments and military 
training.511 After India, the US, and the UK suspended aid in response to the 2005 
coup, China stepped in to fill the void.512 The Monarchy’s international allies have 
considered the Maoist insurgency as a much bigger threat to their interest than the 
authoritarian regime. Both the European Union and the United States have for 
example placed the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on their designated list 
of terrorist organizations.  
Considering the fact that it was the Maoist insurgents who tried to overthrow the 
sovereign government of Nepal between 1996 and 2006, they were perhaps more 
eligible for UN sanctions than the regime itself. A UN arms embargo was however 
never imposed on either of the parties. There have been no draft Resolutions or 
vetoes on Nepal in the UN Security Council, arguably because nobody wanted to 
openly support an authoritarian Nepalese regime in a war that the regime itself had 
created. Once the war was ended with the 2006 signing of the Comprehensive 
Peace Accord, the United Nations did respond favorably to the Nepalese request 
to establish a United Nations political mission.513    
 
9.6.5. Coup in Guinea-Bissau (2012, sanctioned) 
Since its Independence from Portugal in 1974, Guinea-Bissau has been the stage 
of four coup d´état´s and at least 6 other attempts. However, being an insignificant 
West African country home to less than 2 million inhabitants and with no strategic 
interest to the rest of the world, it was never important enough to make international 
headlines. 
In 1980 Joao Bernardo Vieira staged the first coup, ousting the country´s first 
president Luis Cabral, allowing him to rule for the next 19 years. In 1998 another 
coup attempt split the government forces (supported by neighboring countries) and 
coup leaders, who controlled large parts of the army. After 11 months of civil 
conflict and thousands of deaths, president Vieira was toppled and replaced. The 
next president, Kumba Yala, lasted for three years before he too was overthrown 
in 2003 in a military coup. After some tumultuous years, ex-president Vieira made 
a comeback from being exiled in Portugal and managed to win the 2005 elections. 
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In 2009 he was assassinated by renegade soldiers. None of these events however 
ignited the urge to install a sanctions regime.514  
So what made the international community change its mind? Since the mid-2000s 
media coverage on Guinea-Bissau, although still meagre, has become dominated 
by the issue of drug trafficking. As a small state with weak political infrastructure, 
high levels of poverty and corruption, and a favorable geography, Guinea-Bissau 
has turned out to be a perfect place for trafficking drugs from Latin America 
destined for the European market. The country´s Atlantic coastline is dotted with 
two dozen little islands that have proven comfortable smuggling havens for 
Colombian, Ecuadorian, Peruvian, Brazilian and Venezuelan drug cartels that 
smuggle cocaine into Europe.515 
In 2008 a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
recognized Guinea-Bissau as a new hub for cocaine trafficking in West Africa. 
Between 2005 and 2007 a total of 33 tons of cocaine were intercepted in West 
Africa on route to Europe, compared to a mere 1 ton prior to 2005. With the drug 
trafficking increasingly penetrating into Guinean society and politics, the peace 
building and democratization efforts of the UN peace-building mission in Guinea-
Bissau (UNIOGBIS) were largely undermined. The trafficking business negatively 
affected public security, respect for the rule of law, and public health (because of 
increased local consumption). Politics became increasingly corrupted, with 
politicians and military leaders being involved. 
As the situation worsened in 2010 and 2011, donors retrieved and the European 
Union (EU) decided to stop training Guinean security forces and suspends part of 
its aid. The United States froze the assets of two drug-traffickers, and the UNODC 
and Interpol helped Guinea-Bissau set up a Transnational Crimes Unit. In the 
meantime the two alleged drug kingpins subjected to US asset freezes were 
promoted to Army Chief (Antonio Indjai) and head of the Navy (Jose Americo Bubo 
Na Tchuto). Tchuto was arrested by the American Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) in international waters on 4 April 2012, eight days before the coup.516 Indjai 
has also been indicted by the United States but still walks free in Bissau. On 12 
April 2012, when the military toppled the interim government, Indjai was placed on 
the UN travel ban list along with 10 other military officials.517 
During the coups of 1999 and 2003 and the assassination of Vieira in 2009, the 
UN Security Council and the Sanctions Committee had all the technical capacity 
and institutional consensus to interfere with the internal politics of Guinea-Bissau. 
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However, apparently the coup d´états in an insignificant country such as Guinea-
Bissau were not important enough to arouse sufficient attention in the UNSC. With 
the 2012 coup the UNSC finally had a legal excuse to impose sanctions on the 
individuals implicated in the drug trafficking. However, by then Guinea-Bissau had 





United Nations sanctions regimes in response to coups d’état are the exception, 
with the rule being inaction. Targets are conveniently cherry-picked by the Western 
permanent members of the Security Council to deal with some urgent threats to 
democratic peace, not ‘threats to the peace’ in a more general sense.  
The fact that most coups d’état since 1990 were not sanctioned by the United 
Nations makes sense. Compared to nuclear proliferation, interstate war, civil war, 
and terrorism, coups are relatively minor threats to international security, or human 
security for that matter. As a matter of fact, more than half of all successful coups 
since 1990 were bloodless, and a quarter of all coups actually led to improved 
governance in the aftermath. It would be unfair to put these events on par with the 
security threats of ISIL, the second Congo War, or the North Korean nuclear 
program. It’s therefore the exceptions we should look at, not the rule.  
Many coup leaders have received unilateral sanctions from the United States or 
the European Union, indicating a commitment to spreading and upholding 
democratic values across the world. Unfortunately for those who support the liberal 
peace thesis, however, the unilateral sanctions records of both the EU and the US 
reveal a pattern of selectivity based on interests, not on a full commitment to 
democracy. There is no good reason to withhold military aid to Nigeria (1993), Mali 
(2012), and Thailand (2014) in the aftermath of military coups, but not to Niger 
(1996, 2010), the Central African Republic (2003) or Bangladesh (2007), all of 
which led to a dramatic adverse regime change, and three of which included 
killings. The full logic behind this selectivity of unilateral sanctions remains 
unknown, and deserves further study. Similarly, it remains unclear why the US and 
the EU did not push for multilateral sanctions under the umbrella of the United 
Nations. In most of the cases that were sanctioned unilaterally by Western 
governments, Russia and China did not have any clear strategic interest in 
blocking the sanctions with a veto in the Security Council.  
The tendency to select cases of special interest to Western P5 members is even 
more pronounced in the three cases of Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. In 
the case of Haiti, the US had a clear interest in bringing back to power Aristide, the 






democratically elected president that the US had fervently supported in his 
campaign to deal with drug-traffickers on the island in America’s backyard. 
Similarly, in the case of Sierra Leone, President Kabbah was clearly the candidate 
most favored by the West, given his background as a UNDP officer and his 
inclusive political program. The fact that the coup that ousted him also sparked the 
continuation of a civil war that had already killed tens of thousands of people added 
to the urgency of the sanctions, but doesn’t explain them as such. After all, civil 
wars were also ongoing during the earlier coups in Sierra Leone, as well as in 
coups in Mali, Afghanistan, and the Central African Republic, among others, not of 
which were sanctioned. Finally, the case of Guinea-Bissau shows that a coup can 
serve to legitimize a sanctions regime that is really about something else. After all, 
drug-trafficking in a failed state in West Africa that affects the European narcotics 






































































Conclusions: UN Sanctions and Selective Security  
 
 
What are United Nations sanctions regimes for? 
The short answer is that sanctions are selected based on the interests of those 
who send them. The 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council use their 
power either to promote sanctions regimes or to block them. Western members 
typically promote sanctions to pursue their interests; China and Russia tend to 
block them to pursue theirs. The interplay among the interests of the senders 
decides what happens when a sanctionable offence occurs. If there is sufficient 
interest to promote UN sanctions, and no major objection from any other members, 
they are imposed. If at least one member does object, or if nobody deemed the 
issue important enough in the first place, they are not imposed. It’s as simple as 
that.  
The long answer, while reaching the same conclusion, is that it’s complicated. Yes, 
states follow their ‘interests’ when they discuss about whether a conflict represents 
a ‘threat to the peace’ that requires sanctions. Throughout this thesis, however, we 
have seen that the word ‘interests’ is a highly malleable one, flexible through time 
and space. The security ‘interests’ of France are not the same as those of Russia, 
and the ‘interests’ of the United States were not the same in the 1960s as they are 
in 2019. Also, while the security interests surrounding nuclear proliferation are 
framed in terms of geopolitics and defensive realism, those surrounding civil war 
are rather framed in terms of human security, or at most regional stability. Add to 
that a few layers of international treaties, ex-colonial ties, regional power-politics, 
and international public opinion, and the confusion is complete. It is now our task 
to disentangle the 191 sanctionable offences discussed in the previous chapters 
and reassemble them so as to clearly explain what UN sanctions since 1990 have 
been for.  
The table below represents an overview of all five sanctionable offences and all 
seven conclusions that help explain the selective nature of UN sanctions. A plus 
sign (+) indicates that sanctions are more likely to be imposed when this variable 
exists in a given case. A negative sign (-) indicates that UN sanctions will not be 
imposed. Negative signs however always trump positive signs, no matter how 
many apply to a case. The boxes that are left empty indicate that a variable is not 






that matters is countervailing power. If it is present (-), sanctions will not be 
imposed. If it is absent (.), they will be imposed.  
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Except for the variable of ‘countervailing power’ (-), all the variables discussed in 
conclusions two to seven (+) concern Western liberal interpretations of 
international security. Human security is an inherently liberal idea that conflicts with 
the concept of unrestrained state sovereignty. The issues of democracy (+) and 
state fragility (+) are intimately linked with Western conceptions of what a healthy 
state looks like. Public pressure (+) only affects those states in which the public 
has a say in government policy. While the threat of Islamic terrorism mostly affects 
civilians in Islamic countries, the global war against Islamic terrorism (+) is 
unquestionably led by the West. Finally, while China and Russia are also 
concerned with Africa (+), it has historically been the West that has had most 
political and economic interaction with Africa, whether through (ex-) colonial ties, 
humanitarian intervention, or structural economic adjustment.  






In an institution with a normative framework that was largely created by the West, 
the responsibility for delivering on the promises of the institution also lies with the 
West. Surely, power-politics (-) form an obstacle sometimes, but in all the other 
cases that could have been sanctioned but nevertheless weren’t, the West only 
has itself to blame. While China and Russia do not always explicitly agree with the 
norms that the West created within the framework of UN sanctions, they tend not 
to block UNSC resolutions as long as their vital interests are not at stake. As a 
matter of fact, they normally don’t abstain, but positively vote along with resolutions 
that propose to sanction humanitarian crises, cases of state failure, or Islamic 
terrorism. When it comes to nuclear proliferation and interstate war, the consensus 
among the P5 is even stronger, leading to a convergence of interests. Apart from 
those cases that met obvious geopolitical obstacles, all the failures to impose 
sanctions are on the West’s account.  
Whereas chapters 5-9 were ordered by offence, the conclusions of this thesis will 
link back to the hypotheses presented in chapter 4, as well as the theories 
discussed in the theoretical framework in Chapters 1-3. Together, they form a 
comprehensive overview of how the interests of the permanent members of the 
UN Security Council differ from each other, as well as how they have change over 
time and how they differ per type of offence.  
 
Conclusion One: Countervailing Power Matters (-) 
 
Countervailing power matters. Besides the P5 themselves, a number of states 
have it, whether it is thanks to their nuclear capability, their relative geopolitical 
weight, or a strong historical or political alliance with one of the P5 members. Unfair 
as it may seem to the defenders of a more idealist UN sanctions regime, this 
means that states such as India, Pakistan, Israel, Myanmar, Turkey, Indonesia, 
Ukraine, Colombia, Nigeria, and Syria can get away with human rights violations 
that are otherwise likely to receive sanctions.  
It must be noted that the conclusions on countervailing power do not directly 
helping in answering what UN sanctions are for. Rather, countervailing power 
helps explain what sanctions are not for. It is clearly not in the interest of the UNSC 
to provoke nuclear powers regional hegemons into further escalation of a conflict. 
The same goes for issues concerning states that are allied to a P5 member, such 
as Ukraine (Russia) or Myanmar (China). UN sanctions are not designed to poke 
bears.  
With respect to chapter 5 (nuclear proliferation), the issue of countervailing power 
is one of the reasons that no further states are allowed to develop nuclear weapons 






security in themselves, they also give those governments who own them a wildcard 
to commit human rights violations at will without having to fear the consequences. 
Take Pakistan for example. Since 1990 the Pakistani government has (a) 
developed a nuclear program, (b) started an interstate war with India, (c) fought 
several civil wars, (d) sponsored terrorism, and (e) experienced a coup d’état. All 
of these offences feature in the SOD; none of them were sanctioned. Had Pakistan 
remained a non-nuclear power, it might have ended up like Iraq, which also tried 
to develop a nuclear program, started an interstate war with Kuwait, fought several 
civil wars, and sponsored terrorism, and which was subjected to UN sanctions 
regimes almost uninterruptedly since 1990. It is only logical that the UNSC does 
not want Iran and North Korea to follow in the footsteps of Pakistan. Not only 
because of the risk that nuclear weapons represent in themselves, but also 
because of the countervailing power it gives them to exempt themselves from 
being sanctioned for other offences.  
With respect to chapter 6 (interstate war), the logic of UN sanctions plays out 
perfectly along the lines of countervailing power. Iraq was sanctioned for its 
aggression against Kuwait in 1990; Pakistan was let off the hook in response to 
the 1998 Kargil war against India. Similarly, Eritrea and Ethiopia were both 
sanctioned for the 1998-2000 border war; sanctions on the US-led coalition that 
invaded Iraq in 2003 were out of the question. Nobody would argue that this track-
record has anything to do with the nature of the aggression, or with the 
humanitarian gravity of the war. Countervailing power explains everything.  
With respect to chapter 7 (civil war), the only government with countervailing power 
that was involved in a civil war that was nevertheless subjected to UN sanctions 
was Liberia in 1992. Regardless of the hundreds of thousands of conflict-deaths in 
Syria, India, Turkey, Russia, or Colombia, and regardless of the impact these wars 
had on the governability of the states at hand or the regional instability that ensued 
as a result, none were sanctioned. This is not to say that other factors don’t matter 
at all (they do) but simply to acknowledge the fact that they only matter after filtering 
out those cases in which countervailing power interferes.  
With respect to chapters 8 (terrorism) and 9 (coups d’état), the issue of 
countervailing power is less salient, but nevertheless existent. UN sanctions 
regimes related to terrorism have largely focused on terrorist organizations, not 
states. States have however also been sanctioned for supporting terrorism (Libya, 
Afghanistan, Sudan), whereas other states such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, 
Iraq, India, Russia, and the United States have not. Perhaps not all of these 
governments were left unsanctioned because of their countervailing power, but in 
several of them it might certainly have played a role. When it comes to sanctioning 
coups d’état, a different logic applies. Most coups were left unsanctioned simply 
because of a lack of interest on the part of the international community.  






Overall, the selectivity of sanctions based on countervailing power is neatly in line 
with classical- and neo-realist theories of international relations. Not much has 
changed since Mussolini’s claim that the League of Nations is very well when 
sparrows shout, but no good at all when eagles fall out. Similarly, E.H. Carr would 
not be surprised to see that utopian idealism can only get the international 
community so far before hitting a wall of vested interests. Despite the UN Charter, 
despite the advances made in international humanitarian law, despite the end of 
the Cold War, despite American soft power, despite the institutionalization of 
international political economy, and despite the advances made within United 
Nations peace operations, the core political interests of powerful states remain a 
primary variable in determining who gets sanctioned. The selectivity of UN 
sanctions regimes clearly shows the limits of Krasner’s ‘regime shifts’ and 
Keohane’s ‘sticky institutions’ after hegemony. It also shows the limits of the liberal 
idealism espoused by Moravcsik and Nye. Surely the ideal of liberal democracy 
and the respect human rights has taken root in various places around the world 
since 1990, most notably in Eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent in Latin 
America, Africa, and South-East Asia. Although some of these states are currently 
experiencing nationalist and authoritarian backlashes, their overall achievements 
are still notable. One might even go as far as to say that the relative peace and 
stability in these countries is related to the overall democratic and economic 
progress made since 1990 in these places. None of these achievements have 
however structurally changed the way in which states with countervailing power 
avoid UN sanctions, or the way P5 members vote when it comes to sanctioning 
allies or nuclear powers. As Mearsheimer put it, “in the anarchic world of 
international politics, it is better to be Godzilla than Bambi”.518  
 
Conclusion Two: Humanitarian Concerns Matter (+) 
 
Humanitarian concerns do matter. The record of UN sanctions since 1990 in 
response to humanitarian suffering does reveal a selectiveness based on the 
extent of crises. Especially after filtering out the cases that were left unsanctioned 
due to countervailing power (see conclusion 1), there is a clear tendency to 
sanction those conflicts, governments, and groups responsible for most deaths, 
whether counted as battle-deaths or civilian deaths. The results show that 
whenever geopolitical obstacles are absent, international humanitarian norms 
such as the Responsibility to Protect are relevant.  
With respect to chapter 6 (interstate war), all major interstate wars that did not 
involve major powers (with countervailing power) were met with UN sanctions. 
                                            






Both in the cases of Iraq-Kuwait and Eritrea-Ethiopia, P5 votes on the imposition 
of sanctions were unanimous.519 Together with the sanctions on nuclear 
proliferators, the track record on sanctioning interstate wars shows that there is a 
clear consensus among the P5 members that wars of aggression are not tolerated. 
It must also be remembered that during the Cold War the UNSC did not sanction 
any of the dozens of interstate conflicts around the world. In that light the track-
record of sanctions in response to interstate wars can only be considered progress.  
With respect to chapter 7 (civil war), humanitarian concerns should be of utmost 
importance. Of all the sanctionable offences discussed in this thesis, civil war is 
responsible for the most deaths by far. Nuclear weapons have not killed a single 
person since 1990. Interstate wars killed approximately 170.000 people. The 88 
deadliest terrorist organizations since 2000 killed roughly 135.000 people since 
1990. Coups d’état killed no more than 11.500. Civil wars, by comparison, killed 
about 1.8 million battle deaths according to the UCDP, as well as many more 
millions of direct and indirect civilian deaths. 
Civil wars that were sanctioned were clearly bloodier than those that were not 
sanctioned, with average death-tolls of approximately 49.000 for sanctioned 
conflicts vs. 12.500 non-sanctioned conflicts. The most dramatic exception of a 
non-sanctioned civil war is obviously that of Syria, by far the bloodiest conflict since 
the Rwandan genocide at over 290.000 deaths. Together with conflicts such as 
those in Myanmar, Ukraine, India, and Pakistan, Syria represents the frustration 
many people feel towards the power-politics in the UNSC. While the failure to 
impose targeted sanctions in these cases is infuriating to some, at least it can be 
explained. Some bears are simply not to be poked. The true concern should 
perhaps lie with the 19 cases that didn’t face any countervailing power restraints, 
but that were nevertheless left unsanctioned. While on average the deaths among 
these cases were substantially lower than those conflicts that were sanctioned, 
there are at least 7 wars that produced more than 5.000 deaths, including Sri Lanka 
(60.000), Uganda (10.000), Nepal (10.000), Burundi (9.000), Chad (7.000), Peru 
(6.000), and the first Congolese war (6.000). In all these cases except for the DRC, 
the armed groups fighting the governments did not form a major threat to state-
collapse, pointing towards the idea that governments are given some leeway in 
dealing with armed groups as long as state-sovereignty is not at stake (see 
conclusion 3).  
With regard to chapter 8 (terrorism), human security also matters, although the 
(perceived) security of some humans seems to matter more than those of others. 
Across the board, terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan are 
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indeed the deadliest groups since 2000. The threat they pose to human security is 
on par with civil wars such as South Sudan, Libya, or Cambodia, all of which were 
sanctioned. The issue with sanctions against terrorist organizations is however that 
they seem to be heavily biased against Islamic groups. Non-Islamic groups that 
use tactics of terror while fighting wars of liberation, independence, whether in 
Colombia (FARC), Sri Lanka (Tamil Tigers), or Turkey (PKK) seem to be invisible 
to the UN, whereas relatively minor Islamic groups loosely associated with Al-
Qaeda or ISIL are almost instantly listed (see conclusion 6).   
Finally, with regard to chapter 9 (coups d’état), human security seems irrelevant. 
It is not only that generally very few people get killed during coups, but also that 
the deadliest instances of coups since 1990 in Chad (5.000 deaths) and Burundi 
(6.000) were not sanctioned. The only cases in which sanctions were imposed 
were all bloodless. The selectivity of sanctions on coups can better be explained 
through the variable of democracy (see conclusion 4).  
Overall, we can conclude that the UNSC does select sanctions based on the 
humanitarian gravity of the situation. The liberal idealism espoused by the West 
since 1990, as well as the normative changes that were institutionalized in the UN 
though the efforts of Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan, did facilitate sanctions 
episodes in response to many humanitarian crises. Considering that before 1990 
UN sanctions in response to civil wars were unthinkable, lots of progress has been 
made. The track-record among conflicts that broke out after 2000 is especially 
hopeful, with only one conflict of 5.000+ deaths (Ukraine) left completely 
unsanctioned.520 While China is known for abstained from voting so as not to 
interfere with the sovereignty of other states, in reality it only did so in the civil wars 
of Cambodia (1992), Bosnia (1992), Kosovo (1998), and Sudan (2005). In all the 
other sanctioned civil wars both Russia and China actively voted in favor of 




Conclusion Three: State Fragility Matters (+) 
Fragile and failed states are more likely to receive sanctions. Not because they 
lack countervailing power, but because the power vacuum that exists in such states 
has many negative consequences, both in terms of human security, national 
security, and international security. The UN Security Council may not always agree 
on the importance of liberal democracy in sovereign states, they do all agree that 
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at least some sort of national stability is necessary in order to maintain the 
international sovereign state system intact. That means that in some cases the 
humanitarian gravity of a conflict moves to a secondary plane. After all, state 
collapse doesn’t necessarily come with tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths, 
but it does increase the risk of conflict-escalation, the use of child-soldiers, rape as 
a weapon, human trafficking, terrorism, and regional instability.  
With respect to chapters 5 (nuclear proliferation), 6 (interstate wars), and 9 (coups 
d’état), state fragility doesn’t seem to be a relevant factor. While nuclear 
proliferation in weak states is potentially a bigger threat to international security 
than in a stable democracy, it will be sanctioned regardless. A democratic 
revolution in North Korea or Iran will not make the Security Council more lenient 
towards their nuclear programs. Similarly, the consensus in the Security Council 
that interstate wars should be sanctioned will hold regardless of the stability or 
fragility of the states involved (as long as they don’t have countervailing power). 
Finally, while coups d’état sometimes do lead to dramatic adverse regime 
changes, they primarily affect the democratic credentials of the state at hand, not 
necessarily the ability to govern.  
With regard to chapter 6 (civil war) typical examples of conflicts in which state 
failure was a more important determinant for sanctions than the death-toll include 
Cote d’Ivoire, Chad, and the Central African Republic, all of were sanctioned when 
the conflicts had not reached 5.000 deaths yet, but that were all associated with 
the consequences of state failure, including large refugee streams, Islamic 
terrorism, high levels of corruption, and group grievances. Not only were these 
security threats in themselves, they were also potential triggers for the escalation 
of larger conflicts. Conversely, relatively large civil wars in states with relatively 
stable governments such as Russia, the Philippines, Pakistan, Algeria, and 
Nigeria, were left unsanctioned. As a matter of fact, with respect to Chapter 7 
(terrorism), in all of the above examples the respective governments, in 
collaboration with the UNSC, did manage to list the armed groups they were 
fighting as designated terrorist organizations, technically imposing targeted 
sanctions on them. This shows that sometimes state stability matters more than 
human security.  
With respect to the theoretical framework, it makes sense to both realists and 
idealists that state fragility matters. For liberal idealists, weak states represent a 
humanitarian risk, as well as an opportunity to promote good governance along 
liberal democratic lines in the aftermath of conflicts. For realists, weak states are 
also an indirect threat to the senders of sanctions themselves. Weak states create 
regional instability, produce immigrant flows, are a breeding ground for terrorism, 
and don’t allow for secure trade and investment. When sanctioning weak states, 
there is something in it for everyone.  







Conclusion four: Democracy can be used as a wildcard (+) 
 
United Nations sanctions generally do not discriminate between democracies and 
autocracies. Yes, many sanctionable offences occur in non-democracies. Yes, 
weak states tend to be non-democracies. And yes, the lifting of UN sanctions in 
the aftermath of conflicts is typically linked to the requirement of holding democratic 
elections. After controlling for these factors, however, the UNSC does not sanction 
targets because they are not democratic, just as it does not let targets off the hook 
because they were democratically elected.  
With respect to chapters 5 (nuclear proliferation), 6 (interstate war), 7 (civil war), 
and 8 (terrorism), the variable of democracy is thus irrelevant. The UNSC would 
not make any exceptions if Finland or New Zealand were to vote for the 
development of a nuclear program. Neither would it stand by idly if Spain and 
Portugal started an interstate war, if a civil war broke out in Panama, or if Japan 
started financing extremist terrorism. Sanctions in response to these offences are 
all responses to the nature of the threat itself, the strength or weakness of the state 
involved, and the humanitarian gravity of the situation, not democratic credentials.  
The only exception seems to lie with coups d’état. Although there is no consensus 
among the P5 members of the Security Council that coups are sanctionable, both 
the United States and the European Union are fierce promoters of democracy, and 
explicitly recognize coups as anti-democratic acts. This is not to say that all 
undemocratic coups since 1990 have been systematically unilaterally sanctioned 
by the US and EU, but it does mean that both have made a point of defending 
democratically elected governments when they are overthrown.  
Since coups d’état are almost never major humanitarian crises, and since they are 
not necessarily correlated with state failure, the UNSC has really only played the 
‘democracy card’ in three instances: Haiti (1991), Sierra Leone (1997), and 
Guinea-Bissau (2012) In all cases, presidents who were clearly favored by the 
international community because of their democratic credentials were ousted by 
military dictatorships. Additionally, the US and EU had a clear interest in reversing 
the coups in all cases, due to Haiti’s proximity to the US, Sierra Leone’s civil war 
and ex-colonial ties with the UK, and Guinea-Bissau’s role in transatlantic drug-
trafficking to Europe. Together, these factors led the UNSC to consider these 
coups as sanctionable.  
Sanctions selected based on the threat to democracy are thus exceptions, but they 
do teach us something extra about what UN sanctions are for, and how norms 
surrounding them are flexible. While China and Russia typically use their voting 






sometimes use sanctions as ‘progressive tools’. Critics might label these actions 
as neocolonial, but in the light of the institutional liberalism advocated by Krasner 
and Keohane it does mean that the Western powers are more instrumental in 
setting the agenda of UN sanctions regimes, as well as the norms surrounding 
them. If one day China or Russia feels the need to reverse a coup in their backyard, 
they might very well follow the precedent set by the West.  
 
Conclusion Five: Public Pressure Sometimes Works (+) 
 
Just as selecting sanctions regimes on the basis of the threat to democracy is 
exclusively a Western affair, so is selecting sanctions based on public pressure. 
Public pressure requires freedom of speech, as well as the freedom of association 
and an independent press. Russia and China both lack these democratic features, 
facilitating them to pursue foreign policy goals without having to fear popular 
backlash, and without having to play two-level games. For the US, UK, and France 
it’s a different story. In multi-party representative democracies, governments don’t 
only represent the general interest, they also have to make sure to get (re-) elected 
into office. While foreign policy adventures with military involvement can backfire 
among the public, sanctions in response to human rights violations are normally 
supported, or even requested. For Western governments, sanctions are then a 
convenient compromise between ‘doing something’ to hold up international norms 
and to punish human rights violators, without having to pay the political and 
economic price of a military adventure.  
Just as with humanitarian concerns, public pressure only influences the likelihood 
of sanctions after having passed a filter of countervailing power (see conclusions 
1 and 2). In cases that concern nuclear powers, regional hegemons, or allies of P5 
members, the New York Times, the Times, and Le Figaro can publish as many op-
eds as they like, but they won’t translate into sanctions regimes. Once the obstacle 
of countervailing power is accounted for, however, public pressure works, both in 
getting sanctioned small and large conflicts.  
With respect to chapters 5 (nuclear proliferation) and 6 (interstate war), the variable 
of public pressure is thus not a major determinant. The nuclear threat is large 
enough for all P5 members to impose sanctions regardless of public opinion, even 
if it were to turn against sanctions. Similarly, there is sufficient international 
consensus around the illegality of wars of aggression to impose UN sanctions 
regardless of what the public might think. At most, public opinion vis-à-vis nuclear 
proliferators and aggressors can influence the severity and types of sanctions, for 
example because of public outcry about unintended consequences on innocent 
civilians.  






With respect to chapter 7 (civil war), the link between public pressure and UN 
sanctions is the clearest. In civil wars free from countervailing power, increased 
media attention influences big and small conflicts alike. Among large humanitarian 
crises, the difference in media attention between sanctioned and non-sanctioned 
cases is not huge, given that these conflicts had grabbed the attention of the UNSC 
anyway. In relatively small conflicts the media can make a big difference though, 
as witnessed by the disproportional attention given by the media to conflicts in 
Israel, former Yugoslavia, or the second Liberian war.  
With respect to chapters 8 (terrorism) and 9 (coups d’état) no comprehensive 
research on media attention was done, but it seems clear that the terrorist groups 
and coups that were most salient in the Western press were also the ones 
sanctioned. Most notably, targets of sanctions include groups related to Al-Qaida 
and ISIL that killed western civilians or western military targets. Not surprisingly 
these groups are also the ones receiving disproportionate media attention. Taking 
into account the fact that the real threat that terrorist organizations pose to human 
security in the west is negligible, the media obviously plays an instrumental role in 
blowing out of proportion the issue of Islamic terrorism (also see conclusion 6). 
The same arguably goes for coups d’état, which are normally not considered major 
events unless special Western interests are at stake.  
 
Conclusion Six: Sanctions Discriminate Against Islamic Groups (+) 
 
The conclusions on UN sanctions regimes and Islam only apply to the chapter on 
terrorism. Nuclear proliferators, aggressor states and rebel groups in civil wars are 
sanctionable regardless of their religious background. Similarly, sanctions on coup 
stagers are not targeted against Islamists. When it comes to sanctioning terrorist 
groups, however, armed groups that have used tactics of terror and that have 
Islamic backgrounds are much more likely to be labelled terrorist groups than non-
Islamic groups that have committed similar crimes. While Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 
AQIM in Mali, FARC in Colombia, and the LRA in Uganda have all used tactics of 
terror in the campaigns against their respective governments, the former two are 
widely recognized as extremist Islamic terrorist groups, while the latter two are 
typically characterized as rebels or guerrillas. Not surprisingly, the former two are 
listed on the UNSC 1267 / 2253 lists of designated terrorist organizations, while 
the latter two are not.  
Some of the discrimination against Islamic terrorist groups makes sense. Besides 
the fact that groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group, Al-Qaida, the Armed Islamic 
Group, and ISIL have killed innocent targets in the West, they have also explicitly 
publicly stated objectives to destroy the West, as well as to establish Islamic 






incompatible with the sovereign state system, and the UNSC is right to isolate them 
by imposing sanctions. The problem is however that the UN’s designated terrorism 
list has also included a range of organizations that in reality are just disgruntled 
rebels with domestic political grievances. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement 
(China), the Abu Sayyaf Group (Jolo and Basilan Islands, Philippines), Lashkar-e-
Taiba (Kashmir), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Waziristan), and the Riyadus-Salikhin 
Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (Chechnya) may 
have had links with Al-Qaida for practical purposes, but are in reality just fighting 
wars to overthrow their governments or to achieve regional autonomy or political 
independence. Conversely, non-Islamic groups with similar objectives, including 
the SPLM (South-Sudan), the Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka), or the Communist Party of 
Nepal-Maoist (Nepal) were not listed.  
In general, the sanctions regimes against Islamic terrorist groups again show that 
UN sanctions design is primarily a Western affair. It was the United States that 
announced the ‘war on terror’ in the aftermath of 9/11, and it was the West that 
was most instrumental in designing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, as 
well as UNSC Resolutions 1267 and 2253 to fight groups affiliated with Al-Qaida 
and ISIL. While Russia and China have also used the institutional framework that 
allows the UN to sanctions terrorist organizations in Turkestan and Chechnya, the 
rules of the game were largely shaped by the US and EU.  
 
Conclusion Seven: Sanctions target Africa for good reasons (.) 
 
It probably comes as no surprise that Africa is heavily represented in UN sanctions 
regimes since 1990. The only two sanctions regimes that the UN imposed during 
the Cold War were on Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Since 1990, Algeria, 
Angola, the Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Liberia, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, and 
Sudan have all been added to this list. Additionally, terrorist groups in Egypt, 
Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia were listed on the UN’s 
designated list of terrorist organizations. While not all conflicts were sanctioned, it 
seems as if the only African countries that were completely free of the interference 
of UN sanctions were those that did not experience any conflict since 1990. The 
only exception lies with coups d’état, which have generally not been sanctioned 
anyway. Still, two out of the three coups that were sanctioned did concern African 
states.  
How can the bias towards Africa be explained? In a way Africa represents a 
complete recipe of conclusions one to six, especially in terms of countervailing 
power, humanitarian concerns, and state fragility.  






Firstly, no African states have nuclear weapons, no African states are considered 
indispensable strategical allies of P5 members, and besides South Africa and 
perhaps Nigeria no African states have sufficient countervailing power based on 
their economic, military, or demographic strength. This means the African 
continent is largely free of geopolitical obstacles. Add to that the ‘progressive’ 
sanctioning culture of the West and the (neo-) colonial ties between the West and 
Africa, and you are left with an open playing field. Simply put, the UNSC imposes 
sanctions on African targets because it can.  
Secondly, sanctions on Africa are however also a humanitarian must. Since 1990 
more people died in civil wars in Africa (907.000) than in Asia (414.000) and the 
Middle East (470.000) combined. Also, two thirds of all successful coups d’état 
since 1990 occurred in Africa. Africa is home to most UN peacekeeping missions, 
most internally displaced people, and most people living below the poverty line. 
Conflicts from the Congo to Sudan are associated with conflict minerals, child 
soldiers, and the use of rape as a weapon. It is undeniable that human security in 
plays an important role in the selectivity of UN sanctions in Africa.  
Thirdly, sanctions on African targets are also a must in the fight against state 
failure, and its consequences for both human and regional security. On average 
the African states that experienced civil war since 1990 score 96/120 on the Fragile 
States Index, placing them in the category of high-warning of state failure. Across 
the board African states score poorly on domestic security, economic stability, 
public services, human rights, demographic pressures, refugees, and internally 
displaced people, many of which are human security threats in themselves, and all 
of which increase the risk on the outbreak of conflict.  
 
What to do now? 
 
This dissertation has given a comprehensive answer to the question: What are 
United Nations Sanctions regimes for? Now that we know, the question that 
remains is: So what? What should policy makers and academics do with these 
insights? 
One typical concern for policy makers and academics alike is that UN sanctions 
are imposed as part of a set of institutional rules that have not changed since 1945.  
Sanctions can only be imposed when there is sufficient consensus among the 
(permanent) members of the Security Council about the ‘sanctionability of a case. 
Since members have different interpretations of this concept as well as different 
national security interests, countervailing power to block or evade sanctions 
remains a stubborn obstacle. While it is not an explicit (nor realistic) aim of this 






surrounding UN sanctions, the SOD and the findings of this can contribute to the 
debate surrounding the expansion of the Security Council and/or its permanent 
members, as well as the debate about abstaining from using the veto, something 
that France and the United Kingdom have tried to promote. For example, policy 
makers might promote a norm in which the veto is only used for issues of 
humanitarian (military) intervention, but not for certain types of sanctions. This 
would be a way to create consensus without rocking the boat too much.  
For policy makers and academics that are more concerned with upholding norms 
surrounding human security, the SOD may be used as an advocacy tool to point 
out both the progress and the failures of UN sanctions in promoting security and 
human rights. The results of this thesis point out that while progress has been 
made, the agenda that was initiated with Boutros Ghali’s ‘Agenda for Peace’ and 
that was formalized with the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect principles in 
2005, there is also still work to be done. The advocates of higher moral standards 
of UN sanctions of course already knew this, but their arguments are mostly based 
on ad-hoc indignation, rather than structural analysis.  
It must be pointed out and remembered that the moral framework that establishes 
which offences should be punished dominated by the West. The UN’s ideological 
shift in the 1990s was inspired by liberal democratic ideas about a ‘Liberal Peace’, 
in which democratic governments of sovereign states had to legitimize their 
sovereignty through good governance, in accordance with western standards. The 
conclusions of this dissertation should therefore be especially relevant to Western 
policy makers.  
 
Western policy makers have to be advocates for Liberal Peace in two ways. First, 
they have to use diplomacy and politics to overcome the geopolitical obstacles 
represented by China and Russia that sometimes stand in the way of UN 
sanctions, and that have led to horrible human rights violations in places such as 
Syria and Myanmar. It is up to diplomats and country experts to analyze precisely 
where the obstacles to imposing targeted sanctions lie, and how they can be 
overcome.  
Second,  and perhaps more importantly, Western policy makers should also look 
in the mirror, and take a long and hard look at all the cases that were left 
unsanctioned despite the absence of geopolitical obstacles. From civilians who 
suffered in wars in Ethiopia and Chad to people who died in terrorist attacks by the 
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka or the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines, 
and from people who lost their livelihoods in the aftermaths of military coups in 
Thailand or Fiji, the West owes these people an explanation.  






The latter argument is not only a moral one, but potentially also one about 
sanctions’ effectiveness. The incoherent track-record of UN sanctions diminishes 
the authority of those who impose them. Why would anyone take sanctions 
seriously if some get punished while others are not? This is a topic worth 
researching further.  
 
Suggestions for further research 
There are many opportunities for further research in relation to this dissertation. 
First, the SOD has plenty of space to expand, both in terms of extra variables and 
in terms of timeframe. Over the years many commentators have suggested the 
SOD should include deeper target analysis, variables related to refugee streams, 
economic dependency of targets on senders, neocolonial links between targets 
and senders, data on unilateral sanctions or sanctions from regional organizations, 
and so forth. Many of these ideas are worth exploring and adding to the SOD. In 
terms of time-frame it would be a logical step to update the dataset annually or bi-
annually.  
Apart from expanding the SOD, it may be interesting to explore the relationship 
between the coherency of sanctions regimes and their effects on targets. Sanctions 
scholars, behavioral scientists, and diplomats alike have long agreed that coercive 
diplomacy works best when it is coherent and predictable.521 However, most 
academic research related to sanctions takes policy tools as independent variables, 
simply analyzing the effects of the tools that governments use to influence targets.522 
Conclusions then state that policy ‘X’ works better or worse when variables ‘A’, ‘B’, 
and ‘C’ are existent or non-existent.523 This gives policy-makers the illusion that, if 
they control the variables at hand, there are more or less clear-cut recipes for 
success and failure.  
 
The reality is however that sanctions are also dependent variables, in so far as they 
are not stand-alone actions. The policies that Western governments pursue are part 
of a wider normative framework, the coherency and credibility of which is vital to 
each action separately.524 In other words, diplomatic actions have a bigger impact 
when they are in line with a strong and consistent normative framework. Without 
                                            
521 Galtung. “On the Effects of Economic Sanctions” (1967); Cortright & Lopez. “Smart 
Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft”(2002); Becker. “Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach” (1968).   
522 Hufbauer et al. “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered” (2009). Bierstecker et al. “Targeted 
Sanctions” (2016). 
523 Galtung. “On the Effects of Economic Sanctions” (1967). 
524 Keohane and Martin.“The Promise of Institutionalist Theory” (1995). Nye.“Soft Power” 






such a framework, diplomatic measures arguably have the same effect on targets 
as an arbitrary domestic punishment on an angry toddler.   
 
Secondly, sound scientific methodology teaches us that the effects of sanctions can 
only be fully be understood when they are compared to a ‘control group’, something 
that’s typically missing in sanctions research.525 Whereas most research on 
diplomatic policy effects focuses only on the cases in which ‘X’ occurred (i.e. a 
sanction or measure was imposed), they are not able to control for counterfactual 
events, because they don’t compare the results to similar cases in which ‘X’ did not 
occur. As a result, these studies risk mistaking correlation for causation. Hence, 
understanding the coherency of Western sanctions regimes is crucial for their 

















                                            
525 For example, Hufbauer et al. (2009) and Bierstecker et al. (2016) boast impressive 
datasets on types, purposes, and outcomes of sanctions regimes, but neither is able to 
compare the outcomes of sanctioned cases to those of non-sanctioned cases.  
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ANNEX 1 – SANCTIONABLE OFFENCES DATASET 
 
The full Sanctionable Offences Dataset is attached separately to this dissertation 
because it is too big for the format of this document. The hard copy comes with a 
poster inside the cover that includes the most important variables. The pdf version 




























































ANNEX 2 – RESUMEN EN CASTELLANO 
 
 
Sanciones de las Naciones Unidad y la Seguridad 
Selectiva 
 
Cuando se estableció la Sociedad de las Naciones, se pensó que las sanciones 
serían la mejor herramienta nueva para tratar con agresores en las relaciones 
internacionales. Sin embargo, la trayectoria de la Sociedad entre 1919 y 1939 
demostró que, al fin y al cabo, los episodios de sanciones eran un simple reflejo 
de intereses geopolíticos. Podrían aplicarse cuando ninguna de las grandes 
potencias tuviera objeciones claras, pero eran inútiles cuando estados importantes 
violaban las normas internacionales. Como dijo Benito Mussolini: "La Sociedad 
está muy bien cuando pian los gorriones, pero no sirve para nada cuando se 
pelean las águilas".526 
Con las secuelas de 1945, se creó una configuración institucional más realista a 
través de la Organización de Naciones Unidas (ONU). El diseño del Consejo de 
Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas se aseguró de que un sistema basado en 
normas funcionaría mejor, al mismo tiempo que protegía los intereses vitales de 
los cinco miembros permanentes, China, Francia, la Unión Soviética (URSS), el 
Reino Unido y los Estados Unidos, al darles el derecho a usar su veto. Durante 
cuatro décadas y media, sin embargo, las sanciones nunca vieron la luz del día, 
ya que fueron casi constantemente bloqueadas ya sea por Estados Unidos o la 
URSS, producto de la guerra fría. Los dos únicos casos en los que fueron usadas 
no se trataron de episodios de guerras de agresión, sino más bien de regímenes 
de Apartheid en el sur de Rodesia y Sudáfrica. Una vez más, el historial de las 
sanciones de la ONU apuntaba hacia el (neo) realismo, y no hacia el idealismo o 
el institucionalismo liberal. Cualesquiera fueran las palabras en la Carta de las 
Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos humanos y las obligaciones derivadas de 
tratados y otras fuentes de derecho internacional, y no importa cuántos atentados 
a la paz y actos de agresión ocurrieron durante la Guerra Fría, las sanciones eran 
escasas. 
                                            
526 Aunque las palabras de Mussolini en la Liga de Naciones se han citado mucho, ninguno de los 






La década de 1990 marcó dos cambios importantes. En primer lugar, el final de la 
Guerra Fría y la hegemonía occidental permitieron que muchas más resoluciones 
pasaran por el Consejo de Seguridad. En segundo lugar, y a la vez, hubo un 
cambio pronunciado con respecto a las normas e ideas que primaban sobre el 
papel de las Naciones Unidas en general, y específicamente, sobre el rol de las 
sanciones. Los procedimientos se mantuvieron iguales, pero la idea de "para qué 
se aplican las sanciones", cambió. Las ideas sobre las amenazas que plantean 
las "nuevas guerras", las crisis humanitarias y los "Estados fallidos" cambiaron el 
pensamiento normativo sobre cuándo la ONU debería utilizar sanciones. De 
repente, no sólo los Estados agresores en conflictos internacionales podrían ser 
sancionados, sino también actores estatales y no estatales en guerras civiles, 
grupos terroristas y gobiernos que los albergan, y perpetradores de golpes de 
Estado. La era de soberanía absoluta e incondicional había llegado a su fin. Entre 
1990 y 2018, el Consejo de Seguridad impuso sanciones en virtud del Capítulo VII 
en respuesta a dos proliferadores nucleares, dos guerras interestatales, veinte 
guerras civiles, veintiséis organizaciones terroristas, tres gobiernos que albergan 
terroristas y tres golpes de Estado. Fue una gran victoria para aquellos a favor de 
la gobernanza global y el institucionalismo liberal. 
¿Pero qué tan impresionante es esta trayectoria realmente? ¿Es acaso una 
victoria para el institucionalismo y un sistema basado en reglas? ¿O estamos más 
bien ante un sistema en el que algunos casos son "securitizados" a través de una 
lógica discriminatoria, mientras que otros no lo son? Y si es así, ¿quién lo 
determina? La respuesta es que, si bien las normas cambiantes que rodean las 
sanciones de las Naciones Unidas encuentran su base en el institucionalismo 
liberal y el liberalismo ideacional, las reglas que rodean el voto en el Consejo de 
Seguridad no han cambiado desde 1945, lo que resulta en una trayectoria aún 
selectiva. 
La evolución de las normas relativas a las sanciones de la ONU podría haber 
acercado los regímenes de sanciones a un ideal de paz liberal, pero hay 
demasiadas excepciones de conflictos sangrientos no sancionados, 
perpetradores de golpes impunes y organizaciones terroristas aún libres, para 
cumplir plenamente esta promesa. Peor aún, algunos de los grupos e individuos 
que sí han sido sancionados difícilmente pueden ser considerados una "amenaza 
para la paz". 
El carácter selectivo de las sanciones de la ONU tiene dos explicaciones 
principales. En primer lugar, algunos delitos sancionables están bloqueados por 
políticas de poder. Estos fracasos a la hora de aplicar sanciones pueden 
explicarse a través de intereses geopolíticos y realistas en lugar de a través de 
intereses idealistas. Hay que aceptar la realidad de que potencias nucleares como 
Israel, hegemonías regionales como la India y aliados cercanos de los cinco 






miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad pueden salirse con la suya con 
ciertas cosas. El segundo tipo de selectividad se refiere a los casos que 
permanecen después de filtrar la política de poder, y en los que las ideas liberales 
sobre la seguridad humana y la gobernanza democrática podrían aplicarse 
libremente. Aquí es donde Occidente tiene la oportunidad de demostrar su 
compromiso con las normas que dice defender universalmente, y que ha tratado 
de institucionalizar en las Naciones Unidas. Aquí es donde está en juego la 
credibilidad de los Estados Unidos y de la Unión Europea. Un registro de 
sanciones consistente aumenta su credibilidad. La incoherencia implica que 
corren el riesgo de ser etiquetados como hipócritas o neoimperialistas. 
Esta tesis mostrará que ambas explicaciones existen. Explicará por qué los 
Estados fuertes casi nunca son blanco de sanciones, por qué los estados que 
sufren de conflictos civiles no reciben sanciones hasta que el Estado realmente 
se desmorona, por qué las sanciones casi siempre están dirigidas a rebeldes y 
terroristas, pero casi nunca en contra de gobiernos, y por qué los estados 
poderosos pueden decidir si los estados agresores, grupos rebeldes, golpes de 
estado, organizaciones terroristas o proliferadores nucleares son sancionados o 
no. Los resultados muestran que, si bien en algunos casos los responsables 
políticos deberían centrarse en la diplomacia para superar los obstáculos 
geopolíticos, en otros casos los gobiernos occidentales deberían mirarse a sí 
mismos. Esa es la única manera de crear un régimen de sanciones 
verdaderamente creíble y coherente. 
 
¿Por qué leer esta tesis? 
Este trabajo aborda una pregunta que muchos académicos, estudiantes y otros 
comentaristas han debatido explícita o indirectamente, pero que aún no ha sido 
respondido exhaustivamente: ¿Para qué son las sanciones de las Naciones 
Unidas? 
La investigación presentada en esta tesis se suma a la literatura sobre sanciones 
internacionales, así como a la literatura sobre el papel de las instituciones 
internacionales, en particular las Naciones Unidas. En el ámbito académico de las 
sanciones internacionales, esta tesis va más allá de la cuestión de la eficacia, y 
examina la cuestión de para qué sirven las sanciones en primer lugar; una 
pregunta que muchos se han 'saltado' y que pocos se han molestado en hacer. 
En el ámbito académico de las Naciones Unidas hay una gran cantidad de 
investigación que considera el papel del Consejo de Seguridad, la evolución de 
las Naciones Unidas como guardián de la paz, la importancia del veto de los 
miembros del P-5, y los éxitos y fracasos de los regímenes de sanciones de la 
ONU. Sin embargo, cuando se trata de regímenes de sanciones, la investigación 






preguntas más profundas sobre las razones detrás de la acción de las Naciones 
Unidas tienden a centrarse en el papel del Consejo de Seguridad en las fuerzas 
de paz y las intervenciones humanitarias, no por su rol en regímenes de 
sanciones. Al estudiar el historial de las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas desde 
1990, aprenderemos sobre las verdaderas motivaciones detrás, así como la 
naturaleza de la ONU como institución en general. 
 
La investigación sobre sanciones no proporciona una respuesta 
satisfactoria 
 
La investigación académica sobre sanciones tiende a tratar cuestiones de eficacia, 
impacto y eficiencia. Ya en el establecimiento de la Sociedad de Naciones en 1920 
Woodrow Wilson estaba convencido de que: 
 
"Una nación que es boicoteada es una nación que está a la vista de la rendición. 
Aplique este remedio económico, pacífico, silencioso y mortífero y no habrá 
necesidad de fuerza. Es un remedio terrible. No cuesta una vida fuera de la nación 
boicoteada, pero trae una presión sobre la nación que, a mi juicio, ninguna nación 
moderna podría resistirse"527 
 
Rápidamente se comprobó que Wilson estaba equivocado cuando la Sociedad 
comenzó a desmoronarse en los años previos a la Segunda Guerra Mundial, pero 
la búsqueda de sanciones efectivas continuó. En 1967, cuando Johann Galtung 
estudió el impacto del primer régimen de sanciones de las Naciones Unidas al 
gobierno de minoría blanca de Ian Smith en Rodesia del Sur, este enumeró las 
condiciones teóricas ideales para un boicot económico528. Es más probable que 
el país boicoteado admita las demandas de los remitentes si sufrieran 
desproporcionadamente por la interrupción del comercio, y si las sanciones fueran 
fáciles de supervisar y controlar529. Un comentarista señaló que, con respecto a 
las sanciones de Rhodesia, los británicos predijeron que el régimen caería "en 
cuestión de semanas"530. El Frente Rodesiano de Ian Smith tardó catorce años en 
ser reemplazado por el partido ZANU-PF de Robert Mugabe, y no gracias a las 
                                            
527 Padover. “Wilson´s Ideals”. (1942). 
528 Galtung. “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions”. (1967) page 384. 
529 Galtung. “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions”. (1967) page 384. 
530 Makonese. “The Significance of the Sanctions Campaign for the Liberation Movement”. (1974) 
page 5. 






sanciones. En efecto, Galtung calificó la investigación sobre las sanciones como 
herramientas de coerción como la «teoría ingenua de las sanciones».531 
En las décadas de 1970 y 1980 Margaret Doxey y David Baldwin desarrollaron 
marcos explicativos para el éxito y el fracaso de las sanciones internacionales 
como instrumentos políticos. Ambos hicieron una distinción importante entre las 
sanciones como herramientas morales/jurídicas, por un lado, y las sanciones 
como herramientas económicas/políticas por el otro532. Por ejemplo, Doxey 
reconoció que los fundadores de organizaciones internacionales (y regionales) 
tomaron prestada la idea de aplicar sanciones a Estados que no cumplan con las 
leyes nacionales533. En efecto, muchos eruditos en los campos de relaciones 
internacionales y derecho internacional no reconocieron las medidas económicas 
unilaterales (o guerras comerciales) como sanciones en absoluto. 
A pesar de las "advertencias" de los académicos sobre el impacto limitado de las 
sanciones y sus consecuencias no deseadas, la década de 1980 vio en su 
mayoría optimismo sobre la utilidad y eficacia de las sanciones de las Naciones 
Unidas. Las sanciones se consideraron una alternativa inofensiva y rentable a la 
intervención militar. Se propuso la idea de que los representantes políticos 
utilizaran con mayor frecuencia este tipo de medidas económicas/políticas. 
Después de todo, “sería una lástima, tal vez un desastre global, que un presidente 
estadounidense contemporáneo recurriera a la guerra únicamente porque la 
naturaleza, las implicaciones y las consecuencias de estas políticas económicas 
hayan sido malinterpretadas por sus asesores".534 
A esta ola de optimismo se sumó el proyecto "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered" 
por Hufbauer, Schott y Elliot, quizás el estudio más exhaustivo sobre sanciones 
como herramientas de política exterior de la época535. Establecida por primera vez 
en 1982, y todavía activa, cuenta con una base de datos de 174 episodios de 
sanciones entre 1914 y 2000 para tratar de responder cuán eficaces han sido 
estos regímenes de sanciones económicas a la hora de cumplir con sus objetivos 
de política exterior. La tasa de éxito del 35% que afirmaron los autores fue 
ampliamente citada por académicos y responsables políticos. 
En la década de 1990 también se registró un fuerte aumento en el uso de 
sanciones por parte de las Naciones Unidas. Mientras que la ONU había impuesto 
sanciones sólo en dos ocasiones durante la Guerra Fría, la década de 1990 llegó 
                                            
531 Galtung. “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions”. (1967) page 380. 
532 Baldwin. “Economic Statecraft”. (1985); Doxey. “International Sanctions in Contemporary 
Perspective”. (1987) pp 4-6. 
533 Doxey. “International Sanctions”. (1972). 
534 Baldwin. “Economic Statecraft”. (1985) page 373. 






a ser apodada 'la Década de las Sanciones'536. El Consejo de Seguridad impuso 
regímenes de sanciones en un total de doce casos, en respuesta a tradicionales 
guerras de agresión, así como también a guerras civiles, a golpes de Estado y a 
Estados patrocinadores del terrorismo. Las sanciones internacionales se 
convirtieron en una herramienta política entre la espada y la pluma.537 
A medida que las sanciones se convirtieron en una herramienta más popular de 
la política exterior, también crecieron las críticas hacia ellas. Distintos 
investigadores demostraron que las sanciones no siempre son tan exitosas como 
se afirma, a veces tienen graves consecuencias no deseadas, y a menudo son 
violadas y evadidas descaradamente. 
En respuesta a la obra de Hufbauer et. al., Robert Pape se preguntó: ¿Por qué las 
sanciones económicas no funcionan? 538 Encontró que aquella tasa de éxito del 
35% de las sanciones estaba sobrevalorada, porque en realidad los éxitos se 
determinaban por la fuerza militar o porque sólo se lograban objetivos menores. 
Otra crítica argumentaba que las sanciones no eran tan inofensivas como se 
habían presentado inicialmente. Después de las estrictas sanciones económicas 
impuestas a Irak539, quedó claro que el aislamiento económico había matado 
indirectamente a cientos de miles de civiles inocentes, que morían de hambre 
mientras el régimen de Saddam Hussein permanecía en el poder. Cuando la 
embajadora de Estados Unidos en la ONU, Madeleine Albright, defendió en 
televisión nacional que el medio millón de muertes infantiles estimadas en Irak 
"valían el precio"540, la imagen de las sanciones como inofensivas se 
desvaneció541. Los regímenes de sanciones a Haití y a la República Federal de 
Yugoslavia consolidaron aún más este argumento de que las sanciones pueden 
tener graves consecuencias no deseadas542. Posteriormente, la investigación 
sobre sanciones ha tratado la cuestión de cómo hacerlas más eficaces. Las 
sanciones “inteligentes”, por ejemplo, a individuos y grupos dificultan el uso de sus 
cuentas bancarias, los viajes al extranjero o la adquisición de dinero o armas543. 
Los investigadores también han aprendido más sobre el diseño de sanciones 
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538 Pape: “Why Economic Sanctions do not Work”. (1997). 
539 UNSC Resolution 661 (1990). 
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“dirigidas” de las Naciones Unidas, su relación con otras herramientas de política 
y su aplicación.544 
Por tanto, toda investigación sobre sanciones parece simplemente dar por 
sentada la lista de casos existentes y pregunta (1) ¿Quién es el objetivo? 2) ¿Qué 
hicieron para merecer sanciones? (3) ¿Qué sanciones se aplicaron? (4) 
¿Alcanzaron estas sus objetivos? (5) ¿Por qué tuvieron éxito o fracasaron?, y (6) 
¿Hubo consecuencias no deseadas? En cambio, ninguna investigación sobre los 
regímenes de sanciones de las Naciones Unidas, ni otros regímenes de sanciones 
unilaterales y multilaterales al respecto, examina la cuestión de por qué se 
imponen las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas en primer lugar. 
Esto no quiere decir que la investigación académica sobre sanciones no se refiera 
a la cuestión de para qué son estas. Los autores de "Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered" no se preocupan mucho por las normas internacionales y aceptan 
el hecho de que las sanciones económicas, tanto unilaterales como multilaterales, 
son actos de política exterior (apoyados legalmente). Los gobiernos pueden 
utilizarlas para demostrar determinación y liderazgo estadounidense, para 
expresar indignación por un evento internacional o para asegurar a sus aliados 
que Estados Unidos apoyará sus compromisos internacionales545. Del mismo 
modo, Drezner describe las sanciones económicas como una "herramienta de 
política exterior" que se empleará en situaciones en las que el remitente obtenga 
un resultado político significativo546. Una de sus conclusiones es que, siendo los 
demás factores iguales, los remitentes estarán ansiosos por coaccionar a sus 
adversarios y reacios a coaccionar a sus aliados, pero en realidad son las 
sanciones a los aliados las más propensas a tener éxito. Una vez más, el enfoque 
sigue siendo la eficacia. 
Algunos eruditos han reconocido que los objetivos de las sanciones de los 
remitentes no son siempre, parafraseando a Robert Dahl, 'conseguir que los 
objetivos hagan cosas que de otra manera no harían'547. Por ejemplo, los 
gobiernos imponen sanciones a veces simplemente para "demostrar 
determinación" o "expresar indignación", sin resolver realmente nada o actuar 
plenamente sobre su indignación en términos de política contundente548. En 
efecto, es poco probable que las sanciones afecten el comportamiento de sus 
objetivos si el fin es meramente simbólico.549 
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Giumelli hace una distinción importante entre los diferentes "propósitos" de las 
sanciones, reconociendo tres categorías: Coerción, Restricción y 
Señalización/Estigmatización550. La coerción es el intento de cambiar el 
comportamiento del objetivo a través del uso de sanciones. Se basa en la noción 
clásica de que las sanciones son herramientas de poder. Ya en 1967 Johan 
Galtung criticó esta perspectiva llamándola la "teoría ingenua" de las sanciones551; 
una y otra vez se ha demostrado que el dolor económico o la presión política rara 
vez llevan a los objetivos a cambiar su comportamiento y ceder a las demandas 
de los remitentes552. Por el contrario, las sanciones pueden incluso envalentonar 
a los objetivos (efecto de “rally around the flag”),553 o pasar el peso de las 
sanciones a civiles inocentes.554 
La restricción, en segundo lugar, se define como el esfuerzo para reducir la 
capacidad de los objetivos para alcanzar sus fines. Las sanciones dirigidas con el 
fin de restringir, en lugar de coaccionar, tienen más probabilidades de conseguir 
realmente su propósito. Si bien las sanciones dirigidas por sí mismas rara vez son 
suficientes para poner fin a los esfuerzos bélicos de grupos armados, ciertamente 
pueden ayudar a debilitar su capacidad para viajar, realizar transacciones 
financieras y traficar minerales u otras materias primas en conflicto. Junto con la 
coerción (56%), la restricción (41%) es un propósito principal importante de las 
sanciones dirigidas por las Naciones Unidas.555 
El tercer propósito, la señalización/estigmatización, ocurre cuando las sanciones 
buscan indicarles a los objetivos, y a la comunidad internacional en general, la 
primacía de ciertas normas internacionales. Este propósito está presente en el 
100% de los episodios de sanciones dirigidas por la ONU analizados, aunque casi 
nunca como único o principal propósito. También es un propósito que es siempre, 
e instantáneamente, eficaz. Como describe el autor: '... la señalización se logra a 
menudo por el acto mismo del Consejo de Seguridad al avanzar hacia las crisis 
internacionales»556. Dado que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas son 
esenciales para dar forma a las normas internacionales relativas a la paz y la 
seguridad, los que son atacados por ellas son sin duda estigmatizados, lo admitan 
o no.  
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El valor simbólico de las sanciones está, por lo tanto, lejos de ser inútil557, 
especialmente para una institución como las Naciones Unidas. Las sanciones de 
las Naciones Unidas indican al objetivo y a la comunidad internacional que el delito 
en cuestión merece una reacción seria. Si se hace de manera coherente, esto 
tiene una doble ventaja. En el extremo receptor, estigmatiza o "avergüenza" a sus 
objetivos, incluso cuando las sanciones no duelen; del lado emisor, mejoran la 
legitimidad y credibilidad del remitente. 
No aplicar sanciones también envía un mensaje. Los objetivos pueden interpretar 
el hecho de que la ONU no imponga sanciones como una luz verde para continuar 
con lo que estaban haciendo. Por ejemplo, la ausencia de una respuesta enérgica 
a la crisis de los rohingyas en Myanmar, por medio de sanciones u otras medidas, 
envía una señal al régimen de Myanmar de que o bien tienen razón en la limpieza 
étnica de los "extranjeros" rohingyas de la región de Rakhine, o de que el Consejo 
de Seguridad no considera que el tema sea lo suficientemente importante558. Por 
el lado del remitente, la falta de respuesta envía una señal de que, al parecer, los 
intereses geoestratégicos y políticos de algunos miembros (permanentes) del 
Consejo de Seguridad superan el sufrimiento humanitario sobre el terreno. Por 
ejemplo, el hecho de no imponer sanciones al régimen de Bashar al-Assad en 
Siria (bloqueado por Rusia) ha hecho que algunos responsables políticos 
consideren que la inacción pueda convertirse en el "cementerio de las Naciones 
Unidas".559 
Muchos autores han reconocido la diversa gama de delitos que las sanciones de 
la ONU han abordado, incluida la reversión de un hecho de agresión, el 
restablecimiento de líderes elegidos democráticamente, el fomento de los 
derechos humanos, la disuasión del terrorismo y el fomento de desarme (nuclear) 
560. Un autor incluso ha reconocido que las graves crisis humanitarias han sido 
una razón para que el Consejo de Seguridad aplique sanciones en virtud del 
Capítulo VII, relacionadas con los conflictos civiles en Costa de Marfil, Sudán y 
Ruanda, así como tras el golpe de Estado de 1991 en Haití561. Otros se han 
centrado más bien en los motivos de los remitentes, incluido el cumplimiento del 
derecho internacional, la contención de conflictos u otras amenazas a la paz, o 
simplemente la expresión de indignación562. Sin embargo, casi nadie va más allá 
de simplemente enumerar los propósitos de las sanciones y los motivos que 
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existen para imponerlas. Nadie pregunta por qué algunos casos están 
sancionados y otros no. 
El libro que se acerca más a responder a lo que son las sanciones de la ONU es 
posiblemente el de Andrea Charron. Dividiendo la lista de episodios de sanciones 
de la ONU entre 1990 y 2010 en cuatro categorías (Conflictos interestatales (4), 
Conflictos intraestatales (14), Estados Incumpliendo Normas Internacionales (5) y 
Terrorismo Internacional (4)), llega a la conclusión de que la trayectoria de 
sanciones del Consejo de Seguridad tiene en realidad más sustancia y dirección 
de lo que se le suele atribuir, incluso si solo el 22% de los conflictos internacionales 
entre 1990 y 2010 fueron realmente sancionados.  
 
La investigación sobre el Consejo de Seguridad no proporciona una 
respuesta satisfactoria 
 
La investigación académica sobre el propio Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones 
Unidas nos ayuda a comprender el diseño institucional del Consejo, su evolución 
en respuesta a amenazas internacionales, así como la política que determina 
cuándo interfiere la ONU en crisis humanitarias. Sin embargo, no existe un estudio 
exhaustivo e imparcial que investigue para qué sirven las sanciones de las 
Naciones Unidas y cómo la respuesta a esa pregunta difiere en función del tipo 
de delito. 
Las Naciones Unidas como institución han sido reconocidas como 
"potencialmente el órgano supranacional más poderoso del mundo"563. De hecho, 
ninguna otra institución de seguridad internacional tiene tantos Estados miembros 
como las Naciones Unidas, y ninguna otra institución de seguridad ha intervenido 
tanto en asuntos de seguridad internacional. Es la única organización de 
seguridad verdaderamente global, y a pesar de las muchas críticas sobre su 
funcionamiento, es ampliamente percibida como una institución legítima. Desde la 
década de 1990, la ONU prácticamente ha eliminado las intervenciones militares 
unilaterales564. Los Estados tratan ampliamente de asociarse con las Naciones 
Unidas para legitimar sus acciones y comunicar información importante sobre sus 
intenciones políticas.565 
Mientras que el debate académico sobre las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas 
apenas examina la cuestión de para qué sirven, la literatura académica sobre las 
fuerzas de paz lo hace de forma mucho más exhaustiva. Sin duda, la mayoría de 
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las investigaciones académicas sobre los cascos azules (así como la de 
diplomacia preventiva, la imposición de paz y la consolidación de paz) también se 
refieren a su valor como herramienta política. Después de todo, determinar los 
ingredientes para el éxito y fracaso es "esencial para desarrollar conocimientos 
sobre el mantenimiento de la paz y tomar buenas decisiones políticas"566. Los 
estudios de caso y el análisis comparativo de las operaciones de cascos azules 
ayudan a los responsables de formular políticas concretas entender la evolución 
del mantenimiento de la paz567, así como sus debilidades, lecciones aprendidas568 
y consecuencias (no intencionadas) de medidas a medias, o de imposición de la 
paz.569 
Sin embargo, muchos otros han teorizado sobre el historial de las misiones de paz 
de las Naciones Unidas desde un punto de vista más crítico. Por ejemplo, Barnett 
y Finnemore argumentaron que para evaluar la toma de decisiones detrás de las 
fuerzas de paz de la ONU, es crucial entender las normas que dominan la 
institución570. Su perspectiva va más allá de la premisa institucionalista neoliberal 
de que los estados soberanos poderosos pueden utilizar las instituciones para 
promover o solidificar sus intereses y fomentar la colaboración571. De manera 
Weberiana, la burocracia de las Naciones Unidas extiende el poder real a los 
expertos dentro del sistema, independientemente de su nacionalidad. 
A nivel macro, los propósitos de las intervenciones militares y las normas que las 
rodean han cambiado, también dentro de las Naciones Unidas572. La teoría 
dominante sobre las fuerzas de paz de la ONU desde la década de 1990 se 
describe mejor como la "tesis de paz liberal", basada en las premisas de que (1) 
los Estados democráticos liberales son intrínsecamente menos propensos a 
experimentar una guerra civil, y (2) los Estados democráticos liberales no luchan 
entre sí. Otros llegan a reconocer una creciente "cultura global" en torno al 
mantenimiento de paz y las normas que dirigen el organismo de las Naciones 
Unidas después de los conflictos civiles.573 
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Las normas sobre las fuerzas de paz también pueden encontrar sus orígenes en 
el cosmopolitismo574. En otras palabras, algunos eruditos consideran que las 
normas como la responsabilidad de proteger a los civiles, los derechos humanos 
y los principios de resolución de conflictos son verdades filosóficas, en lugar de 
expresiones culturales. Si bien las normas cosmopolitas sobre la gobernanza 
mundial son difíciles de cuadrar con la realidad política del Consejo de Seguridad, 
estas proporcionan una perspectiva sobre la situación de las Naciones Unidas. 
Sin embargo, la realidad de las normas y procedimientos institucionales en torno 
a la intervención de las Naciones Unidas tiende a surgir de manera post hoc, 
creando así un desajuste histórico entre las teorías cosmopolitas, culturales o 
jurídicas, por un lado, y la política internacional, por otro575. En el mejor de los 
casos, esto conduce a una política de incoherencia. En el peor de los casos, lleva 
a los críticos a considerarlo una política de neocolonialismo576, realismo anticuado 
u otros argumentos críticos que parten de la premisa de que "la teoría es siempre 
para alguien y para algún propósito"577. Parafraseando a Damrosch: "Un sistema 
difícilmente puede calificar como ley cuando sus reglas se aplican selectivamente 
y sólo de acuerdo con las preferencias de los grandes poderes".578 
Algunos eruditos que estudian el papel de las intervenciones de las Naciones 
Unidas describen la selectividad del Consejo de Seguridad para actuar 
arbitrariamente con respecto a la interpretación del Artículo 39 de la Carta de las 
Naciones Unidas como inevitable, o incluso útil. De hecho, el término "seguridad 
selectiva" que utilizo a lo largo de esta tesis para describir los regímenes de 
sanciones de la ONU desde 1990 no es mío; proviene de un libro de 2014 que 
lleva el título de "seguridad selectiva" para explicar el tema de la guerra y el 
Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU desde 1945.579 
Roberts y Zaum defienden que el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU es 
inherentemente selectivo, y que esto es intencionalmente así. En efecto, el propio 
diseño institucional del Consejo y el papel del P-5 y su derecho a veto, permiten 
la selectividad, así como muchos artículos de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, en 
particular el artículo 39. La ventaja de dicha selectividad es que el Consejo ha 
podido reaccionar a una amplia variedad de amenazas cambiantes desde 1945. 
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La desventaja es que el diseño del Consejo, en combinación con la política 
internacional, puede ayudar a mantener la paz y seguridad internacional en 
términos generales, pero no puede mantener un verdadero "estado de derecho". 
El Consejo de Seguridad no fue concebido siguiendo un entendimiento de la 
justicia como el tratamiento de casos similares por igual, o como la administración 
imparcial de la justicia. Fue diseñado para permitir la política y la selectividad, y el 
mantenimiento del status quo. 
Incluso si el Consejo hubiera querido desempeñar un papel más proactivo y 
consistente en la implementación del estado de derecho, simplemente no tiene la 
capacidad ni el financiamiento580. La ONU no tiene una agencia de inteligencia ni 
un ejército propio. Más bien, depende de los Estados miembros dispuestos a 
proporcionar recursos y tropas a las misiones de la ONU. Las misiones de paz son 
estructuralmente cortas para los soldados, lo que conduce a operaciones 
inadecuadas. De las 34.000 tropas de la UNPROFOR que se consideraron 
necesarias en zonas seguras bosnias como Srebrenica y Sarajevo, sólo llegaron 
7.000581. En los meses previos al genocidio ruandés, ninguno de los diecinueve 
Estados miembros que habían prometido proporcionar tropas a la misión de la 
UNAMIR lo hizo582. En algunos de los casos en los que sí se materializan 
cantidades suficientes de cascos azules, estos han hecho más daño que bien, 
como se ha visto en los relatos de soldados de la ONU que participan en 
violaciones, contrabando y tráfico de armas, entre otros.583 
A pesar de las deficiencias de las misiones de paz de las Naciones Unidas en 
términos de capacidad y finanzas, todavía cabría esperar que el Consejo de 
Seguridad seleccionara cuidadosamente los casos a los que responde de acuerdo 
con algún tipo de lógica. Esta lógica puede ser moral, legal, institucional o egoísta; 
y sus orígenes teóricos podrían recaer en el humanitarismo, el liberalismo, el 
cosmopolitismo o el realismo, entre otros. El truco es averiguar qué lógica se 
ajusta mejor al historial de las Naciones Unidas. 
 
El libro que metodológicamente se acerca más a explicar por qué y cómo las 
intervenciones humanitarias de la ONU son selectivas es el de Martin Binder584. 
Este explica que, dependiendo de las consideraciones humanitarias, materiales e 
institucionales que desempeñan un papel en las crisis humanitarias, el Consejo 
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de Seguridad puede decidir adoptar (1) medidas enérgicas o 2) medidas limitadas 
o ninguna. La razón más importante para tomar medidas limitadas o ninguna se 
refiere a la prudencia política hacia objetivos que poseen un fuerte poder 
compensatorio. Otras razones para no actuar incluyen situaciones en las que el 
sufrimiento humanitario es relativamente bajo, con poco riesgo de contagio 
internacional, o casos en los que las Naciones Unidas han estado relativamente 
poco involucradas, lo que significa que tienen menos costos hundidos. 
La ventaja del método de Binder es que, contrariamente a la mayoría de las 
investigaciones sobre el terreno, los casos que considera incluyen tanto crisis 
humanitarias en las que la ONU intervino, como crisis en las que no lo hizo. Al 
hacer esto, evita un sesgo de confirmación. Como él dice: "Un análisis imparcial 
de los impulsores de intervención del Consejo de Seguridad no puede centrarse 
únicamente en los casos en que el Consejo de Seguridad ha tomado medidas; 
también debe incluir aquellas situaciones en las que el Consejo podría haber 
intervenido, pero optó por no hacerlo." 585 La lista de 31 crisis humanitarias desde 
1991 que Binder utiliza como punto de partida de su análisis se basa en el número 
de víctimas, personas desplazadas, hambrunas y enfermedades. Aunque la 
investigación de Binder es metódicamente similar a esta tesis, y aunque algunas 
de sus conclusiones están en línea con las que se encuentran en esta tesis, sólo 
se centra en las crisis humanitarias, no en las amenazas que plantea la 
proliferación nuclear, la guerra (civil), el terrorismo y los golpes de Estado. 
Además, se centra en la selectividad de la intervención de las Naciones Unidas 
en general, no en los regímenes de sanciones de las Naciones Unidas. 
 
Metodologia 
Al igual que el método de Binder, esta tesis también toma como punto de 
partida una lista de eventos que 'podrían' haber sido sancionados. Mientras que 
tal método evita la trampa del sesgo de confirmación, también tiene dos 
desventajas importantes que deben ser abordadas. En primer lugar, el 
‘Sanctionable Offences Dataset’ (SOD, por sus siglas en inglés) en el que se basa 
esta tesis es arbitrario. En segundo lugar, los delitos que no fueron sancionados 
por el Consejo de Seguridad por razones perfectamente sensatas. 
El ‘Sanctionable Offences Dataset’ (SOD), al igual que la lista de 31 crisis 
humanitarias de Binder, no es una fuente de autoridad legal o política. No existe 
fuera del ámbito de esta tesis. No es parte de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas ni 
de ningún otro tratado internacional. Tampoco está en consonancia con la política 
oficial de ningún gobierno, organización regional u organización no 
gubernamental. El SOD tampoco reclama ninguna autoridad moral. Es decir, no 
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creo que cada caso en el conjunto de datos "debería" necesariamente haber 
recibido sanciones de las Naciones Unidas en virtud del Capítulo VII de su Carta. 
Tampoco está en línea con ninguna enseñanza religiosa o filosófica específica 
como la Iglesia Católica o el Kantianismo. 
Si el SOD aspirara a algún tipo de autoridad, sería autoridad académica. Es decir, 
espero que el razonamiento detrás de la lista de 192 delitos sancionables entre 
1990 y 2016 sea ampliamente considerado como racional, lógico y convincente. 
Mi argumento es que, para cada uno de los cinco delitos (proliferación nuclear, 
guerra interestatal, guerra civil, terrorismo y golpe de Estado), si algunos casos 
fueran sancionados por el Consejo de las Naciones Unidas, también podrían 
haberse considerado una serie de otros casos "similares" para ser sancionados. 
Mi trabajo en el Capítulo 4 de esta tesis (metodología) es defender las decisiones 
que he tomado. 
¿Cuáles serían buenas razones para no imponer sanciones? Se ha argumentado 
que las sanciones no creíbles pueden ser contraproducentes. Los débiles 
regímenes de sanciones (debido a desacuerdos en el Consejo) a principios de la 
década de 1990 en respuesta al golpe de Estado de Haití y las guerras en Angola 
y Serbia, posiblemente envalentonaron a sus objetivos porque se sintieron 
"intocables"586. Si bien es cierto que las sanciones más fuertes o las amenazas 
(militares) más creíbles podrían haber disuadido a sus objetivos de manera más 
eficaz, no imponer ninguna sanción de cualquier manera podría haberlos 
envalentonado aún más. 
Existe una mejor excusa para no imponer sanciones cuando ya existe una 
respuesta más fuerte de las Naciones Unidas. Las misiones de las Naciones 
Unidas para el mantenimiento o imposición de la paz han sido reconocidas como 
acciones más contundentes que las sanciones587. Esas misiones no 
necesariamente hacen que las sanciones sean redundantes, pero sí proporcionan 
una respuesta alternativa creíble. De hecho, muchas misiones de paz de las 
Naciones Unidas van de la mano con embargos de armas o sanciones dirigidas. 
La ventaja de las sanciones es que son una herramienta más barata tanto práctica 
como políticamente. Las misiones de paz de la ONU requieren personal, equipo y 
millones de dólares, todos los cuales deben ser suministrados voluntariamente por 
Estados miembros dispuestos, sin mencionar el consentimiento de las partes 
involucradas588. Tampoco están obligadas a ser imparciales, y no conforman 
estrictamente una violación de la soberanía (territorial) de los Estados miembros. 
Esto hace que sea mucho más fácil identificar y sancionar a quienes conforman 
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una "amenaza para la paz". Además, al igual que otras herramientas de política 
exterior, las sanciones pueden ser un ‘juego a dos niveles’, ya que tienen un 
impacto tanto en sus objetivos reales, como en su población a nivel nacional.589 
En efecto, los gobiernos democráticos a veces son presionados por su propia 
población para responder a las crisis humanitarias590. Las sanciones son entonces 
una herramienta fácil para convencer a las audiencias nacionales e 
internacionales. Son una herramienta que vale la pena utilizar con más frecuencia, 
aunque sólo sea por el bien de la credibilidad y la coherencia del Consejo. 
 
 
Resumen de los Capítulos 
 
Los capítulos uno, dos y tres de esta tesis proporcionan un marco teórico, 
mostrando cómo, a lo largo de la historia, tanto la Sociedad de Naciones como las 
Naciones Unidas, han luchado contra el desajuste entre utopía y realidad. El 
capítulo 1 explica cómo las ideas de filósofos visionarios y políticos desde 
Immanuel Kant hasta Woodrow Wilson sentaron las bases para nuestro 
pensamiento sobre la paz internacional y la Sociedad de Naciones, pero en 
realidad la política clásica realista de balance de poder fue mucho más 
determinante a la hora de explicar la guerra, la paz y los regímenes de sanciones 
antes del establecimiento de las Naciones Unidas. En el capítulo 2 se describe 
cómo tanto el diseño institucional del Consejo de Seguridad como su actividad 
real (o la falta de ella) para hacer frente a las amenazas a la paz durante la Guerra 
Fría, se inspiró mucho más en el pragmatismo y el realismo. Como resultado, las 
sanciones sólo se aplicaron dos veces, a Rodesia del Sur (1964) y Sudáfrica 
(1986), ambas en respuesta a regímenes racistas de minorías blancas591. Sin 
embargo, durante el mismo período, otras instituciones internacionales como el 
Banco Mundial (BM), el Fondo Monetario Nacional (FMI) y la Unión Europea 
resultaron prósperas, llevando a académicos institucionalistas liberales, como 
Keohane y Nye, a estudiar el poder de las instituciones, reglas, ideas y jugadores 
dentro de ellas. El capítulo 3 explica entonces que, mientras que desde la década 
de 1990 los actores permanentes dentro del Consejo de Seguridad no han 
cambiado, las reglas, normas e ideas que rodean las sanciones de la ONU 
definitivamente sí lo han hecho. Las doctrinas que han llegado a dominar los 
regímenes de sanciones de la ONU (así como la intervención humanitaria en 
                                            
589 Putnam: “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”. (1988). 
590 Robinson. “The CNN Effect Reconsidered”. (2011). 
591 And in the case of South Africa also because of its occupation of Namibia and its intents to 
develop a nuclear program. 






general) son las de "Paz Liberal" o "Paz Democrática" y la Responsabilidad de 
Proteger (R2P). El lenguaje de estas doctrinas se puede encontrar tanto dentro 
como fuera de las Naciones Unidas, y ha ayudado al Consejo de Seguridad a 
imponer sanciones no sólo en respuesta a conflictos interestatales clásicos, sino 
también a hacer frente a guerras civiles, golpes de Estado, terrorismo y 
proliferadores nucleares. Incluso se han impuesto sanciones para garantizar una 
buena gobernanza en situaciones posteriores a los conflictos.  
Estudiar la evolución de los regímenes de sanciones de la ONU desde 1990 sólo 
observando los casos que recibieron sanciones es engañoso. Prácticamente 
todas las investigaciones sobre regímenes de sanciones sufren de algún sesgo 
de selección. Por lo tanto, el capítulo 4 presenta una metodología en la que se 
tienen en cuenta todos los casos que podrían haber sido sancionados por el 
Consejo desde 1990. Dividiendo los casos en cinco tipos de delitos que han sido 
sancionados por el Consejo, terminamos con el siguiente historial. 
 
Tipo de infracción Delitos 
desde 1990 
Sanciones de la 
ONU 
Porcentaje 
Proliferación nuclear 5 3 60% 
Guerra interestatal 4 2 50% 
Guerra Civil 58 26 45% 
Terrorismo 88 26 30% 
Golpe de Estado 36 3 8% 
    
Total 191 60 31% 
 
Los cinco capítulos siguientes proporcionan un análisis de cada tipo de delito, 
cada vez utilizando una serie de variables que ayudan a responder a la pregunta: 
¿por qué algunos casos fueron sancionados y otros no? Algunas variables 
prueban en qué medida los casos siguen una lógica de intervención humanitaria. 
Otras nos dan más información sobre consideraciones de soberanía e intereses 
geopolíticos del Estado. Sin embargo, ciertas variables prueban en qué medida 
las sanciones sirven a los intereses neocoloniales de los Estados que proponen 
aplicar sanciones de la ONU. Por último, al examinar las sanciones unilaterales 
impuestas por la UE y los Estados Unidos, tenemos una mejor idea de hasta qué 







El capítulo 5 se refiere a las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas en respuesta a la 
proliferación nuclear. Este capítulo mostrará que, cuando se trata de imponer 
sanciones de la ONU, el delito de proliferación nuclear es la encarnación misma 
del realismo estructural. Las decisiones sobre quién es sancionado y quién no, se 
pueden explicar casi en su totalidad a través de cálculos geopolíticos del P-5. 
Durante la Guerra Fría, esto condujo a la exitosa proliferación de armas nucleares 
por parte de Israel y la India, pero no de Sudáfrica, que recibió sanciones de la 
ONU en respuesta a sus ambiciones nucleares combinadas con sus políticas 
internas del Apartheid y los actos de agresión contra sus vecinos. Después de la 
Guerra Fría, las ambiciones nucleares de Irak se contuvieron con éxito, a pesar 
de que no estaba claro si esas ambiciones realmente existían. La proliferación de 
armas nucleares por parte de Pakistán en 1998 fue quizás el mayor error de 
cálculo del Consejo de Seguridad. No sólo llevó a Pakistán al borde de una guerra 
nuclear con la India, sino que también benefició indirectamente a Corea del Norte 
e Irán, quienes se beneficiaron de la transferencia de tecnología nuclear a través 
de Pakistán, acercándolos a alcanzar sus propias ambiciones nucleares. Los 
regímenes de sanciones de la ONU contra Corea del Norte e Irán muestran que 
el P-5 está actualmente en la misma línea geopolítica cuando se trata de la 
proliferación nuclear: mantener el statu quo. 
El capítulo 6 se refiere a las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas en respuesta a 
conflictos interestatales, el delito para el que fueron originalmente diseñadas. Sin 
embargo, debido a las limitaciones geopolíticas de la Guerra Fría, el P-5 no pudo 
(o no estuvo dispuesto) imponer sanciones en respuesta a cualquiera de las 
muchas guerras interestatales que estallaron entre 1945 y 1990. Después de la 
Guerra Fría, sólo se produjeron cuatro guerras interestatales; La invasión de 
Kuwait por Irak (1990), la guerra de Kargil entre India y Pakistán (1998), el conflicto 
fronterizo entre Eritrea y Etiopía (1998-2000) y la invasión de Irak encabezada por 
Estados Unidos (2003). Irak, Etiopía y Eritrea recibieron sanciones en virtud del 
Capítulo VII de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas. India, Pakistán y la coalición de 
los voluntarios encabezadas por Estados Unidos no fueron sancionados. Al igual 
que en el capítulo sobre la proliferación nuclear, el capítulo 6 nos muestra 
entonces que las sanciones de la ONU en respuesta a las guerras interestatales 
son una herramienta que sólo puede aplicarse cuando no hay restricciones 
geopolíticas. 
En el capítulo 7 se analiza la cuestión de los regímenes de sanciones de la ONU 
en respuesta a guerras intraestatales, a partir de la observación de que 20 de los 
58 conflictos civiles desde 1990 recibieron algún tipo de sanciones de la ONU. 
Este capítulo muestra que, si bien la mayoría de los conflictos no han recibido 
sanciones a causa del poder compensatorio de ciertos Estados y sus aliados, el 
historial claramente muestra el progreso de los impulsores de la seguridad 
humana y una política de sanciones más ambiciosa. Analizando variables como 






el número de muertes o la fragilidad del estado, observamos que a pesar de que 
algunos conflictos escapan a las sanciones de la ONU, la selectividad de los 
regímenes de sanciones presenta algunos elementos humanitarios importantes.  
En el capítulo 8 se examinan las sanciones de la ONU y el terrorismo, una 
amenaza que la organización ha reconocido y perseguido desde el atentado de 
Lockerbie de 1989, tras el cual sancionó a Libia por el llamado “terrorismo 
patrocinado por el Estado”, pero que llegó a ser el centro de la política de 
sanciones con el régimen 1267 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. 
El Comité de Sanciones 1267 comenzó como una herramienta para tratar con el 
régimen talibán en Afganistán y conseguir la extradición de Osama Bin Laden en 
respuesta a los bombardeos de 1998 contra las embajadas estadounidenses en 
Nairobi y Dar es Salaam, y luego se convirtió en el más exhaustivo régimen 
sanciones después de los ataques del 11 de septiembre de 2001. Además de 
aplicar sanciones a un amplio listado de individuos y entidades relacionados con 
Al-Qaida, el régimen de 2253 dividió la lista para crear un régimen separado 
relacionado con el ISIL en 2015. Si bien Al-Qaida, ISIL y sus asociados se 
encuentran entre las organizaciones que han matado más personas en ataques 
terroristas, el análisis de las 84 organizaciones terroristas que han matado al 
menos a 100 personas desde 2001 muestra que las sanciones de la ONU sólo se 
imponen a organizaciones que representan una amenaza para los intereses 
occidentales, no a aquellas que permanecen fuera de su alcance. 
El capítulo 9 muestra que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas también han sido 
utilizadas de manera muy selectiva por Occidente para corregir cambios adversos 
a un régimen después de un golpe de Estado. Aunque los golpes de Estado 
pueden representar sin duda una amenaza para la estabilidad interna de los 
Estados e incluso para la estabilidad regional, el historial de sanciones de la ONU 
ciertamente no refleja una preocupación por la seguridad humana, ni siquiera con 
la democracia. Desde 1990 se han producido un total de 36 golpes de Estado 
exitosos, algunos de los cuales fueron sin duda más sangrientos y dañinos para 
la democracia que los golpes de Estado en Haití (1991), Sierra Leona (1997) y 
Guinea Bissau (2012), los casos que fueron sancionados en virtud de Capítulo VII 
de las Naciones Unidas.  
Por último, el capítulo 10 resume las conclusiones de los capítulos 5, 6, 7, 8 y 9, y 
las relaciona con los debates teóricos y la literatura sobre sanciones y el papel de 
las Naciones Unidas. La conclusión es que diferentes tipos de delitos pueden 
explicarse a través de diferentes hipótesis. Si bien la proliferación nuclear y las 
guerras interestatales siguen una lógica directa de la política de poder neorrealista, 
el historial sancionador de las Naciones Unidas en respuesta a la guerra civil revela 
una lógica que está mucho más informada por las preocupaciones y 
preocupaciones humanitarias sobre el fracaso del Estado y sus consecuencias. 






lo es), sino que es una excepción. La presión pública a través de la atención de los 
medios de comunicación en Occidente puede magnificar estas preocupaciones en 
las guerras civiles. 
 
Los registros de sanciones en respuesta al terrorismo y los golpes de Estado siguen 
otros patrones de selectividad. Las sanciones a los grupos terroristas se centran 
exclusivamente en el extremismo islámico, sin tener en cuenta a muchos grupos no 
islámicos responsables de miles de muertes inocentes. Por último, las sanciones 
de la ONU después de los golpes de Estado se utilizan como una especie de 
"comodín democrático" para Occidente, que pueden jugar cuando sea conveniente, 
pero que carece de cualquier forma de coherencia. Esto es una pena, porque es 
difícil convencer a los miembros de que te sigan si no siempre practicas lo que 
predicas. 
 
